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Abstract 
The  following  thesis  is  an  examination  of  the  establishment  and  initial  development  of  a 
British  airborne  force.  Beginning  with  an  examination  of  airborne  development  outside 
the  UK  up  to  1940,  it  traces  the  growing  British  use  of  air  transport  as  a  tool  for  imperial 
policing  in  the  inter-war  period,  and  examines  why  this  did  not  lead  to  the  logical  step  of 
creating  a  dedicated  British  airborne  force.  The  impact  of  German  airborne  operations  and 
the  defeat  at  Dunkirk  in  1940  on  British  attitudes  is  then  analysed,  followed  by  a  detailed 
examination  of  the  mechanics  of  the  establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force,  ending  with 
the  British  ls'Parachute  Brigade  attaining  operational  status  in  January  1942. 
This  work  contains  102,470  words,  excluding  footnotes,  introduction  and  bibliography. 3 
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Introduction 
On  19  June  1998  1  was  privileged  to  attend  the  Aldershot  parade  at  which  the  Parachute 
Regiment  received  new  colours  from  the  Prince  of  Wales.  Conversation  with  Second 
World  War  Parachute  Regiment  veterans  at  the  subsequent  reception  confirmed  the 
findings  of  my  research  to  that  date.  It  was  common  knowledge  that  the  British  airborne 
force  had  been  established  in  June  1940,  that  Winston  Churchill  was  personally  involved, 
and  some  knew  members  and  had  heard  anecdotes  of  the  original  No.  2  Commando 
parachute  cadre.  That,  however,  was  as  far  as  it  went,  a  situation  that  mirrors  the  position 
in  the  published  sources.  There,  the  establishment  of  the  British  airborne  force  rates  a  few 
pages  at  best,  and  a  few  lines  at  worst,  even  in  the  official  and  semi-official  histories,  such 
as  Otway's  Airborne  Forces.  This  is  understandable,  for  battlefield  history  provides  more 
dramatic  reading  than  that  of  establishment  and  background  development. 
This  thesis  therefore  aims  to  rectify  this  omission,  by  charting  and  analysing  the  course  of 
events  that  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force.  It  will  be  argued  that  this 
process  did  not  begin  and  end  in  the  period  June  to  September  1940,  as  is  popularly 
claimed.  Rather,  it  began  in  the  period  following  the  end  of  the  First  World  War,  when 
British  forces  in  the  empire  established  a  world  lead  in  the  transportation  of  troops  and 
material  by  air,  a  technique  which  then  became  a  regular  feature  of  British  imperial 
policing  activities.  The  experience  thus  gained  was  to  prove  invaluable  in  the  latter  stages 
of  the  war  in  Burma,  which  saw  the  garrisons  of  the  Admin  Box,  Imphal  and  Kohima 
supplied  and  reinforced  by  air,  a  development  which  totally  nullified  the  highly  mobile 
tactics  of  the  British  Army's  Japanese  opponents. 
A  new  and  distinct  offshoot  of  this  process  sprouted  in  mid-  1940:  the  establishment  of  a 
large  force  of  parachute  soldiers  in  the  UK.  This  goal  was  achieved  in  early  1942,  when 
the  British  Army  was  finally  able  to  field  a  brigade  of  trained  paratroopers,  which  in  turn 
provided  the  foundation  for  an  airborne  force  in  excess  of  two  divisions  by  1945.  The  first 
stage,  however,  took  a  year  and  a  half  due  to  the  pernicious  effects  of  inter-service  rivalry, 
obstructionism,  internal  service  politicking,  and  bureaucratic  incompetence.  It  also 
involved  subterfuge,  high-level  political  intervention,  drastic  changes  in  policy,  and  the 
unacknowledged  plagiarism  of  parachute  developments  from  allies.  That  story  constitutes 
the  major  focus  of  this  thesis. 
This  thesis  will  also  help  to  fill  a  gap  in  the  historiography  of  the  British  Army  and  the 
Second  World  War.  Hitherto,  work  in  these  areas  has  largely  consisted  of  examinations  of 7 
the  strategic  view  from  the  top,  of  specific  battles  and  campaigns,  augmented  by 
participant  accounts  from  the  bottom.  Both  these  approaches  have  been  joined  more 
recently  by  the  examination  of  operational  history,  as  epitomised  by  Murray  and  Millett's 
recent  A  War  To  Be  Won.  However,  whilst  all  three  perspectives  are  legitimate,  they  still 
do  not  provide  the  full  picture.  A  further  gap  which  needs  to  be  addressed,  and  which  also 
occupies  the  middle  ground  between  high  level  decision  making  and  tactical  or  battlefield 
history,  is  the  development  of  fighting  capabilities.  David  French  in  has  made  a  start  on 
this  synthesis  of  operational  and  tactical  history  in  his  recent  Raising  Churchill's  Ariny, 
and  this  thesis  is  intended  to  follow  that  lead. 
Finally,  I  should  like  to  take  this  opportunity  to  thank  the  following  individuals  and 
institutions  for  their  assistance  in  making  this  work  possible.  Professor  John  Erickson  and 
Dr  Jeremy  Crang,  University  of  Edinburgh;  Mrs  Edith  Philips  of  the  Scottish  United 
Services  Museum,  Edinburgh;  Professor  M.  R.  D.  Foot;  the  late  General  Sir  John  Hackett; 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Jan  Jozef  Lorys  (retd.  );  Mr  Alex  Marshall;  Mr  Simon  Moody  and  John 
Edwards  of  The  Royal  Air  Force  Museum,  Hendon;  Dr  John  Rhodes,  Curator  of  The  Royal 
Engineers  Museum;  the  staff  at  The  Public  Records  Office,  Kew;  Mr  James  Sterrett;  Mr 
Andrzej  Suchitz,  Keeper  of  the  Archives,  The  Polish  Institute  and  Sikorski  Museum;  all 
the  staff,  academic  and  clerical,  at  the  Department  of  Modem  History,  University  of 
Glasgow;  and  last  but  by  no  means  least,  my  academic  supervisor,  Professor  Hew 
Strachan,  whose  guidance,  patience  and  criticism  were  invaluable. 8 
CHAPTER  ONE 
Setting  the  Scene:  Developments  in  Transporting  Troops 
by  Air  Before  1940 
The  idea  of  deploying  troops  from  the  air  preceded  the  requisite  technology  by  a  wide 
margin.  In  1784,  Benjamin  Franklin  summarised  the  essence  of  what  came  to  be  termed 
airborne  and  more  recently,  airmobiIe  and  air-assault,  warfare: 
"Five  thousand  balloons,  capable  of  raising  two  men  each,  could  not  cost  more 
than  five  ships  of  the  line 
...  And  where  is  the  Prince  who  can  afford  so  to  cover 
his  country  with  troops  for  its  defense,  as  that  ten  thousand  men  descending 
from  the  clouds  might  not  in  many  places  do  an  infinite  deal  of  mischief  before 
a  force  could  be  brought  together  to  repel  them?  "' 
However,  it  was  well  over  a  century  before  airborne  idea  was  developed  further.  The  First 
World  War  provided  the  impetus  for  the  development  of  heavier-than-air  flight,  and  by  the 
end  of  the  conflict  aircraft  and  ancillary  equipment  had  become  suffliciently  developed  to 
make  the  transportation  of  troops  by  air  a  viable  proposition.  It  will  therefore  be  necessary 
briefly  to  detail  developments  during  that  conflict  and  in  the  inter-war  period,  in  order  to 
set  the  British  1940  example  in  its  proper  context. 
I.,  Creating  the  Ingredients:  The  Development  of  Bombers  and  Air  Transport 
Techniques  during  the  First  World  War. 
By  1914,  most  military  powers  had  embraced  aviation  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent,  almost 
exclusively  as  a  reconnaissance  tool.  However,  this  role  was  rapidly  widened  to 
encompass  air-to-air  combat  and,  more  importantly  in  this  context,  aerial  bombing. 
Initially,  the  latter  was  confined  to  what  would  now  be  termed  tactical  bombing,  not  least 
because  of  the  relatively  small  carrying  capacity  of  available  aircraft,  which  were  almost 
exclusively  single-engine  machines  with  one  or  two  crewmen.  There  was,  however,  a 
parallel  line  of  development.  This  advocated  the  use  of  large  custom-built  aircraft, 
designed  specifically  to  carry  large  bombloads,  which  could  be  used  to  strike  at  strategic 
targets. 
The  Germans  were  quick  to  appreciate  the  potential  of  "...  air  weapons  to  offset  [British] 
,2 
naval  power.  High  ranking  members  of  the  German  military  and  naval  staffs  extolled  the 
virtues  of  indiscriminant  aerial  bombardment,  particularly  against  London,  as  a  means  of 
breaking  the  British  will  to  fight  as  early  as  1912.3  Initial  German  bombing  efforts  utilised 
vulnerable  Zeppelin  airships,  but  a  heavy  bomber  unit  was  formed  at  the  end  of  1916. 
Officially  labelled  Kagohl  3,  and  unofficially  as  the  Englandgeschwader,  4  the  unit  carried William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  19 
out  day  and  night  raids  against  London  and  south-cast  England  from  mid-  1917,  which 
were  intended  to  "...  crush  the  morale  and  will  to  fight  of  the  English  [sic]  by  disrupting 
war  industry,  communications  and  supply  in  south-eastern  England".  5  The  Germans  were 
the  first  to  implement  a  coherent  strategic  bombing  strategy,  but  not  to  develop  the 
necessary  aircraft.  Russian  designer  Igor  Sikorski  produced  the  four-engine  Ilya  Muromets 
in  the  summer  of  1914,  and  Italian  designer  Gianni  Caproni  test-flew  a  large  three-engine 
design  in  October  the  same  year.  6 
However,  it  was  the  British  who  developed  the  concept  and,  more  importantly,  the  means, 
of  strategic  bombing  flirthest  during  the  First  World  War.  The  initial  impetus  came  from 
the  Royal  Naval  Air  Service  (RNAS),  which  was  charged  with  protecting  naval  bases  in 
the  south  of  England  from  air  attack.  7A  rather  liberal  interpretation  of  this  task  was  used 
to  justify  "..,  the  first  strategic  air  attack  of  the  war"  against  the  Friedrichshafen  Zeppelin 
8 
works  by  Lake  Constance,  on  21  November  1914.  This  was  followed  by  a  series  of  raids 
against  targets  in  occupied  Belgium  in  the  spring  of  1915.  The  relative  success  of  these 
raids  encouraged  the  RNAS  to  look  for  more  suitable  bombing  aircraft.  The  Director  of 
the  Navy's  Air  Department,  Captain  Murray  Sueter,  rejected  the  first  design  tendered  by 
the  Handley  Page  Company  with  the  prophetic  words  "Look,  Mr.  Page  -  what  I  want  is  a 
bloody  paralyser,  not  a  toy!  "9  Handley  Page  returned  to  the  drawing  board  and  in  January 
1915  came  up  with  a  design  for  the  0/100  twin-engined  bomber.  This  was  to  be  the  first  of 
a  long  line  of  British  heavy  bombers  that  extended  to  the  nuclear  "V  Bombers"  of  the 
1950S. 
The  0/100  -  the  figure  referred  to  the  aircraft's  range  in  miles  -  first  flew  in  December 
1915,  but  subsequent  development  took  almost  another  year.  The  first  two  operational 
machines  were  delivered  in  November  1916;  the  third  was  accidentally  gifted  to  the 
Germans  when  the  delivery  pilot  lost  his  way  on  New  Years  Day  1917.  The  new  aircraft 
were  used  against  "...  chemical,  explosives,  and  munitions  factories  and  iron  foundries  in 
the  Saar-Lorraine-Luxemburg  region"  until  March  1917.  The  cessation  of  this  effort  was 
presented  officially  as  an  effort  to  aid  the  hard-pressed  RFC  elsewhere,  although  it  may 
also  have  been  due  to  the  relatively  poor  returns  for  the  effort  involved.  10  Nonetheless,  the 
idea  of  a  British  heavy-bomber  force  for  striking  strategic  targets  had  been  established, 
along  with  something  like  the  means  to  implement  it.  The  idea  was  resurrected  in  October 
1917  in  reprisal  for  the  indiscriminant  German  air  raids  on  London  and  south-east  England. 
The  0/  1  00s  were  reassigned  to  the  RFC's  new  41"  Wing,  which  struck  at  the  German  cities 
of  Stuttgart,  Mainz  and  Cologne.  41  "  Wing  was  expanded  to  a  brigade  on  I  February  1918 
and  ultimately  into  the  semi-autonomous  Independent  Force  (sometimes  called  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  10 
Independent  Air  Force)  in  June  1918.11  The  Independent  Force  dropped  five  hundred  and 
fifty  tons  of  bombs  on  German  targets  in  the  period  6  June-  10  November  1918.12  By  this 
time  it  was  equipped  with  the  longer-ranged  Handley  Page  0/400  bomber;  the  even  larger 
Handley  Page  V  1500,  which  was  designed  to  reach  Berlin,  entered  service  just  too  late  to 
see  action.  13 
Thus,  by  1918  aerial  technology  had  produced  aircraft  of  sufficient  size  and  power  to 
make  the  transportation  of  troops  by  air  a  potentially  reasonable  proposition.  Troop 
transportation  was  not  seriously  considered  as  an  application  for  airpower  during  the  First 
World  War,  and  little  was  done  to  develop,  or  even  explore,  the  possibilities.  Given  the 
circumstances  and  short  time-scale  involved,  this  is  understandable.  The  development  of 
large  aircraft  was  a  costly  business,  and  the  scarce  resources  such  work  required  were 
allocated  solely  in  pursuit  of  the  specific  purpose  of  bombing,  an  intent  that  precluded 
experimentation  in  less  aggressive  directions,  In  addition,  with  the  possible  exception  of 
the  Ilya  Muromets,  machines  of  sufficient  size  and  power  to  carry  even  small  numbers  of 
troops  were  not  available  in  significant  numbers  until  the  latter  stages  of  the  conflict.  Even 
had  there  been  the  time  and  the  inclination,  there  was  more  to  the  matter  than  merely 
substituting  an  alternative  cargo  up  to  the  given  payload.  Aircraft  configured  to  carry 
bombs  may  not  be  physically  suitable  for  the  carriage  of  alternative  loads,  and  particularly 
passengers,  as  the  RAF  discovered  in  1940  when  it  pressed  the  Armstrong  Whitworth 
Whitley  bomber  into  service  as  a  paratroop  transport. 
Nonetheless,  there  was  some  limited  use  of  aircraft  for  transportation  during  the  First 
World  War.  They  were  used  regularly  to  deliver  intelligence  agents  behind  enemy  lines, 
initially  by  landing  the  aircraft,  and  later,  in  an  attempt  to  minimise  the  risk  to  the  aircraft 
and  pilot,  by  parachute.  14  It  appears,  however,  that  this  technique  was  rarely,  if  ever,  used 
to  deliver  more  than  individuals,  15  and  the  most  significant  use  of  aircraft  in  the  transport 
role  during  the  First  World  War  therefore  lay  in  the  delivery  of  material  rather  than  men. 
The  British  pioneered  this  technique,  initially  in  the  attempt  to  supply  the  besieged  garrison 
of  Kut  in  Mesopotamia,  in  March  and  April  1916. 
The  effort  to  supply  Kut  by  air  was  a  double  first.  It  was  the  first  large-scale  logistical 
effort,  and  it  was  also  the  first  to  employ  the  parachute  for  dropping  supplies.  Parachutes 
were  used  to  deliver  a  70-lb.  millstone  to  Kut  on  27  March  1916,  in  an  effort  to  allow  local 
production  of  flour.  According  to  the  official  history,  a  wide  variety  of  other  items  were 
also  delivered  by  air.  These  included  "...  medical  comforts,  wireless  parts,  launch  engine 
parts,  mails,  newspapers  and  money",  although  it  is  not  clear  which  items  were  free- William  IF  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1 
dropped  and  which,  apart  from  the  millstone,  used  parachutes.  The  focus  and  tempo  of  the 
effort  increased  as  the  siege  began  to  bite,  and  in  mid-April  1916  the  garrison  commander 
requested  a  minimum  of  5,000  lb.  of  supplies  per  day,  including  flour,  chocolate,  salt  and 
ghee  cooking  oil  for  the  garrison's  Indian  troops.  Food  drops  commenced  on  15  April 
1916,  with  3,350  lb.  being  delivered  on  the  first  day.  The  effort  was  discontinued  on  29 
April  1916,  by  which  time  one  hundred  and  forty  flights  had  delivering  a  total  of  19,000  lb. 
of  supplies,  16,800  lb.  of  which  was  recovered  by  the  garrison.  Whilst  this  fell 
significantly  below  the  requested  minimum,  it  does  not  detract  from  the  magnitude  or 
significance  of  the  effort,  particularly  given  the  adverse  conditions.  16 
The  effort  at  Kut  proved  the  viability  of  the  concept,  and  British  forces  employed  and 
expanded  the  technique.  The  Middle  East  remained  the  proving  ground,  not  least  because 
the  weather  and  terrain  were  generally  favourable  for  operating  aircraft.  In  addition,  there 
was  little  enemy  aerial  opposition,  and  the  great  distances  and  lack  of  an  extensive  road 
and  rail  net  additionally  enhanced  the  appeal  of  air  transportation.  On  22  September  1918, 
for  example,  the  single  Handley  Page  0/400  bomber  stationed  in  the  Middle  East  was  used 
as  a  temporary  freight-carrier  in  support  of  an  isolated  RAF  detachment,  delivering  a  ton  of 
assorted  fuel,  spare  parts  and  other  supplies  in  the  process. 
The  technique  was  transferred  to  the  Western  Front,  in  direct  support  of  ground  forces  on 
the  battlefield,  although  the  hostile  environment  precluded  the  use  of  large  aircraft  like  the 
Handley  Page  machines.  On  4  July  1918,  No.  9  Squadron  RAF  used  twelve  specially 
adapted  RE8  aircraft  to  deliver  ninety-three  boxes,  containing  a  total  of  111,600  rounds  of 
ammunition,  to  the  4th  Australian  Division.  Prior  preparation  allowed  the  aircraft  to  make 
four  thirty-minute  sorties  each  in  the  roughly  six-hour  period  of  the  operation,  which  was 
carefully  co-ordinated  with  the  ground  forces.  The  latter  were  provided  with  large  white 
cloth  letters  "N"  and  "V"  to  signify  clipped  rifle  or  belted  machine-gun  ammunition.  The 
drops  were  made  from  eight  hundred  feet,  two  aircraft  being  lost  in  the  course  of  the 
operation.  Repeat  drops  were  made  on  21  and  22  August  and  on  I  and  2  October  1918. 
One  hundred  and  twenty-one  boxes  of  ammunition  were  delivered,  along  with  signal  flares 
and  coils  of  barbed  wire.  Subsequent  drops  also  included  food.  RAF  Nos.  82  and  218 
Squadrons  delivered  15,000  individual  rations,  totalling  thirteen  tons,  to  isolated  French 
and  Belgian  troops  on  2  and  3  October  1918,  an  operation  which  merited  a  mention  in  an 
official  RAF  communiqud.  17  Ten  days  later  No.  35  Squadron  delivered  two  tons  of  food  in 
seventeen  sorties  to  the  starving  population  of  Le  Cateau,  despite  adverse  weather 
conditions.  18  This  shows  that  British  air  delivery  of  material  to  ground  forces  was  well 
established  and  expanding  at  the  close  of  hostilities  in  1918.  It  also  appears  that  this  was  a William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  12 
solely  British  development,  for  none  of  the  material  examined  makes  any  mention  of  other 
air  arms  utilising  similar  techniques. 
The  practical  implementation  of  the  technique  may  have  been  restricted  to  delivering 
material  during  the  First  World  War,  but  there  was  also  some  theoretical  examination  of 
the  possibilities  of  expanding  the  concept  to  include  the  delivery  of  troops.  In  October 
1918,  Colonel  William  Mitchell,  then  head  of  the  air  operations  department  of  the  US  I  st 
Army  formulated  an  ambitious  scheme  "...  for  the  capture  of  Metz  [that]  was  startling  in  its 
originality:  no  less  than  the  delivery  of  12,000  men  by  parachute  behind  German  lines.  "19 
Handley  Page  0/400  bombers  from  the  British  Independent  Force  were  intended  to 
transport  troops  from  the  US  1  st  Infantry  Division,  divided  into  ten-man  groupS.  20 
Unsurprisingly,  Mitchell's  scheme  was  rejected,  not  least  because  the  command  and 
control  machinery  and  procedures  necessary  to  co-ordinate  such  an  operation  simply  did 
not  exist.  More  crucially,  the  troops  slated  for  involvement  lacked  specialist  parachute 
training,  and  there  were  simply  not  enough  parachutes  available  even  if  they  had  been  so 
trained.  Whether  Mitchell's  ill  thought-out  scheme  deserves  to  be  regarded  as  "a  milestone 
in  airborne  history'  is  therefore  open  to  debate.  21  It  could  be  argued  that  in  practical  terms, 
it  did  little  more  to  further  the  cause  of  airborne  warfare  than  the  rhetorical  hypothesising 
of  Benjamin  Franklin  one  hundred  and  thirty-two  years  previously. 
Mitchell  may  have  been  the  first  to  advocate  the  parachute  as  a  method  of  troop  delivery, 
but  he  was  not  the  first  to  suggest  the  deployment  of  troops  from  the  air.  In  October  1917, 
Winston  Churchill  published  a  paper  covering  a  wide  range  of  air  related  matters.  One 
proposal  was  for  the  formation  of  "flying  columns"  of  air  transported  troops  for  operations 
behind  enemy  lines.  22  This  proposal  was  typically  Churchillian,  insofar  as  it  was  long  on 
theory  but  short  on  detail.  Nonetheless,  it  was  significant  for  a  number  of  reasons,  and  not 
simply  because  it  pre-dated  Mitchell's  scheme.  First,  it  pointed  the  way  to  the  pioneering 
use  of  air  transportation  by  the  RAF  as  an  adjunct  to  imperial  communication  and  policing 
after  1918.  Second,  it  establishes  that  Churchill's  June  1940  demand  for  the  creation  of  a 
British  airborne  force  was  not  merely  a  knee-jerk  reaction  to  German  airborne  activity  in 
the  Low  Countries.  Rather,  it  was  the  result  of  Churchill's  long-standing  interest  in  air 
matters  per  se,  which  dated  from  the  beginnings  of  British  military  aviation.  Churchillwas 
made  Secretary  of  State  for  War  and  Air  in  January  1919,  and  lobbied  hard  for  the  RAF  to 
be  given  an.  imperial  role.  As  a  result,  the  RAF  officially  assumed  responsibility  for  the 
defence  of  Iraq  on  1  October  1922.23  This,  the  so-called  policy  of  Air  Control,  was  the 
beginning  of  a  process  that  saw  RAF  air  transport  and  supply  of  ground  troops  spread 
across  the  Middle  East  in  the  1920s,  and  to  India  in  the  1930s. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  13 
IL  An  Ideal  Testing  Ground.,  The  RAF  and  the  Development  of  Air 
Transportation  in  the  Empire,  1918-1940 
The  end  of  hostilities  in  1918  found  the  independent  British  air  arm  uniquely  positioned 
to  develop  air  transportation.  The  RAF  was  "arguably  the  most  effective  air  service  in  the 
world",  24  and  enjoyed  a  wealth  of  operational  aeronautical  experience  and  expertise  as  a 
result.  It  was  also  equipped  with  large  aircraft  that  possessed  at  the  very  least  the  potential 
for  adaptation  for  transportation,  such  as  the  Handley  Page  0/400  and  VI  500.  Equally 
important,  the  post-  1918  RAF  needed  a  new  role  to  justify  its  continued  independent 
existence,  and  the  prevailing  conditions  meant  that  role  had  to  be  established  in  the  empire. 
The  vast  expanses  of  the  empire  meant  that  transportation  had  to  play  a  large  role  in 
whatever  activities  the  RAF  undertook.  As  a  result,  the  RAF  therefore  pioneered  work  in  a 
variety  of  ways  that  have  since  become  staples  of  civilian  air  transportation. 
For  example,  in  May  1919  the  Air  Ministry  proposed  the  establishment  of  "...  weekly 
RAF  services  to  carry  1,500  lb.  of  mail  between  Egypt  and  India  using  two  Handley  Page 
0/400  squadrons".  This  was  followed  in  January  1920  by  a  less  ambitious  scheme  to  carry 
mail  and  passengers  between  Baghdad  and  Cairo.  The  former  scheme  was  stillborn, 
largely  because  of  a  high  accidental  attrition  rate  suffered  by  a  force  of  0/400s  despatched 
to  Egypt  as  part  of  a  mobility  demonstration 
. 
25  The  Baghdad  to  Cairo  scheme,  however, 
commenced  in  June  1921,  and  carried  over  four  tons  of  assorted  mail  and  one  hundred  and 
twenty  passengers  in  the  first  twelve  months.  26  The  next  step  was  to  expand  this  civilian 
oriented  activity  to  encompass  military  needs.  This  process  can  be  roughly  divided  into 
three  successive  stages,  all  of  which  commenced  between  1919  and  1923,  and  which 
became  increasingly  intermingled  thereafter.  The  first  stage  was  the  air  evacuation  of 
casualties,  the  second  was  the  evacuation  of  civilians  from  threatened  areas,  and  the  third 
was  the  culmination  of  the  process,  with  the  deployment  of  fully  equipped  troops. 
The  first  recorded  air  evacuation  of  a  British  military  casualty  occurred  in  the  Sinai  desert 
in  February  1917.  This  capability  was  deliberately  factored  into  the  RAF's  first  direct 
foray  into  imperial  policing,  the  provision  of  "Z"  Squadron  to  the  joint  Army-RAF 
campaign  to  subdue  the  "Mad  Mullah"  in  Somaliland  in  January  1920.27  Z  Squadron 
fielded  the  world's  first  custom-built  air  ambulance,  based  on  a  single-engined  DH9 
aircraft.  Nicknamed  "the  hearse",  the  aircraft  was  produced  by  the  Royal  Aircraft 
Establishment  (RAE) Farnborough,  on  the  recommendation  of  Wing-Commander  W. 
Tyrell,  the  senior  Medical  Officer  attached  to  Z  Squadron.  This,  and  the  parallel  regular 
use  of  unmodified  aircraft  for  "casevac"  and  "acromedical"  tasks  in  Iraq,  encouraged  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  14 
Air  Ministry  to  procure  three  specially  configured  in  1921-22,  based  on  specially 
purchased  Vickers  Vimy  Commercial  aircraft;  the  Commercial  was  the  civilian  version  of 
the  RAF's  Vernon  transport  aircraft.  The  first  was  an  expensive  one-off  modification, 
complete  with  medical  oxygen  equipment,  passenger  cooling  fans,  an  electric  kettle  and  a 
toilet.  Unfortunately  it  was  written  off  in  a  crash  before  it  was  able  to  perform  in  its 
intended  function.  The  two  subsequent  models  were  less  sophisticated,  only  differing  from 
the  standard  RAF  Vernon  by  having  a  nose-loading  door  and  rails  for  stretchers  fitted 
above  the  passenger  seats,  and  were  thus  virtually  indistinguishable  from  the  standard 
model.  28 
An  outbreak  of  dysentery  among  troops  operating  in  Kurdistan  in  April  1923  prompted 
the  RAF's  first  major  medical  airlift.  The  following  eyewitness  comment  clearly 
illustrates  the  value  of  air  transportation  in  this  regard: 
"At  Girde  Telleh  the  sick,  amounting  to  one  hundred  and  ninety-eight,  were 
evacuated  by  air  to  Baghdad  via  Kirkuk,  some  two  hundred  and  sixty  miles,  in 
a  few  hours.  It  was  a  very  creditable  achievement.  The  sick  would  otherwise 
have  had  a  six-day  journey  by  donkeys  and  would  have  suffered  severely.  ,  29 
By  mid-May  1923,  two  hundred  and  fifty-five  patients  had  been  shuttled  to  Baghdad.  The 
success  of  the  Baghdad-Kirkuk  medical  lift  had  two  effects  upon  subsequent  RAF  aircraft 
procurement  policy.  First,  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the  lift  was  carried  out  by  standard 
Vickers  Vernon  transports  cast  doubt  on  the  need  for  specially-configured  ambulance 
aircraft,  and  the  Air  Ministry  curtailed  its  efforts  in  that  regard  accordingly.  Secondly,  in 
conjunction  with  the  concurrent  beginning  of  the  practice  of  airlifting  troops  to  trouble 
spots  discussed  below,  the  Baghdad-Kirkuk  lift  confirmed  the  utility  of  air  transportation. 
As  a  result,  until  the  late  1930s  Air  Ministry  specifications  for  bomber  aircraft  classified 
them  as  bomber/transports,  with  the  additional  proviso  that  they  also  be  easily  adapted  to 
carry  casualties  if  necessary. 
The  efficacy  of  evacuating  casualties  by  air  was  thus  proven,  although  an  attempt  to 
extend  the  concept  to  the  UK  in  1925  was  discontinued  as  uneconomic  after  six  months. 
Despite  this,  the  air  evacuation  of  casualties  nevertheless  became  commonplace  in  the 
empire  throughout  the  inter-war  years.  In  the  Middle  East,  between  1925  and  1935  an 
average  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  patients  a  year  was  airlifted  to  hospitals  in  Egypt, 
Palestine  and  Iraq.  From  April  1929  aircraft  were  also  used  to  shuttle  serious  cases 
requiring  sea  repatriation  to  the  UK  to  Port  Said  for  embarkation.  This  service  was  later 
extended  to  include  the  port  of  Jaffa. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  15 
The  Quetta  earthquake  in  May  1935  was  responsible  for  bringing  medical  air  evacuation 
into  widespread  use  in  India.  RAF  aircraft  flew  in  a  twenty-six  strong  Army  medical  unit, 
complete  with  supplies  of  anti-tetanus  serum,  4,300  lb.  of  clothing,  12,750  lb.  of  medical 
supplies  and  food  in  the  twenty-one  day  period  following  the  disaster.  They  also 
evacuated  one  hundred  and  thirty-six  casualties  for  treatment  at  Karachi,  Lahore  and 
Risalpur.  By  1937  the  total  of  Indian  medical  cases  moved  by  air  exceeded  those  of  Iraq 
and  the  Middle  East.  This  was  due  in  part  to  the  campaign  in  Waziristan,  which  accounted 
for  half  the  two  hundred  and  ninety-eight  cases  moved  by  air  in  India  that  year.  The 
technique  had  come  a  long  way  in  the  two  decades  since  its  inception.  By  1939,  RAF 
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aircraft  had  carried  some  2,600  assorted  medical  cases  a  total  of  320,000  miles. 
The  second  stage  expanded  the  RAF's  air  transport  activities  to  include  the  evacuation  of 
officials  and  civilians  from  threatened  locations.  The  first  large-scale  effort  occurred  in 
September  1922,  when  sixty-seven  assorted  evacuees  were  lifted  from  Sulaimaniya  in  Iraq. 
The  operation  took  six  hours,  and  used  DH9,  Bristol  Fighter,  and  twin-engine  Vickers 
Vernon  aircraft.  31  Subsequent  evacuations  were  larger  and  sustained.  In  November  1928, 
a  rebellion  in  Afghanistan  necessitated  the  evacuation  of  the  British  and  other  legations 
from  the  Afghan  capital,  Kabul.  Beginning  on  23  December  1928,  and  continuing  despite 
severe  winter  conditions  until  February  1929,  a  total  of  five  hundred  and  eighty-six 
passengers  were  flown  to  safety  in  India,  along  with  24,000  lb.  of  baggage.  32 
The  third,  and  most  pertinent,  stage  in  this  development  was  the  expansion  of  British  air 
transportation  to  include  the  carriage  of  armed  troops.  There  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  this 
development  was  formulated  from  above.  Rather,  it  appears  to  have  been  the  result  of 
pragmatic,  on-the-spot  decision  making  by  those  at  the  "sharp  end".  Such  initiative  was  by 
no  means  uncommon  in  the  empire.  The  relatively  small  proportion  of  RAF  strength 
engaged  in  transportation,  and  the  fact  that  this  proportion  remained  virtually  static, 
supports  this.  No.  70  Squadron,  for  example,  was  involved  in  the  Sulaimaniya  evacuation 
of  1922,  the  first  airlift  of  troops  in  1923,  in  the  Kabul  evacuation  of  1928-29,  and  in  the 
pioneering  battalion-sized  troop  lift  from  Egypt  to  Iraq  in  1932.  One  advantage  of  this 
relatively  small  commitment  was  that  it  allowed  a  high  degree  of  operational  experience  to 
be  concentrated  and  passed  on  over  time.  It  also  allowed  the  establishment  of  good  rapport 
with  the  Army.  It  can  therefore  be  argued  that  the  expansion  of  the  RAFs  transport 
activities  to  include  the  carriage  of  tro9ps  was  a  logical  progression,  part-driven  by 
necessity. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  16 
The  first  military  airlift  to  include  troops  occurred  on  21  September  1920,  when  two 
Handley  Page  0/400  bomber  aircraft  successfully  lifted  a  dismantled  mountain  gun  with 
crew  and  ammunition  from  Heliopolis  to  Almaza  in  Egypt.  The  gun  was  brought  into 
action  within  seven  minutes  of  the  aircraft  touching  down.  33  The  RAF  received  its  first 
Vickers  Vernon  aircraft,  which  was  specially  configured  by  the  manufacturer  at  the  Air 
Ministry's  request  for  carrying  freight  and  passengers,  at  the  end  of  1921.  Consequently, 
this  also  made  the  carriage  of  complete  units  of  troops  a  practical  proposition.  34  Thus,  in 
February  1923  two  complete  companies  of  Sikh  troops  were  lifted  from  Kingerban  to 
Kirkuk  in  Iraq  to  stem  a  native  insurrection.  In  May  1924  a  company  of  the  Inniskilling 
Fusiliers  was  lifted  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles  from  Baghdad  to  Kirkuk  in  response  to  a 
further  outbreak  of  civil  disorder.  These  operations  set  the  pattern  for  future  crisis 
management  measures,  and  subsequently  extended  the  technique  into  the  realms  of  what 
would  now  be  termed  "strategic  lift",  albeit  on  a  comparatively  small  scale. 
In  August  1929,  a  fifty-two  strong  detachment  from  the  South  Wales  Borderers  was  lifted 
by  air  from  Egypt  to  Jerusalem,  to  assist  in  quelling  civil  disorder  there.  A  company  of  the 
Kings  Regiment  was  airlifted  for  the  same  purpose  from  Palestine  to  Cyprus  on  23  October 
193  1,  the  first  airlift  of  troops  over  the  open  sea.  35  In  June  the  following  year,  the  RAF 
mounted  its  largest  single  air  transport  operation  of  the  inter-war  period.  This  was  the 
airlift  of  five  hundred  and  twenty-six  men  of  the  I  st  Battalion,  the  Northamptonshire 
Regiment,  over  eight  hundred  miles  from  Egypt  to  Iraq.  This  operation  was  subsequently 
hailed  a  "striking  demonstration  of  the  mobility  conferred  by  the  use  of  aircraft  as  well  as 
of  close  and  effective  co-operation  between  the  Army  and  the  Royal  Air  Force"  . 
36 
Twenty-five  Vickers  Victoria  aircraft  were  used,  and  the  operation  required  thirty-six 
separate  sorties,  spaced  over  the  six-day  period  22  to  27  June  1932.  The  lift  was  repeated 
in  reverse  over  a  less  hurried  twenty-five  day  period  between  18  July  and  12  August 
1932.37 
The  Egypt-Iraq  lift  proved  the  efficacy  of  the  method  beyond  doubt,  for  subsequent  troop- 
lift  operations  were  larger,  although  they  were  spread  over  longer  periods.  For  example, 
during  the  Waziristan  campaign,  a  series  of  lifts  moved  a  total  of  5,750  troops,  and  four 
hundred  tons  of  supplies  between  November  1936  and  May  1938  . 
38  The  practice  was  also 
extended  beyond  crisis  management  to  encompass  more  routine  troop  movements.  This 
included  the  "Chitral  RelieV,  a  twice  yearly  garrison  relief  in  Chitral  province  on  India's 
NorthWest  Frontier.  This  usually  entailed  a  thirty-six  day  march  by  the  troops  involypd,  as 
well  as  the  deployment  of  a  substantial  security  force.  Carrying  out  the  relief  by  air  was 
first  mooted  in  1927,  and  by  1938  the  shuttling  of  complete  companies  back  and  forth  wAs William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  17 
39 
a  matter  of  routine.  The  1940  relief  was  conducted  entirely  by  air  ,  thereby  laying  the 
foundations  for  the  large-scale  airlift  operations  mounted  against  the  Japanese  in  1944.40 
By  the  1930s,  the  technique  had  been  transferred  from  the  empire  to  the  UK,  albeit  on  a 
much  more  modest  scale.  From  the  n-M-1930s,  the  RAF  provided  aircraft  for  short  periods 
at  Farnborough  for  troop  acclimatisation  on  an  annual  basis.  In  1938  5,250  troops  took 
part  in  air  acclimatisation  flights.  This  included  the  despatch  of  a  platoon-sized 
detachment  of  Coldstream  Guards  to  participate  in  a  tactical  landing  exercise  at  Catterick 
Barracks  in  Yorkshire.  41 
By  1940,  therefore,  air  transportation  by  the  RAF  had  become  an  accepted,  regular  and 
important  feature  of  British  military  activity  across  the  empire  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  at 
home.  However,  British  development  did  not  proceed  beyond  that  point.  There  was  no 
effort,  for  example,  to  expand  the  air  transportation  of  troops  with  parachutes  or  gliders, 
although  these  methods  were  taken  up  elsewhere.  There  were  specifically  British  reasons 
for  this  seeming  omission,  but  before  examining  these,  it  will  first  be  necessary  to  conclude 
this  chapter  with  an  examination  of  airborne  developments  up  to  1940  outside  Britain. 
111.  From  a  Logistical  to  a  Tactical  Role:  The  Development  of  Air 
Transportation  Outside  Britain  and  the  Empire 
British  forces  were  by  no  means  alone  in  appreciating  or  applying  the  air  transportation 
after  1918,  with  the  US  being  an  early  convert.  The  United  States  Marine  Corps  (USMC) 
deployed  and  supplied  isolated  outposts  by  air  during  the  2nd  Nicaraguan  Campaign  of 
1925-1929,  and  also  used  aircraft  to  evacuate  casualties.  A  total  of  21,148  USMC 
personnel  were  moved  by  air  over  that  period.  The  US  Army  airlifted  a  single  field 
artillery  battery  across  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  in  193  1,  and  repeated  the  exercise  in  1933 
with  a  full  artillery  battalion.  In  1932  a  small  force  of  infantry  were  air  landed  during 
tactical  manoeuvres  at  Fort  Du  Pont,  Delaware.  42  The  German  military  also  created  an  air 
transport  capability.  In  1936  the  Luftwaffe  carried  out  a  sustained  airlift  on  behalf  of 
Franco's  Spanish  Nationalist  forces.  Between  July  and  September  1936,  German  Junkers 
52  aircraft  shuttled  almost  9,000  troops,  with  their  equipment,  support  weapons  and 
ammunition,  from  Morocco  to  Spain.  43 
However,  the  main  player  besides  Britain  in  the  air-landing  field  for  much  of  the  inter- 
war  period  was  the  Red  Army.  Future  Marshal  M.  N.  Tukhachevsky  carried  out  a  series  of 
air  landing  trials  in  the  Leningrad  Military  District  in  1928.  The  results  were  collated  in  a 
paper  entitled  "Operations  of  an  Air  Assault  Force  in  an  Offensive  Operatione'.  A 
reinforced-company  size  exercise  was  held  the  following  year  based  on  the  paper,  after William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  18 
which  Tukhachevsky  proposed  the  formation  of  "...  a  sample  air-motorised  division 
... 
fo  r 
use  as  an  operational-strategic  air-landing  force".  44  Imperial  policing  activity  in  Central 
Asia  presumably  played  a  part  in  prompting  the  Soviet  developments.  On  27  May  1928 
the  8th  Independent  Reconnaissance  Aviation  Detachment  carried  out  an  "air-landing 
assault"  against  Moslem  Basmachi  guerrillas  in  the  Turkestan  Military  DistriCt;  45 
Basmachi  was  a  widely  used  term  for  bandits  in  Central  Asia.  46  Other  Soviet  units  carried 
out  at  least  one,  and  possibly  two,  similar  operations  in  this  period.  A  contemporary 
account  of  an  air  landing  operation  was  published  in  January  1929,  which  may  possibly 
refer  to  the  operation  of  the  previous  May.  The  account  included  operational  conclusions 
and  recommendations  for  units  engaged  in  similar  activity.  47  Another  operation  was 
carried  out  later  in  1929,  when  an  air-landed  party  was  credited  with  driving  off  another 
band  of  Basmachi  besieging  the  garrison  of  Garm  in  Tadzhikistan.  48 
Whatever  its  inspiration,  Tukhachevsky's  theoretical  work  was  taken  up  by  others, 
especially  the  chief  of  staff  of  the  Red  Army's  air  component,  A.  N.  Lapchinsky. 
Lapchinsky  "...  trumpeted  the  feasibility  of  harnessing  aircraft  to  the  task  of  large-scale 
delivery  of  combat  forces  into  the  enemy  rear",  49  and  drew  up  detailed  calculations  for  a 
variety  of  possible  employments  from  battalion  to  regimental  size.  He  also  suggested  such 
forces  be  used  to  support  offensive  action  by  conventional  ground  forces,  to  threaten 
enemy  flanks,  and  to  seize  geographical  features  such  as  river  crossings  or  defiles  in  order 
to  disrupt  enemy  communications. 
In  March  1931  a  company  size  "aviation  motorised  landing  detachment"  was  formed  in 
the  Leningrad  Military  District,  and  from  January  1932  similar  detachments  were 
authorised  for  the  Moscow,  Belorussian  and  Ukrainian  Military  Districts,  although  only  the 
Leningrad  unit  was  fully  established.  50  In  December  1932  the  Leningrad  detachment  was 
expanded  to  a  brigade,  and  redesignated  the  "3d  Airlanding  Brigade  (Special  Purpose)". 
The  Brigade  had  three  battalions,  and  an  organic  air  group  of  three  squadrons.  Smaller 
district  detachments  were  again  established  elsewhere  from  March  1933,  along  with 
numerous  battalion  and  company-sized  units  attached  to  corps  and  divisions  across  the 
Soviet  Union.  By  January  1934,  the  Soviet  airborne  establishment  numbered  10,000  men, 
complete  with  representation  on  the  Red  Army  staff,  and  a  dedicated  training  organisation 
linked  to  a  coherent  operational  doctrine.  51 
it  is  therefore  beyond  dispute  that  transporting  troops  and  material  by  aircraft  was  widely 
practised  in  the  inter-war  period.  However,  the  Achilles  heel  of  the  method  lay  in  the  total 
reliance  of  fixed  wing  aircraft  upon  a  suitable  and  secure  landing  ground.  In  this  sense,  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  19 
technique  was  analogous  to  that  of  rail  transportation  a  century  earlier.  Both  methods 
allowed  hitherto  undreamed  of  mobility,  but  mobility  trammelled  within  relatively  narrow 
parameters.  The  need  for  suitable  and  secure  landing  places  thus  limited  the  practical 
utility  of  air  transportation  to  the  strategic  and  operational,  rather  than  tactical,  sphere.  The 
Soviet  operations  in  the  late  1920s  show  that  more  aggressive  application  of  the  technique 
was  possible,  although  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Soviets  profited  from  novelty  value,  and 
were  small  in  scale.  The  1929  landing  at  Gann,  for  example,  employed  only  three  light 
aircraft  and  fifteen  men  including  aircrew,  and  was  mounted  in  a  flat,  desert  region  ideal 
for  landing.  52  It  is  highly  likely  that  things  would  have  gone  rather  differently  once  the 
Basmachi  became  aware  of  the  limitations  of  the  method,  as  they  undoubtedly  would. 
Landing  a  large,  heavily  laden  transport  aircraft  in  the  face  of  opposition,  even  that  from 
unsophisticated  tribesmen,  remains  an  extremely  hazardous  and  foolhardy  act.  Clearly, 
what  was  required  was  a  method  that  would  allow  troops  to  be  delivered  without  landing 
the  aircraft.  Two  methods  were  developed,  which  have  become  synonymous  with  airborne 
forces:  the  parachute,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent  in  popular  perception  if  not  practice,  the 
glider. 
IV.  The  Search  for  a  Feasible  Method  of  Tactical  Delivery.,  Enter  the 
Parachute 
Experiments  with  man-carrying  parachutes  go  back  at  least  as  far  as  the  pioneering 
balloon  flights  that  so  impressed  Benjamin  Franklin.  Frenchman  A.  J.  Gamerin  made 
jumps  from  a  hydrogen  balloon  over  Paris  and  London  in  1797  and  1802  respectively. 
Garnerin  used  a  "rigid"  parachute,  in  which  the  shape  of  the  parachute  canopy  was 
supported  by  spokes,  rather  like  an  umbrella.  Two Americans,  brothers  Samuel  and 
Thomas  Baldwin,  developed  the  more  familiar  "limp"  parachute.  The  brothers 
demonstrated  their  new  invention  at  Golden  Gate  Park,  San  Francisco,  on  30  January  1887. 
The  first  recorded  descent  from  an  aircraft  using  the  limp  parachute  also  occurred  in  the 
United  States,  twenty-five  years  later,  when  Albert  Berryjumped  from  a  monoplane  over 
Jefferson  Army  Barracks,  Missouri  on  28  February  1912.53 
As  with  heavier-than-air  flight,  it  was  the  First  World  War  that  provided  the  impetus  for 
more  systematic  development.  The  first  military  application  of  the  parachute  was  as  a 
lifesaving  device,  when  the  British  Army  adopted  Everard  Calthorpe's  "Guardian  Angel" 
parachute  to  allow  observation  balloon  crews  to  escape  from  their  extremely  inflammable 
craft  in  the  event  of  enemy  attack.  54  Parachutes  were  also  used  to  a  limited  extent  for  more 
offensive  purposes.  One  secondary  source  claims  that  French,  Italian  and  Russian William  F  Buckingham,  . 2000  Chapter  1  20 
intelligence  gathering  and  sabotage  parties  were  dropped  behind  enemy  lineS,  55  and 
another  that  the  British  used  them  to  deliver  agents  and  carrier  pigeons  behind  enemy  lines 
on  the  Western  Front  and  in  Italy.  56 
In  British  service,  the  latter  application  was  a  subsidiary  one,  the  primary  being  aerial 
resupply.  As  cited  above,  this  began  at  the  siege  of  Kut  in  1916,  and  was  carried  over  into 
the  inter-war  period.  In  1923,  British  troops  on  campaign  in  Kurdistan  were  supplied  with 
a  wide  variety  of  material,  including  1,000  pairs  of  boots  and  3,000  pairs  of  socks,  by 
parachute.  57  The  technique  was  not  always  an  unqualified  success,  or  without  risk  to  the 
recipients,  as  this  eyewitness  account  from  the  1923  Kurdistan  drop  shows: 
"A  great  quantity  of  the  stores  fell  on  ground  from  which  they  could  not  be 
recovered;  sacks  of  flour  and  grain  were  dropped  only  to  split  open  on  the 
ground;  a  mule  was  knocked  over;  a  bag  of  horse  shoes  brought  down  a  tent; 
while  a  rain  of  boots  caused  many  soldiers  to  run  about  with  a  left  or  right  boot 
in  their  hand,  looking  for  its  mate.  Finally,  when  a  party  of  officers  had  almost 
suffered  the  fate  of  the  mule,  the  dropping  of  fiirther  consignments  was  stopped 
by  an  order  communicated  by  wireless.  "5 
Nonetheless,  the  use  of  parachutes  for  resupply  became  commonplace  in  the  empire.  In 
September  1930,  the  Chitral  relief  column,  consisting  of  1,400  troops  and  their  animals, 
were  supplied  for  two  days  solely  by  air.  Around  six  tons  of  rations  and  forage  were 
dropped  at  pre-arranged  night  stopping  points.  Air  supply  also  played  a  vital  part  in  the 
Waziristan  campaign  of  1936-38,  particularly  in  the  period  October  1936  to  January  1937, 
when  -heavy  rains  rendered  road  transport  impossible  for  troops  operating  in  the  Khaisora 
Valley.  59  However,  it  was  the  Italian  military  which  first  took  the  step  of  using  the 
parachute  to  deliver  numbers  of  troops  simultaneously.  This  was  made  possible  by  the 
development  of  the  "Salvatori"  static-line  parachute,  and  it  may  be  advisable  at  this  point 
to  provide  a  little  technical  detail  about  parachutes. 
Parachutes  can  be  broadly  grouped  into  two  types,  static-line  and  rip-cord.  These  terms 
refer  to  the  method  used  to  initiate  the  opening  sequence  of  the  parachute  canopy.  The  rip- 
cord  parachute  can  be  deployed  at  a  time  of  the  parachutist's  choosing,  by  pulling  a  strap 
called  the  rip-cord.  This  method  is  commonly  used  by  civilian  parachutists  and,  more 
recently,  specially  trained  military  personnel.  The  latter  are  usually  Special  Forces  troops, 
utilising  specialist  techniques  developed  since  1945,  such  as  HALO  (High  Altitude  Low 
opening)  to  avoid  detection  from  the  ground.  In  contrast,  the  static  line  parachute 
performs  the  action  of  deploying  the  parachute  canopy  automatically,  via  a  strap  or  cord, 
called  the  static-line,  linking  the  parachute  to  a  suitable  strong  point  in  the  aircraft.  All  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  21 
parachutist  has  to  do  is  attach  the  static-line  prior  to  leaving  the  aircraft  and  gravity  does 
the  rest. 
The  static-line  method  has  obvious  advantages  for  military  parachuting.  Minimising 
individual  input  reduces  the  possibility  of  human  error,  and  simplifies  rote  training  of 
parachuting  skills  in  a  minimal  number  of  set  drills.  It  also  leaves  the  military  parachutist 
free  to  concentrate  on  getting  himself  and  his  equipment  to  and  through  the  aircraft  door  as 
quickly  as  possible,  with  a  minimum  of  distraction.  This  is  often  no  mean  feat  in  itself, 
given  the  very  heavy  loads  paratroopers  are  usually  obliged  to  carry  in  addition  to  their 
parachutes.  Lack  of  distraction  is  a  vital  consideration  under  operational  conditions,  when 
the  aircraft  may  be  taking  evasive  action,  and  possibly  in  the  dark.  Speed  is  doubly 
important  because  military  parachuting  usually  involves  jumping  as  a  group  or  "stick" 
rather  than  as  individuals,  and  speed  in  exiting  as  a  compact  group  minimises  the  dispersal 
of  the  stick  between  leaving  the  aircraft  and  reaching  the  ground.  This  in  turn  reduces  the 
time  necessary  for  post-jump  re-organisation.  Consequently,  static-line  jumping  is  the 
standard  military  parachuting  technique  employed  worldwide. 
Pioneering  civilian  parachutists  like  the  Baldwin  brothers  and  Albert  Berry  used  both 
methods,  usually  depending  on  whether  the  parachute  pack  was  carried  on  the  parachutist's 
body,  or  mounted  on  the  aircraft  or  balloon.  The  latter  practice  was  originally  utilised  due 
to  the  great  bulk  and  weight  of  early  parachutes,  factors  that  at  least  partially  justified  the 
oft-quoted  reluctance  of  the  British  authorities  to  issue  combat  pilots  with  parachutes 
during  the  First  World  War.  Models  tested  by  the  Air  Board  for  use  by  pilots  in  January 
1917  weighed  up  to  forty  pounds,  a  considerable  burden  for  contemporary  aircraft.  60  Such 
equipment  was  clearly  of  limited  utility  for  military  purposes,  and  thus  required  further 
refinement  to  resemble  the  backpack  type  parachutes  synonymous  with  the  term  today. 
The  first  modem  parachute  was  a  ripcord  model  demonstrated  by  American  entrepreneur 
Leslie  Irvin  to  officers  of  the  US  Army  Air  Service  in  April  1919.  The  Italian  Salvatori 
model  was  developed  along  similar  lines  based  upon  the  pre-  1914  work  of  American 
carnival  parachutist  Charles  Broadwick.  Broadwick  designed  and  demonstrated  a  static- 
line  parachute  carried  in  a  bag  stitched  to  the  back  of  a  modified  jacket.  61 
Thus  equipped  with  a  suitable  man-carrying  parachute,  the  Italians  went  on  to  develop  a 
training  infrastructure  and  tactical  doctrine.  In  1927  they  set  up  the  world's  first  formal 
military  parachute  training  course,  catering  for  around  two  hundred  and  fifty  trainees.  On 
6  November  the  same  year,  Italian  parachutists  performed  the  world's  first  collective 
parachute  drop  by  fully  equipped  troops  at  Cinisello  airfield  near  Milan.  Despite  this William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  22 
double  world  lead,  however,  the  Italians  failed  to  maintain  their  momentum.  This  may 
have  been  linked  to  the  death  of  the  commander  of  the  new  arm,  General  Guidoni,  in  a 
parachuting  accident  in  1928.  Nonetheless,  by  the  end  of  the  1930s  Italian  forces  fielded 
several  parachute  battalions,  which  took  part  in  manoeuvres  in  Libya  in  193  7  and  193  8.62 
The  airborne  lead  in  the  inter-war  period  passed  from  the  Italians  to  the  Red  Army.  In 
August  1930  tests  were  conducted  at  Voronezh  to  minimise  dispersal  and  speed  up  re- 
formation  of  units  after  landing.  In  September  the  same  year,  an  eleven-strong  parachute 
detachment  carried  out  a  successful  raid  on  a  divisional  headquarters  during  manoeuvres  in 
the  same  area,  and  further  tactical  exercises  were  performed  near  Leningrad  in  August  and 
September  193  1.  A  forty-six  strong  "parachute  echelon"  was  added  to  the  "aviation 
motorized  landing  detachment"  at  Leningrad,  tasked  with  the  seizure  of  "airfields  and 
landing  strips  in  the  enemy  rear  to  secure  an  area  for  landing  the  main  force".  63  The 
landing  detachment  was  expanded  to  a  brigade  in  December  1932,  with  two  airlanding  and 
one  parachute  battalions.  64  By  the  mid  1930s,  when  the  Soviet  parachute  arm  was 
displayed  to  Western  military  observers  and  cinema  audiences,  65  drops  of  battalion  and 
brigade  size  were  a  matter  of  routine. 
The  scale  of  this  expansion  is  clearly  illustrated  by  the  airborne  portion  of  the  1935 
manoeuvres  in  the  Kiev  Military  District.  The  airborne  task  was  to  secure  landing  areas 
and  crossings  on  the  River  Dnieper  for  a  corps  mechanised  attack.  A  simultaneous  drop  of 
1,188  paratroops  seized  landing  grounds,  which  were  then  used  to  air  land  a  further  1,765 
troops,  complete  with  armoured  cars,  light  tanks  and  artillery.  66  Later  reports  claimed  that 
67 
a  further  2,500  men  were  air  landed  within  a  forty  minute  period  .A 
larger  parachute 
exercise  took  place  in  the  following  year  in  the  Moscow  Military  District.  On  22 
September  1936,  a  diversionary  drop  of  2,200  paratroops  seized  river  crossings  and 
attacked  the  "enemy"  rear.  An  hour  later  a  further  3,000  paratroops  seized  an  airfield  forty 
kilometres  away,  into  which  an  entire  infantry  division  was  air  landed 
. 
6'  Given  this, 
Commissar  of  Defence  Voroshilov  may  not  have  been  exaggerating  when  he  claimed  that 
"...  the  Red  Army  then  possessed  over  15,000  well-trained  parachute  jumpers  and  that  a 
doubling  of  that  number  was  Planned  for  1937.  iiW 
A  crucial  factor  in  the  Soviet  parachute  expansion  was  the  popularity  of  civilian  sport 
parachuting  in  the  Soviet  Union,  sponsored  by  the  Komsomol  (Communist  Union  of 
Youth)  and  Osoaviakhim  (Society  for  the  Promotion  of  Defence  and  the  Furthering  of 
Aviation  and  of  the  Chemical  Industry  of  the  USSR).  These  organisations  provided 
parachute-training  towers,  open  to  both  sexes,  in  every  major  town  in  the  Soviet  Union.  70 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  23 
According  to  one  contemporary  source,  two  million  qualified  parachutists  in  the  Soviet 
Union  had  been  trained  by  1939.71  Soviet  sources  claim  the  Red  Army  possessed  fifteen 
airborne  brigades  in  May  1941,  grouped  into  five  airborne  corps,  totalling  approximately 
100,000  men.  72 
The  Soviets  also  formulated  a  doctrine  for  its  airborne  force.  The  Red  Army  Order  of 
1932,  entitled  "Temporary  Regulation  on  the  Organisation  of  Deep  Battle",  included  a 
"Regulation  on  the  Operational-Tactical  Employment  of  Air  Motorised  Landing 
Detachmente'.  This  was  based  largely  on  Tukhachevsky's  1929  work,  which  was  then 
expanded  by  the  Chief  of  Airborne  Service  of  the  Red  Army  Air  Force  staff,  I.  E. 
Tatarchenko,  in  a  paper  entitled  "Technical,  Organisational,  and  Operational  Questions  of 
Air  Assault  Forces".  This  advocatpd  the  delivery  of  substantial  forces  into  enemy  rear 
areas.  Surprise  was  deemed  crucial,  and  was  to  be  heightened  by  launching  simultaneous 
landings,  possibly  at  night  and/or  in  poor  weather,  to  dilute  enemy  response.  The  landings 
were  to  be  in  four  stages.  First,  small  teams  were  to  be  inserted  by  parachute  to  locate 
suitable  landing  areas.  These  sites  would  then  be  secured  and  protected  by  a  parachute 
detachment  for  the  delivery  of  a  more  heavily  armed  vanguard,  which  would  in  turn 
protect  the  arrival  of  the  main  force,  complete  with  light  tanks  and  other  vehicles.  Once  in 
place,  the  whole  force  would  "commence  operations  in  close  co-ordination  with  mainfront 
forces".  73 
Tatarchenko's  ideas  were  integrated  into  the  Red  Army's  1936  Field  Service  Regulations, 
which  formalised  the  new  Soviet  mechanised  doctrine  of  "deep  battle".  74  According  to 
Article  7  of  the  new  Regulations: 
"Parachute  landing  units  are  the  effective  means  ... 
[ofl...  disorganizing  the 
command  and  rear  services  of  the  enemy.  In  coordination  with  forces 
attacking  along  the  front,  parachute  landing  units  can  go  a  long  way  toward 
producing  a  complete  rout  of  the  enemy  on  a  given  axis.  " 
It  was  therefore  no  accident  that  the  212th  Airborne  Brigade  fought  at  the  Khalkin  Gol  on 
the  Mongolian-Manchurian  border  in  summer  1939,  although  the  rapid  progress  of  Soviet 
armoured  formations  rendered  parachute  insertion  superflUOUS.  76  The  scope  for  large-scale 
airborne  operations  was  restricted  in  the  Winter  War  against  Finland,  although  a  few  small- 
scale  reconnaissance  and  diversionary  parachute  operations  were  carried  out.  However, 
the  201st,  204th  and  214th  Airborne  Brigades  carried  out  several  drops  during  the  Soviet 
occupation  of  Bessarabia  in  June  1940.  Two  of  these  involved  full  brigades,  and  Soviet 
paratroops  successfully  occupied  the  cities  of  Bolgrad,  Kagul  and  lzmail.  77 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  24 
The  scale  and  high  profile  of  Soviet  airborne  activity  in  the  inter-war  period  inspired 
investigation  and  imitation.  A  Soviet-staffed  Spanish  Republican  parachute  schoolwas  set 
at  La  Rosas,  and  in  April  1938  an  airborne  assault  was  planned  to  wipe  out  the  Nationalist 
Condor  Legion  on  the  ground  at  its  base  at  Barbastro.  The  attack  was  only  stymied  by  a 
lack  of  suitable  parachuting  aircraft  . 
78  The  French  established  an  experimental  force  of 
"infanterie  de  lai?  '  following  the  Soviet  manoeuvres  in  193  6,  consisting  of  two  parachute 
companies  with  an  attached  troop-carrying  squadron,  which  was  disbanded  in  1939.79 
Poland  also  imitated  Soviet  developments,  with  particular  regard  to  the  promotion  of 
civilian  sport  parachuting,  and  seemingly  without  direct  Soviet  involvement.  The  present 
author  has  been  unable  to  locate  any  evidence  of  direct  Soviet-Polish  contacts,  'which  is 
hardly  surprising  given  the  high  level  of  historical  and  political  emnity  between  those 
states  at  that  time.  It  is  therefore  likely  that  the  Polish  imitation  of  the  Soviet  model  was 
based  upon  knowledge  gained  through  osmosis,  which  is  the  stated  opinion  of  a  retired 
Polish  airborne  officer  who  participated  in  the  early  Polish  military  parachuting  effort.  80 
This  view  is  supported  by  the  nature  of  Polish  developments.  The  activities  of  the  Polish 
LOPP  (League  for  National  Air  Defence)  mirrored  that  of  the  Soviet  Komsomol  and 
Oasviakhim,  by  promoting  sport  parachuting  and  gliding  and  providing  public  facilities. 
The  first  Polish  public  parachuting  towerwas  erected  in  Warsaw  in  1936,  and  by  1939 
seventeen  more  had  been  erected  across  the  country.  Polish  Boy  Scouts  gave  a 
81 
parachuting  demonstration  at  the  5th  International  Scouting  Jamboree  in  August  1937. 
The  Polish  military  initially  used  parachuting  as  a  character-building  exercise  for  trainee 
officers,  with  voluntary  training  courses  being  offered  to  cadets  in  their  final  year  of 
training;  other  options  included  sport  gliding,  rock  climbing  and  hill  walking.  Military 
parachute  towers  were  constructed  at  officer  cadet  schools  at  Bydgoscz  and  Legionovo, 
and  at  the  infantry  school  at  Komorovo.  Volunteers  underwent  a  four-week  course,  which 
incorporated  pre-jump  ground  training,  two  or  three  jumps  from  a  captive  balloon,  and 
three  jumps  from  an  aircraft.  They  were  also  taught  parachute  packing,  and  were 
responsible  for  packing  their  own  equipment.  Rip-cord  parachutes  were  used,  which 
required  a  high  degree  ofjudgement  on  the  part  of  the  trainee.  An  interviewee  recalled  the 
near-demise  of  one  fellow-cadet  during  a  balloonjump  at  Komorovo.  The  trainees  were 
taught  to  use  the  cable  tethering  the  balloon  as  a  guide  for  when  to  operate  their  rip-cords. 
The  cadet  in  question  closed  his  eyes  on  jumping  and  missed  seeing  the  cable  as  a  result. 
He  operated  the  rip-cord  on  his  own  initiative,  and  the  parachute  canopy  barely  deployed 
before  he  touched  the  ground.  On  completion  of  the  course,  successful  candidates  were 
awarded  a  small  enamelled  parachute  badge  which,  though  unofficial,  was  permitted  on 
military  uniform.  82 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  25 
In  September  1937  the  Poles  formed  a  parachute  sabotage  and  diversion  force,  and 
established  a  Military  Parachuting  Centre  at  Bydgoszcz  in  May  1939.  Entrywas  open  to 
volunteers  of  all  ranks,  and  the  Centre  was  also  tasked  with  research  and  development 
work.  The  first  course  of  trainees  graduated  in  June  1939,  but  the  German  invasion  on  1 
September  1939  caused  the  second  course  to  be  cut  short.  The  Centre  was  destroyed  in  the 
fighting,  and  the  graduates  and  staff  were  dispersed.  "  As  we  shall  see,  this  was  to  prove 
fortuitous  for  the  establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force,  for  at  least  some  of  these  men 
and  their  invaluable  expertise  eventually  wound  up  in  Britain  after  the  debacles  in  France 
and  Norway.  84 
The  other  large-scale  proponent  of  airborne  warfare  after  the  Soviets  in  the  inter-war 
period  was  Hitler's  Germany.  The  inspiration  for  German  airborne  development  is  unclear. 
One  secondary  source  claims  that  Hermann  Goering,  future  head  of  the  Luftwaffe 
'85  and 
Kurt  Student,  future  commander  of  the  Luftwaffe's  airborne  arm,  attended  a  Soviet  tactical 
parachute  demonstration  in  193  1.86  Whilst  convenient,  this  is  problematic,  for  Goering 
was  not  a  serving  officer  at  that  time,  and  it  is  therefore  difficult  to  see  why  he  would  be 
allowed  to  participate  in  the  highly  secret  liaison  between  the  Reichswehr  and  the  Red 
Army  under  the  Rapallo  Treaty  of  1922.  Student's  presence  is  also  difficult  to  reconcile. 
He  was  involved  in  the  air  side  of  the  Soviet-German  liaison,  87  but  his  involvement  ceased 
in  December  1928  when  he  was  posted  to  an  infantry  unit  in  East  Prussia  to  gain  command 
experience.  "  That  is  not  to  say  that  the  German  military  was  unaware  of  Soviet  airborne 
developments.  Future  Panzer  expert  Erich  von  Manstein,  for  example,  witnessed  a 
parachute  exercise  in  the  Trans-Caucasian  Military  District  in  September  1932.89  It 
therefore  appears  likely  the  airborne  idea  was  transmitted  to  Germany  as  a  result  of 
German-Soviet  military  co-operation  prior  to  Hitler  assuming  power  in  1933. 
Goering's  attendance  at  Soviet  airborne  demonstrations  may  be  questionable  but  he  was 
responsible  for  setting  up  the  first  German  parachute  unit,  in  February  1933.90  Police 
Group  Wecke  was  a  para-military  Prussian  police  unit,  which  was  integrated  into  the 
Lufhvaffe's  Hermann  Goering  Regiment  in  March  1935.  One  battalion  of  the  regiment  was 
to  be  parachute  trained,  and  six  hundred  volunteers  came  forward  despite  a  less  than 
inspiring  parachute  demonstration  on  1  October  1935,  which  left  the  sole  participant 
injured  and  unconscious.  91  German  Airborne  Forces  proper  were  officially  established  on 
29  January  1936,  when  a  Luftwaffe  Order  of  the  Day  called  for  volunteers  for  parachute 
training.  92  A  Luftwaffe  training  school  was  set  up  at  Stendahl,  and  training  commenced  on 
II  May  1936.93  A  platoon  of  Luftwaffe  paratroops  participated  in  manoeuvres  in  Saxony 
in  October  1936,  and  a  larger  detachment  carried  out  a  demonstration  before  Hitler  in  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  26 
spring  of  1937.  In  the  spring  of  1937  the  Reer  formed  its  own  parachute  company,  94 
which  was  expanded  to  a  battalion  in  June  193  8.95  Reer  interest  was  prompted  as  much  by 
inter-service  rivalry  as  any  recognition  of  the  potential  of  airborne  forces,  although  a  lack 
of  facilities  obliged  the  Reer  to  send  its  men  to  Stendahl  for  training  by  the  Luftwaffe,  The 
Heer  parachute  company  also  participated  in  the  spring  1937  parachute  demonstration  for 
Hitler. 
The  future  of  the  new  arm  remained  unclear  until  the  projected  invasion  of 
Czechoslovakia  in  1938,  for  which  the  airborne  force  was  tasked  to  attack  fixed  Czech 
defences  around  Freundenthal.  Student  was  given  command  of  the  venture  on  I  June 
193  8,  with  all  planning  and  preparation  to  be  complete  by  IS  September.  On  I  July  193  8, 
the  Luftwaffe  7th  Flieger  division  was  established  as  an  umbrella  organisation  for  all  units 
involved,  and  Student  reported  his  new  command  combat  ready  on  I  September  1938.  The 
Munich  Agreement  obviated  the  need  for  combat  operations,  which  was  probably  just  as 
well  for  Student  and  his  fledgling  airborne  force.  The  Heer  refused  to  provide  as  many 
troops  as  Student  requested,  obliging  the  hasty  substitution  of  virtually  untrained 
96  Sturmableflung  (SA)  personnel  as  a  stopgap.  The  Beer  promptly  removed  its  parachute 
battalion  and  other  troops  from  Student's  control  immediately  the  Munich  Crisis  passed.  97 
Inter-service  bloody-mindedness  undoubtedly  played  a  part  in  this,  but  there  was  also 
genuine  disagreement  between  the  two  services  over  the  projected  employment  of  the  new 
airborne  force.  There  were  three  differing  views  on  this.  The  original  Luftwaffe  concept 
saw  paratroops  as  a  small-scale  sabotage  force,  to  strike  at  targets  inaccessible  to  attack  by 
bomber  aircraft.  The  Beer,  on  the  other  hand,  saw  airborne  operations  as  an  adjunct  to 
support  ground  operations.  In  this  scheme,  paratroops  were  a  spearhead  to  seize  suitable 
landing  grounds  for  the  air  landing  of  larger  units  of  troops.  98  The  third,  and  most  radical 
alternative,  was  put  forward  by  Student  himself  This  envisaged  "an  integrated  airborne 
unit  with  its  own  transport  aircraft,  air  support,  [and)  artillery",  99  operating  under  a  tactical 
doctrine  labelled  the  "drops  of  oil"  technique.  1('0  This  advocated  the  simultaneous  seizure 
of  multiple  landing  sites  in  order  to  dilute  the  enemy  defence,  which  would  form  air- 
supplied  pockets  behind  enemy  lines.  These  pockets  would  then  expand  and  link  up  with 
each  other,  and  then  with  advancing  ground  forces. 
Student's  ideas  were  radical,  but  their  originality  is  less  certain,  They  bear  an  uncanny 
resemblance  to  Tatarchenko's  1932  paper  "Technical,  Organisational,  and  Operational 
Questions  of  Air  Assault  Forces",  101  whilst  the  drops  of  oil  analogy  harks  back  to  the 
French  colonial  "strategy  of  the  oil  patclf',  formulated  and  implemented  in  Morocco  by William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  27 
Marshal  Lyautey  before  the  First  World  War.  102  That  is  not  to  say  that  Student's  ideas 
were  invalid,  but  merely  that  they  are  not  as  original  than  they  are  routinely  portrayed.  Be 
that  as  it  may,  German  airborne  doctrine  eventually  became  a  compromise  between  these 
three  views,  whilst  Student  succeeded  in  bringing  all  airborne  matters  under  his  personal 
control.  This  was  achieved  with  some  astute  political  manoeuvring,  including  a  carefully 
stage-managed  air-landing  exercise  during  the  occupation  of  the  Sudetenland  in  October 
1938.  It  involved  two  hundred  and  forty-two  transport  aircraft,  and  impressed  Goering 
into  continuing  his  support.  103 
Such  high  level  support  proved  crucial  when  the  Heer  withdrew  its  parachute  battalion 
from  7th  Flieger  division  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Munich  Crisis.  By  January  1939,  when 
Student  became  Inspector  General  of  Airborne  Forces,  the  Heer's  parachute  battalion  had 
been  permanently  incorporated  into  the  Luftwaffe,  and  its  specially  trained  22nd  Luftlande 
division  was  also  placed  under  Student's  operational  control.  104  At  the  same  time  an  OKW 
directive  established  the  projected  role  of  the  airborne  force,  105  which  was  an  amalgam  of 
the  three  differing  concepts  cited  above.  It  was  this  force  and  doctrine  which  carried  out 
the  operations  in  Norway  and  the  Low  Countries  in  1940,  and  which  in  turn  inspired 
Churchill  to  order  the  formation  of  a  British  force  with  similar  capabilities.  Given  this,  it  is 
illuminating  briefly  to  compare  and  contrast  the  development  of  the  German  and  British 
forces. 
Whilst  their  development  ran  parallel  in  many  ways,  there  were  also  significant 
differences  between  the  two.  There  was,  for  example,  no  British  parallel  to  the  political 
dimension  present  in  German  Airborne  Forces.  The  nature  of  the  Nazi  regime  made  some 
degree  of  political  influence  inevitable,  and  the  fact  that  Goering  was  a  high-ranking  Nazi 
as  well  as  commander  of  the  Luftwaffe  also  had  some  bearing  on  the  complexion  of  the 
German  Airborne  Forces.  In  addition,  the  original  German  parachute  cadre  was  drawn 
from  a  Nazi  oriented  para-military  police  unit.  It  is  no  accident  that  German  airborne 
troops  featured  prominently  in  Nazi  propaganda,  and  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  they 
carried  consequent  attitudes  onto  the  battlefield,  the  widespread  perception  of  German 
airborne  troops  as  a  hard  fighting  but  chivalrous  foe  notwithstanding.  106 
The  German  airborne  force  also  differed  from  the  British  in  its  operational  set  up. 
German  airborne  troops  were  all  Luftwaffe  personnel,  and  remained  under  Luftwaffe 
operational  control  until  they  linked  up  with  ground  forces.  They  then  came  temporarily 
under  tactical  control  of  those  forces,  but  only  until  they  could  be  withdrawn  from  the 
battle  area.  This  was  the  opposite  of  the  British  arrangement,  under  which  airborne  troops William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  28 
remained  an  Army  responsibility,  coming  under  RAF  control  only  for  specialist  training 
and  transportation  purposes.  107  Both  systems  had  advantages  and  drawbacks  in  roughly 
equal  measure.  Being  an  integral  part  of  an  air  force,  for  example,  allowed  German 
Airborne  Forces  access  to  suitable  aircraft  in  sufficient  numbers,  a  matter  which  proved  a 
major  stumbling  block  to  the  British,  particularly  in  the  early  stages  of  their  development. 
The  Luftwaffe  possessed  large  numbers  of  Junkers  52  aircraft  and  their  obsolescence  as 
bombers  coincided  neatly  with  the  new  airborne  arm's  requirement  for  a  suitable  transport 
aircraft.  The  RAF  possessed  aircraft  of  similar  capabilities,  such  as  the  Bristol  Bombay 
and  Handley  Page  Harrow,  108  as  a  result  of  the  RAF  inter-war  practice  of  acquiring  aircraft 
with  a  dual  bomber/transport  function.  However,  there  were  nowhere  near  as  many  British 
machines,  and  more  importantly  the  RAF  proved  disinclined  to  provide  aircraft  for 
airborne  use,  much  in  the  same  way  as  the  Reer  had  been  unwilling  to  part  with  its  soldiers 
for  fancifid  airborne  experiments.  The  results  of  this  RAF  intransigence  were  to  dog  the 
development,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  employment,  of  British  airborne  troops  throughout 
the  Second  World  War. 
The  German  and  British  airborne  examples  were  more  similar  in  other  areas.  Both 
employed  gliders  as  well  as  parachute  troops,  in  the  British  case  largely  as  an  accidental 
by-product  of  RAF  obstructionism.  109  Gliders  nonetheless  became  an  important  part  of 
British  airborne  doctrine,  with  the  coup-de-main  operation  to  secure  the  Ome  River  and 
canal  crossings  on  the  eve  of  the  invasion  of  Normandy  in  June  1944  being  a  famous  case 
inpoint.  110  The  Germans'  adoption  of  the  medium  was  made  much  easier  by  state 
sponsorship  of  sport  gliding,  along  the  same  lines  as  the  Oasvlakhim  and  Komsomol 
organisations  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  LOPP  in  Poland.  The  specific  German 
motivation  was  to  circumvent  the  Versailles  restrictions  on  the  training  of  military  pilots, 
and  Student's  experience  in  this  regard  alerted  him  to  the  possibilities  gliders  offered  over 
parachutes  for  troop  insertion.  In  particular,  they  offered  a  precision  means  to  deliver 
cohesive  parties  of  troops  to  a  specific  point.  Student  commissioned  the  German  Research 
Institute  for  Gliding  to  produce  a  suitable  troop-carrying  design,  and  personally  test  flew 
the  resulting  prototype  Gotha  DFS  230.111  Student  considered  gliders  especially  suitable 
for  special  operations,  and  established  a  glider  assault  regiment  as  "...  the  elite  of  the 
parachute  forces",  112  a  status  Assault  Detachment  Koch  justified  in  May  1940.113  In  this 
instance,  it  would  also  appear  Student's  thinking  was  original,  for  the  German  glider 
success  in  1940  prompted  the  Red  Army  to  include  "Glider  GroupsP  in  a  1940  Airborne 
Brigade  organisation.  114 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  1  29 
An-even  more  crucial  parallel  between  German  and  British  airborne  forces  was  the  fact 
that  they  shared  high  level  political  support.  As  we  have  seen,  Churchill  first  mooted  the 
basic  idea  in  1917,  and  was  instrumental  in  the  establishment  of  the  British  airborne  force 
inmid-1940.  Hitler  shared  Churchill's  keen  advocacy  of  airborne  warfare,  at  least  until 
Crete.  The  source  of  Hitler's  enthusiasm  is  unclear,  although  it  is  possible  that  he  viewed 
airborne  forces  as  a  technologically  updated  version  of  the  elite  storm  troop  units  he  is 
likely  to  have  witnessed  in  action  in  the  trenches  during  the  First  World  War.  115  Churchill 
also  appears  to  have  regarded  German  airborne  troops  in  the  same  light.  In  an  enquiry  on 
19  June  1940  he  recommended  emulating  "...  the  idea  of  storm  troops,  which  had  been 
made  use  of  so  successfully  by  the  Germans".  116  The  date  and  context  of  this  comment 
indicates  that  he  was  referring  to  the  recent  activities  of  German  airborne  troops  in  the  Low 
Countries. 
This  interpretation  was  largely  correct,  for  it  can  be  argued  that  the  role  played  by  the 
new  German  airborne  force  in  the  Low  Countries  and  after  paralleled  that  of  their  First 
World  War  forebears,  apart  from  the  former's  spectacular  method  of  delivery  to  the 
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CHAPTER  TWO 
A  Question  of  Resources,  Need  and  Suitability:  Why  the 
British  Lead  in  Air  Transportation  Lapsed  In  the  1930s 
British  forces  were  the  world  leaders  in  moving  and  supplying  troops  by  air  in  the  first 
decade  after  the  First  World  War,  yet  within  a  further  ten  years  they  had  been  left  far 
behind  by  Soviet  and  German  airborne  development.  On  the  surface,  this  is  puzzling. 
Their  initial  lead  meant  that  British  forces  possessed  sufficient  equipment  and  expertise  to 
match  these  developments  and  create  their  own  dedicated  airborne  force.  In  addition, 
imperial  policing,  which  was  the  primary  role  of  the  British  military  in  the  inter-war 
period,  appears  to  be  simultaneously  a  perfect  justification  for  the  creation  of,  and  a  tailor- 
made  role  for,  such  a  force.  The  omission  cannot  be  because  they  were  unaware  of 
developments  elsewhere.  British  officers  attended  the  widely  publicised  Soviet  airborne 
demonstrations  in  the  mid-1930s,  and  Winston  Churchill  hypothesised  about  an  airborne 
invasion  of  Britain  in  June  1936.1  British  intelligence  monitored  German  developmentS,  2 
and  The  United  Services  Review  published  a  photo-essay  featuring  German  paratroopers 
making  training  jumps  from  a  Junkers  52  aircraft  in  October  193  8.3 
The  British  failure  to  capitalise  on  their  airborne  lead  cannot  therefore  have  been  due  to  a 
lack  of  expertise,  or  ignorance  of  the  tactical  and  operational  possibilities  of  transporting 
troops  by  air.  Rather,  there  was  a  set  of  specifically  British  circumstances  that  militated 
against  further  British  development  of  the  airborne  idea,  and  by  extension,  the 
establishment  of  a  dedicated  British  airborne  force,  This  chapter  will  therefore  argue  that 
the  lapse  was  due  to  the  same  factors  that  concurrently  hampered  armoured  and 
mechanised  development  in  the  British  Army;  a  combination  of  government  parsimony 
and  Army  overstretch,  An  additional  factor  specifically  applicable  in  the  airborne  case  was 
high  level  RAF  intransigence,  which  also  ruled  out  official  Army-RAF  airborne  co- 
operation.  In  addition,  it  will  also  show  that  the  subject  was  not  totally  neglected  by 
British  military  thinkers,  and  that  low-level  co-operation  between  the  Army  and  RAF  in 
the  empire  laid  an  invaluable  foundation  when  the  British  acted  to  make  up  lost  ground. 
LA  Poor  Climate  For  Innovation:  Government  Parsimony  and  the  British 
Military  in  the  Inter-War  Period 
First,  there  is  the  matter  of  cost.  Providing  the  necessary  equipment  for  a  dedicated 
airborne  force  was,  and  remains,  a  comparatively  expensive  business.  This  was  less  of  a 
problem  for  the  Soviets  and  Germans,  because  both  incorporated  their  airborne  effort  into 
much  wider  rearmament  programmes.  This,  however,  was  not  the  case  in  Britain,  where William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  37 
governments  of  all  political  persuasions  pursued  a  consistent  policy  of  pursuing  fiscal 
savings  at  the  expense  of  the  armed  services  through  most  of  the  inter-war  period,  The 
tone  for  this  was  set  in  August  1919,  in  a  memo  which  declared  that  ".  -non-productive 
employment  of  manpower  and  expenditure,  such  as  is  involved  by  naval,  military  and  air 
effort,  must  be  reduced  within  the  narrow  limits  consistent  with  national  safety"  .4 
Government  parsimony  was  possibly  justifiable  in  the  immediate  post-war  period,  but  the 
its  view  of  narrow  limits  and  national  safety  differed  considerably  from  that  of  the  military. 
This  continued  to  be  the  case  until  the  mid-1930s,  when  it  was  belatedly  acknowledged 
that  Britain  was  "...  approaching  a  point  when  we  are  not  possessed  of  the  necessary  means 
,5  of  defending  ourselves  against  an  aggressor'. 
As  a  result,  for  most  of  the  inter-war  period  there  was  barely  sufficient  money  available  to 
cover  the  three  services'  existing  commitments.  The  Army,  for  example,  had  its  budget 
reduced  every  year  between  1919  and  1932.6  The  situation  was  exacerbated  further  by  the 
status  of  the  RAF  as  an  independent  service,  This  introduced  an  additional  technology- 
based,  and  therefore  expensive,  competitor  for  what  funding  was  available,  Given  this,  it 
can  be  argued  that  the  British  lost  their  airborne  lead  because  they  lacked  the  finance  to 
maintain  it,  The  requisite  research  and  development  alone  would  have  imposed  an 
additional,  possibly  unsustainable,  burden  upon  already  overstretched  budgets. 
Consequently,  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated  airborne  force  did  not  figure  in  the  Army  or 
RAF's  list  of  priorities.  That  said,  the  RAF  showed  a  little  interest  in  airborne  forces  in  a 
combined  operations  context  after  the  Inter-Service  Training  and  Development  Centre 
(ISTDC)  was  set  up  in  1937.7  This  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  Chapter  Four  below. 
The  paucity  of  funding  argument,  whilst  crucial,  is  not  the  whole  story  however.  The 
Army  succeeded  in  stretching  its  fiscal  resources  to  include  high-tech  research  and 
8  development  in  armoured  and  mechanised  forces  in  the  late  1920s,  for  example.  Indeed, 
from  a  purely  fiscal  perspective,  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated  airborne  force  could  have 
been  presented  as  a  cost-saving  measure,  for  such  a  force  located  in  the  Middle  East  could 
have  provided  a  useful  force  multiplier  for  imperial  policing,  In  the  event,  the  Army  and 
RAF  showed  little  interest  in  the  matter,  jointly  or  individually,  and  the  reasons  for  this 
omission  must  be  sought  in  the  specific  circumstances  and  attitudes  of  the  Army  and  the 
RAF  in  the  inter-war  period. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  38 
11.  Undermanned,  Overstretched  and  in  Need  of  Renovation:  The  Army  in  the 
Inter-War  Period 
In  addition  to  fmancial  strictures,  the  Army's  lack  of  interest  in  establishing  a  dedicated 
airborne  force  undoubtedly  resulted  in  part  from  a  shortage  of  manpower,  which  impacted 
most  heavily  on  the  infantry.  Whilst  that  arm  increased  from  49.5  per  cent  to  52.6  per  cent 
of  the  Army  as  a  whole  between  1918  and  1935,9  this  was  more  than  offset  by  a  parallel 
increase  in  the  Army's  commitments.  10  The  primary  role  of  the  Army  in  the  inter-war 
period  was  imperial  policing,  which  fell  most  heavily  on  the  infantry.  The  creation  of  an 
airborne  force  would  therefore  have  imposed  an  additional,  and  possibly  unbearable,  strain 
upon  an  already  hard-pressed  arm.  An  alternative  would  have  been  to  re-assign  serving 
troops  from  other  arms  to  the  infantry,  but  this  would  have  undoubtedly  prompted  stiff 
resistance  from  them,  in  the  same  way  that  the  cavalry  bitterly  resisted  mechanisation.  The 
most  logical  approach,  to  establish  the  airborne  force  as  an  independent  arm,  was 
precluded  by  the  same  fmancial  strictures  that  helped  to  produce  the  manpower  problem  in 
the  first  place.  Even  then,  the  infantry  would  have  been  the  most  logical  source  of 
manpower,  which  would  doubtless  have  also  prompted  stiff  resistance  from  within  the 
tribal  structure  of  that  arm.  The  tenacity  with  which  trained  paratroopers  of  the  original 
British  parachute  battalions  clung  to  their  regimental  distinctions,  until  the  enforced 
adoption  of  the  maroon  beret  and  Parachute  Regiment  cap  badge  in  mid-  1942,  provides  a 
clear  and  relevant  example  of  such  tendencies.  " 
The  Army's  manpower  problem  was  not  solely  due  to  expanded  commitments.  By  the 
mid-1930s,  the  Army  was  finding  it  increasingly  difficulties  to  obtain  sufficient  recruits, 
despite  the  poor  economic  climate.  This  provoked  a  heated  debate  amongst  military 
pundits,  who  identified  a  variety  of  contributing  and  often  contradictory  factors  for  the 
Army's  recruiting  problems.  In  1935,  an  article  in  The  Army  Quarterly  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Graham  Seton-Hutchinson  listed  factors  detrimental  to  voluntary  Army 
recruitment.  These  included  poorly-presented,  sport-oriented  recruiting  posters  which 
"insulted  the  intelligence  of  the  potential  recruit";  the  disparity  between  equivalent  civilian 
opportunities  and  an  Army  career,  particularly  for  Other  Ranks;  and  dissatisfaction  with 
the  obligation  for  Reserve  Service  after  discharge  being  included  in  the  Army's  Short 
Service  System.  12  Another  article  by  a  Captain  Telfer  claimed  the  Army  was  obsessed 
with  "trivial  parades",  recruited  from  the  "starving  and  idiots",  and  presided  over  by 
ccantique"  commanders.  In  addition,  Telfer  also  blamed  recruiting  problems  on  the 
difficulties  faced  by  ex-soldiers  in  the  labour  market  after  leaving  the  service,  and  the 
"glamour"  of  the  RAF  as  a  recruiting  competitor.  13  This  in  turn  provoked  a  response  from William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  39 
Seton  Hutchinson,  and  contributions  from  J.  F.  C.  Fuller,  and  an  anonymous  spokesman 
for  the  Other  Ranks,  writing  under  the  pseudonym  "Decurioif'.  The  latter  was  also 
scathing  about  the  Army's  recruiting  practices  which,  it  was  claimed,  resulted  in  most 
recruits  being  unskilled  "conscripts  of  necessity",  with  the  remainder  being  "...  youths 
looking  for  adventure  ...  the  sons  of  S'oldiers...  or  ... 
derelicts  from  the  higher  classes".  14 
Parallel  to  this,  the  Army  was  also  experiencing  uncertainty  over  its  training  practices, 
and  their  relevance  for  future  warfare.  This  too  was  a  recurring  theme  in  contemporary 
military  debate,  and  sprang  in  part  from  the  experiences  of  many  of  the  commentators 
during  the  First  World  War.  Seton  Hutchinson,  for  example,  opined  that  "...  training 
[which)  does  not  bear  an  exact  relation  to  reality,  or  as  close  as  can  be  without  the  shooting 
and  the  killing 
... 
is  quite  useless",  and  that  11 
...  the  training  of  the  Army  concentrates  upon 
the  production  of  peacocks  where  it  should  produce  panthers".  15  The  debate  spilled  over 
into  the  popular  press.  The  Times,  for  example,  ran  a  three-part  article  on  the  subject  in 
November  1935.16  Whilst  much  of  the  debate  dwelt  on  the  need  for  reform  in  the  Army  as 
a  whole,  17  there  was  also  a  specific  focus  upon  the  need  to  reform  the  training  and  role  of 
the  infantry.  This  was  due  in  part  to  perceived  infantry  shortcomings  during  the  First 
World  War,  and  presumably  because  the  infantry  constituted  the  single  largest  and  most 
active  component  of  the  Army.  Commentators  on  the  subject  included  Fuller,  in  his  1932 
Lectures  on  F.  S.  R.  111,18  Liddell  Hart's  The  Future  of  Infantry  of  the  following  year,  19 
and  a  host  of  less  illustrious  writers.  20 
The  need  for  reform  was  also  recognised  by  some  within  the  Army.  Future  Field  Marshal 
Viscount  Alanbrooke,  for  example,  was  so  concerned  with  the  low  quality  of  tactical 
leadership  he  encountered  during  his  command  of  8th  Infantry  Brigade  in  1934-5  that  he 
set  up  a  Brigade  school  to  upgrade  the  tactical  training  of  his  platoon  commanders.  He 
also  became  a  convinced  and  vociferous  advocate  for  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated 
School  of  Infantry  to  regulate  and  centralise  such  training.  Despite  badgering  the  Director 
of  Military  Training  (DMT)  in  1935,  and  later  gaining  the  support  of  all  Infantry 
Brigadiers  for  such  a  venture  during  his  own  tenure  as  DMT  the  following  year,  he  was 
unable  to  resolve  the  issue  to  his  satisfaction  at  that  time.  21 
Of  course,  all  this  need  not  have  prevented  the  Army  from  at  least  examining  the  airborne 
idea.  There  were,  however,  two  additional  reasons  that  explain  why  this  was  not  done. 
First,  the  Army  was  fully  occupied  with  mechanisation,  which  left  it  little  time  or  resources 
for  deployment  elsewhere-22  Second,  and  more  germane,  the  Army  had  no  direct  access  to 
aircraft.  These  remained  firmly  under  control  of  the  RAF,  which  was  disinclined  to  lend William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  40 
its  resources  for  airborne  research.  Given  this,  it  will  also  be  necessary  briefly  to  examine 
the  condition  and  attitude  of  the  RAF  during  the  inter-war  period. 
Ill.  Seeking  Justification  for  Existence:  The  RAF  in  the  Inter-War  Period 
The  RAF  became  the  world's  first  independent  air  arm,  through  the  amalgamation  of  the 
RFC  and  RNAS,  on  1  April  1918,  complete  with  its  own  Air  Ministry  alongside  the 
Admiralty  and  the  War  Office.  It  was  "arguably  the  most  effective  air  service  in  the 
world"'23  with  300,000  personnel  serving  two  hundred  front-line  squadrons,  and  had 
accrued  a  huge  amount  of  operational  experience.  Between  July  1916  and  the  cessation  of 
hostilities,  RAF  aircraft  flew  almost  a  million  operational  hours,  dropped  6,942  tons  of 
bombs,  and  expended  10.5  million  rounds  of  ammunition  on  ground  targets.  24  All  this  was 
not  necessarily  as  impressive  as  it  appears,  however: 
"Its  [the  RAF's]  contribution  to  victory  ...  was  largely  ancillary.  Attempts  to 
influence  the  course  of  the  war  through  the  direct  use  of  airpower  against 
tactical  or  strategic  objectives  had  brought  little  return.  Long-distance 
bombing  of  industrial  targets  in  Germany 
...  caused  little  damage  or  dislocation. 
Even  when  the  German  army  began  to  retreat,  British  aircraft  were  unable  to 
cause  serious  confusion  in  its  ranks.  The  RAF's  major  contribution  was  to 
assist  Haig  to  break  through  the  Hindenburg  Line  by  providing  the  same 
reconnaissance  and  observation  facilities  which  had  flrst  brought  the  air  service 
to  prominence  in  the  early  years  of  the  war.  ,  25 
In  practical  terms  therefore,  the  hugely  expanded  British  air  service  ended  the  war  where  it 
had  begun.  The  Army  and  Royal  Navy  could  fall  back  on  their  former  imperial  roles,  but 
this  was  a  luxury  denied  the  fledgling  RAF,  whose  survival  was  cast  into  doubt  in  the 
immediate  post-1918  period  by  government  fiscal  stringency  and  the  inter-service 
wrangling  this  provoked. 
In  the  event,  the  RAF  avoided  extinction  by  creating  an  imperial  policing  role  for  itself, 
by  64  ...  substituting  air  power  for  land  power  in  the  more  inaccessible  comers  of  the  British 
Empire.  -)ý26  This  was  encapsulated  in  the  policy  of  Air  Control,  which  was  shrewdly  and 
successfully  sold  by  stressing  the  economies  attainable  by  replacing  manpower  with 
technology.  The  first  operation  was  ajoint  venture  with  the  Army,  to  suppress  the  "Mad 
MullaW'  in  Somaliland  in  1919-20.  The  RAF  contribution  was  the  eight  aircraft  strong  Z 
Force.  The  supposed  economy  of  the  operation  -a  figure  of  07,000  pounds  is  regularly 
and  inaccurately  quoted  -  was  cited  on  a  regular  basis  as  justification  for  Air  Control  by  the 
RAF.  This  figure  conveniently  overlooks  the  cost  of  the  Army's  not  inconsiderable 
involvement  in  the  campaign,  however,  which  lasted  three  times  longer  than  the  RAFs, William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  41 
and  which  almost  doubled  the  price  to  E150,000.27  Nonetheless,  the  strategy  worked,  for 
on  1  October  1922,  after  a  considerable  amount  of  political  lobbying  by  Churchill  as 
Secretary  of  State  for  War  and  Air,  military  responsibility  for  Iraq  passed  from  the  War 
Office  to  the  Air  Ministry.  28 
The  development  of  the  RAF's  pioneering  air  transport  capabilities  in  the  inter-war  period 
therefore  resulted  from  a  series  of  coincidences.  The  size  of  the  RAF's  new  fiefdom  in  Iraq 
demanded  either  very  long-range  bombing  aircraft,  or similarly  capable  transport  aircraft  to 
service  smaller  aircraft  operating  from  remote  locations.  The  focus  on  strategic  bombing 
in  the  latter  stages  of  the  First  World  War  meant  the  RAF  possessed  a  pool  of  large 
bombers,  which  could  be  used  for  their  original  purpose,  or  modified  as  transports.  This 
was  the  beginning  of  the  RAF  practice  of  issuing  specifications  for  bomber/transport 
aircraft,  which  continued  into  the  mid-  193  Os.  29  Thus  it  was  Air  Control  that  prompted  the 
development  of  large  transport  aircraft,  and  which  provided  the  conditions  for  their  use. 
Even  so,  it  is  also  significant  that  the  powers  that  be  did  not  regard  Air  Control  as  a  total 
solution.  Churchill  was  the  RAF's  staunchest  political  supporter  at  this  time,  but  he  still 
considered  that  policing  Iraq  would  require  some  14,000  troops  . 
30  The  RAF  decision  to 
convert  heavy  bombers  into  transports  may  therefore  have  reflected  this  reality  as  much  as 
a  desire  to  supply  RAF  units.  Nonetheless,  the  appearance  of  the  RAF  in  Iraq  encouraged 
the  spread  of  "air  mindedness"  across  the  empire,  as  the  benefits  of  air  transportation 
became  more  widely  recognised. 
The  lack  of  an  integrated  ground  force  was  thus  the  Achilles  heel  of  the  Air  Control 
Policy,  31  as  shown  by  the  formation  of  RAF  armoured  car  units  as  a  mobile  ground  back- 
up  for  their  aerial  activities.  32  This  graphically  illustrates  the  limitations  of  pure  air  power 
even  in  the  remote  regions  where  Air  Control  was  supposedly  most  applicable;  hence 
Liddell  Hart's  comment  that  "Air-and-Armour  Control"  was  a  more  appropriate  title  for 
the  Policy.  33  Given  this,  it  would  have  been  logical  for  the  RAF  to  establish  its  own 
dedicated  airborne  force  for  rapid  intervention.  However,  apart  from  the  armoured  car 
squadrons  and  small  units  raised  locally  for  airfield  defence,  the  RAF  did  not  establish  an 
integral  ground  force  in  the  inter-war  period,  airborne  or  otherwise.  There  are  several 
reasons  for  this.  First,  it  would  have  provoked  the  Army.  The  RAF's  foray  into  imperial 
policing  was  already  impinging  on  the  Army's  traditional  territory,  and  further  trespass 
would  have  elicited  fierce  resistance,  not  least  because  it  would  probably  have  meant  a 
concomitant  reduction  in  the  Army's  funding.  Such  hostility  undoubtedly  assisted  the 
pursuit  of  fiscal  parsimony,  but  was  hardly  conducive  to  military  efficiency  or  harmonious 
inter-service  relations.  In  any  case,  the  RAF  was  subject  to  the  same  fiscal  restraint  as  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  42 
Army,  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  additional  expenditure  for  an  airborne  force  could 
have  been  justified  to  the  Treasury  or  the  War  Office. 
Second  and  more  importantly,  the  RAF  sold  its  Air  Control  policy  by  stressing  the 
supposed  economy  of  substituting  aerial  technology  for  manpower.  This  in  itself  ruled  out 
the  establishment  of  a  sizeable  ground  force  of  any  description  by  the  RAF.  The  armoured 
car  units  could  be  justified  as  a  security  measure  for  downed  aircraft  and  their  crews,  and 
in  any  case  required  relatively  few  personnel.  It  is  therefore  doubtful  that  the  Air  Ministry 
could  have  found  sufficient  manpower  for  anything  larger,  even  if  it  had  been  so  inclined. 
Such  a  development  would  not  only  have  been  duplication  of  the  Army's  function,  but  also 
an  admission  that  Air  Control  was  a  flawed  concept.  It  would  also  have  undermined  the 
RAF's  carefully  crafted  image  as  a  modem,  high-tech  force,  and  by  extension  have  cast 
doubt  upon  the  RAF's  status  as  an  independent  service.  Thus,  a  combination  of  doctrinal 
unpalatability  and  survival-driven  pragmatism  was  sufficient  to  Prevent  the  RAF  from  pre- 
empting  Hitler's  Luftwaffe  by  establishing  the  world's  first  airborne  force  under  the  control 
of  an  independent  air  arm. 
The  doctrinal  angle  is  crucial,  because  just  as  the  Army  was  preoccupied  with 
mechanisation,  so  the  RAF  was  preoccupied  with  aerial  bombing.  Bombing  had  occupied 
a  central  position  in  RAF  thinking  since  1918,  it  supplied  the  coercive  element  of  Air 
Control,  and  the  threat  of  bombing  provided  the  RAF  with  a  domestic  justification  for 
independence  to  set  alongside  its  imperial  policing  role.  This  was  in  some  ways  a 
reorientation  from  the  RFC's  and  RAF's  primary  role  in  the  First  World  War,  which  came 
about  not  as  a 
44 
...  revolution  in  the  theorising  about  air  power  but  [as]  a  slow  and  almost 
imperceptible  shift  from  the  orthodoxy  of  co-operation  with  the  surface  forces, 
on  the  model  of  the  RFC  on  the  Western  Front,  to  the  radical  idea  of  strategic 
independence  put  forward  in  the  1930S.  "34 
This  coincided  with  a  public  "...  fear  of  aerial  bombardment  in  inter-war  Britain  [that]  was 
unprecedented  and  unique",  35  which  bordered  in  some  cases  on  hysteria,  and  reached  a 
peak  in  the  early  to  mid-1930s.  This  fear  was  based  largely  upon  suspect  extrapolations 
from  German  bombing  during  the  First  World  War  and  current  and  sensationalised 
examples  from  China  and  latterly  Spain,  and  was  reinforced  by  alarmist  writingS.  36  It  Was 
encapsulated  by  Prime  Minister  Stanley  Baldwin's  oft  misquoted  claim  that  "the  bomber 
will  always  get  throUgh".  37 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  43 
The  RAF  capitalised  upon  this  to  support  its  continued  independence  in  two  ways,  First, 
it  portrayed  itself  as  an  anti-bomber  force,  through  the  catch-all  theory  of  Strategic 
Interceptioný  formulated  in  the  late  1920s,  This  was  then  gradually  superseded  by  the 
RAF's  own  strategic  bombing  pretensions,  which  were  complete  by  the  latter  half  of  the 
1930s.  Despite  the  lack  of  opportunity,  the  RAF  never  lost  their  original  strategic  focus, 
propounded  from  1925  as  the  "knock-out  blow"  theory,  which  promoted  the  bomber  to  a 
strategic,  war-winning  weapon  in  its  own  right,  allegedly  capable  of  inflicting  lethal 
damage  to  an  enemy's  war-making  capacity.  38  However,  this  transition  was  neither 
straightforward  nor  sound,  for  it  J 
"...  took  place  without  a  reorientation  of  the  fundamental  military  principles 
which  might  have  made  strategically  independent  air  power  a  sound 
proposition  for  Britain,  In  particular,  the  British  school  of  airpower  never 
understood  the  significance  of  the  classical  concept  of  'command  of  the  air, 
and  they  came  to  rely  instead  on  what  was  considered  the  unique  power  of  the 
bomber  to  prepare  the  way  for  victory,  virtually  by  ignoring  the  existence  of  09 
the  enemy  air  force  as  a  strategic  obstacle. 
The  flaws  in  this  line  of  thinking  were  brutally  exposed  in  the  first  days  of  war  in  1939,40 
but  the  point  here  is  to  prove  that  the  RAF's  chosen  method  of  waging  war  had  no  place 
for  the  creation  of  an  integral  ground  force,  airborne  or  otherwise.  Strategic  bombing  was 
intended  largely  as  a  substitute  for  ground  operations,  and  the  establishment  of  an  RAF 
force  for  terrestrial  operations,  even  ones  launched  from  the  sky,  was  therefore  heretical  at 
worst  and  irrelevant  at  best.  This  attitude  was  to  exert  a  malign  influence  on  the 
establishment  of  a  dedicated  British  airborne  force. 
The  logical  solution  would  have  been  for  the  Army  and  RAF  to  co-operate,  if  only 
because  a  united  front  was  more  likely  to  secure  government  approval.  However,  the 
Army  resented  the  way  the  RAF  had  usurped  its  traditional  imperial  role,  and  remained 
suspicious  of  further  trespass,  The  RAF,  for  its  part,  retained  ",,,  a  tendency  to  look  on  the 
Royal  Navy  and  the  Army  as  wicked  uncles  who  ...  might  once  again  revert  to  predatory 
instincts".  41  The  result  was  a  severe  outbreak  of  inter-service  rivalry,  in  which  neither  side 
was  blameless;  The  RAF,  for  example,  only  formed  its  arnioured  car  units  after  the  Army 
refused  to  allow  its  own  units  to  continue  locally  arranged  co-operation  with  the  RAF.  42  In 
this  specific  case,  the  Army  shot  itself  in  the  foot.  As  Omissi  points  out,  War  Office 
reluctance  to  place  Army  units  under  RAF  control,  even  temporarily,  lost  the  progressive 
elements  in  the  Army  the  chance  to  use  imperial  policing  as  a  lever  for  mechanisation,  in 
the  same  way  as  the  RAF  used  Air  Control  for  its  survival.  43 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  44 
inter-service  rivalryý  generated  by  government  parsimony,  and  the  resultant  inward  focus 
of  Army  and  RAF  activity  were  obstacles  to  the  creation  of  a  dedicated  British  airborne 
force  in  the  inter-war  period,  However,  this  requires  a  significant  caveat,  Army-RAF 
hostility  was  rampant,  but  not  across  the  board,  In  fact,  it  tended  to  diminish  in  direct 
proportion  to  the  distance  from  Whitehall,  which  is  why  British  forces  in  the  empire  led  the 
world  in  military  air  transportation  in  the  first  decade  after  1918.  This  paradox  merits 
examination,  because  it  was  symptomatic  of  a  less  than  obvious  quality  that  was  to  play  a 
crucial  role  in  the  establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force  after  the  summer  of  1940. 
IV.,  Operational  Necessity  as  the  Mother  of  Flexibilityi  Unofficial  Army-RAF 
Co-operation  in  the  Empire 
The  high  level  of  enmity  between  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  was  not  automatically 
reflected  by  the  lower  echelons  of  the  Army  and  RAF,  in  the  UK  and,  more  especially,  in 
the  empire.  There,  relations  could  be  most  cordial,  as  illustrated  in  a  letter  from  Martel  to 
Liddell  Hart  in  the  mid-1930s:  "The  Air  Force  is  a  good  show  out  here  [in  India];  I  wish 
the  Amy  was  as  progressive.  "44Martel  had  reverted  to  his  original  Corps,  the  Royal 
Engineers  (RE)  after  the  First  World  War,  and  commanded  the  RE  component  of  the 
Experimental  Mechanised  Force  during  its  1927  trialS.  45He  was  posted  to  King  George's 
own  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners  in  April  1929,  and  served  as  an  instructor  to  the  Indian 
Staff  College  at  Quetta  between  1930  and  1934,  where  he  taught  mechanised  warfare  and 
air  co-operation  in  addition  to  more  traditional  RE  subjects.  46  Martel's  wide-ranging 
experience  illustrates  that  the  key  to  this  co-operation  was  an  inherent  flexibility  in  the 
lower  levels  of  the  Army  and  RAF,  a  quality  that  was  to  prove  crucial  in  the  establishment 
of  a  dedicated  British  airborne  force  in  1940.  It  will  therefore  be  necessary  to  briefly 
examine  why  and  how  this  flexibility  occurred  in  the  two  services, 
Flexibility  is  not  a  quality  popularly  associated  with  the  British  Army,  and  a  veritable 
industry  has  grown  up  proclaiming  exactly  the  opposite.  The  1842  retreat  from  Kabul,  the 
Crimea  and  both  Boer  Wars  are  recurring  favourites,  47  but  the  performance  of  the  Army  in 
the  First  World  War  has  drawn  the  most  adverse  comment,  48  and  still  excites  debate.  49 
However5  this  rather  narrow  and  populist  view  overlooks  a  rich  parallel  seam  of  tactical 
and  technological  innovation  driven  by  the  Army's  involvement  in  the  empire,  Service 
there  obliged  the  Army  to  fight  a  myriad  of  campaignsý  often  with  whatever  forces  were  at 
hand,  and  frequently  in  extreme  geographical  and  climatic  conditions.  This  in  turn  obliged 
adjustments  in  training,  tactics,  organisation  and  equipment.  Thus,  far  from  being  "merely William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  45 
the  play  of  children",  50  the  life-and-death  reality  of  colonial  warfare  demanded  operational 
flexibility  of  a  high  order.  51 
The  creation  of  light  infantry  units  in  North  America  from  the  1740s  provides  a  good 
example  of  this.  52  Fieldcraft  and  mobility  were  their  prime  attributes,  and  the  concept  was 
modified  and  employed  in  the  American  War  of  Independence  with  the  creation  of  light 
companies  within  infantry  units  serving  there,  The  concept  was  exported  back  to  the  Old 
World  as  a  counter  to  the  mass  tactics  of  Revolutionary  France,  and  became  regularised 
53 
with  the  creation  of  a  separate  light  infantry  arm  during  the  Napoleonic  Wars.  It  was 
then  employed  on  India's  Northwest  Frontier  in  the  mid-Nineteenth  century,  There 
11 
... 
dispersion  and  Light  Infantry  skills  became  the  order  of  the  day  as  [British]  Indian 
troops  adapted  to  the  irregular  fighting  methods  ...  of  the  hill  tribes",  leading  to  the 
54 
establishment  of  the  all-arms  Punjab  Frontier  Force  (PFF).  Thus,  within  a  century  a 
concept  formulated  in  response  to  a  specific  set  of  conditions  had  spread  into  mainstream 
operations  virtually  everywhere  the  Army  operated, 
This  was  by  no  means  an  isolated  example  of  such  flexibility.  Mounted  infantry  were 
introduced  in  an  effort  to  enhance  mobility  in  the  vast  open  spaces  of  Egypt  and  South 
Africa,  55  and  there  are  numerous  examples  of  the  Army  enhancing  its  flexibility  by 
adopting  new  technology4  The  PFF  was  equipped  with  specially  designed  lightweight 
artillery  pieces,  56  the  Royal  Engineers  (RE)  deployed  a  traction-engine  equipped  "Steam 
Road  Transport  Company"  in  the  Second  Boer  War,  57  and  formed  an  "Air  Battalion",  a 
forerunner  of  the  RFC,  in  April  1911.58  Indeed,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  establishment  of  a 
British  airborne  force  in  1940  was  merely  a  continuation  of  this  long-standing  tendency, 
rather  than  a  startlingly  new  development.  Be  that  as  it  may,  by  the  outbreak  of  the  First 
World  War  the  regular  British  Army  had  attained  an  extremely  high  level  of  operational 
flexibility,  almost  exclusively  as  a  result  of  its  service  in  the  empire.  In  addition,  the  high- 
intensity  and  changing  circumstances  of  the  First  World  War  enhanced  the  Army's 
flexibility  still  further,  in  developing  new  practices  and  adopting  new  technology;  the 
development  and  introduction  of  the  tank  is  arguably  the  most  famous  and  enduring 
example  of  this  tendency.  59 
It  is  also  important  to  note  that  this  flexibility  was  carried  over  into  the  Home  Army  after 
1918,  a  point  illustrated  by  the  course  of  armoured  and  mechanised  development  in  the 
1920s,  Popular  interest  in  the  activities  of  radical  theorists  like  Fuller  and  Liddell  Hart 
frequently  overshadows  the  fact  that  the  remainder  of  the  Army  was  not  entirely  made  up 
of  hide-bound  reactionaries,  but  included  a  leavening  of  officers  who  were  open  minded William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  46 
but  realistic  with  it.  General  Sir  John  Bumett-Stuart,  for  example,  was  originally  a 
conventional  infantry  commander,  but  became  a  staunch  advocate  of  paced  mechanisation 
following  the  involvement  of  his  Yd  Division  in  trials  of  the  Experimental  Mechanised 
Force  in  1927.60  There  is  also  evidence  that  some  officers  in  the  cavalry,  renowned  as  the 
bastion  of  conservatism,  were  also  less  blinkered  than  they  are  popularly  portrayed.  An 
article  entitled  "Mechanisation  from  a  Cavalry  Point  of  View"  was  published  in  the 
Journal  of  the  Royal  United  Service  Institution,  and  stressed  the  need  for  the  cavalry  to 
adapt  to  modem  conditions  via  mechanisation.  61  Indeed,  the  mere  fact  that  trials  with  the 
all-arms  Experimental  Mechanised  Force  and  its  successor  the  Experimental  Armoured 
Force  were  carried  out  in  1927  and  1928  is  clear  evidence  of  the  Army's  flexibility, 
especially  given  the  prevailing  financial  climate. 
The  contention  that  service  in  the  empire  was  the  initial  driver  for  the  Army's  flexibility 
is  reinforced  by  the  example  of  the  RAF.  The  RAF  originally  intended  to  merely  transfer 
its  First  World  War  practices  into  the  new  setting,  but  the  empire  imposed  its  own 
dynamics.  As  a  result,  the  RAF  was  obliged  to  modify  its  attitude,  and  transportation  in 
particular  became  a  major  focus  of  operations.  The  degree  of  this  shift  is  illustrated  by  the 
fact  that  the  RAF  began  to  specify  that  new  bomber  aircraft  should  be  easily  converted  for 
transport  work  from  the  early  1920s,  and  officially  referred  to  its  bombers  as 
bomber/transports  until  the  late  1930s.  This  label,  however,  merely  referred  to  the  ability 
of  such  aircraft  to  carry  freight  and/or  passengers  primarily  for  the  RAF,  rather  than  fully- 
equipped  troops  for  the  Army.  The  RAF  was  also  obliged  to  establish  its  own  ground 
security  forces,  and  to  co-operate  more  closely  with  the  Army  at  the  operational  level. 
Thus,  RAF  exposure  to  the  realities  of  operations  in  the  empire  rapidly  forced  a  degree  of 
flexibility,  in  much  the  same  way  and  for  much  the  same  reasons  as  the  Army  before  it. 
Paradoxically,  however,  this  flexibility  is  in  itself  evidence  as  to  why  British  forces  did 
not  move  to  establish  a  dedicated  airborne  force  before  1940.  The  Army  was  well  used  to 
adapting  to  meet  specific  operational  requirements  in  the  empire,  and  the  elements  of  the 
RAF  operating  in  the  empire  rapidly  developed  the  same  capacity.  The  degree  of 
operational  rapport  between  the  two  suggests  that  a  small,  dedicated  airborne  force  of  some 
description  could  have  been  established,  if  necessary  without  referring  the  matter  to 
Whitehall.  The  elements  necessary  for  such  a  development  were  certainly  available.  The 
Army  could  have  found  the  manpower,  while  the  RAF  possessed  aircraft  capable  of 
carrying  parachutists  from  the  early  1920s,  and  had  access  to  the  parachutes  used 
increasingly  for  dropping  supplies  from  at  least  1923.  Converting  these  parachutes  to  carry 
men  would  not  have  presented  an  insurmountable  problem.  Given  all  this,  it  can  be  argued William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  47 
that  there  was  a  very  simple  reason  why  this  seemingly  logical  step  was  not  taken:  there 
was  simply  no  need  for  a  dedicated  airborne  force.  This  is  a  rather  trite  answer,  but  a 
perfectly  logical  one,  if  viewed  from  a  contemporary  perspective.  In  order  to  prove  this 
contention,  it  will  be  necessary  to  turn  the  coin,  and  investigate  what  benefits  a  dedicated 
airborne  force  could  have  offered  over  established  practice.  Before  drawing  any 
conclusions  on  this,  however,  it  may  be  advisable  by  examining  what  British  military 
theorists  had  to  say  about  the  airborne  idea,  to  put  the  matter  in  context. 
V.  Hits  and  Misses:  British  Military  Thinkers  and  the  Airborne  Idea  In  the 
In  ter-  War  Period 
Given  their  high  profile  as  progressive  military  thinkers,  it  would  be  logical  to  look  to 
Fuller  and  Liddell  Hart  for  comment  on  the  airborne  idea.  However,  neither  writer  paid 
much  attention  to  it,  as  an  examination  of  their  works  published  in  the  inter-war  period 
shows.  According  to  a  writer  on  the  former,  "...  Fuller  doesn't  seem  to  be  very  interested  in 
airborne  forces  and  hardly  ever  comments  on  thern".  62  That  said,  he  was  at  least  aware  of 
the  military  advantages  and  ramifications  of  air  transportation.  In  his  1932  Lectures  on  F. 
S.  R.  M,  Fuller  referred  to  the  air  evacuation  from  Kabul  in  the  1928-1929.  He  considered 
this  as  holding  "enon-nous  military  possibilities",  and  predicted  "[it]  is  not  too  much  to 
suppose  that  considerable  numbers  of  soldiers,  supplies  in  bulk,  and  even  scout  tanks,  will 
in  the  future  be  transported  from  place  to  place  by  ait".  63  Apart  from  this  general 
comment,  however,  Fuller  viewed  bombing  as  the  primary  military  role  for  aircraft,  which 
he  felt  could  have  a  more  spectacular  moral  effect  upon  an  enemy  than  a  massed  attack  by 
tanks.  He  also  opined  that  "...  the  tank  and  the  aeroplane  are  complimentary  [sic] 
machines,  and  for  a  long  time  to  come  one  is  unlikely  to  be  able  to  operate  safely  without 
the  other".  64 
Liddell  Hart  also  considered  bombing  to  be  the  primary  military  role  for  aircraft,  as 
illustrated  by  his  comment  on  the  "...  ease  with  which  air  attack  can  paralyse  armies 
through  strikes  on  assembly  routes  and  positions,  communications,  supply  and  munitions 
centres".  15  Unlike  Fuller,  he  made  no  mention  of  the  possibilities  offered  by  air 
transportation,  either  in  the  inter-war  period  despite  the  widespread  use  of  air  transport  in 
the  empire,  or  even  after  a  British  airborne  force  had  become  a  reality.  66  Fuller  and  Liddell 
Hart  remained  focused  on  mechanisation,  and  consequently  regarded  aircraft  as  long-range 
artillery,  with  a  subsidiary  reconnaissance  and  air  defence  role.  67  This  was  despite  the  fact 
that  both  acknowledged  the  difficulty  of  striking  small  targets  with  aerial  bombing,  68  and 
despite  clear  evidence  of  the  applicability  of  air  transportation  as  an  adjunct  to  mobility. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  48 
The  essay  preceding  Liddell  Hart's  in  The  Next  Ten  Years...,  for  example,  contained  a 
wealth  of  detail  on  recent  advances  in  air  technology  with  particular  reference  to  the 
carriage  of  more  passengers  and  freight  by  air  for  longer  distances,  the  military  utility  of 
which  are  obvioUS.  69 
Their  neglect  may  have  been  a  side  effect  of  the  Army's  separation  from  airmen  and 
aircraft  by  the  RAF's  independence,  but  the  fact  remains  that  Fuller's  and  Liddell  Hart's 
failure  to  draw  the  appropriate  conclusions  denied  the  airborne  idea  influential  theoretical 
recognition  in  Britain.  This  in  turn  may  have  contributed  to  the  British  failure  to  officially 
investigate  the  airborne  idea  in  the  inter-war  period. 
However,  they  were  not  the  only  British  military  thinkers,  and  the  airborne  idea  was 
discussed  in  British  military  journals.  An  early  and  significant  article  appeared  in  the 
Royal  United  Services  Institute  Journal  (RUSI)  in  1935,  by  Major  J.  T.  Godfrey,  RE.  70 
Godfrey's  work  merits  detailed  examination  because  it  presents  the  coherent  synthesis 
between  air  and  mechanised  operations  missed  by  Fuller  and  Liddell  Hart.  Entitled 
"Winged  Armies",  Godfrey's  paper  focused  on  the  relevance  of  aerial  developments  in  a 
British  context.  In  particular,  he  highlighted  the  need  for  official  Army-RAF  co-operation, 
observing  that  "...  in  cases  where  air  transport  has  been  provided  [by  the  RAF]  for  the 
Army,  its  use  was  dictated  by  purely  temporary  considerations;  it  has  not,  so  far,  been  a 
matter  of  deliberate  PoliCy.,,  71 
Godfrey  envisaged  the  formation  of  what  he  termed  an  "air  brigade",  equipped  with 
vehicle  mounted  machine  guns  and  anti-tank  guns.  A  basic  tactical  unit  of  six  vehicles, 
consisting  of  one  radio-equipped  command  vehicle,  four  machine  gun  carriers  and  an  anti- 
tank  gun  carrier,  was  suggested.  The  brigade  in  total  would  field  three  hundred  and  sixty 
such  vehicles,  delivered  by  one  hundred  and  twenty  aircraft  carrying  three  vehicles  each. 
Enemy  communications  were  identified  as  the  most  promising  target  for  the  brigade,  in 
conjunction  with"mobile  land  forces  of  armoured  fighting  vehicles".  Godfrey  also 
identified  the  need  for  "a  high  degree  of  air  superiority",  and  the  need  for  a  suitable 
landing  ground  near  the  target  but  as  remote  as  possible  from  sizeable  enemy  forces.  He 
defined  the  purpose  of  the  brigade  as  being  to 
66 
...  plant  , 
by  means  of  air  transport,  a  "cell"  on  a  nodal  point  of  the  enemy's 
communications,  perhaps  50  to  100  miles  behind  the  main  theatre  of 
operations,  and  to  maintain  it  there  until,  like  a  turnour  on  the  enemy's  arteries, 
it  has  paralysed  the  part  of  the  body  fed  by  them.  The  cell  must  be  a  definite 
fighting  organism,  capable  of  endurance  for  several  days,  and  in  the  actual  case 
will  have  wide  powers  of  movement.  "72 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  49 
Godfrey  went  on  to  stress  the  importance  of  timing  and  surprise,  the  need  for  accurate 
intelligence  on  the  selected  landing  area,  and  the  necessity  of  transmitting  that  information 
to  the  troops  using  maps,  sand  models  and  aerial  photographs.  The  task  of  the  brigade's 
first  wave  was  to  secure  the  landing  area  or cell,  after  which  succeeding  waves  would 
"leapfrog"  outward  to  expand  the  perimeter  to  approximately  six  miles,  and  including  the 
objective.  Godfrey  based  his  projections  on  a  hypothetical  ratio  of  trips-per-aircraft-per- 
day,  although  the  fact  that  no  specific  aircraft  or  loads  were  cited  limited  its  utility. 
Nonetheless,  he  correctly  pointed  out  that  "...  every  minute  by  which  the  unloading  time 
could  be  reduced  would  speed  up  the  formation  of  return  batches,  and  render  their 
protection  easief".  73 
Godfrey's  paper  also  examined  a  number  of  operational  details.  These  included  the 
composition  of  the  different  waves,  logistic  requirements  for  operations  of  differing 
lengths,  guarding  enemy  prisoners  and  civilians  within  the  cell  perimeter,  the  advantages 
of  establishing  two  or  more  cells  simultaneously,  and  how  a  cell  could  be  re-oriented  if 
faced  by  enemy  opposition  at  the  original  insertion  point.  Godfrey's  view  of  the  value  of 
the  airborne  operations  echoed  that  of  Benjamin  Franklin  a  century  and  a  half  earlier: 
"With  the  great  flexibility  of  aircraft,  organised  raids  on  factories  a  hundred 
miles  behind  a  land  army  front  would  effect  a  surprise,  or  compel  an  enemy 
detachment  of  large  size  to  protect  all  of  them.  The  procedure  would  be  much 
the  same  as  in  the  cell  attack  on  communications,  but  shorter  and  sharper  ...  one 
success  should  exert  a  moral  effect  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  cost  of  the 
enterprise.  Thereafter,  the  mere  threat  of  such  attacks  might  compel  the  enemy 
government  to  provide  protective  troops;  and  these  must  be  supplied  to  the 
detriment  of  the  main  army  -a  fact  which  in  itself  constitutes  no  small  success 
-  or  from  lower-grade  local  reserves,  with  whom  the  air-borne  picked  troops 
should  be  able  to  deal  easily.  Such  a  menace  would  act  as  a  sword  of 
Damocles  over  thousands  of  square  miles  of  enemy  territory,  able  to  deal 
irreparable  blows  with  startling  suddenness".  74 
The  article  concluded  with  a  brief  examination  of  the  strategic  benefits  of  his  air  brigade, 
and  its  utility  as  an  adjunct  for  imperial  policing  In  the  latter  case  it  was  shrewdly 
observed  that  a  "...  small  reinforcement  arriving  early  is  of  many  times  greater  value  than  a 
larger  but  later  reinforcement".  75  Godfrey  also  recommended  the  establishment  of  a  chain 
of  landing  grounds  across  the  empire,  which  would  allow  a  strategic  reserve  located  in  the 
Sinai  to  be  deployed  rapidly  to  wherever  it  was  needed.  This  would  provide 
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...  one  of  the  most  mobile  forces  in  the  world,  capable  of  throwing 
reinforcements  across  continents  with  a  rapidity  which  would  revolutionize  all 
existing  calculations  ... 
The  virtual  effect  would  be  that  of  multiplying  many- 
fold  the  strength  of  the  [Imperial]  garrisons  by  increasing  their  range  and  speed William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  50 
of  action.  Small  insurrections  could  be  nipped  in  the  bud  before  they  attained 
serious  proportions,  and  a  punitive  force,  either  in  vehicles  or  not  at  will,  could 
come  directly  to  grips  with  the  offender.  06 
Godfrey's  airborne  vision  was  remarkably  prescient,  although  it  was  by  no  means 
flawless.  The  lack  of  precise  aircraft  and  vehicle  details  rendered  his  detailed 
hypothesising  worthless,  and  he  also  appears  to  have  been  unaware  of  the  degree  to  which 
the  air  transportation  and  supply  was  already  an  accepted  and  expanding  norm.  in  the 
empire  at  that  time.  77  His  concept  also  bears  more  than  a  passing  resemblance  to 
contemporary  Soviet  Deep  Battle  theorising  by  Tukhachevsky  and  Tatarchenko.  78  Indeed, 
Godfrey  admitted  that  his  idea  was  "...  a  military  parallel  to  that  which  has  inspired  one  of 
the  most  successful  political  methods  of  Communism 
...  the  political  "cell"  established  in 
the  heart  of  the  enemy  camp".  79  Godfrey  served  as  a  military  attachd  in  Warsaw  from 
1935  to  1938  80  and  be  is  likely  to  have  learned  of  Soviet  developments  from  prior  contacts 
with  the  Polish  military;  this  was  the  same  period  when  the  Poles  began  to  develop  an 
interest  in  airborne  matters  themselves.  81  In  addition,  it  is  curious  that  Godfrey  made  no 
reference  to  the  use  of  parachutes,  despite  the  fact  that  the  Soviets  were  making 
widespread  use  of  them  at  the  time  he  was  writing.  A  mass  Soviet  drop  was  carried  out 
before  Western  observers  at  the  Kiev  manoeuvres  only  the  month  after  Godfrey's  article 
was  published,  for  example.  This  raises  the  suspicion  that  he  based  his  theorising  on 
intelligence  on  earlier  Soviet  developments.  82  Godfrey's  article  was  still  remarkable, 
because  it  shows  that  there  was  British  discussion  of  the  airborne  idea  in  the  inter-war 
period,  and  well-informed  discussion  at  that.  He  formulated  a  valid  operational  role  for  his 
air  brigade  as  an  adjunct  to  mechanised  warfare,  and  highlighted  the  strategic  advantage  an 
airborne  force  offered  to  the  British  military  in  an  imperial  context. 
Godfrey  was  not  alone  in  his  hypothesising.  In  May  1936  The  Army,  Navy  and  Air 
Force  Gazette  published  an  article  entitled  "Three  Infantries,  Not  One  Infantry",  that 
suggested  amalgamating  all  British  Rifle  and  Light  Infantry  (LI)  units  to  form  a  distinct 
sub-division  of  the  infantry  arm.  83  The  new  force  would  be  air  transported,  was  intended 
to  become  a  RAF  equivalent  to  the  Royal  Marines,  and  thus  offer  the  most  rapid  method  of 
deploying  troops  to  the  European  mainland.  Delivery  was  to  be  via  by  parachute,  glider  or 
autogiros,  with  the  latter  also  being  used  for  casualty  evacuation.  Development  of  special 
lightweight  weapons  and  equipment  was  also  suggested,  including  a  119  lb.  machine  pistoP'. 
Creation  of  a  parallel  force  for  use  in  the  empire  was  also  recommended.  The  Punjab 
Frontier  Force  (PFF)  was  nominated  for  this  role,  which  the  writer  considered  would 
enable  the  PFF  to  recover  its  "one  time  briskness"  on  the  Northwest  Frontier.  84 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  51 
Major-General  H.  Rowan  Robinson  followed  this  in  December  1936,  when  The  United 
Services  Review  published  his  "Air  Infantry:  How  Can  This  Development  Assist  Great 
86  Britain".  85  Rowan  Robinson  was  a  well-published  military  commentator  ,  and  his  article 
was  a  response  to  the  highly  publicised  Soviet  airborne  manoeuvres  in  the  Moscow 
Military  District  in  September  that  year,  and  newspaper  reports  on  French  airborne  infantry 
experiments.  He  concluded  that  it  was  a  "...  reasonable  proposition  to  land  considerable 
bodies  of  men  and  equipment  from  aeroplanes",  and  that  an  airborne  force  would  allow  the 
fullest  military  exploitation  of  the  advantages  offered  by  aircraft.  Rowan  Robinson 
proposed  four  missions  for  such  a  force.  These  were  categorised  under  the  headings 
"decisive  destruction",  "raid",  "battle  action7'  and  "reinforcement".  Raids  were  intended  to 
be  "simpler  affairs"  than  decisive  destruction,  which  would  entail  the  seizure  and  retention 
of  an  area  for  a  considerable  period.  Battle  action  encompassed  missions  "...  in  tandem 
with  ground  operations"",  such  as  the  seizure  of  "defiles  in  the  enemy  rear,  or  pivots  for 
mechanised  attacks".  Rowan  Robinson  acknowledged  that  his  work  was  based  in  part 
upon  Godfrey,  but  also  suggested  that  the  latter's  air  brigade  structure  be  augmented  with 
light  howitzer,  mortar  and  anti-aircraft  elements.  He  also  echoed  LVSB's  stress  on  the 
need  for  special  lightweight  weapons  and  equipment,  and  for  airborne  troops  to  be  "hardy 
and  frugal"  in  order  to  cope  with  likely  supply  limitations  on  operations.  Rowan  Robinson 
closed  his  article  with  the  prophetic  comment  that: 
"We  cannot  disassociate  ourselves  from  this  idea,  for  it  is  a  novel  and 
promising  application  of  the  unchanging  strategy  which  has  for  [a]  foundation 
the  attack  and  defence  of  communications.  The  sooner,  therefore,  we 
undertake  the  necessary  experiments  the  better". 
Before  drawing  conclusions  on  the  military  theorists,  it  should  also  be  noted  that 
discussion  of  the  airborne  idea  was  not  restricted  to  military  journals.  In  1934,  an 
anonymous  short  story  entitled  "The  Counter  Raiders"  appeared  in  Blackwood  Tales  from 
the  OUtPoStS.  87  This  described  in  detail  a  fictional  parachute  operation  on  the  Northwest 
Frontier.  The  native  parachute  troops  envisaged  were  specially  clothed  and  equipped  for 
their  role,  and  the  description  of  the  static-line  jump  suggests  that  the  author  had  at  least 
witnessed  such  an  event  personally.  The  story  anticipated  LVSB's  recommendations  for 
converting  the  PFF  into  an  airborne  unit  by  around  two  years,  and  may  well  have  been 
written  by  him.  The  description  of  a  shoulder-fired  grenade  launcher  is  of  particular 
interest,  because  of  its  remarkable  similarity  to  the  M79  Grenade  Launcher  used  by  US 
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With  hindsight,  all  these  articles  are  remarkably  prescient.  They  encapsulate  almost  all 
the  factors  that  guided  and  shaped  the  development  of  a  British  airborne  force  after  June 
1940.88  The  latter  included  the  design  and  production  of  a  plethora  of  specialised 
equipment  ranging  from  special  steel  helmets  and  other  clothing  to  lightweight  tanks.  89 
British  airborne  infantry  were  equipped  in  large  numbers  with  the  Sten  sub-machine  gun, 
to  provide  concentrated  firepower  in  the  assault;  90  the  Sten  weighed  just  under  9  lb. 
loaded.  91  It  was  also  prescient  to  identify  the  advantages  air  transport  offered  for  the  rapid 
deployment  of  troops  to  the  Continent.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  doubtful  that  LVSB 
imagined  the  post-Dunkirk  circumstances  that  rendered  it  necessary  for  Churchill  to  order 
the  creation  of  a  parachute  raiding  force  to  carry  the  war  back  to  the  victorious  Germans.  ' 
All  that,  however,  lay  a  few  short  years  in  the  future.  The  points  here  is  that  Godfrey, 
LVSB  and  Rowan  Robinson  were  discussing  the  merits  of  the  airborne  idea  in  a  British 
public  military  forum,  and  notjust  within  the  imperial  paradigm.  This  suggests  that  the 
British  air  transport  lead  did  not  lapse  because  the  Army  and  RAF  were  unaware  of  the 
possibilities  offered  by  developing  their  existing  capabilities.  The  fact  remains,  however, 
that  no  such  development  was  carried  out  or  even  investigated.  The  next  section  will 
therefore  attempt  to  explain  this  seemingly  puzzling  omission. 
V1.  An  Inappropriate  Method  for  the  Circumstances:  The  Case  Against  the 
Establishment  of  a  Dedicated  British  Airborne  Force  in  the  Inter-War  Period 
Superficially,  a  dedicated  British  airborne  force  appeared  to  hold  a  number  of  advantages 
for  imperial  policing  as  practised  in  the  empire  between  the  wars.  In  fact  it  did  not,  for  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  a  dedicated  force  could  have  improved  on  the  pre-existing  ad  hoc 
practice  of  air  landing  conventional  troops.  As  we  have  seen,  this  practice  expanded  from 
lifting  company-sized  units  of  troops  a  hundred  miles  or  so  in  1923,  to  the  extended 
shuttling  of  over  five  thousand  troops  and  their  supplies  over  an  eighteen-month  period  in 
93  India  in  1936-38  . 
This  alone  suggests  that  the  existing  system  functioned  perfectly  well 
within  its  operational  parameters.  The  technique  required  no  specialist  training,  and  only  a 
slight  re-configuring  of  personal  equipment,  which  in  practical  terms  made  the  experience 
little  different  from  travelling  by  road  or  rail.  In  addition,  the  high  level  of  operational  co- 
operation  between  the  Army  and  RAF,  allied  to  the  relatively  modest  scale  of  their  air 
landing  operations,  was  sufficient  to  offset  the  lack  of  a  formal  establishment  and 
command  structure. 
Consequently,  the  only  advantage  a  dedicated  airborne  force  might  conceivably  have 
offered  over  the  existing  ad  hoc  system  was  a  direct  assault  capability.  This,  however, William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  53 
would  have  been  of  limited  utility  to  imperial  policing  as  practised  by  the  British  between 
the  wars.  Quelling  urban  unrest  was  one  of  the  staple  imperial  policing  tasks  -  the  first 
airlift  of  British  troops  in  Iraq  in  May  1924  was  in  response  to  unrest  in  Kirkuk,  and 
similar  unrest  prompted  the  first  airlift  of  troops  over  the  open  sea  from  Palestine  to 
Cyprus  in  October  1931.94  Urban  terrain  is  highly  unsuitable  for  landing  by  aircraft  or 
parachute,  and  a  dedicated  airborne  force  therefore  offered  no  advantage  over  airlifted 
conventional  troops  in  such  circumstances. 
it  can  also  be  argued  that  an  assault  capability  would  have  been  of  limited  utility  in  the 
wilder  hinterland  of  the  Empire  too.  Admittedly,  the  Soviets  enjoyed  some  success  with 
air  landing  parties  against  Basmachi  tribesmen  in  the  Turkestan  Military  District  in  the  late 
1920s,  but  this  was  largely  due  to  the  element  of  surprise,  which  would  reduce  in  direct 
proportion  to  the  frequency  of  use.  Their  equivalents  in  the  British  empire  were  equally 
unsophisticated,  but  it  is  logical  to  assume  that  they  would  have  quickly  latched  onto  the 
crucial  importance  and  characteristics  of  landing  grounds  suitable  for  such  operations.  The 
deep  shelters  adopted  by  tribal  communities  as  a  counter  to  the  RAF's  Air  Control 
bombing  supports  this.  Tribesmen  would  doubtless  have  used  their  superior  local 
knowledge  to  avoid  or  set  ambushes  on  suitable  landing  areas,  and  the  effect  of  accurate 
small  arms  fire  upon  slow  and  vulnerable  transport  aircraft  can  be  imagined.  The 
mountainous  nature  of  much  of  the  empire  also  suggests  that  it  may  not  have  been  possible 
to  land  troops  in  locations  to  best  exploit  the  shock  effect  of  their  arrival. 
it  is  therefore  highly  likely  that  a  dedicated  airborne  force  would  have  spent  a  good  deal 
of  time  waiting  for  the  enemy  to  place  themselves  obligingly  in  proximity  to  a  suitable 
landing  ground.  Manpower  was  always  at  a  premium  in  the  empire,  and  a  specialised 
airborne  unit  would  have  to  have  been  employed  on  conventional  imperial  policing  tasks  in 
the  interim.  Not  only  would  this  have  been  a  misuse  of  expensive  training,  it  would  also 
have  defeated  the  object  of  forming  such  a  force.  Using  parachutes  could  have 
circumvented  the  reliance  upon  aircraft  landing  grounds,  but  this  would  also  have  created 
as  many,  if  not  more,  problems  than  it  resolved. 
Establishing  a  parachute  force  would  have  obliged  an  additional  joint  training  and 
equipment  effort,  for  teaching  troops  to  parachute  requires  much  more  expertise  than 
merely  training  them  to  disembark  from  a  landed  aircraft  in  a  tactical  manner.  More 
importantly,  the  utility  of  parachuting  was  also  questionable  in  the  British  imperial  context. 
The  fact  that  there  were  relatively  few  aircraft  of  sufficient  size  to  carry  parachutists  would 
have  restricted  the  size  of  any  force  so  equipped.  It  should  be  remembered  that William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  54 
parachutists  too  require  a  suitable  landing  zone,  and  cannot  therefore  be  dropped 
anywhere.  Parachute  troops  could  have  been  used  to  secure  aircraft  landing  sites,  but 
would  have  offered  little  improvement  on  the  limitations  of  air  landing  already  examined. 
An  alternative  would  have  been  to  deploy  them  as  a  quick  reaction  spearhead  for  ground 
forces,  but  this  too  would  have  been  a  tricky  proposition.  The  fate  of  the  "Edwards  Patror' 
in  the  Radfan  Mountains  of  the  Yemen  in  1964,  with  lightweight  radios,  jet  aircraft  and 
helicopters  all  to  hand,  provides  a  graphic  illustration  of  the  likely  fate  of  a  small  force 
isolated  in  territory  dominated  by  tribesmen.  95  The  prospects  for  a  small  parachute- 
inserted  party  in  the  wilder  reaches  of  the  empire  during  the  inter-war  period  would 
arguably  have  been  at  least  as  bleak. 
A  dedicated  airborne  force  thus  offered  little,  if  any,  benefit  over  the  ad  hoc  system 
already  in  place  in  the  empire  in  the  inter-war  period.  That  is  not  to  say  that  parachute 
operations  were  totally  inappropriate  in  a  colonial  context.  The  French  made  extensive  use 
of  the  technique  in  Indo-China  in  the  1940s  and  50s,  96  and  British  Special  Forces  used  the 
technique  on  a  smaller  scale  during  the  Malayan  Emergency.  This,  however,  was  because 
the  capability  and  equipment  was  readily  available  as  result  of  the  Second  World  War, 
rather  than  because  the  method  was  particularly  suitable.  It  can  therefore  be  argued  that 
there  was  no  justification  for  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated  British  airborne  force  within 
the  specific  time-frame  of  the  inter-war  period,  when  the  existing  level  of  air  transportation 
and  supply  of  troops  remained  quite  sufficient  for  the  needs  of  that  mission.  The  key  to 
understanding  why  the  British  did  not  establish  a  dedicated  airborne  force  thus  lies  in 
understanding  the  parameters  of  imperial  policing  as  practised  by  the  British  in  that  period, 
rather  than  looking  back  with  hindsight  from  the  post-  1945  period. 
This  perspective  might  also  cast  new  light  on  contemporary  British  reaction  to  Soviet 
airborne  developments.  The  leader  of  the  British  military  delegation  to  the  1936  Minsk 
manoeuvres,  future  Field-Marshal  Lord  Wavell,  and  later  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Giffard 
Martel  both  produced  accounts  of  the  operations.  Wavell  noted  that  "...  the  parachutists  we 
saw  in  action  after  the  landings  were  in  remarkably  good  trim  and  mostly  moving  at  the 
double",  97  whilst  Martel,  who  was  chauffeured  around  the  drop  zone,  commented  that 
"In  spite  ...  of  spending  quite  a  long  time  seeing  them  land  or  talking  to  them 
after  they  had  done  so,  I  failed  to  find  a  single  [parachuting]  casualty.  Some  of 
them  had  fallen  on  trees  and  others  on  the  roofs  of  houses,  but  they  seemed  to 
have  been  able  to  negotiate  their  difficulties  and  the  worst  we  saw  were  a  few 
cuts  and  abrasions.  They  were  certainly  none  the  worse  for  their  descent  and 
most  of  them  were  doubling  to  collect  by  units.  "" William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  55 
However,  both  observers  also  commented  on  the  dispersion  of  the  paratroopers,  and  on  the 
amount  of  time  it  took  for  them  to  rally.  Martel  noted  that  "They  [the  paratroopers]  were 
scattered  over  a  considerable  area  and  it  was  at  least  an  hour  before  the  force  was  properly 
assembled".  99  Wavell  went  further,  considering  the  "...  tactical  value  [of  the  technique] 
may  be  doubtful",  and  that  it  "...  apparently  took  some  time  to  collect  the  force  after  the 
landing;  about  one  and  a  half  hours  after  the  first  descent  began,  a  part  of  the  force  was  still 
being  collected".  100 
The  latter  observations  are  typically  quoted  piecemeal,  and  are  generally  interpreted  as 
typifying  rigid,  reactionary  and  obstructionist  Army  thinking  in  the  face  of  innovation. 
However,  the  general  tone  of  the  comments  in  full,  and  the  background  and  future  careers 
of  the  officers  involved  suggest  otherwise.  Wavell,  for  example,  was  one  of  the  most 
enthusiastic  senior  supporters  of  the  British  airborne  force  in  1940  and  1941,  and  Martel's 
staunch  advocacy  of  armoured  and  mechanised  warfare  shows  he  was  far  from  reactionary 
or  hidebound. 
It  can  thus  be  argued  that  in  fact,  Martel's  and  Wavell's  comments  represent  a  fair  and 
balanced  appraisal  of  what  they  witnessed  based  upon  professional  experience. 
Admittedly,  the  most  intensive  portion  of  that  experience  was  gained  from  service  on  the 
Western  Front  during  the  First  World  War,  and  it  would  be  surprising  if  this  did  not  colour 
their  views  somewhat.  However,  given  the  fact  that  imperial  policing  had  been  the  major 
focus  of  the  Army's  activity  before  and  after  the  First  World  War,  it  is  also  logical  to 
assume  that  the  realities  of  the  Army's  major  duty  played  some  part  in  their  appraisal.  It  is 
therefore  probably  not  coincidental  that  both  men  highlighted  the  very  weakness  that 
rendered  parachute  insertion  unsuitable  for  use  in  a  British  colonial  context. 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  bulk  of  the  Soviet  paratroopers  seen  by  Wavell  and  Martel 
dropped  without  weapons.  101  This  was  a  very  common  practice,  at  least  in  early  airborne 
operations,  obliged  by  a  combination  of  cramped  contemporary  transport  aircraft  and 
limitations  of  parachute  harness  design.  Troops  therefore  dropped  from  the  aircraft  and 
recovered  their  weapons  from  externally  carried  containers  jettisoned  at  the  same  time  after 
landing.  This  technique  was  used  by  German  paratroopers  in  Scandinavia  and  the  Low 
Countries  in  1940,  and  initially  by  the  British  until  the  development  of  special  kit-bags  and 
weapons  valises,  which  could  be  attached  to  the  individual  for  the  jump,  in  1942-43.102 
Whilst  the  practise  may  thus  have  been  unavoidable,  it  was  extremely  hazardous  from  a 
tactical  perspective;  many  German  paratroops  were  killed  or  wounded  attempting  to  reach 
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surprising  that  both  Martel  and  Wavell  also  picked  up  on  this  glaring  tactical  handicap  in 
1936. 
The  airborne  idea  was  therefore  not  suitable  for  imperial  policing  as  practised  by  the 
British  in  the  inter-war  period.  However,  the  focus  of  the  Army  shifted  from  the  empire  to 
nearer  home  at  the  end  of  the  1930s,  with  the  growing  awareness  of  the  threat  posed  by 
Hitler's  resurgent  Germany.  It  will  thus  be  necessary  to  examine  briefly  whether  or  not 
this  re-orientation  toward  conventional  warfare  in  the  contemporary  sense  offered  more 
fertile  ground  for  the  airborne  idea  in  a  British  context. 
This  is  again  an  attractive  proposition,  not  least  because  by  the  late  1930s  there  had  been 
some  theoretical  British  examination  of  the  airborne  idea  to  provide  a  foundation.  The 
matter  was  again  not  so  straightforward.  First,  there  were  relatively  few  transport  aircraft 
in  the  UK.,  the  majority  being  stationed  in  the  empire  where  there  was  most  demand  for 
them.  Second,  irrespective  of  their  location,  all  such  aircraft  remained  firmly  under  RAF 
control,  and  relations  between  the  Army  and  RAF  at  home  lacked  the  flexibility 
engendered  by  the  realities  of  the  imperial  environment,  where  mutual  necessity 
outweighed  petty  inter-service  rivalries.  Thus  there  were  few  aircraft  available  in  Britain 
to  utilise  for  the  creation  of  an  airborne  force  for  deployment  in  a  conventional  European 
war,  and  the  RAF  had  no  need  and  little  interest  in  pursuing  transportation  or co-operation 
in  the  home  environment  in  any  case. 
Third,  there  is  again  the  matter  of  suitability.  Most  of  what  British  airborne  theorising 
appeared  was  primarily  concerned  with  the  application  of  the  idea  in  a  conventional  war 
context.  This  was  also  largely  based  on  the  Soviet  model,  which  was  intended  as  an 
adjunct  to  the  Soviet  theory  of  mechanised  deep  battle.  British  operational  need  at  that 
time  was  rather  more  restrained,  being  focused  primarily  upon  defensive  operations  in 
France  and  Belgium.  This  allowed  little  scope  for  offensive  airborne  operations,  even  had 
the  RAF  possessed  and  been  forthcoming  with  the  necessary  aircraft.  The  British  theorists 
thus  failed  fully  to  appreciate  the  operational  and  fiscal  realities  of  the  British  situation 
before  1940.  Consequently,  it  can  be  argued  there  was  even  less  justification  for  the 
creation  of  a  home-based  British  airborne  force  than  there  had  been  in  the  empire. 
It  is  thus  clear  why,  despite  the  seeming  suitability  of  the  airborne  idea,  the  British  did  not 
extend  their  lead  in  the  air  transportation  and  supply  into  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated 
airborne  force  in  the  inter-war  period.  Government  parsimony  played  a  major  role, 
exacerbated  by  the  pernicious  effects  of  inter-service  rivalry.  This  resulted  in  an William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  2  57 
overarching  shortage  of  funding,  that  heightened  the  rivalry  between  the  Army  and  RAF, 
and  in  the  process  largely  precluded  airborne  experimentation,  joint  or  otherwise.  The 
situation  was  further  complicated  yet  further  by  the  RAF's  independent  status,  which 
allowed  it  to  pursue  its  own  aims  and  doctrines  whilst  maintaining  sole  control  over  British 
military  aviation.  In  addition,  the  Army  was  overstretched,  preoccupied  with 
mechanisation,  and  experiencing  difficulty  attracting  sufficient  infantry  recruits  to  cover  its 
existing  conunitments. 
If  this  were  not  sufficient  explanation  as  to  why  the  British  neglected  to  establish  a 
dedicated  airborne  force  before  June  1940,  there  is  also  compelling  evidence  to  argue  that 
there  was  simply  no  real  need  for  capability  offered  by  such  a  force.  It  was  of  dubious 
utility  in  an  imperial  policing  context,  and  offered  no  real  advantage  over  the  ad  hoc  but 
perfectly  functional  Army-RAF  co-operation  in  the  empire.  British  military  observers  kept 
abreast  of  foreign  activities,  whilst  home-grown  theorists  provided  a  foundation  for  future 
development.  This  remained  the  case  until  the  German  offensive  in  the  West  in  May  1940, 
which  simultaneously  delivered  a  stinging  object  lesson  in  the  application  of  the  airborne 
idea,  and  transformed  both  the  British  situation  and  the  British  attitude  to  the  creation  of  an 
airborne  force  out  of  all  recognition. 
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CHAPTER  THREE 
A  Salutary  Shock:  The  Impact  of  German  Airborne 
Operations  in  the  Low  Countries  and  Defeat  in  France, 
May  -  June  1940 
The  outbreak  of  war  in  September  1939  did  not  immediately  change  the  British  attitude  to 
the  creation  of  a  dedicated  airborne  force,  not  least  because  the  defensive  nature  of  the 
British  commitment  in  France  rendered  it  superfluous.  However,  the  German  offensive  in 
the  West  that  opened  on  10  May  1940  precipitated  a  near  catastrophic  series  of  events  for 
the  Allies.  In  the  space  of  a  mere  twenty-four  days,  Holland  and  Belgium  were  overrun, 
the  Anglo-French  Armies  were  split,  and  the  bulk  of  the  British  Expeditionary  Force  (BEF) 
were  evacuated  in  an  ad  hoc  operation  from  Calais  and  Dunkirk.  The  remainder  of  the 
BEF,  accompanied  by  a  variety  of  Allied  military  and  civilian  personnel,  were  removed 
from  ports  along  the  north  and  western  French  seaboard  by  20  June  1940.1 
British  military  circumstances  were  thus  transformed  out  of  all  recognition,  and  British 
attitudes  to  the  creation  of  an  airborne  force  along  with  them.  This  chapter  will  therefore 
IM 
begin  by  briefly  surveying  the  German  airborne  operations  in  the  Low  Countries  that 
spearheaded  their  offensive  into  the  West,  because  it  was  these  operations  which  inspired 
Churchill  to  order  the  formation  of  a  British  force  with  similar  capabilities.  It  will  then 
examine  the  impact  of  the  subsequent  Allied  defeat  on  the  condition  and  attitudes  of  the 
Army  and  RAF,  to  provide  the  necessary  backdrop  to  the  final  section.  This  will  be  an 
examination  of  Churchill's  initial  order  to  establish  a  parachute  force,  and  the  motivation 
behind  it. 
1.  Catalyst  and  Example:  German  Airborne  Operations  in  the  Low  Countries, 
May  1940 
The  German  assault  upon  the  Low  Countries  was  spearheaded  by  a  series  of  special 
operations  at  Hitler's  personal  insistence.  These  operations  were  carried  out  by  specially 
trained  Heer  troops  from  conventional  units  and  members  of  the  Brandenburger  special 
forces  unit,  but  the  largest  were  carried  out  by  the  new  and  largely  untried  German 
airborne  force.  This  comprised  Student's  7th  Flieger  Division  and  the  Heer's  operationally 
subordinate  22nd  Luftlande  Division,  an  Army  formation  configured  and  trained  for  air 
landing  operations.  2  The  German  plan  had  undergone  a  series  of  modifications  since  Hitler 
unveiled  his  requirement  to  Student  on  27  October  1939,  but  the  basic  objective  remained 
constant.  This  was  vertically  to  outflank  Belgian  and  Dutch  troops,  and  to  facilitate  the 
western  advance  of  German  ground  forces  by  seizing  water  crossings  on  their  line  of William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  63 
march.  The  latter  obliged  a  coup-de-main  assault  on  the  Belgian  fortress  of  Eben  Emael, 
whose  guns  controlled  vital  bridges  over  the  Albert  Canal. 
Student's  command  had  gained  some  operational  experience  prior  to  its  assault  on  the 
Low  Countries.  Parachute  units  were  not  committed  in  Poland,  being  held  back  for  a 
series  of  aborted  airborne  operations,  but  an  infantry  regiment  from  22nd  Luftlande 
Division  was  deployed  by  air  for  conventional  operations  in  the  closing  stages  of  the 
campaign.  7th  Flieger  Division's  paratroops  had  their  baptism  of  fire  in  April  1940,  in  a 
series  of  small  coup-de-main  operations  to  seize  airfields  at  Aalborg  and  the  three 
kilometre  bridge  linking  Copenhagen  with  the  Gedser  ferry  terminal  in  Denmark,  and  the 
Oslo-Fornebu  and  Stavanger-Sola  airfields  in  Norway.  All  three  operations  were 
successful,  although  not  without  some  confusion  in  Norway,  particularly  at  Oslo-Fornebu. 
A  later  company-sized  operation,  intended  to  prevent  a  link  up  between  Norwegian  and 
British  troops  at  Dombas,  failed  when  bad  weather  prevented  aerial  re-supply  or 
reinforcement,  and  the  survivors  were  taken  prisoner  after  fighting  alone  for  ten  days.  3 
Student  also  authorised  the  formation  of  an  experimental  glider  unit  in  November  1939,  to 
test  the  glider's  utility  as  transport  for  assault  engineers  attacking  fixed  defences.  Initially 
codenamed  "Test  Section  Friedrichshaferf',  the  unit  became  formally  established  as 
"Assault  Battalion  KocW',  and  was  considered  to  be  an  elite  within  an  elite,  a  status  which 
it  was  to  confirm  at  Eben  Emael.  4 
For  the  thrust  into  the  Low  Countries,  Student's  force  was  divided  into  three  parts.  These 
were  Assault  Detachment  Koch,  Group  North,  and  Group  South,  each  of  which  was  tasked 
with  specific  objectives.  Assault  Detachment  Koch,  sub-divided  into  four  Groups  entitled 
"Granite",  "Concrete",  "Iron7'  and  "SteeT,  was  to  neutralise  the  fortress  of  Eben  Emael  and 
5  seize  three  nearby  bridges  across  the  Albert  Canal.  Group  North,  consisting  of  the  bulk  of 
22nd  Luftlande  Division  with  a  parachute  spearhead,  was  to  secure  airfields  near  The 
Hague  at  Valkenburg,  Ockenburg  and  Ypenburg,  before  seizing  the  Dutch  government, 
Royal  family  and  military  leadership.  These  landings  were  thus  intended  to  strike  at  the 
heart  of  the  so-called  "Fortress  Holland",  thereby  denying  the  RAF  use  of  airfields  to  strike 
at  Germany,  and  vertically  outflanking  the  Dutch  "Grebbe"  and  'New  Water"  defence 
lines.  6  Last  but  not  least  there  was  Group  South,  consisting  of  the  bulk  of  7th  Flieger's 
parachute  units  and  attached  elements  of  22nd  Luftlande.  Its  mission  was  to  seize 
Waalhaven  airfield,  south-east  of  Rotterdam,  and  road  and  rail  bridges  at  Moerdijk, 
Dordrecht  and  in  Rotterdam  itself,  thereby  providing  an  avenue  of  attack  into  Western 
Belgium  and  the  Channel  ports.  7  The  bridge  at  Rotterdam  was  to  be  seized  by  a  coup-de- William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  64 
main,  utilising  twelve  Luftwaffe  Heinkel  He  59  seaplanes  to  deliver  troops  from  22nd 
8 
Luf1lande  directly  onto  their  objective. 
These  operations  were  tactically  and  geographically  disparate,  and  reflect  the  broad-brush 
nature  of  German  airborne  doctrine.  As  such,  they  were  a  blend  of  the  original  Luftwaffe 
concept  of  a  small  airborne  sabotage  force,  the  Heer's  view  of  parachute  forces  as  a 
spearhead  for  air  landing  operations,  and  Student's  more  radical  concept  of  an  independent, 
all-arms  airborne  force  to  operate  in  support  of  major  ground  operations.  9  Assault 
Detachment  Kochs  mission  was  thus  essentially  an  expanded  coup-de-main  sabotage 
mission  carried  out  in  support  of  ground  operations,  an  amalgam  of  the  original  Luftwaffe 
and  Heer  concepts.  Group  Norths  mission  was  a  blend  of  the  Heer's  concept  modified 
with  Student's  idea  of  airborne  troops  as  a  shock  force  as  advocated  in  his  "drops  of  oil" 
technique,  while  that  of  Group  South  was  a  similar  mix  to  Group  North's,  with  an 
additional  coup-de-main  element.  In  the  event,  Assault  Detachment  Koch  and  Group 
South  were  largely  successfid,  whilst  Group  NortWs  operation  proved  to  be  a  costly  failure. 
The  almost  total  success  of  Assault  Detachment  Koch  was  due  to  a  combination  of 
surprise  (the  operation  marked  the  first  combat  use  of  gliders),  reinforced  by  meticulous 
,  and  painstaking  training  and  rehearsal.  The  unit  had  practised  full-scale  assaults  with  live 
ammunition  and  explosives  on  former  Czechoslovak  fixed  defences.  Experience  gained 
from  these  exercises  allowed  the  fabrication  of  special  armour-piercing  shaped  charges  to 
penetrate  Eben  Emael's  armoured  gun  cupolas.  10  The  value  and  quality  of  this  preparation 
is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  initial  phase  of  the  assault  succeeded  without  its  designated 
commander,  Leutnant  Witzig.  Witzig  force-landed  in  Germany  after  his  tug  aircraft 
jettisoned  the  tow  to  avoid  a  collision  in  the  pre-dawn  darkness;  he  arrived  later,  in  broad 
daylight  and  before  the  fortress  was  fully  subdued,  having  personally  secured  a 
replacement  tug  aircraft  for  his  glider.  "  Group  s  Concrete  and  Steel  succeeded  in  seizing 
their  allotted  bridges  over  the  Albert  Canal,  whilst  Group  Irorfs  target  was  demolished  by 
its  defenders  during  their  glider  approach,  leaving  that  Group  to  establish  a  bridgehead 
instead.  All  three  units  held  on  to  their  objectives  until  relieved  by  ground  forces  on  the 
afternoon  of  10  May  1940,  whilst  Group  Granite  was  eventually  reinforced  by  a  unit  of 
Heer  engineers  at  around  0700  hours  on  11  May  1940.  The  Eben  Emael  fortress  and  its 
garrison  of  1,200  men  surrendered  at  13.15  the  same  day.  12 
Surprise  was  also  crucial  to  the  success  of  Group  South,  reinforced  by  accurate  delivery 
of  the  assault  forces.  Student,  although  nominally  in  charge  of  Group  North  and  South, 
jumped  in  with  the  second  wave  of  Group  South.  This  act,  whilst  undoubtedly  courageous, William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  65 
can  also  be  regarded  as  rather  foolhardy,  and  highlights  a  particular  dilemma  faced  by 
airborne  commanders,  in  addition  to  the  routine  but  nonetheless  demanding  command  and 
control  problems  that  can  hamstring  any  military  operation.  The  presence  of  a  senior 
commander  in  the  initial  assault  risks  his  loss  should  the  initial  assault  go  awry,  yet  delay 
can  fatally  compromise  a  commander's  ability  to  influence  events  with  equally  catastrophic 
results.  In  Student's  case,  leading  from  the  front  had  drastic  consequences,  for  he  was 
severely  wounded  in  the  head  by  trigger-happy  members  of  the  SS  LeibstandarteAdoý' 
Hitler  in  the  closing  stages  of  the  battle  for  Rotterdam.  This  also  highlights  the  very  real 
dangers  associated  with  placing  airborne  troops  in  front  of  advancing  ground  forces.  13 
Group  South  succeeded  in  seizing  the  airfield  at  Waalhaven  with  an  imaginative  parallel 
assault.  Paratroops  were  dropped  along  the  edges  of  the  airfield,  and  once  their  activities 
had  drawn  the  attention  of  the  defenders,  transport  aircraft  landed  troops  directly  onto  the 
runway.  This  operation  was  carried  out  under  fire  and  several  aircraft  crash-landed,  but 
within  a  matter  of  minutes  an  entire  infantry  battalion  was  on  the  ground  and  the  airfield 
was  secured  shortly  thereafter.  The  seaplane  coup-de-main  against  the  bridges  in 
Rotterdam  and  the  parachute  assaults  on  the  bridges  at  Moerdijk  and  Dordrecht  were  also 
largely  successful.  However,  all  the  units  involved  and  those  from  Waalhaven  attempting 
to  link  up  with  the  defenders  of  the  Rotterdam  bridges  became  embroiled  in  street-fighting, 
which  continued  until  they  were  all  relieved  by  the  9th  Panzer  Division  on  13  May  1940.14 
Thus  Assault  Detachment  Koch  and  Group  South  both  achieved  their  primary  aim,  that  of 
enabling  German  ground  forces  "...  to  burst  through  a  defence  system  which  could  not  have 
been  overcome  so  quickly  by  traditional  means".  15 
Group  North  did  not  achieve  a  comparable  degree  of  success  due  to  a  combination  of 
factors.  The  Dutch  defenders  were  alert  to  the  possibility  of  airborne  attack,  and  had 
reinforced  airfield  defences  and  obstructed  runways.  Flawed  operating  procedures  and 
plain  bad  luck  exacerbated  this.  The  parachute  drop  at  Ockenburg  and  Ypenburg  airfields 
was  scattered,  and  the  paratroopers  were  unable  to  recover  their  weapons  containers  before 
the  first  transport  aircraft  arrived.  The  latter  then  tried  to  land  on  the  unsecured  runways, 
with  predictable  results.  16  Anti-aircraft  defences  took  a  heavy  toll,  and  many  aircraft  were 
obliged  to  land  instead  on  roads,  fields  and  beaches.  As  a  result,  few  of  their  passengers 
were  able  to  reach  their  initial  objectives.  The  parachute  spearhead  at  Valkenburg  fared 
better,  but  the  ground  there  was  too  soft  to  support  a  fully  laden  Junkers  52,  and  the  field 
was  rapidly  blocked  by  bogged  aircraft.  The  last  wave  of  transports  was  diverted  to 
Waalhaven,  in  Group  Souths  area.  As  a  result  of  all  this,  the  attack  on  The  Hague  was William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  66 
abandoned,  and  the  remnants  of  Group  North  moved  to  link  up  with  Group  South,  arriving 
at  Rotterdam  on  the  night  of  12-13  May  1940.17 
Group  North's  operation  was  thus  a  costly  failure,  as  a  German  source  acknowledges: 
"Of  the  430  Ju-52s  engaged  in  the  [whole]  operation  two-thirds  either  never 
returned  from  Holland  or  were  so  badly  damaged  as  to  be  write  offs.  The 
special  purpose  [group]  KGzb  V2,  during  the  landing  attempts  in  The  Hague 
area,  lost  ninety  per  cent  of  its  aircraft.  The  Dutch  airfields  [and  roads,  fields 
and  beaches]  were  littered  with  broken  and  burnt-out  wrecks.  "18 
The  toll  was  not  restricted  to  equipment,  for  22nd  Luftlande  Division  lost  forty  per  cent  of 
its  officers  and  twenty-eight  per  cent  of  its  other  ranks  killed,  19  along  with  some  1,600 
prisoners,  many  of  whom  were  shipped  to  Britain  for  incarceration.  Given  the  failure  of 
Group  North,  the  majority  of  these  prisoners  were  presumably  from  22nd  Luftlande,  a 
suggestion  reinforced  by  contemporary  photographic  evidence.  On  20  May  1940  The 
Times  published  a  picture  captioned  as  showing  German  airborne  troops  captured  in 
Holland,  all  of  whom  were  wearing  Heer  uniform.  The  accompanying  text,  however, 
specifically  referred  to  the  capture  of  parachute  troops  with  their  special  equipment.  20  At 
least  some  paratroopers  were  also  captured.  A  subsequent  photograph  in  The  Times  on 
showed  a  group  of  six  Fallschirmjdger  wearing  several  items  of  special  airborne 
equipment,  allegedly  developed  from  a  camera  belonging  to  a  parachute  POW  captured  in 
Holland.  21 
The  impact  of  the  German  airborne  operations  in  the  Low  Countries  was  considerable, 
but  their  scope  and  operational  variations  made  it  difficult  for  contemporary  observers  to 
form  an  accurate  picture  of  what  had  occurred.  The  results  ranged  from  understandable 
misunderstanding  to  wild  exaggeration  of  German  airborne  capabilities.  22  For  example, 
Otway's  official  account  of  British  Airborne  Forces  claimed  that  Witzig's  engineers 
parachuted  onto  Eben  Emael  and  were  reinforced  by  glider-23  The  uncertainty  was 
heightened  by  deliberate  German  misinformation.  The  tug  aircraft  that  delivered  Assault 
Group  Koch  dropped  dummy  paratroops  with  attached  pyrotechnic  devices  to  simulate 
gunfire.  These  sowed  confusion  behind  the  Belgian  lines,  24  and  presumably  account  for 
Otway's  error. 
Nonetheless,  the  British  were  able  to  gain  enough  information  on  German  operational 
practices  and  equipment  to  guide  their  own  initial  airborne  effort.  British  paratroops  were 
initially  equipped  with  step-in  cotton  duck  jump  smocks  and  bigh-leg  side-laced  boots 
modelled  closely  on  German  equipment,  25  and  the  pyrotechnic  dummy  idea  was  also  noted William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  67 
for  future  reference.  Similar  devices  were  employed  during  Allied  airborne  operations  in 
Sicily  in  1943,  and  in  Normandy  the  following  year.  26  In  addition,  the  German  attack  on 
Eben  Emael  and  a  subsequent  coup-de-main  operation  to  seize  the  Corinth  Canal  crossings 
in  Greece  in  1941  inspired  a  comparable  British  operation.  This  was  the  seizure  of  the 
Orne  River  and  Canal  bridges  on  the  eve  of  the  D-Day  landings  in  June  1944,  to  seal  the 
eastern  flank  of  the  invasion  beaches.  27  The  German  model  also  presumably  accounted  for 
the  formation  of  brigade-size  "Acrodrome  Capture  Groups",  which  featured  in  early 
British  airborne  planning.  28 
It  would  also  appear  that  the  British  were  quicker  than  the  Germans  to  draw  the 
appropriate  conclusions  from  the  Low  Countries  example.  German  paratroops  continued 
to  drop  separately  from  their  weapons,  although  this  was  in  part  due  to  the  limitations  of 
German  parachutes  and  transport  aircraft.  29  In  contrast,  by  the  time  of  their  large-scale 
operations,  British  parachute  troops  were  equipped  with  a  variety  of  special  weapon 
sleeves  and  valises  that  allowed  them  to  jump  with  all  issued  personal  weapons,  including 
Sten  guns,  Lee  Enfield  rifles  and  Bren  light  machine-guns.  30  It  also  appears  that  the 
Luftwaffe  learned  little  from  their  severe  aircraft  losses,  given  that  they  tried  an  assault  air 
landing  against  unsubdued  defences  again  at  Maleme  airfield  on  Crete  the  following  year, 
and  with  similar  results.  Their  British  counterparts,  on  the  other  hand,  turned  to  gliders  to 
deploy  its  "airlanding"  troops  in  units  of  up  to  brigade  size.  The  52nd  Lowland  Division 
was  at  one  point  configured  as  an  "airportable"  unit,  31  although  it  was  never  operationally 
deployed  in  that  capacity. 
This  particular  instance  was  arguably  a  case  of  the  British  learning  a  lesson  too  well.  The 
52nd  Lowland  was  slated  for  delivery  to  Deelen  airfield  north  of  Arnhem  in  the  latter 
stages  of  Operation  Market-Garden,  the  ill-fated  attempt  by  the  British  I  st  Airborne 
Division  to  seize  crossings  over  the  Dutch  River  Rhine  in  September  1944.32  The  failure 
of  I  st  Airborne  to  achieve  its  primary  objective  rendered  that  part  of  the  operation 
superfluous.  However,  it  could  be  argued  that  had  I  st  Airborne  Division  been  employed  to 
set  up  an  airhead  at  Deelen  instead,  in  conjunction  with  glider  coup-de-main  operations  to 
seize  the  river  crossings,  Operation  Market-Garden  might  have  turned  out  very  differently, 
the  presence  of  two  depleted  SS  Panzer  formations  notwithstanding. 
These  developments  lay  far  in  the  future  from  the  dark  perspective  of  May  and  June  1940. 
In  the  circumstances,  both  the  Army  and  RAF  would  have  been  fully  justified  in 
concentrating  upon  more  pressing  matters,  not  least  the  perceived  threat  of  imminent 
invasion.  It  was  thus  left  to  Churchill  to  take  the  initiative,  and  his  offensive  proposals William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  68 
following  the  defeat  and  evacuation  of  the  BEF  included  the  creation  of  a  parachute  force. 
His  sponsorship  of  the  idea,  however  vague,  therefore  obliged  the  Army  and  RAF  to 
investigate  the  matter.  Before  analysing  Churchill's  proposals,  it  will  first  be  necessary 
briefly  to  examine  the  impact  of  the  defeat  in  France  upon  those  two  services,  in  order  to 
set  both  the  proposals  and  Army  and  RAF  reactions  in  their  proper  context. 
1l.  -  The  Impact  of  Defeat  One:  The  Army  in  France  and  Belgium,  10  May-4 
JuneI940 
The  events  of  May  and  June  1940  undoubtedly  impacted  heaviest  upon  the  Army.  Mere 
fractions  of  the  deployed  equipment  and  supplies  were  salvaged;  322  from  2,794  artillery 
pieces,  4,739  from  68,618  vehicles,  32,303  from  109,000  tons  of  ammunition,  33,060  from 
449,000  tons  of  other  stores  and  supplies,  and  1,071  from  166,000  tons  of  fuel.  Arguably 
more  importantly,  the  BEF  left  68,111  of  its  personnel  in  France,  killed,  missing  or  as 
pOWS.  33  The  scale  of  the  BEF's  defeat  would  suggest  that  the  shortcomings  in  the  Army's 
tactical  training  identified  in  the  1930s  had  gone  unaddressed.  In  September  1939  an 
officer  in  the  Directorate  of  Military  Training  predicted  that  the  current  conflict  would 
replicate  the  First  World  War  for  the  infantry,  unless  training  began  to  "...  appeal  to  his  [the 
soldier's]  intelligence",  with  emphasis  on  fieldcraft  to  allow  the  infantryman  to  become  a 
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...  stalker,  athlete  [and]  marksmaif  . 
This  view  was  remarkably  similar  in  content  and 
language  to  that  expressed  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Graham  Seton-Hutchinson  in  The  Army 
Quarterly  five  years  previously,  and  by  Liddell  Hart  before  that.  35 
All  this  would  appear  to  justify  then  Major-General  Montgomery's  typically  forthright 
opinion  that  "...  in  September  1939  the  British  Army  was  totally  unfit  to  fight  a  first-class 
war  on  the  Continent  of  Europe",  36  and  John  Terraine's  assertion  that 
"A  generation  of  senior  commanders  which  had  passed  through  the  First  World 
War  seemed  only  able  to  remember  the  great  static  battles  of  1915-17;  they 
forgot  how  fast  things  had  often  moved  in  1918  and  they  ignored  what  had 
happened  in  Poland  in  1939.07 
But  Montgomery  was  somewhat  over-egging  the  pudding  and,  whilst  Terraine's  conunents 
are  justified  to  a  degree,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  reality  from  hindsight.  The  Army 
undoubtedly  suffered  a  ma  or  and  humiliating  defeat,  and  perhaps  had  more  than  its  share  i 
of  faults.  However,  there  is  a  good  deal  of  evidence  to  support  the  argument  that  the  BEF 
was  by  no  means  as  rigid  and  hidebound  as  it  is  often  portrayed,  and  that  its  defeat  was  in 
part  due  to  circumstances  beyond  the  Army's  control.  It  will  be  necessary  examine  this 
evidence  for  two  reasons.  First,  because  it  is  unfair  and  inaccurate  to  lay  all  the  blame  for William  IF  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  69 
the  defeat  at  the  Army's  door.  Second,  and  more  importantly,  because  such  an  examination 
confirms  that  the  Army  was  in  fact  flexible  enough  to  recognise  and  adopt  new  ideas,  a 
vital  factor  in  the  subsequent  establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force. 
First,  whatever  the  Army's  flaws  and  the  views  of  military  commentators  in  the  1930s, 
there  appears  to  have  been  little  wrong  with  the  Army's  basic  raw  material  in  1940.  It  may 
be  exaggerating  to  claim  that  the  BEF's  infantrymen  "...  constituted  the  best  disciplined, 
best  led,  man  for  man  the  best  infantry  in  the  world  ... 
[who  maintained]  ...  an  incredible 
sense  ofpersonal  superiority"  (original  italics) 
'38 
but  they  did  nonetheless  give  a  very 
creditable  account  of  themselves.  The  SS  Leibstandarte  AdojCffitler,  for  example, 
credited  the  British  troops  they  encountered  with  providing  "...  the  most  severe  opposition 
the  SS  had  encountered  ...  [which]  ...  was  thought  ...  to  be  maintained  by  first-class,  elite 
troops".  39  In  fact,  the  troops  referred  to  were  Territorial  rather  than  Regular  soldiers, 
which  emphasises  the  basic  qualitative  point.  This  is  not  to  deny  that  there  were  serious' 
flaws  slightly  higher  up  the  tree.  The  BEF  despatched  to  France  in  September  1939  bore 
little  relation  to  its  1914  predecessor,  and  not  just  because  Regular  units  ultimately  formed 
a  minority  within  its  ranks,  augmented  by  Territorial  volunteers.  Unlike  1914,  the  Regular 
Army's  "...  quality  and  leadership  [were]  often  flabby  and  defective 
... 
[and  whilst]  Regular 
units  possessed  a  basic  discipline  and  standard  of  administration  ...  Territorial  units  had 
...  too 
little  time  to  acquire,  and  too  little  experience  to  develop  [similar  capabilities  of  their 
own]  91.40  Operational  conditions  exacerbated  these  problems: 
46 
...  as  the  French  insisted  on  wireless  silence,  there  could  be  no  Command  Post 
Exercises  to  practise  communications  and  control,  of  the  kind  vital  to  give 
cohesion  to  an  Army  ...  much  of  the  Army  was  not  equipped  for  modem  war  at 
all  ...  the  Regular  divisions  themselves  suffered  a  shortage  of  vital  specialist 
weapons,  of  ammunition,  of  spare  parts,  of  communications;  but  above  all  of 
tanks  ...  there  was  totally  inadequate  air  support  ...  [thus  in  real  terms]  the  BEF 
was  an  infantry  force,  albeit  with  a  great  deal  of  motor  transport"  . 
41 
The  crux  of  all  these  problems  Jay  in  years  of  mismanagement  and  fiscal  neglect,  and  it 
was  unreasonable  to  expect  the  BEF  to  right  them  in  a  matter  of  months,  and  under  war 
conditions. 
The  BEF's  problems  were  magnified  by  uncertainty  generated  from  several  quarters.  The 
BEF  represented  only  around  a  tenth  of  the  combined  Anglo-French  strength,  42  and  it  was 
logical  that  the  British  force  should  thus  play  a  subordinate  role.  However,  contact  with 
French  forces  aroused  British  concern  over  their  mettle  and  reliability,  even  in  a 
Francophile  like  then  Lieutenant-General  Brooke,  who  noted  his  rnisgivings  as  early  as William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  70 
November  1939.43  This  was  exacerbated  further  by  the  defensive  scheme  to  which  the 
BEF  was  committed.  Codenamed  'Tlan  D",  this  required  the  BEF  to  advance  to  meet  any 
German  attack  into  Belgium  and  set  up  a  defensive  line  along  the  River  Dyle  to  the  East  of 
Brussels,  but  only  after  formal  invitation  from  the  Belgian  government.  The  Belgians  were 
understandably  wary  of  provoking  the  Germans,  but  their  failure  to  prepare  proper 
positions  for  the  BEF  to  occupy,  or  to  liaise  effectively  with  the  French  and  British 
commands  placed  the  BEF  at  a  severe  disadvantage.  44  In  addition,  the  BEF's  London 
masters  made  their  own  contribution  to  the  climate  of  uncertainty.  BEF  units  were 
allocated  for  Churchill's  abortive  scheme  to  aid  Finland  against  the  Soviet  Union,  the 
BEF's  Sth  Division  was  removed  to  create  a  "War  Office  Reserve"  in  April  1940,  and  still 
more  units  and  equipment  were  diverted  for  the  ill-fated  Norway  expedition.  45 
It  is  also  difficult  to  condemn  the  BEF's  leadership  for  its  failure  to  predict  the  form  of  the 
German  attack.  The  Chiefs'of  Staff  assumption  that  any  German  offensive  would  be  a  re- 
run  of  the  1914  version  of  the  Schlieffen  Plan  was  misplaced,  46  but  their  French  superiors 
shared  it.  The  French  High  Command  initially  acknowledged  the  possibility  of  an  assault 
through  the  Ardennes,  but  then  reverted  to  "...  the  belief  that  the  Ardennes  were  impassable, 
ý  47 
an  assumption  ... 
invested  with  all  the  prestige  of  Foch  and  Petain.  This  also  reinforced 
French  faith  in  the  impregnability  of  the  Verdun-inspired  Maginot  Line.  48  These 
assumptions  were  further  reinforced  by  intelligence  obtained  from  a  force-landed  German 
aircraft  on  10  January  1940.49 
Consequently,  the  BEF's  planning  and  dispositions  were  framed  by  factors  outside  its 
control,  and  that  its  efforts  were  based  upon  the  best  information  currently  available.  Any 
error  was  therefore  due  as  much  to  a  lack  of  relevant  intelligence  as  faulty  military 
appreciation.  As  an  authority  on  intelligence  succinctly  puts  it: 
"The  chief  reasons  for  the  oversight  [i.  e.  misjudging  the  location  of  the  main 
German  offensive  in  May  1940]  were  two-fold.  Certain  preconceptions,  based 
on  other  considerations  than  intelligence,  kept  attention  elsewhere. 
Intelligence  was  unable  to  unearth  sufficient  information  to  undermine  these 
preconceptions.  "'O 
It  is  also  important  to  acknowledge  that  the  Army  made  an  effort  to  rectify  identified 
failings.  For  example,  the  War  Office  issued  a  new  Military  Training  Pamphlet  (MTP)  in 
March  1940.51  In  combination  with  a  re-organisation  of  the  infantry  platoon  structure  this 
"...  had  the  highly  significant  effect  of  turning  the  corporal  in  charge  of  a  section  [the  basic 
tactical  platoon  sub-unit]  from  a  mere  subordinate  leader  into  a  commander  in  his  own 
right,  with  two  tactical  components  to  co-ordinate".  52  This  impulse  eventually  led  to  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  71 
establishment  of  a  central  School  of  Infantry  in  October  1942,  building  upon  the  success  of 
Divisional  Battle  Schools  modelled  on  similar  First  World  War  organisations.  The  process 
was  hampered  by  a  reactionary  tendency  in  some  quarters  within  the  Army  to  shoot  the 
messenger  rather  than  heed  his  message.  53  Although  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  overstate  the 
significance  of  the  March  1940  initiative,  for  the  infantry  continued  to  draw  criticism, 
particularly  following  the  D-Day  invasion  in  June  1944,54  the  fact  remains  that  the  Army 
made  at  least  some  effort  to  put  its  tactical  training  in  order  before  the  Dunkirk  debacle. 
Similarly,  a  number  of  officers  in  the  BEF  were  subsequently  to  distinguish  themselves, 
55 
many  of  whom  had  also  participated  in  the  fast  moving  tactical  successes  of  1918. 
indeed,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  German  tactics  employed  with  such  devastating  effect  in 
1940  were  merely  a  more  refined  and  technologically  advanced  variation  on  the  British 
1918  theme.  The  degree  to  which  German  armoured  doctrine  was  influenced  by  British 
pioneers  has  been  challenged  by  recent  research,  56  but  the  armoured  counter-attack  at 
Arras  on  21  May  1940  clearly  shows  that  the  British  Army  nonetheless  possessed 
something  of  the  necessary  expertise.  The  fact  that  the  attack  was  led,  literally,  by  Martel 
(also  a  First  World  War  veteran)  from  an  open  car  a  la  Rommel  or  Guderian  reinforces  the 
57 
point. 
All  this  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  the  Army  suffered  a  comprehensive  defeat  and  was 
ignominiously  ejected  from  the  Continent  in  the  process.  It  does,  however,  show  that  the 
BEF  and  by  extension  the  Army  as  a  whole  was  not  as  rigid  and  hidebound  as  some 
portrayals  would  suggest.  The  most  conclusive  evidence  of  this  is  the  enthusiasm  with 
which  the  Army  reacted  to  Churchill's  directive  to  establish  a  parachute  force. 
The  Impact  of  Defeat  Two:  The  RAF  in  France  and  Belgium  10  MaY-4  June 
1940,  and  the  Effect  Upon  ArmpRAF  Relations 
The  RAF's  Advanced  Air  Striking  Force  (AASF)  and  BEF  Air  Component  suffered 
losses  proportionately  as  heavy  as  those  of  the  Army,  if  not  more  so.  "  RAF  casualties 
during  the  Battle  of  France  totalled  931  aircraft  and  1,526  killed,  missing  or captured.  The 
majority  of  these  casualties  were  aircrew.  59  Squadrons  equipped  with  the  Fairey  Battle 
bomber  were  particularly  hard  hit,  rapidly  suffering  a  fifty-six  per  cent  casualty  rate 
attacking  bridges  over  the  Meuse  at  Sedan,  which  obliged  a  switch  to  night  operations.  60 
Like  the  Army,  the  RAF  suffered  from  conflicting  priorities.  Until  July  1939  the  Air 
Ministry's  Home  Defence  planning  was  based  upon  the  premise  that  the  Luftwaffe  would 
be  operating  from  bases  inside  Germany,  61  but  the  rapid  German  advance  into  France  and William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  72 
the  Low  Countries  vastly  expanded  its  offensive  capabilities.  This  in  turn  obliged  the  RAF 
to  adjust  its  priorities,  for  it  simply  did  not  possess  the  resources  to  support  the  BEF  and 
defend  British  airspace.  Procurement  of  fighters  for  Home  Defence  had  been  a  pre-war 
bone  of  contention, 
62  and  the  minimum  considered  necessary  by  both  the  Air  Ministry  and 
Fighter  Command  was  eroded  by  assigning  fighters  to  the  AASF  and  BEF  Air 
Component.  63  Demand  for  fighter  support  reached  unsustainable  levels  by  15  May  1940, 
leaving  the  War  Cabinet  with  the  unenviable  task  of  choosing  between  Home  defence  and 
the  pleas  of  the  Army  and  their  Allies.  The  former  need  prevailed,  and  no  more  fighters 
were  despatched  to  France.  64  Fighter  cover  for  the  BEF,  such  as  it  was,  came  henceforth 
from  bases  in  the  south  of  England.  This  in  turn  fed  a  growing,  widespread  and  inaccurate 
perception  within  the  Army  that  it  had  been  let  down  by  the  RAF. 
The  problem  was  that  the  RAF  incurred  its  losses  largely  beyond  sight  of  the  BEF,  which 
understandably  contrasted  a  perceived  lack  of  RAF  activity  with  the  depredations  of  the 
Luftwaffe.  The  result  was  a  further  souring  of  Army-RAF  relations,  which  were  in  any 
case  frequently  far  from  cordial  . 
65  Alanbrooke  claimed  in  his  diary  that  he  "...  practically 
never  saw  a  [RAF]  fighter  during 
... 
[his] 
...  time  in  France",  66  and  made  numerous  references 
to  unopposed  German  air  attacks  upon  the  BEF,  an  implicit  criticism  in  itself  67  The  BEF,  s 
lower  echelons  were  less  circumspect.  One  RAF  participant  claimed  that  an  Army  officer 
informed  a  pilot  seeking  evacuation  at  Dunkirk  that  "...  all  boats  were  for  the  Army  and  not 
for  the  RAF",  68  whilst  another  recalled  receiving  "a  really  good  verbal  pasting"  from 
newly  evacuated  soldiers  at  London's  Victoria  station.  69 
These  Army  reactions  may  have  been  understandable,  but  they  were  unfair.  RAF  fighter 
aircraft,  frequently  outnumbered,  were  indeed  present  over  France,  but  their  activities 
increasingly  occurred  beyond  the  sight  of  ground  observers.  As  one  participant  pilot 
pointed  out: 
"What  Dunkirk  did  for  air  fighting  was  that  it  moved  the  fighting  ...  from  around 
7,000  to  10,000  feet,  straight  to  over  20,000  feet  in  about  four  days 
...  this  is  one 
of  the  reasons  I'm  sure  the  Army  often  said,  'where  are  these  fighter  pilotsT 
They  were  there  all  right  but  they  [the  Army]  couldn't  see  them.  ,  70 
Army  perceptions  of  the  matter  may  have  been  exacerbated  by  poor  aircraft  recognition.  A 
forced-landed  RAF  pilot  was  present  at  an  Army  brigade  headquarters  near  Dunkirk  during 
an  air-raid  alarm.  To  the  surprise  of  his  hosts  including  the  brigadier,  the  pilot  was  able 
categorically  to  identify  the  aircraft  concerned  as  belonging  to  the  RAF: William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  73 
"This  ...  astonished  the  Army  who  said  that  they  did  not  know  that  all  British 
fighters  had  the  under  surface  of  their  wings  on  one  side  painted  white  and  on 
the  other  painted  black.  They  said  they  had  frequently  seen  aircraft  with  these 
markings  and  did  not  realise  they  were  RAF 
...  at  the  time  of  Dunkirk  there  was 
...  much  distress  in  the  Army  because  they  were  not  being  protected  by  the 
RAF  ...  personally  I  think  that  at  least  part  of  the  explanation  must  be  that  there 
had  been  an  extraordinary  failure  by  British  Intelligence  in  that  at  a  unit  as 
important  as  a  brigade  headquarters  no  one  knew  the  standard  RAF 
markings. 
5971 
The  reality  of  the  RAF's  contribution  was  thus  somewhat  different  from  Army  perceptions, 
bruised  Army  sensibilities  notwithstanding.  Inter-Service  prejudice,  possibly  reinforced  by 
an  understandable  if  less  than  creditable  Army  desire  to  deflect  responsibility  for  its  defeat, 
proved  stronger  and  more  attractive  than  the  facts. 
That  said,  it  must  also  be  acknowledged  that  RAF  attitudes  did  little  to  alleviate  matters. 
The  Air  Ministry  made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  it  viewed  the  provision  of  air  support  for 
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ground  forces  to  be  a  "gross  misuse  of  air  forces'.  The  costly  RAF  actions  in  France 
were  thus  considered  an  unwelcome  distraction  from  what  the  Air  Ministry  saw  as  its 
primary  task  -  delivering  a  "knock-out  blow"  to  Germany's  war  making  capacity.  73  Its 
single-minded  adherence  to  this  view  is  well  illustrated  by  the  War  Cabinet  crisis  meeting 
held  on  15  May  1940.74  The  rapidly  worsening  situation  in  France  prompted  an  appeal 
from  the  Army  for  the  RAF  to  emulate  the  Luftwaffe  by  striking  with  all  possible  strength 
at  the  communication  centres  that  were  feeding  the  German  advance.  75  However,  the  Air 
Staff  considered  unleashing  a  strategic  air  offensive  against  the  Ruhr  to  be  a  more 
appropriate  course  of  action.  76  The  fact  that  this  was  supported  by  Dowding,  who  had 
fought  hard  against  the  bombing  lobby  to  establish  an  effective  Fighter  Command, 
underlines  the  extent  to  which  bombing  dogma  permeated  the  RAF.  77  Unsurprisingly,  the 
Army  was  unimpressed.  As  the  Chief  of  Imperial  General  Staff  (CIGS)  trenchantly 
observed  at  the  time,  if  "...  the  battle  [of  France]  is  lost,  the  bombing  of  the  Ruhr  means 
nothing  at  all  to  the  fate  of  the  Empire".  78 
The  RAF's  attitude  might  have  been  marginally  more  acceptable  had  it  possessed  the 
means  to  carry  out  such  a  strategic  bombing  offensive.  Unfortunately,  despite  RAF 
enthusiasm  and  grandioseclaims,  it  did  not.  In  September  1940,  Bomber  Command 
consisted  of  forty  operational  squadrons.  Admittedly,  attrition  in  France  had  largely 
removed  single-engine  machines  from  Bomber  Command's  inventory,  but  the  remainder 
was  still  unsatisfactory  for  strategic  bombing  purposes.  "  They  were  classified  as 
"medium"  or  "heavy  medium"bombers,  80  and  included  the  Bristol  Blenheim,  Handley 
Page  Hampden,  Armstrong  Whitworth  Whitley  and  Vickers  Wellington.  Collectively William  IF  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  74 
these  types  lacked  speed,  range,  defensive  armament  and  payload  for  strategic  bombing, 
albeit  in  varying  degrees.  The  larger  four-engine  Short  Stirling  heavy  bomber  was  in  the 
pipeline,  but  did  not  enter  squadron  service  until  August  1940,  and  was  not  operational 
until  the  following  February.  Even  then,  the  machine  had  an  "unimpressive  bomb-load" 
and  poor  service  ceiling.  81 
This  dearth  of  equipment  was  paralleled  by  a  lack  of  suitable  operating  procedures  and 
tactics.  Pre-war  faith  in  the  ability  of  bomber  formations  to  defend  themselves  against 
fighter  attack  proved  ludicrously  optimistic,  as  shown  by  the  fifty  per  cent  casualty  rate 
suffered  in  daylight  raids  during  1939.82  Shifting  by  necessity  to  night  bombing  threw  up 
as  many  problems  as  it  solved.  Not  least  of  these  was  the  matter  of  locating  the  target,  the 
difficulties  of  which  were  clearly  illustrated;  by  the  disappointing  results  of  Bomber 
Command's  first  night  strike  against  Hbmum  in  the  Friesian  Islands  on  19  March  1940. 
This  provided  "the  first  object  lesson  on  the  ineffectiveness  of  night  bombing,  with  the 
existing  lack  of  navigational  facilities.  vt83  There  was  clearly  much  to  be  done  before 
strategic  bombing  could  live  up  to  the  potential  claimed  by  the  RAF's  bombing  lobby. 
This  then  was  the  military  background  against  which  Churchill  ordered  the  establishment 
of  a  British  airborne  force.  The  underlying  condition  of  the  Army  was  not  as  bad  as  its 
defeat  in  France  suggested,  largely  due  to  its  innate  flexibility.  It  did,  however,  have  its 
work  cut  out  in  June  1940  preparing  for  seemingly  imminent  invasion  and  attempting  to 
repair  the  damage  incurred  at  Dunkirk.  The  position  of  the  RAF  was  similar,  insofar  as  it 
had  suffered  significant  losses  in  France,  but  was  also  preparing  to  repel  German  invasion. 
Relations  between  the  two  services  were  at  an  all  time  low.  The  Army  felt  that  it  had  been 
badly  let  down  by  the  RAF  in  France.  For  its  part,  the  RAF  was  impervious  to  Army 
hostility,  and  Was  happily  focusing  on  launching  a  long  planned  strategic  bombing 
offensive  against  Germany.  These  were  not  auspicious  conditions  in  which  to  launch  a 
new  inter-service  venture,  and  the  two  services'  individual  reactions  to  Churchill's 
directives  differed  significantly. 
IV.  Fiddling  While  Rome  Bumed.  -  Churchill's  Directives  of  June  1940 
Churchill  raised  the  subject  of  raising  raiding  and  parachute  forces  in  a  minute  to  the 
Military  Secretary  to  the  Cabinet,  General  Sir  Hastings  ismay,  on  3  June  1940.84  The 
Prime  Minister  expressed  concern  over  the  possibility  of  German  landings  from  both  the 
air  and  sea,  warned  against  the  dangers  of  adopting  the  "...  completely  defensive  habit  of William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  75 
mind  which  has  ruined  the  Frenclf',  and  postulated  on  the  possibilities  of  carrying  the 
offensive  back  to  the  Germans: 
"...  if  it  is  so  easy  for  the  Germans  to  invade  us  ...  why  should  it  be  thought 
impossible  for  us  to  do  anything  of  the  same  kind  to  them  ...  It  is  of  the  highest 
consequence  to  keep  the  largest  number  of  German  forces  all  along  the  coasts 
of  the  countries  they  have  conquered,  and  we  should  immediately  set  to  work 
to  organise  raiding  forces  ...  composed  of  the  self-contained,  thoroughly 
equipped  units  of  say  1,000  up  to  not  less  than  10,000  when  combined.  iM 
Churchill  expanded  on  his  offensive  theme  in  another  minute  to  Ismay  on  5  June  1940. 
This  called  for  the  appropriate  authorities  to  investigate  waYs  of  expediting  his 
suggestions,  and  recommended  that  yet-to-arrive  Australian  troops  be  divided  into: 
"...  detachments  of  250,  equipped  with  grenades,  trench  mortars,  tommy  guns, 
armoured  vehicles  and  the  like,  capable  of  acting  against  an  attack  in  this 
country  ... 
[and]  ... 
landing  on  the  friendly  coasts  now  held  by  the  enemy. 
Enterprises  must  be  prepared,  with  specially  trained  troops  of  the  hunter  class, 
who  can  develop  a  reign  of  terror  down  these  coasts,  first  of  all  on  the  'butcher 
and  bolt'policy,  but  later  on,  or  perhaps  as  soon  as  we  are  organised,  we  should 
surprise  Calais  or  Boulogne,  kill  or capture  the  Hun  garrison  and  hold  the  place 
until  all  the  preparations  to  reduce  it  by  siege  or  heavy  storm  have  been  made, 
and  then  away-I  look  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  the  Staff  to  propose  me  measures 
for  a  vigorous,  enteTrising  and  ceaseless  offensive  against  the  whole  German- 
occupied  coastline"  .6 
This  was  followed  by  a  list  of  five  specific  measures.  The  first  on  the  list  was  a  call  for 
proposals  for  organising  "striking  Companies"  [sic];  number  four  was  for  the  "deployment 
of  parachute  troops  on  a  scale  equal  to  5  00011.87 
The  immediate  purpose  of  the  new  raiding  force  was  thus  relatively  straightforward.  It 
was  to  inculcate  and  preserve  the  British  offensive  spirit,  by  prosecuting  a  "vigorous, 
enterprising  and  ceaseless  offensive  against  the  whole  German-occupied  coastline  [of 
Europe]  ,.  88  The  longer  term  purpose  of  the  force,  if  any,  and  the  precise  manner  in  which 
it  was  to  carry  out  its  mission  were  less  clear.  In  part,  this  was  because  Churchill's  modus 
operandi  was  to  frame  concepts  and  leave  the  details  to  others,  and  then  monitor  progress 
and  interfere  as  necessary.  In  this  instance,  the  new  raiders  were  formally  established  as 
Commando  units,  operating  under  an  independent  Combined  Operations  Headquarters  set 
up  especially  for  the  purpose.  The  Commandos  then  evolved  into  elite  light  infantry, 
capable  of  raiding  and  carrying  out  operations  in  support  of  more  conventional  units. 
Commando  units  were  instrumental  in  securing  the  left  flank  of  the  Normandy  beach-head 
on  D-Day,  for  example,  and  provided  half  the  initial  assault  wave  in  the  Rhine  crossing  of 
March  1945.89 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  76 
At  the  time  of  their  inception,  however,  this  line  of  development  was  by  no  means  clear. 
it  may  have  been  Churchill's  intention,  a  suggestion  supported  by  his  repeated  references 
to  the  inclusion  of  Australians,  New  Zealanders  and  Canadians  in  the  new  raiding  force. 
Troops  from  these  Commonwealth  nations  were  regularly  used  as  shock  troops  during  the 
First  World  War,  and  possibly  Churchill  continued  to  view  them  in  this  light,  in  the  same 
way  as  he  apparently  viewed  German  airborne  troops  as  a  more  up-to-date  version  of  First 
World  War  stormtroops.  90 
Churchill's  motive  for  issuing  his  requirement  for  a  raiding  force  is  similarly  obscure,  for 
whilst  the  impulse  was  laudable,  the  timing  was  anything  but.  In  part,  this  was  due  to  his 
character,  for  Churchill's  mental  resilience  and  capacity  for  work  displayed  incredible 
stamina  for  a  man  of  his  years,  along  with  a  high  degree  of  single-mindedness  and  an 
impressive  grasp  of  detail.  Unfortunately,  the  latter  quality  also  drove  him  to  expend 
energy  on  relative  trivia,  which  was  frequently  included  in  directives,  and  which  thus 
tended  to  obscure  the  underlying  point.  As  one  of  his  contemporaries  commented: 
"Winston's  ceaseless  industry  is  impressive.  He  is  always  having  ideas  which 
he  puts  down  on  paper  in  the  form  of  questions  and  despatches  to  Ismay  or  the 
CIGS  for  examination.  Sometimes  they  relate  to  matters  of  major  importance, 
such  as  the  measure  to  be  taken  against  invasion,  or  the  provision  of  more 
aeroplanes,  and  sometimes  they  relate  to  quite  trivial  questions.  This  is  the  sort 
of  thing:  "General  Ismay.  Inquire  into  the  number  of  German  guns  now 
trophies  in  this  country,  and  whether  any  can  be  reconditioned  for  blocking 
exits  from  beaches"...  Another  today  asked  whether  wax  could  be  supplied  to 
troops  to  put  in  their  ears  to  deaden  the  noise  of  warfare.  "91 
Churchill's  directives  to  establish  raiding  and  parachute  forces  could  therefore  have  formed 
part  of  a  mental  long-term  plan,  or  been  the  result  of  a  late-night  whim,  for  it  was  not 
unknown  for  him  to  work  from  his  bed.  92  It  is  also  possible  that  psychology  played  a  part, 
for  aggressive  scheming  would  appear  to  have  provided  Churchill  with  a  mental  safety 
valve  of  sorts,  and  directives  on  such  matters  frequently  mirrored  downturns  in  the  British 
military  situation.  The  minutes  of  3  and  5  June  1940,  for  example,  coincided  with  the 
official  cessation  of  the  Dunkirk  evacuation.  A  later  directive  specifically  regarding  the 
creation  of  parachute  troops,  dated  22  June  1940,93  followed  the  evacuation  of  all 
remaining  Allied  forces  from  the  Continent. 
Churchill's  sponsorship  of  a  parachute  force  was  unsurprising,  and  not  merely  due  to  the 
spectacular  German  demonstration  in  the  Low  Countries.  He  had  a  long-standing  interest 
in  the  air  deployment  of  troops,  and  had  theorised  on  the  subject  as  far  back  as  1917,  and 
again  in  1936.94  The  driver  for  his  1940  renewal  of  interest  is  apparent  in  his  minute  of  3 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  77 
June  1940:  "...  if  it  is  so  easy  for  the  Germans  to  invade  us  in  spite  of  sea-power  some  may 
feel  inclined  to  ask  the  question  -  why  should  it  be  thought  impossible  for  us  to  anything  of 
the  same  kind  to  them?  "95  This  is  clearly  a  reference  to  German  airborne  capability,  with 
the  implication  that  it  should  be  imitated.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  inclusion  of  the 
requirement  for  parachute  troops  in  the  minute  of  5  June  1940. 
This  minute  was  Churchill's  first  specific  reference  to  the  creation  of  a  British  airborne 
force,  although  airborne  matters  clearly  remained  in  his  thoughts  thereafter.  On  16  June 
1940  he  re-issued  his  1936  paper  "Invasion  by  Air",  as  part  of  a  demand  for  the  Home 
Defence  authorities  to  appraise  him  of  preparations  to  repulse  such  an  event.  96  He  returned 
to  the  subject  again  on  22  June  1940,  in  a  further  letter  to  Ismay: 
"We  ought  to  have  a  corps  of  at  least  5,000  parachute  troops,  including  a 
proportion  of  Canadians,  Australians  and  New  Zealanders,  together  with 
trustworthy  Norwegians  and  Frenchmen  ...  I  hear  something  is  being  done 
already  to  form  such  a  corps  but  only,  I  believe,  on  a  very  small  scale. 
Advantage  must  be  taken  of  the  summer  to  train  these  forces,  who  can  none  the 
less  play  their  part  meanwhile  as  shock  troops  in  home  defence.  Pray  let  me  07  have  a  note  from  the  War  Office  on  the  subject. 
There  can  thus  be  no  doubt  that  Churchill  wanted  a  parachute  force,  but  what  he  wanted  it 
for  is  less  certain.  The  characteristic  vagueness  of  his  directive  makes  it  difficult  to 
identify  any  specific  intent  for  such  a  parachute  force.  It  may  have  been  intended  for 
small-scale  raiding,  although  Churchill's  reaction  to  the  initial  low  level  of  activity 
suggests  differently,  or  as  shock  troops,  or as  a  large-scale  strategic  spearhead  on  the 
German  Low  Countries  model.  Churchill's  vagueness  may  also  have  been  deliberate,  to 
allow  the  individuals  tasked  with  carrying  out  his  proposals  latitude.  Whether  or  not,  it 
could  also  cause  confusion,  both  at  the  time  and  long  after  the  event. 
The  date  of  the  establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force  provides  a  clear  and  relevant 
illustration  of  this.  Otway's  official  Airborne  Forces,  The  Ministry  of  Information's  By 
Air  to  Battle,  and  Saunders'  semi-official  The  Red  Beret  all  cite  22  June  1940,  because 
of  Churchill's  memo  of  that  date.  98  However,  Churchill  referred  specifically  to  the  raising 
of  a  parachute  force  seventeen  days  earlier,  on  5  June  1940,  and  this  date  is  considered  to 
mark  the  beginning  in  some  later  works  on  the  subject.  99  The  point  is  open  to  individual 
interpretation,  but  it  clearly  illustrates  the  problems  inherent  in'Churchill's  method  of 
issuing  his  requirements.  Providing  the  spirit  of  a  given  directive  was  adhered  to,  this 
presented  no  great  problem,  but  ambiguity  was  a  two-edged  sword  because  it  allowed William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  78 
scope  for  obstruction  through  selective  interpretation,  a  practice  which  became  a  recurring 
theme  in  the  evolution  of  a  British  airborne  force. 
Churchill's  airborne  directives  may  have  been  vague,  but  it  does  not  necessarily  follow 
that  there  was  no  specific  purpose  behind  them.  There  is  a  tendency  to  link  the 
establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force  with  that  of  the  Commandos,  not  least  because 
they  both  came  from  the  same  directive.  This  is  an  understandable  assumption,  which  is 
supported  by  the  fact  that  the  Army's  first  parachute  unit  was  established  within  the 
Commando  raiding  umbrella.  It  is  further  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  the  first  British 
airborne  ventures,  against  the  Tragino,  Aqueduct  in  Southern  Italy  in  February  1941  and  the 
German  radar  station  at  Bruneval  in  February  1942,  were  small-scale  raiding  operations.  100 
However,  it  is  thus  equally  possible  that  the  assumed  association  between  the 
establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force  and  a  sea-borne  raiding  force  is  exactly  that,  and 
their  simultaneous  appearance  in  the  directive  of  5  June  1940  could  be  entirely 
coincidental.  Both  measures  were  undoubtedly  offensive  in  nature,  and  the  initial  placing 
of  the  parachute  force  within  the  Commando  framework  could  have  been  for 
administrative  convenience  rather  than  any  intent  to  use  it  exclusively  for  raiding. 
similarly,  the  fact  that  the  first  two  British  parachute  operations  were  raids  is  as  indicative 
of  development  levels,  inter-service  politics  and  operational  opportunity  as  of  any 
inclusion  in  any  grand  raiding  design. 
it  is  therefore  perfectly  possible  that  Churchill  was  thinking  big  from  the  outset,  literally 
and  metaphorically,  and  the  evidence  for  this  view  can  be  seen  in  his  directives.  The  initial 
raiding  directive  of  3  June  1940  suggested  the  formation  of  an  unspecified  number  of 
raiding  units  totalling  10,000  men  "when  combined".  How  these  raiders  were  to  be 
delivered  was  not  specified,  although  the  wording  suggests  by  sea.  101  This  is  supported  by 
the  content  of  his  directive  of  5  June  1940,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  Churchill 
was  referring  to  this  10,000  strong  force  of  raiders  when  he  called  for  "proposals  for 
organizing  the  striking  Companies".  The  same  directive  ordered  the  "deployment  of 
parachute  troops  on  a  scale  equal  to  5,000".  Had  Churchill  intended  these  to  be  included  in 
the  10,000  raiding  force,  it  would  have  been  logical  to  include  this  as  part  of  the  first 
measure  on  his  list  of  recommendations,  or  at  least  to  place  it  at  number  two.  The  fact  that 
it  was  separated  by  orders  as  dissimilar  as  investigating  means  for  delivering  tanks  over 
beaches  and  setting  up  espionage  and  intelligence  networks  along  enemy  held  coasts 
suggests  that  the  two  ideas  should  be  regarded  distinct  entities.  It  should  also  be  noted  that 
5,000  men  is  a  relatively  large  force  which,  although  it  did  not  fit  into  any  existing  British 
military  organisation,  was  half  as  large  as  the  projected  ceiling  for  the  new  raiding  force.  102 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  3  79 
Churchill's  later  directives  also  support  the  thesis  that  he  was  thinking  big.  His  directive 
of  22  June  1940  re-iterated  the  demand  for  5,000  parachute  troops,  and  demanded  details 
from  the  War  Office  of  how  this  requirement  was  to  be  met.  103  He  also  stuck  to  his 
original  figure  when  informed  that  the  parachute  force  only  numbered  500  in  August  1940, 
scrawling  "I  said  5000"  in  the  margin  of  the  offending  document.  104  The  biggest  clue  to 
Churchill's  initial  airborne  intentions  appeared  in  a  letter  to  Ismay  at  the  end  of  May  194  1, 
following  the  furore  generated  by  the  lack  of  progress  evident  on  a  visit  to  the  Parachute 
Training  Centre  at  RAF  Ringway  on  26  April  194  1.  In  this  he  lamented  the  fact  that 
British  airborne  progress  constantly  lagged  behind  that  of  the  Germans,  and  pointed  out 
that  "we  ought  to  have  5,000  parachutists  and  an  Air-borne  division  on  the  German  model, 
with  any  improvements  which  might  suggest  themselves  from  experience".  105  This  would 
indicate  that  by  this  date  at  least,  if  not  before,  Churchill  did  not  intend  a  British  airborne 
force  to  operate  in  a  raiding  role,  except  perhaps  as  a  temporary  expedient.  Rather,  it 
would  appear  that  he  intended  them  to  be  used  in  the  perceived  German  manner,  in  support 
of  conventional  operations. 
Of  course,  much  of  this  is  conjecture,  and  it  is  getting  somewhat  ahead  of  the  story.  What 
is  certain  is  that  Churchill  proposed  a  host  of  offensive  measures  to  carry  the  war  back  to 
the  Germans  following  the  evacuation  of  Dunkirk,  and  that  two  of  those  measures  were  the 
establishment  of  a  raiding  force  and  a  parachute  force,  possibly  for  the  same  purpose.  The 
matter  then  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  organisations  charged  with  turning  Churchill's 
theorising  into  an  operational  reality,  and  it  will  now  be  necessary  to  examine  the  reactions 
of  the  Air  Ministry  and  the  War  Office  to  Churchill's  directives. 
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CHAPTER  FOUR 
Immediate  Reactions:  Churchill's  Directives,  the  Army, 
and  the  RAF,  4  June  -  15  July  1940 
As  might  be  expected,  the  reactions  of  the  War  Office  and  the  Air  Ministry  to  Churchill's 
parachute  directive  of  5  June  1940  varied  considerably,  although  not  necessarily  in  the  way 
that  the  individual  circumstances  of  the  two  arms  would  have  suggested.  This  chapter  will 
therefore  examine  immediate  Army  and  RAF  reactions  to  the  parachute  directive.  These 
merit  close  and  specific  examination,  because  they  set  the  tone  not  only  for  the 
establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force,  but  also  for  its  subsequent  development.  The 
chapter  will  then  detail  the  initial  development  of  measures  initiated  by  both  services  to 
meet  the  parachute  requirement. 
1.  Coincidental  with  a  Shifting  of  Attitudes:  The  Army's  Immediate  Reaction 
to  Churchill's  Raiding  and  Parachute  Directives 
The  Army  could  have  been  forgiven  for  reacting  badly  to  Churchill's  directives,  given  its 
straitened  circumstances  following  the  evacuation  from  the  Continent.  However,  the  War 
Office  accepted  them  with  equanimity,  if  not  outright  enthusiasm,  a  reaction  which  merits 
explanation.  There  were  two  major  reasons  for  this.  First,  the  idea  of  a  raiding  force 
dovetailed  into  a  pre-existing  War  Office  interest  in  irregular  operations.  This  dated  from 
the  mid-1930s,  when  the  General  Staff  (Research)  (GS(R))  section  was  established  with  a 
staff  of  two.  Major  J.  C.  F.  Holland  RE,  GS(R)'s  second  commander,  launched  an 
investigation  into  guerrilla  operations  in  future  wars  in  1938,  prompted  by  personal  service 
in  the  Middle  East  during  the  First  World  War,  service  in  Ireland  in  the  early  1920s,  and  by 
events  in  Spain  and  China.  This  change  of  Army  focus  was  paralleled  by  the  Foreign 
office  which,  prompted  by  the  rapidly  deteriorating  situation  in  Europe,  also  established 
two  departments  for  the  same  purpose  in  1938.  These  were  named  EH  and  Section  D, 
which  were  to  "...  investigate  every  possibility  of  attacking  potential  enemies  by  means 
other  than  the  operations  of  military  forces".  ' 
GS(R)  was  expanded  and  renamed  Military  Intelligence  (Research)  (MI(R))  in  1939,  and 
Major  Colin  Gubbins  MC  joined  the  department  in  April  that  year.  Gubbins  had  a 
background  in  irregular  warfare  beginning  in  Russia  in  1919,  subsequently  in  Ireland. 
mI(R)  was  authorised  to  pursue  three  specific  tasks:  "To  study  guerrilla  methods  and 
produce  a  guerrilla  FSR;  To  evolve  destructive  devices 
...  suitable  for  use  by  guerrillas'; 
[and]  To  evolve  procedure  and  machinery  for  operating  guerrilla  activities,  if  it  should  be 
decided  to  do  so  subsequently".  2  Gubbins  produced  three  pamphlets,  entitled  "The  Art  of William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  86 
Guerrilla  Warfare",  "How  to  Use  High  Explosivee',  and  "The  Partisan  Leader's 
Handboole'.  He  also  travelled  covertly  to  Rumania,  Poland  and  the  Baltic  States  to 
investigate  the  "...  possibilities  of  guerrilla  action  among  Germany's  eastern  neighbours", 
and  was  attached  to  the  British  military  mission  in  Warsaw  under  MI(R)  auspices  on  25 
August  1939.3  MI(R)s  irregular  work  expanded  with  the  outbreak  of  war.  It  was  involved 
in  an  abortive  scheme  to  send  a  ski  battalion  to  Finland  and  formed  "Guerrilla  Companies" 
to  serve  in  Scandinavia  following  the  German  invasion  in  April  1940,  commanded  by 
Gubbins.  4  Renamed  "Special  Infantry  Companies"  and  finally  "Independent  Companies", 
ten  such  units  were  formed  in  mid-to-late  April  1940,  using  volunteers  drawn  from  second- 
line  Territorial  Army  Divisions.  Five  saw  action  in  Norway  before  evacuation  Scotland  by 
10  June  1940.5 
The  second  main  reason  for  the  Army's  favourable  reaction  to  Churchill's  raiding  and 
parachute  directives  was  because  the  Army  was  accustomed  to  co-operating  with  its  sibling 
services.  As  we  have  seen,  co-operation  with  the  RAF  in  the  empire  was  widespread  in  the 
inter-war  period,  and  the  Army  had  an  even  longer  record  of  amphibious  co-operation  with 
the  Royal  Navy  (RN)  that  pre-dated  the  First  World  War.  This  was  largely  ad  hoc  in 
nature  before  1914,  although  the  Gallipoli  landings  prompted  interest  in  more  formalised 
arrangements. 
6  The  impetus  for  this  was  handicapped  after  1918  by  a  divergence  between 
amphibious  theory  and  practice,  exacerbated  by  a  combination  of  funding  limitations  and  a 
perceived  lack  of  need  for  a  coherent  amphibious  strategy.  However,  interest  was 
maintained  through  low  level  contingency  planning,  mainly  through  the  staff  colleges, 
along  with  a  limited  amount  of  practical  work.  From  1924,  for  example,  small-scale 
amphibious  operations  were  carried  out  on  an  annual  basis,  and  a  new  Manual  of 
Combined  Operations  was  issued  in  1925.  In  1930  an  invasion  exercise  was  held  on  the 
Isle  of  Wight,  and  in  1934  the  Army's  5h  Division  carried  out  landings  on  the  Yorkshire 
coast,  including  tanks,  motor  landing  craft  and  smokescreens.  7 
inter-service  co-operation  received  a  boost  in  1936,  with  the  formation  of  a  committee  to 
revise  the  Combined  Operations  Manual.  The  committee  recommended  the  creation  of  a 
Deputy  Chiefs  of  Staff  Committee  on  Inter-Service  Training  (DCOS(IT)),  and  the 
establishment  of  the  Inter-Service  Training  and  Development  Centre  (ISTDC)  to  develop 
the  necessary  techniques  and  equipment.  Established  the  following  year,  the  DCOS  (IT) 
and  ISTDC  were  originally  intended  to  address  all  forms  of  inter-service  co-operation,  but 
in  the  event  became  focussed  exclusively  on  amphibious  matters  due  to  pressure  from  the 
Admiralty.  Both  the  War  Office  and  Air  Ministry  complained  about  the  preoccupation  of 
the  revised  Combined  Operations  Manual  with  amphibious  matters,  but  to  little  avail,  not William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  87 
least  because  the  rapidly  deteriorating  situation  in  Europe  diverted  attention  to  more 
8 
pressing  matters. 
Interestingly,  the  RAF  representative  to  the  DCOS(IT)  urged  the  inclusion  of  airborne 
troops  in  the  ISTDC  remit.  The  DCOS(IT)  issued  at  least  one  memo  on  the  matter,  and  it 
was  also  suggested  that  the  commandant  of  the  ISTDC  should  attend  French  parachute 
trials  in  1939.9  The  fact  that  the  French  disbanded  their  experimental  parachute  unit  that 
same  year  may  explain  why  the  matter  appears  to  have  lapsed,  10  although  the  Air  Ministry 
interest  explains  why  the  RAF  compiled  a  modest  store  of  intelligence  on  German  airborne 
forces  that  was  to  prove  useful  after  Churchill  issued  his  parachute  directive.  "  That  said, 
the  Air  Ministry  response  to  Churchill's  directive  detailed  below  does  not  suggest  that  it 
was  considering  the  formation  of  a  large-scale  airborne  force  on  the  German  model.  It  is 
therefore  more  likely  that  the  Air  Ministry  was  thinking  along  the  lines  of  a  small-scale 
sabotage  force  to  augment  Bomber  Command's  capabilities,  if  they  were  seriously 
considering  the  idea  at  all. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  the  War  Office  also  pre-empted  Churchill's  parachute  directive,  albeit 
by  a  much  narrower  margin.  The  driver  in  this  instance  was  the  public  interest  generated 
by  the  spectacular  German  airborne  demonstration  in  the  Low  Countries,  which  led  to  the 
matter  being  raised  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The  German  use  of  airborne  troops  caught 
the  British  public  imagination  in  a  big  way.  Every  issue  of  The  Times  between  II  and  22 
May  1940  contained  numerous  references  to  the  subject,  and  it  remained  a  popular  topic 
thereafter,  particularly  in  the  "Letters  to  the  Editor"  section.  These  included  fairly  accurate 
reporting  of  events,  12  erroneous  reports  of  German  paratroopers  in  Holland  wearing  British 
uniforms,  13  appeals  for  "country  gentlemen"  to  refrain  from  taking  "flying  or  running  shots 
at  ...  missionaries  of  Hitlerism.  dropping  from  the  skies",  14  and  optimistic  claims  that  the 
new  threat  had  been  successfully  mastered.  15 
Public  perceptions  of  the  threat  were  consequently  somewhat  muddled,  with  an 
understandable  tendency  to  confuse  paratroopers  with  Fifth  Columnists  in  a  variety  of 
"abominable"  disguises,  including  "...  nuns,  Red  Cross  nurses,  monks,  train  car  conductors, 
policemen  and  postmen7.16  Such  paranoia  was  not  a  uniquely  British  phenomenon.  A 
contemporary  Czech  writer  on  airborne  matters,  for  example,  claimed  to  have  first-hand 
evidence  of  similar  ploys  being  employed  at  Lowicz  in  Poland  on  4  September  1939. 
Three  "paratroops",  disguised  as  a  nun,  a  policeman  and  a  schoolboy,  were  apprehended 
after  all  three  were  found  to  be  bruised  from  their  parachute  harnesses;  the  nun  apparently 
compounded  her  error  by  wearing  silk  underwear.  17  The  source  and  veracity  of  such William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  88 
accounts  are  difficult  to  identify,  but  British  public  perception  of  the  airborne  threat  was 
sufficient  to  allow  Secretary  for  State  for  War  Anthony  Eden  to  appeal  successfully  for  the 
formation  of  Local  Defence  Volunteer  units  as  a  counter-measure.  18 
Popular  interest  in  German  airborne  activity  led  to  the  matter  being  raised  in  the  House  of 
Commons.  On  4  June  1940  Mr  Frederick  Cocks,  MP  for  Nottingham  Broxtowe,  asked  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  War  whether  he  intended  to  organise  a  corps  of  parachutists  and 
gliders.  This  evoked  a  rather  evasive  response,  which  invoked  the  National  Interest  in  an 
attempt  to  stymie  further  discussion  on  the  subject.  This  prompted  Mr  George  Garro 
Jones,  MP  for  Aberdeen  North,  to  cut  straight  to  the  heart  of  the  matter  in  the  following 
exchange: 
Mr  Garro  Jones:  "Is  the  right  Honourable  Gentleman  not  aware  that  operations 
of  this  kind  have  been  in  process  of  experiment  in  other  countries  for  many 
years;  and  is  this  the  first  time  that  they  have  come  under  the  study  of  the 
British  War  Office?  " 
Mr  Eden:  "I  never  said  that.  " 
Mr  Garro  Jones:  "I  am  asking  the  right  Honourable  Gentleman  whether  this 
form  of  warfare,  which  has  been  experimented  on  by  foreign  armies  over  the 
last  three  years,  has  been  equally  studied  by  the  British  War  Office.  " 
Mr  Eden:  "The  reply  which  I  made  referred  to  recent  operations  and  it  is  those 
recent  operations,  which  are  a  new  development  of  a  method  practised  before, 
which  are  now  being  studied".  19 
The  short  answers  to  Mr  Garro  Jones'  questions  were  no,  yes  and  no  respectively,  but 
hecklers  spared  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  further  embarrassment  by  reducing  the 
exchange  to  a  shouting  match.  However,  Mr  Cocks'  original  question  was  no  surprise  to 
the  War  Office,  which  had  formulated  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War's  initial  evasive 
response,  probably  on  3  June  1940  . 
20  The  question  also  prompted  an  internal  War  Office 
minute  entitled  "Creation  of  a  Parachute  Corps",  which  was  also  issued  on  4  June  1940: 
"This  idea  [the  formation  of  a  parachute  force]  has  real  possibilities  at  the 
present  time.  The  objection  will  come  from  the  RAF  e.  g.  provision  of  special 
equipment  and  troop  carrying  aircraft.  Will  you  make  a  short  preliminary 
investigation  into  the  possibilities  of  putting  it  into  effeCt?  iý21 
Given  the  relative  timing  of  these  documents,  and  given  the  fact  that  they  are  filed  together 
in  sequence,  and  the  fact  that  they  use  similar  wording  (both  refer  to  creating  a  "corpe'),  it 
is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  Parliamentary  question  was  the  driver  for  the  War  Office William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  89 
instruction.  Thus,  as  with  the  raiding  force  directive,  the  War  Office  was  ahead  of 
Churchill,  albeit  probably  only  by  a  matter  of  hours  in  this  instance. 
It  is  possible  that  Churchill  communicated  his  parachute  requirement  to  the  War  Office 
privately,  although  this  is  unlikely  given  the  current  evidence.  Churchill's  first  explicit 
reference  to  raising  parachute  troops  came  the  day  after  Mr  Cocks  raised  the  matter  in  the 
House  (on  5  June  1940).  Consequently,  it  is  logical  to  assume  that  the  Prime  Minister 
reacted  by  appending  his  parachute  requirement  to  his  eclectic  5  June  1940  list  of  offensive 
measures  for  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  22  It  would  be  wrong  to  make  too  much  of  the 
parliamentary  angle,  given  that  Churchill  had  hypothesised  on  airborne  matters  back  in 
19173,23  and  again  in  1936 
. 
24  It  would  also  be  wrong  to  over-emphasise  the  importance  of 
the  War  Office  minute  of  4  June  1940.  This  called  only  for  a  "short  preliminary 
investigation7',  whereas  Churchill's  directive  was  a  direct  executive  order  to  raise  a 
parachute  force.  As  a  result,  the  belated  War  Office  initiative  was  overtaken  and  subsumed 
by  the  Prime  Minister's  directive.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  that  matter  was  raised  in  the 
House,  and  that  the  War  Office  launched  a  parachute  investigation  of  its  own  volition  casts 
the  widely  held  and  oft  quoted  view  that  Churchill  was  solely  responsible  for  the  decision 
to  establish  a  British  airborne  force  in  a  different  light.  25 
Raising  a  parachute  force  was  more  problematic  than  raising  an  amphibious  raiding  force, 
not  least  because  the  War  Office  lacked  the  meagre  experience  accrued  by  MI(R)  and  the 
ISTDC.  However,  the  high  degree  of  "air-mindedness"  which  characterised  the  Army  in 
the  Empire  in  the  inter-war  period  offset  this  lack  to  some  extent,  as  did  a  pool  of 
intelligence  gathered  on  foreign  airborne  forces.  Observers  reported  on  the  Soviet  airborne 
manoeuvres  in  the  late  1930s,,  26  and  British  military  attach6s  and  intelligence  officers 
27 
closely  monitored  German  developments.  The  latter's  reporting  was  very  accurate,  and 
some  of  it  was  released  in  the  press.  The  Times  published  an  article  on  15  May  1940  that 
correctly  detailed  German  operational  jumping  heights,  and  stressed  the  need  for 
paratroops  to  be  well  drilled  11  ...  so  that  they  pour  rapidly  from  the  aircraft".  28  Interrogation 
of  the  1,600  Gennan  airborne  POWs  from  Holland  incarcerated  in  Britain,  and 
examination  of  their  special  equipment  expanded  knowledge  further.  29  This  is  clear  from 
the  detailed  pr6cis  presented  at  an  Air  Ministry  conference  on  10  June  1940  . 
30  Military 
information  was  also  responsible  for  the  extremely  accurate,  two-view  drawing  of  a  fully 
equipped  German  paratrooper  which  appeared  in  The  Times  on  8  June  1940;  the  original 
is  filed  in  the  Public  Record  Office 
. 
31  This  information  was  gathered  for  defence  rather 
than  imitation,  for  small-scale  German  airborne  landings  in  Britain  were  considered  a William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  90 
possibility  almost  from  the  opening  of  hostilities  in  September  1939.32  However,  the  data 
gathered  provided  an  equally  valuable  template  for  the  establishment  of  a  similar  force. 
It  can  therefore  be  argued  that  the  existence  of  MI(R)  and  the  ISTDC,  the  low-level  War 
Office  investigation  of  the  airborne  idea  initiated  on  4  June  1940,  and  the  pool  of 
intelligence  gathered  on  foreign  airborne  efforts  explain  the  favourable  War  Office 
reactions  to  Churchill's  directives.  In  short,  the  Prime  Minister  was  ordering  the  War 
Office  to  commence  a  course  upon  which  it  had  already  embarked  of  its  own  volition,  by 
however  narrow  a  margin.  Churchill's  raiding  and  parachute  directives  thus  confirmed  the 
War  Office's  appreciation  of  the  realities  of  the  situation  and,  more  importantly, 
legitimised  the  expansion  and  implementation  of  measures  to  meet  them.  GS(R)/MI(R) 
and  the  ISTDC  should  not  therefore  be  viewed  as  initiatives  that  were  unable  to  "...  make 
much  headway  against  the  traditionally  hidebound  directorate  of  military  operations,  which 
ran  between  the  blinkers  of  King's  Regulations  and  Army  Council  Instructions.  03  Rather, 
they  were  shrewd,  low-cost  insurance  policies,  the  initial  scale  of  which  was  dictated  by 
the  realities  of  an  overstretched  Army  and  a  tightly  stretched  military  budget,  as  opposed  to 
Blimpish  tendencies  within  the  Army.  Such  tendencies  did  exist,  of  course,  but  their 
influence  here  should  not  be  overstated. 
The  War  Office  failure  to  take  out  a  similar  airborne  insurance  policy  says  as  much  about 
Army-RAF  relations  as  the  Army's  attitude  to  the  matter,  and  in  particular  about  the 
realities  of  dealing  with  a  wilful,  independent  and  single-minded  air  arm  bent  on  pursuing 
its  own  divergent  priorities.  The  success  of  unofficial  Army-RAF  co-operation  in  the 
Empire  meant  there  was  no  pressing  need  for  the  War  Office  to  challenge  the  status  quo, 
either  in  the  inter-war  period  or  up  until  June  1940.  Then,  however,  the  defeat  in  France 
totally  transformed  the  prevailing  circumstances,  and  simultaneously  created  a  need  and  a 
role  for  a  home-based  British  airborne  force.  This  is  clear  from  the  rapidity  with  which  the 
War  Office  began  to  formulate  a  broader  role  for  its  new  parachute  force.  By  July  or  early 
August  1940  at  the  latest,  the  senior  Army  officer  present  at  RAF  Ringway  was 
recommending  the  new  force  be  reserved  for  important  tasks  like  the  "...  capture  of  a 
Channel  port  for  an  invasion  of  France".  34  Within  six  months  the  War  Office  presented  a 
formal  requirement  for  two  all-arms  "Aerodrome  Capture  Groups",  with  organic  light  tank, 
35 
artillery,  and  anti-aircraft  and  anti-tank  units.  The  War  Office  minute  of  4  June  1940 
shrewdly  and  correctly  assessed  the  likely  Air  Ministry  reaction  to  raising  a  parachute 
force.  Churchill's  parachute  directive  of  5  June  1940  thus  provided  the  War  Office  with 
the  means  to  overcome  RAF  intransigence  in  pursuit  of  what  was  now  considered  a 
military  necessity. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  91 
There  were  other,  less  tangible  reasons  for  the  War  Office  acceptance  of  Churchill's 
raiding  and  parachute  directives.  The  War  Office  must  have  been  motivated  by  a  desire  to 
restore  the  Army's  reputation,  badly  sullied  by  the  debacle  in  France,  and  by  the 
unpalatable  sight  of  the  rival  RAF,  with  whom  relations  stood  at  an  all-time  low,  taking 
centre  stage  against  seemingly  imminent  German  invasion.  A  ma.  or  plank  in  the  Air  i 
Ministry's  long  and  successful  campaign  to  maintain  its  independence  involved  projecting 
the  RAF  as  a  modem  hi-tech  force,  and  it  would  not  be  unreasonable  to  assume  that  the 
War  Office  had  absorbed  the  same  lesson.  Forming  a  parachute  unit  of  its  own  would 
allow  the  Army  also  to  portray  itself  as  modem  and  dynamic,  willing  to  learn  from  past 
mistakes,  and  prepared  to  adopt  and  utilise  the  latest  military  techniques.  It  would  also 
allow  the  Army  to  capitalise  on  the  public  fear  of  parachutists  and  fifth  columnists  by 
providing  a  tangible  counter-measure,  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  RAF  exploited  popular 
fear  of  aerial  bombing  in  the  1930s  to  support  its  strategic  bombing  pretensions. 
The  War  Office  may  also  have  been  looking  to  deflect  criticism  for  failing  to  investigate 
the  airborne  idea  earlier.  It  cannot  be  entirely  coincidental  that  the  War  Office  decided  to 
launch  a  preliminary  investigation  into  raising  a  parachute  force  just  as  it  became  apparent 
that  it  was  about  to  become  a  matter  of  public  political  debate.  In  addition,  the  hostile 
questioning  by  Mr  Garro  Jones  made  it  clear  that  the  War  Office's  perceived  failure  had 
not  gone  unnoticed.  Initiating  a  belated  investigation  as  a  damage  limitation  exercise 
would  be  a  logical  move  in  such  circumstances.  However,  it  is  doubtful  that  these 
background  issues  drove  the  policy-making  process,  although  the  Army  did  make  good  use 
of  its  airborne  arm  for  propaganda  purposes.  36  Sir  Laurence  Olivier's  1944  film  of 
Shakespeare's  Henry  V,  which  was  released  on  the  eve  of  D-Day  in  1944,  was  specifically 
dedicated  to  "Britain's  Commando  and  Airborne  Troops".  37  This  came  a  significant  period 
after  the  establishment  of  a  British  airborne  forces,  however,  and  shows  policy  driving 
public  relations  rather  than  vice-versa. 
public  and  inter-service  relations  therefore  played  only  a  minor  and  probably  largely 
subliminal  part  in  the  establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force.  The  crucial  factor  was  the 
War  Office's  own  appreciation  of  the  new  realities  and  needs  of  the  British  military 
situation,  which  fortuitously  coincided  with  Churchill's.  Given  this,  it  is  possible  to 
examine  how  the  British  airborne  force  was  actually  established.  As  the  War  Office  chose 
to  include  raising  a  parachute  force  within  the  larger  establishment  of  its  Commando 
raiding  force,  this  is  best  achieved  by  examining  the  latter  development  in  order  to  place 
events  in  context. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  92 
Il.  Generally  Positive:  The  Army's  Response  to  Churchill's  Raiding  Directive 
A  practical  Army  response  to  Churchill's  raiding  directive  of  4  June  1940  was  swift. 
Inspired  by  Boer  operations  in  South  Africa,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Dudley  Clarke  wrote  a 
note  on  raiding  parties,  and  suggested  that  the  new  force  be  called  Commandos  in  their 
honour  . 
38  The  note  was  presented  at  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  meeting  on  6  June  1940  to  discuss 
39 
Churchill's  directives,  and  Clarke's  scheme  was  approved  two  days  later,  with  the 
proviso  that  "no  unit  was  to  be  diverted  from  the  essential  defence  of  the  British  Isles,  and 
the  new  force  must  make  do  with  a  minimum  of  am-is".  40  On  9  June  1940  the  Director  of 
Recruiting  and  Organisation  (DRO)  at  the  War  Office  despatched  a  detailed  letter  to 
Northern  and  Southern  Commands.  Entitled  "Volunteers  for  Special  Service"  this 
informed  them  that: 
"It  is  proposed  to  raise  and  train  a  special  force  of  volunteers  for  independent 
mobile  operations.  You  are  requested  to  collect  the  names  of  up  to  40  officers 
and  1,000  other  ranks  in  your  Command 
...  who  you  consider  suitable  for  it. 
Volunteers  will  be  employed  on  fighting  duties  only,  and  Commanding 
Officers  should  be  assured  that  these  duties  will  require  only  the  best  type  of 
officers  and  men.  "41 
Volunteers  were  to  be  young  and  fit,  preferably  able  to  swiný4  immune  to  seasickness,  and 
to  have  experienced  active  service.  Driving  and  sapper  training  were  considered 
particularly  valuable.  Officers  were  expected  to  display  "-personality,  tactical  ability  and 
imaginatioif',  whilst  other  ranks  were  to  exhibit  a  good  standard  of  intelligence, 
independence  of  character  and  a  healthy  respect  for  private  property.  The  letter  specified 
that  the  non-commissioned  volunteer  should  be  capable  of  behaving  "...  himself  without 
supervision  (there  must  be  no  risk  of  looting  etc.  by  men  operating  independently)". 
Service  with  the  new  force  was  only  expected  to  last  for  a  few  months,  and  all  ranks  were 
to  be  selected  by  personal  interview,  which  would  make  explicit  the  nature  and  conditions 
of  their  duties.  Prospective  volunteers  were  then  free  to  withdraw  their  application  if  they 
wished.  The  leaders  of  the  proposed  units  were  to  be  lieutenant-colonels  or  below,  and  the 
names  of  six  to  eight  officers  "considered  capable  of  leading  a  Commando"  were  to  be 
passed  to  the  War  Office  as  quickly  as  possible  "under  secret  cover"  . 
42 
Two  further  memos  from  the  Director  of  Military  Operations  and  Planning  (DMO&P)  at 
the  War  Office,  Major-General  R.  H.  Dewing,  refined  the  volunteer  requirement  and  laid 
the  groundwork  for  their  organisation.  The  first,  issued  on  12  June  1940,  was  addressed  to 
the  DRO  and  recommended  extending  the  call  for  special  service  volunteers  to  all  Home 
CommandS.  43  The  second  was  issued  the  following  day,  and  made  detailed  proposals William  IF  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  93 
regarding  the  raising,  organisation  and  employment  of  the  new  Commandos 
. 
44  A  total 
force  of  two  hundred  officers  and  5,000  men  was  suggested,  with  each  Home  Command 
appointing  one  or  two  Commando  leaders.  These  would  select  Troop  leaders,  who  would 
in  turn  interview  and  select  their  own  men.  A  Commando  establishment  of  ten  troops  of 
fifty  men,  including  one  or  two  officers,  was  recommended.  The  administrative  tail  was 
virtually  non-existent,  with  equipment  to  be  issued  from  and  returned  to  a  central  pool  for 
operations.  No  accommodation  was  provided,  for  all  ranks  were  to  be  provided  with 
money  to  make  their  own  arrangements.  The  intent  was  to  "...  provide  no  more  than  a  pool 
of  specialised  soldiers  from  which  irregular  units  of  any  size  and  type  can  be  very  quickly 
created  to  undertake  any  particular  tasle  I.  45 
The  DMO&P's  proposals  were  accepted  in  principle  at  an  Army  Council  meeting  on  17 
June  1940.46  Telegrams  and  letters  extended  the  call  for  volunteers  to  all  Home 
Commands  the  same  day,  47  with  the  proviso  that  no  volunteers  be  accepted  from  the  3rd 
48 
Division  which  was  earmarked  for  home  defence.  The  Commando  organisation  was 
formalised  at  a  War  Office  conference  on  20  June  1940.  Existing  Independent  Companies 
were  to  be  amalgamated  into  No.  I  Commando,  49  with  eleven  more  sequentially  numbered 
Commandos.  All  were  to  remain  under  the  operational  control  of  the  War  Office,  but  were 
to  be  administered  by  their  local  Home  Commands,  which  were  to  appoint  an 
50 
administration  officer  for  the  purpose.  Specific  Home  Command  responsibilities  and 
proposed  locations  for  the  Commandos  were  detailed  in  a  separate  memo  issued  the  same 
day.  Three  were  to  be  raised  by  and/or  located  in  Southern  Command  and  Western 
Command  respectively,  two  each  by  Northern  and  Eastern  Commands,  and  one  each  by 
Scottish  and  Northern  Ireland  Commands.  An  organisation  chart  with  suggested  ranks  and 
appointments  was  attached  to  the  memo,  although  the  size  of  each  Commando  was  to  be 
determined  by  the  GOC  of  each  Command  according  to  the  number  of  available 
volunteers  . 
51  All  nominated  Commando  leaders  were  to  be  detached  from  their  respective 
Home  Commands  for  assembly  at  the  War  Office  on  24  June  1940.52 
A  sub-division  of  the  Adjutant  General's  department,  AG  17,  handled  the  War  Office  end 
of  things.  Code-named  "Forcedly  Seventeen7',  it  rapidly  became  the  focus  for  a  great  deal 
of  paperwork  as  the  Home  Commands  came  to  terms  with  the  Commando  commitment. 
The  place  of  Commando  volunteers  within  the  Army  bureaucracy  was  firmly  established  in 
a  memo  to  all  Home  Commands  from  the  DRO  on  26  June  1940.  This  gave  precise  details 
of  the  procedure  for  selecting  volunteers,  and  formalised  their  conditions  of  service. 
Volunteers  were  to  be  self-reliant,  were  responsible  for  securing  their  own  "food  and 
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Commando  OC,  and  were  free  to  follow  this  course  themselves  at  the  end  of  any  active 
operation.  53  Special  monetary  allowances  were  payable  for  food,  accommodation,  heating 
fuel  and  lighting,  at  a  daily  rate  of  thirteen  shillings  and  four  pence  for  officers  and  six 
shillings  and  eight  pence  for  other  ranks.  54  This  was  in  addition  to  normal  pay,  including 
any  trade  or  proficiency  rates,  and  was  also  payable  during  leave  or  sickness,  although  this 
was  revised  in  October  1940.55  Such  conditions  of  service  were  unusual  in  a  modem  army 
to  say  the  least,  but  were  justified  by  the  prevailing  circumstances. 
The  speed  of  the  Commando  establishment  created  problems  for  the  future.  The  lack  of 
administrative  staff  was  amongst  the  first  to  come  to  light.  Western  Command  requested, 
and  was  refused,  additional  administrative  personnel  for  No.  2  Commando  as  early  as  29 
June  1940,,  56  thereby  prompting  the  DRO  to  clarify  the  situation.  All  Commando 
headquarters  personnel,  excluding  the  OC  and  one  administrative  officer,  were  to  be 
provided  by  the  Home  Command  responsible  for  its  formation.  *57  This  did  not  forestall 
similar  requests  and  complaints  throughout  July  1940,  however.  58  The  food  and 
accommodation  arrangements  also  proved  problematic,  particularly  when  Commandos 
moved  to  poorly  resourced  areas,  and  brought  the  War  Office  into  conflict  with  the 
Ministry  of  Food.  59  In  addition,  administrative  short  cuts  actually  produced  more  rather 
than  less  work  in  some  instances,  such  as  those  regarding  pay.  Normal  pay  and  special 
Commando  allowances  were  paid  by  the  Home  Command  responsible  for  raising  the 
Commando,  but  family  or  dependants'  allowances  and  any  allotment  pay  were  paid  by  the 
volunteer's  original  unit.  60  Consequently,  two  sets  of  pay  records  had  to  be  maintained  for 
each  volunteer  at  widely  separated  and  frequently  shifting  locations. 
Churchill's  directives  were  thus  well  received  at  the  War  Office  and  General  Staff  level, 
but  reactions  lower  down  the  chain  are  harder  to  quantify.  At  least  one  harried  staff 
functionary  bemoaned  to  a  colleague  Churchill's  "harping  on  the  fact  that  he  said  5,000 
parachute  troops  were  to  be  got  ready"'61  and  the  views  of  unit  commanders  on  having 
their  best  and  most  aggressive  personnel  siphoned  off  can  be  well  imagined.  62  The  War 
office  recognised  this  and  attempted  to  minimise  the  deleterious  effects,  although  it  still 
opted  to  call  for  volunteers  across  the  board  rather  than  re-designating  an  existing 
formation,  63  an  option  which  might  have  caused  less  disruption.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
ceiling  of  one  thousand  and  forty  volunteers  from  each  Home  Command  was  relatively 
low,  and  the  dearth  of  administrative  arrangements  must  have  simplified  matters 
considerably.  The  War  Office  was  also  aware  of  the  traditional  response  to  such  calls, 
which  was  for  units  to  use  it  as  an  opportunity  to  purge  themselves  of  undesirables.  The 
wording  and  depth  of  the  9  June  1940  letter  made  very  clear  that  this  was  not  an  acceptable Wifliam  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  95 
response,  and  the  selection  of  volunteers  by  interview,  however  rudimentary,  provided  a 
backstop  against  such  tendencies.  64  The  idea  certainly  appears  to  have  been  popular,  given 
that  sufficient  volunteers  were  ultimately  found  to  form  and  maintain  ten  and  a  half 
Commandos  of  the  projected  twelve,  each  with  a  strength  of  five  hundred  all  ranks.  65  It  is 
also  safe  to  assume  that  the  total  of  volunteers  outnumbered  those  selected,  for  it  is 
doubtful  that  every  volunteer  met  the  required  standard. 
Although  the  response  may  have  been  more  than  adequate,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to 
assume  this  indicated  wholehearted  acceptance  of  the  Commando  policy.  The  stated  short- 
term  nature  of  the  commitment  may  have  offset  opposition,  for  the  9  June  1940  letter 
clearly  stated  that  individuals  were  only  expected  to  remain  with  the  new  force  for  "a  few 
months".  66  Consequently,  before  long  units  began  to  enquire  when  their  volunteers  would 
be  returned.  GOC  Northern  Command  was  relaying  such  enquiries  from  subordinate  units 
to  the  War  Office  by  the  end  of  July  1940,  and  added  a  rider  of  his  own: 
"The  formation  of  Commandos  has  of  course  drawn  very  heavily  on  the  best 
personnel  of  units,  which  will  suffer  a  serious  loss  should  these  men  not 
return  ... 
I  recommend,  therefore,  that  if  possible  arrangements  be  made  for 
personnel  of  Commandos,  on  completion  of  their  special  service,  to  be  returned 
to  their  original  units.  ,  67 
This  presumably  prompted  the  CIGS,  General  Sir  John  Dill,  to  raise  the  matter  with  the 
War  Cabinet  Chiefs  of  Staff  Committee  on  6  August  1940.  Dill  favoured  the  Commando 
proposal  but  pointed  out  that  the  rest  of  the  Army  needed  the  high  calibre  volunteers, 
whom  he  considered  to  be  potential  officers.  He  therefore  requested  that  volunteers  be 
returned  to  their  units  of  origin  "...  if  there  was  no  prospect  of  the  Commandos  being  used 
for  offensive  operationS,,.  68  Similar  sentiments  were  expressed  by  the  GOC  Southern 
Command  in  October  1940,69  and  by  Western  Command,  who  complained  that  uncertainty 
over  the  future  issue  was  affecting  the  "...  morale  and  keenness  of  volunteers  and  home 
Units". 
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Home  Forces  Command  and  their  subordinate  Commands  were  also  tardy  and  selective  in 
implementing  some  aspects  of  the  Commando  initiative,  although  this  could  have  been  the 
result  of  poor  administration  rather  than  deliberate  obstruction.  For  example,  Eastern 
Command  did  not  transmit  the  order  to  release  selected  volunteers  from  523,18  and  55 
Divisions  until  AG  17  issued  a  request  for  immediate  compliance  on  22  October  1940.71 
There  may  also  have  been  some  doubt  over  long-term  intentions.  The  War  Office 
temporarily  suspended  Commando  recruiting  on  22  August  1940,72  and  then  took  over  a 
month  to  rationalise  the  future  shape  of  special  forces  per  se.  73  As  most  Commandos  were William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  96 
still  organising  themselves  this  caused  a  good  deal  of  confiision,  not  least  because  many 
were  still  below  War  Establishment.  74  Recruiting  recommenced  on  I  October  1940,  with  a 
CIGS  order  for  all  Commandos  were  to  be  brought  up  to  strength  "within  a  week".  75  AG 
17  informed  Home  Forces  HQ  and  subordinate  Commands  it  was  "essential  for  ALL 
[original  emphasis]  Commandos  [to]  be  brought  up  to  strength  forthwith"  on  the  same 
day.  '  Home  Forces  HQ,  however,  signalled  all  Home  Commands  that  Commandos  were 
77  to  be  brought  up  to  strength  at  the  discretion  of  their  individual  GOCs.  Consequently, 
Southern  Command  refused  outright  to  bring  Nos.  7  and  8  Commandos  up  to  strength, 
pointing  out  that  it  was  "...  averse  to  depriving  field  units  of  fiirther  selected  personneP', 
and  suggesting  that  henceforth  Commando  volunteers  be  selected  from  Infantry  Training 
Centres  (ITCs)  instead.  AG  17  was  obliged  to  invoke  the  authority  of  the  CIGS  to  force 
compliance,  against  Southern  Command  and  Home  Forces  HQ  when  it  supported  its 
subordinate. 
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Army  acceptance  of  the  raiding  directive  was  therefore  not  universal  or  unequivocal, 
which  was  hardly  surprising  in  the  prevailing  circumstances.  However,  a  combination  of 
perceived  necessity,  high  level  support  and  widespread  enthusiasm  was  sufficient  to  ensure 
that  the  foundation  of  the  Commando  force  was  fulfilled  in  practical  terms.  It  will  now  be 
necessary  to  examine  how  the  establishment  of  a  parachute  force  fitted  into  this  process. 
III.  Airborne  Embryo:  The  Initial  Establishment  of  a  British  Parachute  Force 
The  9  June  1940  call  for  volunteers  for  special  service  did  not  mention  parachuting, 
because  a  preliminary  War  Office  investigation  into  the  matter  initiated  on  4  June  1940 
was  incomplete  . 
79  However,  on  10  June  1940  approval  was  sought  from  the  Chiefs  of 
Staff  for  the  establishment  of  a  "parachute  division  at  Home".  80  As  a  result,  a  12  June 
1940  memo  from  the  DMO&P,  which  recommended  extending  the  call  for  volunteers  to 
all  Home  Commands,  was  also  responsible  for  placing  the  parachute  force  within  the 
Commando  framework,  as  the  closing  paragraph  of  the  memo  clearly  shows: 
"Since  parachutists,  once  landed,  will  operate  in  much  the  same  way  as  any 
other  irregular  troops,  it  is  proposed  to  make  use  of  the  Commando 
Organisation  outlined  in  the  9  June  letter 
... 
[therefore  a  separate  list  of 
parachute  volunteers  is  required  because] 
...  It  is  not  intended  to  employ  any  of 
the  volunteers  for  Special  Service  in  parachute  units  unless  they  specifically 
say  that  they  are  willing  to  serve  in  them.  "81 
This  was  the  first  official  acknowledgement  that  the  War  Office  intended  to  raise  a 
parachute  force,  although  the  ultimate  role  of  such  a  force  had  yet  to  be  ascertained.  The William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  97 
DMO&P  chose  to  class  parachute  troops  with  other  irregular  troops,  but  this  may  well 
have  been  solely  based  on  administrative  convenience.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  possible 
that  the  DMO&P  was  following  a  lead  from  above,  given  that  the  Army  Council  included 
the  parachute  question  in  a  meeting  to  discuss  the  raising  of  "Special  Parties"  on  17  June 
1940.  The  same  Army  Council  meeting  approved  the  DMO&P's  recommendation  that 
separate  lists  of  parachute  volunteers  be  compiled  by  each  Home  Command.  Telegrams 
enforcing  this  were  despatched  the  same  day,  with  the  letters  extending  the  call  for  special 
service  volunteers.  82 
The  War  Office  formalised  the  overall  Commando  organisation  on  20  June  1940,  and 
authorised  the  establishment  of  a  parachute  Commando  of  five  hundred  men  at  the  same 
time.  This  was  a  smaller  than  standard  force,  dictated  by  the  dearth  of  RAF  training 
facilities,  but  with  the  possibility  of  expansion  later.  83  The  conference  conclusions  issued 
details  of  Commando  designations,  and  their  locations.  Within  this,  No.  2  Commando  was 
officially  designated  as  a  "Parachute  Commando",  to  be  located  at  Manchester.  Special 
formation  instructions  were  also  included,  with  responsibility  for  forming  ten  letter- 
designated  Troops  of  fifty  spread  across  all  Home  Commands.  Northern  and  Southern 
Commands  were  to  raise  A  and  B,  and  C  and  D  Troops  respectively.  Eastern  Command 
was  to  provide  E  and  F  Troops,  whilst  Western  Command  was  to  raise  G  Troop  and  a 
proportion  of  H  Troop.  Northern  Ireland  Command  was  to  raise  the  remainder  of  H  Troop, 
and  Scottish  Command  was  to  raise  J  Troop.  Southern  Command  was  also  responsible  for 
84  designating  a  suitable  Commando  leader. 
Southern  Command  was  first  off  the  mark.  A  telegram  despatched  to  AG  17  on  26  June 
1940  detailed  the  names  and  ranks  of  six  designated  Troop  leaders  and  Troop  officers 
currently  interviewing  and  selecting  troops  for  "number  2  Commander  (sic)".  85  Internal 
instructions  were  disseminated  to  all  Southern  Command  subordinate  formations  units  two 
days  later,  with  formation  and  concentration  details  for  its  designated  portion  of  No.  2 
Commando.  C  and  D  Troops  were  to  concentrate  at  the  barracks  of  54  Training  Regiment 
at  Perham  Down  on  1  July  1940,  under  the  command  of  Major  C.  J.  Jackson  RTR.  A  list 
of  Troop  leaders  and  officers  was  included,  and  Major  Jackson  was  instructed  to 
acknowledge  compliance  and  when  his  force  would  be  ready  to  move.  Its  tentative 
destination  was  Manchester.  86  Western  Command  were  also  advised  of  this  progress,  and 
requested  additional  administrative  personnel  and  equipment  "...  for  No.  2  Parachute 
87  R  AF  Commando  at  Ringway  near  Manchester"  from  the  War  Office  on  29  June  1940.  t 
Ringway,  formerly  Manchester  Airport,  was  the  location  selected  by  the  Air  Ministry  for 
88 
their  new  parachute  training  establishment,  which  began  formation  on  I  June  1940. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  98 
Major  Jackson  assumed  command  of  No.  2  Commando  at  Ringway  on  3  July  1940.  As 
no  billets  were  available  on  the  RAF  station,  the  volunteers  secured  their  own 
accommodation  at  the  nearby  village  of  Knutsford-89  The  Commando  billeting  svstem 
later  attracted  much  criticism,  but  in  this  instance  it  provided  a  fortuitous  means  of 
overcoming  the  lack  of  facilities  at  Ringway.  In  fact,  the  Central  Landing  School  (CLS), 
as  the  RAF  parachute  training  establishment  was  by  then  known,  officially  requested  that 
No.  2  Commando  be  granted  permission  to  retain  the  system  in  August  1940.90  Precisely 
what  proportion  of  No.  2  Commando  arrived  with  Major  Jackson,  or  was  already  present, 
when  he  arrived  to  assume  command  is  unclear.  It  is  logical  to  assume  that  he  was 
accompanied  by  C  and  D  Troops,  although  the  CLS  Operational  Record  Book  refers  to  B 
and  C  Troops  and  (by  then)  Lieutenant-Colonel  Jackson  commencing  parachute  training 
on  9  July  1940.91  This  means  that  at  least  one  of  Northern  Command's  parachute  Troops 
was  also  at  Ringway  by  that  date.  This  is  reinforced  by  a  secondary  source,  which  refers  to 
fifty  soldiers  arriving  at  Ringway  on  27  June  1940  with  Captain  John  Rock  RE,  the  War 
Office  representative  to  the  CLS.  92 
Nonetheless,  it  was  some  time  before  No.  2  Commando  was  assembled  in  its  entirety.  On 
14  July  1940  the  War  Office  instructed  Northern  Ireland  command  to  select  a  Troop 
commander  and  the  necessary  personnel  for  its  contribution  to  H Troop,  but  not  to 
1concentrate  them  until  further  notice  because  RAF  training  facilities  were  not  ready.  93  The 
order  was  not  acknowledged  or  passed  on  until  29  July  1940.  The  delay  may  have  been 
caused  by  the  selection  of  a  leader  for  H Troop,  given  that  the  name  of  the  chosen 
individual  was  included  in  the  eventual  response.  It  may  also  have  been  due  to  the  revision 
of  Commando  recruiting  criteria  that  occurred  on  14  July  1940.94  J  Troop  took  even  longer 
to  reach  full  establishment.  Scottish  Command  reported  the  posting  of  three  subalterns  to 
No.  2  Commando  'lo  complete  the.  establishment  of  J  Troop",  as  lateas  9  September 
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1940  . 
The  delay  in  concentrating  No.  2  Commando  may  also  have  been  compounded  by  a  lack 
of  suitable  volunteers,  because  parachute  selection  required  a  tighter  profile  than  the 
original  Commando  criteria.  Practical  experience  at  Ringway  obliged  the  DRO  to  issue  an 
update  on  30  June  1940.  This  specified  that  parachute  volunteers  should: 
44a.  not  weigh  more  than  250  lb.  fully  clothed  and  lightly  equipped,  i.  e.  gross 
weight  in  the  air 
b.  be  able  to  pass  comfortably  through  a  circular  aperture,  3  ft  in  diameter 
when  wearing  equipment  and  parachute William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  99 
c.  have  no  physical  disabilities  which  might  render  them  unsuitable  for 
parachute  work  e.  g.  thin  skulls  and  weak  ankles".  96 
Medical  suitability  was  relatively  easy  to  establish,  but  it  is  less  clear  how  the  remainder 
could  be  accurately  verified  in  the  prevailing  circumstances.  The  RAF  was  experiencing 
an  acute  shortage  of  parachutes  and  ancillary  equipment  at  the  time,  97  which  must  have 
been  a  major  obstacle  for  Troop  officers  attempting  to  assess  candidate  suitability,  even 
allowing  for  ad  hoc  improvisation.  It  is  therefore  highly  likely  that  some  proportion  of  the 
original  parachute  volunteers  was  unsuitable  because  of  the  broadness  of  the  original 
Commando  requirement,  and  that  a  lack  of  parachutes  allowed  more  unsuitable  candidates 
through  after  the  selection  criteria  were  tightened.  The  psychological  stress  of  parachuting 
exacerbated  the  problem  further.  By  21  September  1940  only  three  hundred  and  forty-two 
volunteers  of  the  original  five  hundred  were  judged  suitable  by  the  CLS  staff  to  undergo  a 
full  course  of  parachute  instruction.  No.  2  Commando  thus  sustained  a  "...  wastage  rate  of 
some  15  per  cent  over  a  period  of  two  months",  98  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Jackson  was 
authorised  to  tour  all  Home  Commands  in  an  attempt  to  rectify  the  shortfall.  99  AG  17  was 
still  complaining  that  No.  2  Commando  was  understrength  in  November  1940.100 
However,  as  with  the  wider  Commando  establishment,  these  problems  only  became 
apparent  over  time,  and  were  to  be  expected  in  the  circumstances.  The  important  point  is 
that  the  War  Office  had  implemented  measures  to  raise  a  parachute  force  with  impressive 
speed.  A  proportion  of  the  new  force  was  assembled  and  in  position  to  commence 
parachute  training  by  3  July  1940,  within  a  month  of  the  War  Office's  preliminary 
investigation  and  Churchill's  directive,  and  within  thirteen  days  of  official  authorisation 
being  granted  by  the  War  Office.  This,  however,  was  only  half  the  story,  for  the 
establishment  of  a  parachute  force  was  a  joint  Army-RAF  venture.  It  will  therefore  now  be 
necessary  to  examine  the  reaction  and  response  of  the  Air  Ministry  to  the  parachute 
directive. 
IV.  Covertly  Unfavourable:  The  Air  Ministry  Reaction  to  Churchill  s  Parachute 
Directive 
Churchill's  parachute  directive  of  5  June  1940  appears  to  have  been  the  Air  Ministry's 
first  inkling  that  the  raising  of  a  parachute  force  was  being  considered.  Its  reaction,  once 
appraised,  was  as  swift  as  that  of  the  War  Office  to  Churchill's  raiding  directive.  On  8 
June  1940  a  detailed  preliminary  note  was  circulated  within  the  Air  Ministry,  and  a 
conference  to  discuss  the  matter  was  held  two  days  later,  on  10  June.  The  content  of  this 
preliminary  note  and  the  conference  proceedings  are  vital  to  establishing  Air  Ministry William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  100 
reactions,  and  therefore  merit  close  examination.  The  preliminary  note  was  a  three-page 
document  from  the  Air  Ministry's  Director  of  Plans,  Sir  John  Slessor.  Entitled 
"Development  of  Parachute  Troops",  101  it  informed  recipients  of  Churchill's  order  for 
5,000  parachute  troops,  and  that  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  had  agreed  in  principle.  It  also  stated 
that  the  matter  had  been  passed  to  the  General  and  Air  Staffs  for  execution,  and  that  a 
Parachute  Training  Centre  (PTC)  was  to  be  set  up  as  quickly  as  possible. 
Thereafter,  however,  the  note  became  markedly  less  co-operative.  It  was  considered 
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...  clearly  unnecessary,  anyway  to  begin  with,  to  attempt  to  produce  an  organisation 
capable  of  dropping  5,000  -  policy  should  [be  to]  develop  facilities  for  1,000".  At  least 
one  recipient  felt  that  this  eighty  per  cent  reduction  was  insufficient,  and  pencilled  a 
suggestion  that  it  be  reduced  to  five  hundred  " 
...  so  as  to  ascertain  in  practice  the 
possibilities  and  extent  of  this  new  commitment".  It  was  considered  vital  to  agree  a 
framework  for  discussion  before  meeting  the  General  Staff,  ostensibly  because  this  would 
enable  planning  on  '61ong  ternf  'matters  like  the  provision  of  parachutes  and  aircraft  for  the 
PTC  to  begin.  The  third  stage  would  then  be  a  joint  conference  with  the  War  Office,  to 
discuss  the  organisation  of  the  new  force  and  its  training  needs.  Once  "general  agreement" 
had  been  reached,  the  fourth  and  final  stage  could  commence,  and  the  matter  could  then  be 
passed  to  the  Air  Ministry's  Staff  Office  (AMSO)  and  Assistant  Chief  of  Air  Staff 
(Training)  (ACAS(T))  who,  in  conjunction  with  the  War  Office,  would  oversee  formal 
establishment  of  the  new  parachute  force. 
Having  settled  the  matter  of  inter-service  co-operation  to  its  own  satisfaction,  the  note 
then  listed  several  "general  points"  for  consideration.  First  was  the  establishment  of  the 
PTC,  in  particular  where  the  aircraft  and  crews  were  to  come  from,  and  where  it  was  to  be 
located.  There  was  also  the  matter  of  parachutes,  given  that  it  was  "understood  that  the 
normal  service  parachute  was  unsatisfactory  to  carry  a  soldier  and  his  impedimente'.  This 
meant  a  special  parachute  might  have  to  be  developed,  and  it  was  suggested  that  reference 
be  made  to  the  Air  Ministry's  Director  of  Intelligence  (AMDI),  who  had  "...  a  great  deal  of 
material  on  ... 
German  parachute  equipment  and  training".  It  was  also  assumed  that  the 
parachutists  would  not  be  part  of  the  air  force  on  the  German  model,  but  that  the  Army 
would  be  responsible  for  their  training  whilst  the  RAF  provided  the  aircraft  to  carry  them 
There  was,  however,  no  question  of  special  RAF  units  being  formed  for  this  purpose, 
because  no  provision  had  been  made  for  such  an  eventuality  in  the  Air  Ministry's  existing 
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"In  any  event,  it  would  be  uneconomical  in  the  present  circumstances.  We 
may  be  able  to  consider  it  when  we  have  more  crews  and  more  aircraft 
production  than  we  want  for  bombers,  which  will  not  be  for  a  very  long  time.  " 
It  was  therefore  recommended  that  dropping  parachutists  be  an  alternative  role  for 
bombers,  and  whilst  it  was  possible  that  a  specific  Bomber  Group  could  be  selected  for 
such  work,  it  remained  to  be  decided  which  type  of  bomber  was  most  suitable  for 
"decanting"  parachutists.  The  idea  was  also  mooted  that  in  the  future  some  bomber 
squadrons  might  be  equipped  with  transport  aircraft  as  well,  so  that  the  same  aircrew  could 
fly  them  "...  on  the  special  occasions  when  parachute  troops  are  required  to  be  used".  This 
provoked  a  further  marginal  note  stating  that  "We  [the  Air  Ministry]  should  simultaneously 
consider  what  reduction  if  any  in  total  bombing  power  is  involved,  if  later  it  was  decided". 
The  note  closed  by  suggesting  that  its  contents  should  form  the  basis  for  discussing  the 
proposed  scheme  with  the  War  Office. 
This  note  provided  the  basis  for  further  discussion  at  the  high  level  Air  Ministry 
conference  on  10  June  1940.  The  conference  began  with  the  disparaging  and  inaccurate 
opinion  that  "much  of  the  effect  [of  parachute  troops]  was  due  to  surprise  that  they  were 
used  at  all  [and]  this  has  now  wom  off',  and  then  examined  the  issue  point-by-point.  102 
Four  categories  of  mission  were  envisaged;  sabotage  attacks,  holding  attacks  for 
demolition  or  the  seizure  of  vital  points,  reinforcing  front-line  units,  and  flank  or  rear 
attacks.  Responsibility  for  providing  the  necessary  troops  was  placed  on  the  War  Office. 
"Policy  clearly  states  paratroops  [sic]  are  to  be  provided  by  the  Army  -  presumably  the 
provision  of  some  5,000  bodies  will  not  be  very  difficult  and  they  ought  to  be  forthcoming 
in  a  reasonably  short  time".  The  Air  Ministry  undertook  to  design  and  provide  parachutes 
and  accessories,  including  ground  training  "contraptions"  and  "launching  tackle"  for 
equipment  dropped  separately. 
The  Air  Ministry  was  also  to  be  responsible  for  the  provision  of  "paracraft".  As  the 
44  ...  size  and  performance  of  training  paracraft  need  not  compare  with  operational 
paracraft",  it  was  suggested  training  and  civilian  aircraft,  such  as  the  Avro  Anson, 
Airspeed  Oxford  and  DeHavilland  86  and  89  types  be  assessed  for  suitability  as  a  short- 
term  measure.  This  would  allow  consideration  of  the  "very  delicate  question  of  where  the 
operational  paracraft  are  to  come  fronf'.  It  was  also  felt  that  provision  of  a  dedicated 
transport  aircraft  would  place  additional  strain  on  aircraft  production,  which  was  not 
considered  to  be  in  the  national  interest.  As  an  alternative,  it  was  suggested  that  bomber 
aircraft  be  used,  with  the  proviso  that  modification  did  not  keep  them  out  of  operations,  or William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  102 
interfere  with  normal  bombing  duties.  If  this  was  possible,  then  there  was  no  reason  not  to 
allow  temporary  diversion  of  bombers: 
44 
...  as  acceptable  at  the  time.  This  last  point  is  important  and  may  be  the 
possible  cause  of  differences  of  opinion  between  the  War  Office  and  Air 
Ministry.  Though  we  do  not  wish  to  be  obstructionist  it  is  a  point  on  which  a 
definite  understanding  must  be  reached  at  the  outset.  Moreover,  in  the  event  of 
a  difference  of  opinion  arising  at  any  time,  a  proper  procedure  for  appealing  to 
the  Chiefs  of  Staff  Sub-Committee  should  be  agreed  on7'. 
The  conference  then  recommended  that  an  experimental  parachute  unit  be  established  as 
quickly  as  possible,  located  in  Canada  or  South  Africa  on  the  grounds  of  space  and 
reducing  enemy  interference.  The  German  model  was  recommended  as  a  training 
template,  with  alterations  to  provide  a  British  "slant".  Proceedings  then  moved  off  at  a 
tangent.  A  list  of  vague  operational  measures  was  discussed  despite  the  fact  that  they  fell 
outside  the  Air  Ministry's  self-delineated  area  of  responsibility.  These  included  the 
unexplained  provision  of  armour  for  parachute  troops,  along  with  portable  flame  throwers, 
anti-tank  scatter  bomb  throwers  and  portable  bikes  with  small  mortars.  The  conference 
closed  on  a  rather  upbeat  and  Churchillian  note,  given  the  overall  tone  of  the  meeting: 
"However  fantastic  an  idea  may  seem  at  first  let  us  not  discard  without  due 
thought  and  ad-hoc  [original  emphasis]  research  and  trial.  We  laughed  at  the 
whole  idea  of  parachute  troops  until  recently  and  now  the  enemy  has  made  us 
divert  much  of  our  energy  to  guard  against  the  threat.  If  he  never  uses  them 
against  this  country  he  has  nevertheless  gained  something  by  the  threat.  " 
These  internal  documents  clearly  reveal  that  the  Air  Ministry's  immediate  reaction  to 
Churchill's  parachute  directive  was  unenthusiastic,  if  not  downright  hostile.  It  was  seen  as 
an  irrelevant  and  unwarranted  waste  of  resources,  which  posed  a  threat  to  the  RAF's  self- 
appointed  mission  of  strategic  bombing.  The  Air  Ministry  therefore  did  not  intend  to 
provide  any  more  than  the  absolute  minimum  of  co-operation  in  the  matter,  and  not  even 
that  if  possible.  This  is  clear  from  the  unilateral  intent  to  reduce  the  parachute  force  to  a 
fifth  or  even  a  tenth  of  its  projected  size,  and  the  emphatic  insistence  that  the  War  Office 
provide  the  necessary  "bodies"  whilst  the  RAF  take  responsibility  for  transport  and 
training  expertise  as  a  matter  of  "policy".  All  this  was  decided  without  reference  to  the 
War  office.  It  is  also  implicit  that  co-operation  regarding  the  parachute  force  was  a  very 
low  priority,  and  very  much  a  long-term,  as-and-when  resources  become,  available  affair. 
This  was  somewhat  at  variance  with  Churchill's  requirement,  and  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
War  Office's  reaction  to  the  equally  inconvenient  directive  to  create  a  raiding  force. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  103 
However,  there  was  no  hint  of  this  in  the  conference  conclusions,  which  also  appeared  on 
10  June  1940.  This  document  was  a  model  of  co-operation,  which  toned  down  or  even 
omitted  altogether  some  of  the  more  contentious  elements  in  the  8  June  1940  note  and  the 
conference  minutes.  Presumably  this  was  because  the  conclusions  were  intended  for 
external  distribution.  103  The  conclusions  pointed  out,  not  unreasonably,  that  it  was 
currently  not  possible  to  drop  five  thousand  parachutists  at  once,  and  that  the  ability  to  do 
so  was  limited  by  the  availability  of  suitable  aircraft.  This  was  likely  to  limit  drops  to 
seven  or  eight  hundred  men  at  a  time.  Because  aircraft  and  aircrew  shortages  precluded 
the  formation  of  special  transport  units,  parachute  dropping  would  have  to  be  an  alternative 
role  for  bombers.  Of  these,  the  Armstrong  Whitworth  Whitley  was  deemed  the  "only" 
suitable  type,  although  it  was  not  explained  how  this  was  ascertained.  Each  Whitley  was 
considered  to  be  capable  of  carrying  between  ten  and  twelve  parachutists  and  1,000  lb.  of 
additional  equipment,  and  would  have  to  be  modified  with  a  sliding  door,  similar  to  that  of 
the  German  Junkers  52.  Dropping  by  night  was  considered  preferable,  and  it  was  noted 
that  the  aircrew  involved  would  need  additional  training  for  their  new  role. 
The  matter  of  parachutes  was  then  examined.  The  RAF's  aircrew  parachute  was  too  small 
for  the  task,  but  the  training  model  was  considered  suitable  because  it  had  a  larger  diameter 
canopy,  which  would  allow  it  to  support  greater  weights.  The  training  parachute  would 
still  require  modification  for  static  line  operation,  however,  to  allow  jumping  from  the 
recommended  height  of  five  hundred  feet.  It  was  also  currently  out  of  production,  but  a 
production  rate  of  one  hundred  units  per  week  was  claimed  to  be  attainable,  given  three 
weeks  notice.  As  the  necessary  ground  and  air  personnel  were  available,  it  was 
recommended  that  a  separate  PTC  should  be  set  up  immediately.  The  commander  of  the 
RAF's  Parachute  Development  Flight  (PDF)  at  Henlow  was  nominated  for  command.  The 
aircraft  establishment  of  the  PTC  was  to  be  twenty-one  Whitleys,  to  allow  two  hundred 
drops  per  day  and  the  provision  of  a  Whitley  fuselage  and  other  apparatus  for  ground,  or 
synthetic,  training  was  suggested.  No  recommendation  as  to  the  location  of  the  PTC  was 
made,  although  it  was  felt  preferable  to  locate  it  on  an  airfield  with  parachute  packing 
facilities,  and  as  close  as  feasible  to  the  trainees'  barracks.  Failing  this,  it  was  suggested 
that  Parachute  packing  and  synthetic  training  facilities  also  be  provided  at  the  barracks  to 
maximise  training  time.  The  intention  was  to  train  the  parachutists  to  pack  and  retain  their 
own  parachutes  as  a  confidence  building  measure,  and  it  was  also  felt  advisable  to  have  at 
least  one  Army  officer  attached  to  the  PTC,  to  advise  upon  and  develop  special  items  of 
clothing,  weapons  and  equipment.  There  was  also  a  passing  reference  to  exploring  the 
problems  posed  by  towing  large  gliders,  and  to  investigate  an  unattributed  claim  that  "large William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  104 
numbers  of  qualified  glider  pilots  were  serving  in  the  Army".  The  Air  Ministry  was  to 
return  to  this  contention. 
The  document  closed  with  a  request  to  proceed  with  a  list  of  recommendations.  These 
included  approaching  the  General  Staff,  establishing  a  PTC  as  soon  as  possible,  selecting 
six  Whitley  aircraft  for  parachuting  modifications,  and  ordering  ten  thousand  training  type 
parachutes.  A  further  list  of  instructions  was  also  appended  for  the  Air  Ministry's  Director 
of  Research  (DoR)  who,  as  well  as  carrying  out  makeshift  parachuting  modifications  on 
the  six  Whitleys,  was  charged  with  investigating  the  possibility  of  modifying  new  Whitleys 
on  the  production  line,  and  examining  the  so-called  glider  problem. 
This  then  was  the  Air  Ministry's  public  reaction  to  Churchill's  directive  to  raise  a 
parachute  force,  but  its  tone  of  co-operative  sincerity  contrasts  starkly  with  the  negative 
sentiments  and  vehement  objections  in  the  preceding  internal  documents.  There  was  no 
overt  criticism  of  the  parachute  concept,  nor  mention  of  reducing  the  size  of  the  projected 
parachute  force,  nor  suggestion  of  locating  the  PTC  overseas,  nor  references  to  sidelining 
the  project  until  resources  were  more  plentiful  at  some  unspecified  point  in  the  future.  Of 
course,  it  is  possible  that  this  dichotomy  resulted  from  a  further  round  of  un-minuted 
discussion,  although  the  high  level  of  the  10  June  1940  meeting  and  the  time  scale  make 
this  rather  unlikely.  It  is  therefore  logical  to  assume  that  the  internal  documents  reflect  the 
true  Air  Ministry  attitude  to  the  matter,  and  that  the  conference  conclusions  were  a 
bureaucratic  gambit  to  project  an  illusion  of  compliance.  Only  time,  and  the  subsequent 
behaviour  of  the  Air  Ministry,  would  prove  the  case  one  way  or  the  other. 
V.  The  Beginnings  of  a  Training  and  Development  Infrastructure:  The 
Establishment  of  the  Central  Landing  School 
Whatever  its  true  opinion  of  the  matter,  the  Air  Ministry  made  a  rapid  start  on 
implementing  the  recommendations  of  the  10  June  1940  conference.  On  14  June  1940,  the 
Air  Ministry  Departments  of  Plans  and  Operations  issued  a  joint  executive  memo  entitled 
"Parachute  Training  Centre",  which  set  the  establishment  of  a  PTC  in  motion.  104  It  ordered 
the  framing  of  a  paper  establishment,  the  selection  and  modification  of  six  Whitleys,  and 
requested  that  the  Air  Ministry's  Director  of  Military  Co-operation  (DMC)  find  out  where 
the  Army  intended  to  establish  its  own  "Parachute  Force  Centre"  and  propose  a  suitable 
RAF  location  in  the  vicinity.  Other  departments  were  ordered  to  ascertain  the  number  of 
suitable  parachutes  available,  whether  this  was  sufficient  to  allow  training  to  commence 
immediately,  and  to  propose  a  date  for  the  official  establishment  of  the  PTC  in  the  light  of William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4 
all  this.  On  17  June  1940  a  Secret  Organisation  Memo  informed  individual  RAF 
Commands  of  the  Air  Ministry's  decision: 
"I.  The  Parachute  Training  Centre  will  form  at  [RAF]  Ringway  on  21th  [sic] 
June  1940 
2.  It  will  form  to  Establishment  No.  WAR/AC/102  and  will  be  placed  in  No. 
22  Group  for  administration 
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3.  It  will  be  under  the  operational  control  of  the  Director  of  Plans,  Air  Ministry 
4.  The  aircraft  establishment  will  be  4+2  Whitleys.  ,  105 
A  "Table  of  War  Establishment  for  Parachute  Training  Centre"  was  attached  to  the 
memo.  106  Six  RAF  officers,  under  the  command  of  Squadron-Leader  D.  R.  Shore,  and 
sixty-six  RAF  other  ranks  were  to  be  posted  to  the  PTC.  This  appears  to  have  been 
considered  insufficient,  given  that  a  marginal  note  on  the  document  requested  additional 
"instructional  staff  of  4  sergeants  and  4  corporals".  This  was  refused.  107  The  new 
establishment  was  renamed  the  Central  Landing  School  (CLS),  presumably  to  reflect  the 
Air  Ministry's  expressed  interest  in  military  gliding.  108  This  change  in  nomenclature  was 
to  cause  some  confusion.  At  least  one  official  communication  to  Ringway  was  addressed 
"Central  Laundering  Service",  and  the  War  Office  re-directed  a  letter  to  an  Army 
parachute  trainee  addressed  to  the  "Central  Sunday  School".  This  caused  no  little 
amusement  at  the  CLS,  which  at  one  point  rendered  its  telegraph  address  as  "Droppings, 
Ringway".  109 
The  CLS  was  thus  established  on  paper  with  effect  from  21  June  1940,  although  the 
matter  was  not  as  straightforward  as  that.  Personnel  assigned  to  the  CLS  began  to  arrive  at 
RAF  Ringway  from  that  date,  but  the  designated  commander,  Squadron-Leader  Shore,  had 
broken  his  leg  in  a  parachute  jump  at  the  PDF,  and  was  consequently  unable  to  meet  and 
enlighten  his  new  charges.  110  By  24  June  these  included  at  least  six  RAF  pilots,  and 
possibly  Captain  J.  F.  Rock  RE,  the  War  Office's  representative  in  the  new  venture,  who 
arrived  between  24  and  27  June.  "'  Neither  the  new  arrivals  nor  the  existing  station  staff 
had  any  inkling  of  what  they  were  supposed  to  be  doing.  This  situation  prevailed  until  the 
senior  pilot  by  experience  rather  than  rank,  Pilot-Officer  Louis  Strange  DSO,  MC,  DFC 
and  Bar,  borrowed  an  aircraft  on  his  own  initiative  and  flew  to  London  to  clarify  matters 
on  28  June.  There  he  learned  of  Squadron-Leader  Shore's  mishap  and,  thanks  to  an  old 
friend  serving  as  the  Deputy  Director  of  Combined  Operations  (Air),  was  despatched  back William  F  Buc;  Wingham,  2000  Chapter  4  106 
to  Ringway  as  the  CLS's  new  commander  with  the  rank  of  Squadron-Leader,  a  status 
officially  confirmed  by  No.  22  Group  on  1  July  1940.112 
Strange  had  earned  his  DSO,  MC,  DFC,  three  Mentions  in  Despatches  and  the  rank  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  during  the  First  World  War.  He  joined  the  RFC  before  1914,  and  his 
war  service  was  eventful  to  say  the  least.  On  one  occasion,  for  example,  attempts  to  clear  a 
jammed  Lewis  gun  mounted  on  his  Martinsyde  aircraft's  upper  wing  during  a  dog-fight 
ended  with  him  hanging  by  the  fingertips  from  the  Lewis  drum,  after  the  aircraft  inverted 
and  his  seat  belt  snapped.  Somehow,  he  managed  to  regain  control  of  the  aircraft  and 
return  safely  to  base.  Recalled  as  a  RAF  reservist  in  December  1939  with  the  rank  of 
Acting  Pilot  Officer,  he  served  with  the  RAF's  only  dedicated  transport  unit,  No.  24 
Squadron,  ferrying  equipment  and  personnel  to  France.  In  the  process  he  won  the  Bar  to 
his  DFC,  by  successfully  flying  an  unarmed  Hawker  Hurricane  fighter  back  to  the  UK  in 
the  latter  stages  of  the  Dunkirk  evacuation.  Strange  was  chased  by  at  least  six  German 
fighters,  which  he  avoided  with  a  death-defying  display  of  low-level  flying.  This  was  all 
the  more  extraordinary  because  Strange  had  no  previous  experience  with  the  Hurricane,  or 
indeed  any  high-performance  fighter  aircraft.  Nonetheless,  with  the  aid  of  friendly  anti- 
aircraft  fire  off  Dunkirk,  he  succeeded  in  delivering  his  aircraft,  which  by  that  time 
resembled  a  flying  colander,  to  RAF  Manston  in  Kent. 
Strange  was  presumably  posted  to  Ringway  as  a  result  of  his  transport  service  with  No. 
24  Squadron,  and  his  elevation  to  command  the  CLS  was  thus  whimsical  to  say  the  least. 
It  did,  however,  prove  to  be  a  very  happy  development  for  the  new  parachute  venture,  for 
Strange  was  an  extremely  capable  military  maverick  with  a  long-standing  habit  of  bending 
or  ignoring  rules  and  regulations  when  they  interfered  with  the  business  in  hand.  His 
attitude  is  well  summed-up  by  his  alleged  response  to  an  Air  Ministry  accusation  that  he 
had  no  respect  for  procedure:  "I  have  if  it  proceeds".  113  Under  ordinary  circumstances 
such  an  attitude  could  be  a  liability,  but  it  was  exactly  what  was  called  for  in  the 
extraordinary  circumstances  of  June  1940,  however.  Thus  Strange,  like  Churchill,  proved 
to  be  another  right  man  in  the  right  place  at  the  right  time  for  the  establishment  of  a  British 
airborne  force,  and  he  rapidly  imposed  order  upon  the  uncertainty  at  Ringway  in  his  own 
inimitable  style. 
One  of  the  most  crucial  problems  facing  Strange  was  the  matter  of  parachutes,  without 
which  a  parachute  training  establishment  was  redundant.  Air  Ministry  estimates  of 
parachute  availability  and  production  proved  to  be  rather  optimistic.  An  internal  Air 
Ministry  minute  on  20  June  1940  claimed  there  was  only  eleven  serviceable  and  three William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  107 
repairable  training  parachutes  available  in  the  UK.  Although  an  order  had  been  placed  for 
a  further  10,000,  and  10,000  observer-type  harnesses,  training  parachute  packs  were  not 
compatible  with  that  type  of  harness  without  modification.  The  target  was  therefore 
considered  achievable  within  two  months  if  all  other  parachute  production  ceased,  or  five 
months  if  it  did  not.  To  complicate  matters  further,  the  first  option  was  likely  to  affect 
flying  training  in  the  Dominions  under  the  Empire  Training  Scheme,  and  there  was  an 
unexplained  bottleneck  in  production  of  harness  buckles  and  quick  release  mechanisms. 
The  minute  ended,  unsurprisingly,  with  a  request  for  clarification  from  higher  authority.  114 
Strange  tackled  the  problem  by  visiting  the  PDF  on  29  June  1940  and  appropriating  its 
entire  stock  of  Irvin  training  parachutes,  including  some  modified  for  static-line  jumping  as 
a  result  of  Squadron-Leader  Shore's  brief  visit.  Whilst  at  the  PDF,  Strange  also  attempted 
to  rectify  the  shortage  of  parachute  instructors,  by  the  simple  expedient  of  addressing  the 
PDF's  staff  (with  the  station  commander's  blessing)  and  calling  for  volunteers.  Ten  came 
forward,  and  the  remaining  shortfall  was  made  up  by  drafting  in  Army  Physical  Training 
Instructors  (PTIs),  the  first  six  of  which  arrived  at  Ringway  on  I  July  1940  and 
commenced  ground  training  for  their  new  role  the  next  day.  115  Other  personnel  posted  to 
the  CLS  appeared  in  dribs  and  drabs,  and  by  4  July  there  were  sufficient  commissioned 
officers  to  allow  Strange  to  delineate  responsibilities  and  begin  drawing  up  a  preliminary 
training  syllabus.  '  16  By  8  July  the  CLS  had  a  staff  of  eleven.  Besides  Strange  as  OC  and  a 
hastily  promoted  Major  Rock  (to  match  Strange's  elevation  to  Squadron-Leader)  as  the 
ranking  War  Office  representative,  117  the  CLS  boasted  an  Adjutant,  an  Intelligence  Officer, 
a  Chief  Flying  Instructor  and  three  pilots,  a  Chief  and  Assistant  Chief  Landing  Instructor 
and  a  Chief  PT  Instructor.  This  proved  sufficient  for  the  CLS  to  begin  work.  118 
Besides  parachutes  and  personnel,  there  remained  the  matter  of  aircraft.  Some  of  the  six 
assigned  Whitleys  arrived  at  Ringway  before  5  July  1940.  According  to  CLS  operational 
records,  all  assigned  pilots  who  were  not  qualified  on  the  Whitley  received  their 
qualification  in-house  by  that  date.  119  It  would  also  appear  that  these  aircraft  had  not  been 
modified  for  parachute  jumping  with  the  addition  of  a  side-door,  as  recommended  by  the 
Air  Ministry  conference  of  10  June  1940.  According  to  Peter  Heam,  the  PDF  had 
modified  a  single  Whitley  on  its  own  initiative,  again  as  a  result  of  Squadron-Leader 
Shore's  brief  and  ill-fated  visit,  but  not  with  a  side-door.  Instead,  the  rear  gun-turret  had 
been  removed  and  replaced  with  a  small  platform  to  allow  "pull-off  'jumps,  and  the 
ventral  "dustbin"  gun  position  removed  to  create  an  alternative  exit  in  the  floor  of  the 
aircraft.  120  The  former  method  was  the  rather  hair-raising  standard  RAF  training  technique 
at  that  time,  which  required  the  trainee  to  pull  the  rip-cord  on  his  parachute  and  let  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  108 
developing  canopy  yank  him  from  his  perch,  usually  on  the  lower  wing  of  a  biplane.  121 
The  hole  in  the  floor,  or  aperture,  was  a  new  method,  which  was  successfidly  tested  by 
Strange's  ten  PDF  volunteers  on  30  June  1940.  Hearn  also  claims  that  Strange 
subsequently  accompanied  four  Whitleys  assigned  to  the  CLS  to  the  Armstrong  Whitworth 
factory  to  be  similarly  modified  on  his  own  initiative.  122  Although  no  date  is  given  for  this  , 
it  presumably  occurred  between  30  June  and  9  July,  given  that  CLS  operational  records 
show  that  dropping  sandbag  dummy  parachutists  for  pilot  experience  commenced  on  the 
latter  date.  123 
The  PDF's  ad  hoc  floor  aperture  modification  became  the  norin  for  parachute-assigned 
Whitleys.  An  Air  Ministry  progress  report  produced  for  Churchill  and  the  Chiefs  of  Staff 
in  August  1940  claimed  that  the  "door  in  the  side  of  the  Whitley  fuselage  was  examined 
but  found  to  be  too  small".  Enlarging  the  door,  it  was  claimed,  risked  compromising  the 
structural  integrity  of  the  aircraft.  124  However,  at  least  one  drop,  and  an  operational  one  at 
that,  was  carried  out  by  a  Whitley  with  a  side-door  of  some  description,  although  it  is 
unclear  whether  this  was  the  existing  door  for  crew  access  on  the  aircraft's  port  side,  or  a 
modification  or  re-location  thereof  According  to  Jozef  Garlinski,  the  first  Polish  Special 
operations  Executive  (SOE)  operatives  were  delivered  to  Poland  on  the  night  of  15-16 
February  1941  in  a  Whitley  modified  in  this  way.  The  three  operatives  involved 
complained  at  the  time  that  they  had  been  trained  to  jump  from  a  "trapdoor"  in  the  floor 
rather  than  a  side-door,  although  the  jump  went  off  without  mishap.  125 
Assuming  that  the  Polish  account  is  accurate,  this  is  a  curious  anomaly  that  directly 
contradicts  the  Air  Ministry's  stated  verdict.  It  is  logical  to  assume  that  the  aircraft 
involved  had  been  modified,  for  it  is  inconceivable  that  staff  at  the  PDF  or  CLS  could  have 
failed  to  check  the  Whitley's  existing  crew  access  door  for  suitability.  The  aircraft  in 
question  could  have  been  assigned  to  the  CLS,  and  there  could  have  been  others,  but  if  that 
were  the  case  it  would  be  reasonable  to  expect  some  mention  of  them  in  operational 
records,  other  official  documentation  or  participant  accounts.  This  does  not  appear  to  be 
the  case,  and  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  the  existence  of  a  successfully  modified  aircraft 
would  have  gone  unremarked,  for  the  suitability  of  the  Whitley  for  parachuting  was  shortly 
to  become  a  matter  of  serious  dispute  between  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office. 
Why  the  aircraft  was  not  assigned  to  the  CLS  for  its  intended  role  is  therefore  a  mystery. 
Possibly  it  became  misdirected  within  the  RAF's  equipment  administration  system,  or  it 
may  simply  be  that  the  modifications  carried  out  by  the  PDF  were  considered  superior  by 
some  nameless  RAF  official,  resulting  in  the  aircraft  being  considered  surplus  to  CLS William  IF  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  109 
requirements  and  issued  elsewhere.  On  the  other  hand,  given  the  schizophrenic  nature  of 
the  Air  Ministry's  reaction  to  Churchill's  parachute  directive,  it  is  not  impossible  that  the 
officially  modified  aircraft  was  considered  rather  too  well  suited  to  its  projected  task,  and 
was  deliberately  "lost"  to  the  CLS.  Such  a  suggestion  may  appear  rather  far-fetched,  but  it 
is  in  perfect  accord  with  the  sentiments  expressed  in  the  Air  Ministry's  Department  of 
Plans  paper  of  8  June  1940  and  the  minutes  of  the  resulting  conference  on  10  June.  If  this 
was  the  case,  it  was  of  course  upset  by  Strange's  presumably  unforeseen  unilateral  and 
highly  irregular  action,  which  ensured  that  the  CLS  had  at  least  one  Whitley  capable  of 
dropping  parachutists  within  days  of  its  official  establishment. 
Facilities  were  a  further  problem  for  the  CLS.  The  new  establishment  had  been  located  at 
RAF  Ringway,  formerly  Manchester  Airport,  because  it  was  isolated  from  other  RAF 
operational  areas,  126  but  as  a  fully-functioning  RAF  station  Ringway  was  unsuitable  for 
regular  and  large-scale  parachute  descents.  Strange  was  thus  faced  with  the  problem  of 
locating  a  suitable  parachute  landing  zone,  a  task  he  achieved  with  his  customary 
directness  and  speed.  Operational  records  show  that  the  search  began  on  6  July  1940,127 
and  Tatton  Hall  Park,  a  large  area  of  parkland  located  five  miles  southwest  of  Ringway 
recommended  itself  immediately.  Permission  for  aerial  photography  of  the  Park  was 
requested,  128  WhilSt  Strange  approached  the  owner,  Lord  Egerton,  in  person.  Lord 
EgertoWs  son  had  been  a  pioneer  aviator  of  Strange's  acquaintance  before  the  First  World 
War,  and  Strange  gained  permission  to  use  the  Park  as  a  parachute  landing  ground.  129  A 
request  for  official  permission  to  use  Tatton  Hall  Park  as  a  "permanent  landing  area  for 
[parachute]  trainees  but  not  aircraft"  was  sent  to  the  Air  Ministry  on  7  July  1940.  It  was 
accompanied  by  the  relevant  map  sheet  and  grid  references,  a  request  that  other  flying 
activities  be  curtailed  within  a  two-mile  radius  of  the  centre  of  the  Park,  and  confirmation 
that  the  owner  of  the  property  had  given  his  permission.  130  The  Air  Ministry  granted 
authorisation  on  8  July  1940,  with  the  proviso  that  owner  agreement  was  confirmed,  and 
that  there  was  no  cost  to  the  Air  Ministry.  13  1A  further  communication  halted  the 
obstruction  of  the  Park  as  part  of  the  local  programme  of  anti-invasion  measures.  132 
This,  however,  was  far  from  the  end  of  the  matter.  Someone,  from  either  No.  22  Group 
or  the  CLS,  suggested  establishing  a  landing  ground  at  Tatton  for  powered  aircraft.  133  The 
idea  first  arose  toward  the  end  of  July  1940,  when  Lord  Egerton  wrote  to  the  Vice 
Secretary  of  State  for  Air  enquiring  about  compensation  for  the  loss  of  grazing  land  that 
this  would  entail.  134  As  that  position  did  not  exist,  the  letter  was  presumably  intended  for 
the  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Air,  Captain  Harold  Harrington-Balfour.  135  Given  Lord William  F  Buddrigham,  2000  Chapter  4  110 
Egerton's  less  than  perfect  grasp  of  the  British  higher  planning  and  command  structure,  it 
might  be  advisable  at  this  point  to  provide  a  brief  sketch  of  that  structure. 
The  British  government  reacted  far  more  swiftly  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Second  World 
War  than  it  had  in  1914.  The  peace-time  Committee  for  Imperial  Defence  was  suspended 
and  absorbed,  along  with  its  Cabinet  Committees  and  Sub-Committees,  into  a  nine-strong 
War  Cabinet  on  5  September  1939.  This  included  Prime  Minister  Chamberlain,  the  Home 
Secretary  Lord  Halifax,  the  Minister  of  Food,  the  Minister  of  Labour  and  National  Service, 
the  heads  of  the  three  service  Ministries  (Sir  Dudley  Pound,  Leslie  Hore  Belisha  and  Sir 
Kingsley  Wood),  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty  (Churchill)  and  a  Minister  Without 
Portfolio  (Lord  Hankey).  136  In  April  1940  Chamberlain  made  Churchill  head  of  a  new 
Ministerial  Committee  on  Military  Co-ordination,  consisting  of  the  three  service  Ministers, 
the  Chiefs  of  Staff  Committee  (consisting  of  the  Chiefs  of  the  three  services),  and 
representatives  from  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  Treasury.  137 
The  following  month,  on  10  May  1940,  Churchill  became  Prime  Minister  of  a  National 
Government  and  carried  out  his  own  adjustments  to  the  defence  machinery.  In  effect,  the 
Ministerial  Committee  on  Military  Co-ordination  became  Churchill's  Defence  Committee, 
with  the  Prime  Minister  absorbing  the  office  of  Minister  of  Defence.  The  Chiefs  of  Staff 
Committee  thus  became  the  supreme  executive  arm  within  the  Defence  Committee  through 
which  Churchill  prosecuted  the  war.  The  pre-existing  Cabinet  Secretariat's  Military  Wing 
was  transformed  into  the  Office  of  the  Minister  of  Defence  to  act  as  a  "handling  machine" 
within  the  War  Cabinet  Office.  The  latter  was  run  by  Major-General  Sir  liastings  Ismay, 
who  simultaneously  served  as  Churchill's  Personal  Staff  Officer,  with  a  seat  on  the  Chiefs 
of  Staff  Committee.  In  addition,  there  were  two  perinanent  sub-committees  attached  to  the 
Defence  Committee.,  the  Defence  Committee  (Operations)  and  the  Defence  Committee 
(Supply),  whose  responsibilities  were  self-evident.  This  was  the  permanent  structure  under 
which  the  British  airborne  force  was  established,  with  additional  sub-committees  being 
138 
created  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  -to  deal  with  specific  matters. 
in  the  event,  the  scheme  to  establish  an  aircraft  landing  ground  at  Tatton  Park  was  only 
fmally  abandoned  in  January  1941,  after  a  ludicrously  long-winded  process  which  involved 
Lord  Egerton  and  his  estate  staff,  the  Air  Ministry,  the  CLS,  No.  22  Group,  several  Air 
Ministry  Works  departments,  GHQ  Home  Forces,  and  the  Cheshire  War  Agriculture 
Executive  Committee.  139  The  up  side  of  this  sorry  saga  was  the  fact  that  it  did  not  interfere 
with  the  use  of  the  Park  as  a  parachute  landing  zone,  and  the  first  drop,  using  sandbag 
dummies,  took  place  there  on  11  July  1940.140  It  was  not  the  perfect  location,  for  it William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  ill 
contained  several  bodies  of  water  that  came  to  be  viewed  with  some  trepidation  by 
trainees,  and  which  inspired  some  wag  on  the  training  staff  to  pen  a  tongue-in-cheek  ditty 
entitled  "Mind  the  Lake"  to  the  tune  of  "Bless  'em  All".  14'  They  were  later  used  to  train 
SOE  operatives  in  water  jumping  techniques.  142 
The  CLS  thus  had  access  to  an  adequate  parachute  landing  ground  from  8  July  1940,  but 
the  ground  facilities  at  Ringway  had  still  to  be  sorted  out.  On  15  July  1940,  for  example, 
the  CLS  had  to  seek  permission  to  use  the  station's  Airmen's  Dining  Room  for  parachute 
packing  between  18:  00  and  22:  00  hours.  Many  of  the  RAF  non-commissioned  personnel 
were  billeted  a  mile  or  more  from  Ringway,  the  Army  PTIs  were  housed,  rather 
appropriately,  in  the  station!  s  gymnasium,  143  and  the  unit  rapidly  outgrew  the  two  hangars 
it  was  allocated  for  training,  maintenance  and  storage  purposes.  144Nonetheless,  the  fact 
remains  that  in  a  matter  of  ten  days  the  CLS  had  been  converted  from  a  leaderless 
collection  of  individuals  into  a  unit  with  access  to  sufficient  equipment  and  facilities  at 
least  to  begin  carrying  out  its  allotted  task  of  training  military  parachutists. 
The  problems  of  equipment  and  facilities  were  overtaken  to  some  extent  by  the  arrival  of 
the  first  parachute  volunteers  from  No,  2  Commando,  who  began  to  arrive  in  nearby 
Knutsford  from  3  July  1940.145  The  unit's  OC,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Jackson  RTR,  and  B 
and  C  Troops  of  No,  2  Commando  commenced  ground  training  and  air  experience  flights 
at  the  CLS  from  9  July,  whilst  modification  and  testing  work  continued.  146  Inclement 
weather  delayed  matters,  a  circumstance  which  was  to  become  familiar,  given 
Manchester's  reputation  for  having  the  vilest  climate  in  England.  147  Nonetheless,  the  first 
dummy  drops  using  sandbags  occurred  at  Tatton  Park  on  11  July  1940,148  and  the  first  live 
drop  there,  by  members  of  the  CLS  staff,  followed  on  13  July.  This  was  supposed  to  be  a 
secret,  but  according  to  Strange  ",,,  the  whole  of  Manchester  turned  out  to  see  our  first 
jumps,,.  149  They  consisted  of  eight  descents  from  a  Whitley,  two  pull-offs  and  six  from  the 
aperture,  and  included  Strange  himself,  making  his  first  parachute  descent.  The  first  exit 
from  the  aperture  employed  a  rip-cord  operated  Irvin  training  parachute,  and  the  remaining 
five  apparently  used  the  same  parachute  modified  for  static-line  operation.  '50  A  further 
fourteen  descents  were  carried  out  the  following  day.  Six  Army  personnel,  including 
Major  Rock,  used  the  tried  if  hair-raising  pull-off  method,  whilst  RAF  instructors  carried 
out  a  further  six  test  jumps  through  the  aperture.  The  first  Army  descents  from  the 
aperture  were  carried  out  by  selected  PTIs  without  mishap  on  15  Jul  Y.  151  The  next  day  Air 
Marshal  Sir  William  Mitchell  inspected  the  CLS.  A  demonstration  of  ground  training  was 
laid  on,  and  the  staff  felt  sufficiently  confident  of  their  expertise  and  equipment  to  carry 
out  a  live  parachuting  demonstration.  Eight  RAF  and  six  Army  instructors  jumped  for  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  112 
benefit  of  their  visitor  and  the  assembled  Commando  trainees,  although  the  fact  that  one  of 
the  RAF  instructors  injured  himself  on  landing  must  have  reduced  the  PR  and  confidence- 
building  value  of  the  exercise.  152 
Thus,  after  twenty-one  days,  the  CLS  was  ready  to  begin  training  military  parachutists,  an 
achievement  that  compared  favourably  with  the  Army's  performance  in  locating  and 
assembling  the  necessary  volunteers.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  progress  on  the 
RAF  side  was  almost  entirely  due  to  the  unorthodox  and  unauthorised  efforts  of  Squadron- 
Leader  Strange  who,  virtually  single-handed,  secured  the  necessary  personnel,  equipment 
and  facilities  in  the  eleven  days  after  he  assumed  command  of  the  CLS,  Given  that  such 
progress  would  have  taken  infinitely  longer  through  conventional  channels,  and  the  less 
than  urgent  treatment  of  the  matter  by  those  channels,  one  has  to  wonder  whether  the  Air 
Ministry  really  envisaged,  or  even  welcomed,  such  spectacular  progress.  Indeed,  it  is  not 
beyond  the  bounds  of  possibility  that  Strange's  single-minded  approach  upset  a  subtle 
scheme  to  slow  and  thus  minimise  RAT  cornpliance  with  red  tape,  camouflaged  behind  a 
show  of  acceptance. 
There  is  insufficient  solid  evidence  at  this  stage  of  the  British  airborne  story  conclusively 
to  prove  such  a  suggestion.  What  is  apparent,  however,  is  a  marked  dichotomy  of  effort 
and  support  between  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  for  the  new  parachute  venture, 
despite  the  fact  that  both  agencies  purported  to  be  fully  committed  to  it  .  Admittedly,  the 
War  Office  did  reduce  the  initial  parachute  commitment  to  five  hundred  rather  than  ten 
times  that  number,  and  unilaterally  combined  the  parachute  effort  within  the  larger 
Commando  raiding  organisation  for  adminis  rative  cQnvenience,  However,  the  former 
decision  was  based  in  part  on  the  lack  of  RAF  training  facilities,  and  the  fact  remains  that, 
once  the  decision  to  raise  a  parachute  force  was  taken,  the  War  Office  swiftly  disseminated 
the  policy  in  a  manner  which  brooked  no  argument.  It  also  rapidly  assembled  the 
-necessary  administrative  machinery,  and  invested  it  with  sufficient  authority  for 
enforcement,  with  additional  support  from  the  very  highest  level  if  necessary.  AG  17 
wasted  no  time  before  invoking  the  authority  of  the  CIGS  when  faced  with  objections  or 
obstructionism,  real  or  assumed.  153 
Contrast  this  with  the  lack  of  information  and  guidance  which  greeted  those  posted  to  the 
CLS  at  Ringway,  and  the  difficulty  Strange  encountered  in  obtaining  information  on  his 
new  posting  during  his  impromptu  visit  to  London  on  28  June  1940.  No-one  at  the  Air 
Ministry  claimed  to  know  anything  about  a  parachute  unit,  and  Strange  was  obliged  to  use 
his  initiative  to  track  the  matter  to  Combined  Operations  headquarters  (located  at  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  4  113 
Admiralty)  to  attain  enlightenment  and,  as  it  turned  out,  promotion.  154  This  does  not 
suggest  a  venture  enjoying  high  support,  an  impression  reinforced  by  the  refusal  of  the  Air 
Ministry  to  provide  the  CLS  with  a  mere  eight  additional  NCOs.  There  is  also  the  fact  that 
some  pilots  posted  to  the  CLS  were  not  qualified  to  fly  the  Whitley,  despite  the  Air 
Ministry's  insistence  that  the  Whitley  was  the  only  available  aircraft  suitable  for 
parachuting.  There  was  also  the  matter  of  the  non-appearance  of  the  Whitleys  modified 
with  side-doors. 
Of  course,  all  this  could  have  been  coincidental,  the  result  of  administrative  errors, 
incompetence,  or  the  pressure  of  circumstances,  although  similar  constraints  do  not  appear 
to  have  interfered  with  the  ability  of  the  War  Office  to  accomplish  their  much  larger  side  of 
the  parachute  bargain.  Thus,  the  fact  that  both  agencies  were  commendably  swift  in 
issuing  the  necessary  orders  is  not  in  itself  indicative  of  support  for  the  new  venture.  The 
War  Office  took  the  trouble  to  ensure  that  its  instructions  were  fully  and  promptly  obeyed, 
whereas  the  Air  Ministry  was  content  to  sit  back  and  allow  official  procedure  to  follow  its 
course.  This,  in  conjunction  with  the  tone  of  internal  Air  Ministry  discussion  on  the 
subject,  makes  it  reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  Air  Ministry  was  at  best  indifferent,  and 
at  worst  actively  opposed  to  the  establishment  of  a  dedicated  British  parachute  force. 
Subsequent  events  would  prove  the  accuracy  or otherwise  of  this  conclusion. 
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October  1935;  see  MacDonald,  op  cit.,  pp.  11-12 
153  see  for  example  PRO  WO  32/4723,  doc.  76B,  teleprint  from  WO  AG  17  to  HoFor,  All  Commands,  dated 
01/10/1940;  doc.  82A,  signal  from  WO  AG  17  to  HoFor,  dated  04/10/1940;  and  doc.  96A,  telegram  from 
WO  AG  17  to  Eastern  Command,  dated  22/10/1940 
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CHAPTER  FIVE 
Laying  the  Groundwork:  The  Development  of  a  British 
Airborne  Infrastructure,  July  1940  -  April  1941 
Thanks  largely  to  the  unorthodox  efforts  of  Louis  Strange,  the  Central  Landing  School 
(CLS)  metamorphosed  from  paper  to  functioning  reality  in  just  three  weeks,  although  this 
transformation  was  not  as  smooth  as  the  bare  bones  would  suggest.  Even  the  weather 
conspired  against  the  new  enterprise;  according  to  operational  records,  three  days  in  the 
first  seven  after  the  initial  batch  of  Commando  trainees  arrived  at  Ringway  on  9  July  1940 
were  unsuitable  for  parachuting  and/or  flying,  due  to  high  winds  and  rain.  1  The  most 
serious  obstacle  faced  by  the  CLS  in  the  period  immediately  following  its  establishment 
was  not  inclement  weather,  however,  but  the  ad  hoc  and  largely  untried  nature  of  its 
equipment  and  operating  procedures. 
This  chapter  will  therefore  detail  how  the  staff  at  Ringway  rectified  problems  with 
parachutes  and  aircraft,  and  how  parachute  training  was  implemented.  It  will  also  analyse 
received  Air  Ministry  wisdom  with  regard  to  aircraft  provision,  detail  how  the  structure  at 
Ringway  was  expanded  to  accommodate  its  growing  responsibilities,  and  briefly  examine 
the  first  British  parachute  operation. 
I.  The  First  Major  Stumbling  Block.,  Parachute  Problems 
As  well  as  confirming  the  suitability  of  the  new  landing  zone,  the  first  CLS  parachute 
descents  onto  Tatton  Park  on  13  July  1940  tested  the  modified  Irvin  training  parachutes,  2 
and  the  utility  of  the  alterations  to  the  CLS's  Whitley  bombers.  CLS  staff,  including  Major 
R?  ck  and  other  Army  candidate  instructors,  carried  out  more  descents  over  the  next  seven 
days?  The  CLS  was  thus  combining  operational  testing  with  training,  for  none  of  Strange, 
Rock,  or  almost  any  of  the  other  CLS  staff  had  any  previous  parachuting  experience. 
Although  arguably  obliged  by  circumstances,  this  was  extremely  hazardous  and  potentially 
lethal.  Descents  by  Commando  volunteers  began  on  22  July  1940.  Starting  at  0500  to  take 
advantage  of  early  morning  clear  weather,  five  Army  officers  and  six  other  ranks  had  been 
successfully  dropped  by  0800  the  same  day.  4A  further  seventy-two  descents  were  carried 
out  over  the  same  period  on  23  July  1940,  most  from  the  floor  aperture,  and  air  experience 
flights  were  provided  for  the  remainder  of  No.  2  Commando's  B  and  C  Troops  when  the 
weather  became  unsuitable  for  parachuting.  5  No  parachuting  took  place  on  24  July  1940. 
On  25  July,  twenty-one  successful  descents  were  carried  out  before  Driver  Evans,  Royal 
Army  Service  Corps  (RASC)  was  killed  by  a  parachute  malfunction.  Further  parachute 
training  was  prohibited  with  effect  from  16:  45  hours  that  day.  6 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  122 
The  death  of  Driver  Evans  was  directly  attributable  to  the  ad  hoc  modification  of  the  Irvin 
training  parachute  for  static-line  operation.  This  consisted  of  permanently  attaching  one 
end  of  a  length  of  woven  tape  to  the  manual  ripcord  handle  on  the  parachute,  7  the  other  end 
being  secured  with  a  clip  to  a  strong  point  within  the  aircraft.  This  was  supposed  to  allow 
the  parachute  to  open  automatically  as  the  parachutist  fell  away  from  the  aircraft. 
However,  the  modification  failed  to  address  the  opening  sequence  of  the  Irvin  parachute, 
which  emerged  canopy-first  from  the  pack.  This  was  not  normally  a  problem  because  the 
parachutist  was  already  falling  with  sufficient  speed  to  allow  the  canopy  to  inflate  properly 
before  operating  the  ripcord,  while  in  pull-offjumps  the  slipstream  from  the  aircraft  served 
the  same  purpose.  With  a  static-line  however,  the  parachute  opening  sequence  occurred 
while  the  parachutist  was  much  closer  to  the  aircraft.  This  resulted  in  the  rigging  lines 
leaving  the  pack  before  the  canopy  was  fully  inflated,  which  ran  the  risk  of  the  lines 
entangling  the  canopy  and  preventing  it  from  deploying  fully,  a  mishap  that  became  known 
as  a  "Roman  Candle".  This  could  be  exacerbated  by  poor  exit  posture  by  the  parachutist, 
which  could  result  in  arms  and  legs  becoming  entangled  in  the  rigging  lines 
.8  It  Was  one  or 
both  of  these  circumstances  which  killed  Driver  Evans. 
Driver  Evans  was  not  equipped  with  a  reserve  parachute.  Group-Captain  Maurice 
Newnham,  who  commanded  parachute  training  at  Ringway  in  April  1941,  justified  this 
omission  on  the  following  grounds.  Reserve  parachutes  meant  a  considerable  increase  in 
the  weight  and  bulk  of  the  individual  parachutist,  an  important  factor  given  the  dimensions 
and  performance  of  the  Whitley.  There  was  also  a  danger  that  a  deployed  reserve  might 
become  entangled  with  the  failed  main  parachute.  In  addition,  the  low  operational  jumping 
height  of  five  to  six  hundred  feet  did  not  allow  sufficient  time  for  a  reserve  to  be  deployed 
in  any  case,  and  night  drops  would  reduce  its  effectiveness  yet  further  due  to  the  lack  of 
visual  references.  Newnham  therefore  considered  it  better  to  provide  one  reliable 
parachute,  seeing  reserve  parachutes  as  an  unjustifiable  drain  upon  "...  money,  material  and 
labour  resources"?  This  was  reasonable,  although  the  Soviets  used  reserves  from  at  least 
193  1,10  and  that  US  airborne  forces  were  also  equipped  with  them  from  the  outset.  " 
Nonetheless,  it  remained  British  practice  to  jump  without  a  reserve  until  well  into  the 
1950s,  when  their  use  was  enforced  by  NATO  regulations.  Even  then,  the  Parachute 
Regiment's  3d  Battalion  jumped  into  Suez  in  November  1956  without  reserves.  This  was 
due  in  part  to  aircraft  weight  restriction,  and  because  the  small  drop  zone  (DZ)  obliged  a 
drop  from  seven  hundred  feet,  again  considered  too  low  to  make  provision  of  a  reserve 
parachute  worthwhile.  12 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  123 
The  death  of  Driver  Evans  and  the  ban  on  parachute  training  were  embarrassing  for  the 
CLS  because  a  visit  by  high-ranking  officers,  including  the  Director  of  Combined 
Operations  (DCO),  was  scheduled  for  26  July  1940.  A  demonstration  was  held  for  the 
visitors  by  instructors  using  rip-cord  parachutes,  while  the  new  aperture  technique  was 
demonstrated  with  dummy  drops  that  also  served  as  additional  testing  for  the  modified 
Irvin  training  parachutes.  However,  the  ban  proved  fortuitous,  because  three  of  the  eight 
parachutes  used  malfunctioned  in  the  same  way  that  killed  Driver  Evans.  13  The  modified 
Irvin  training  parachute  was  thus  removed  from  service  on  29  July  1940  and,  as  no 
alternative  was  immediately  available,  No.  2  Commando  was  despatched  for  a  fortnight's 
tactical  training.  14  CLS  staff  began  working  to  rectify  the  parachute  problem  immediately 
on  the  death  of  Driver  Evans.  According  to  operational  records,  an  officer  detached  from 
the  PDF  returned  to  Henlow  to  test  modified  parachutes  on  26  July  1940.15  It  is  unclear 
whether  these  were  tests  on  the  existing  modified  Irvin  parachutes,  or  of  a  re-design  of 
some  description,  but  as  Strange  visited  Henlow  the  next  day  and  selected  a  "suitable  type" 
of  parachute  for  delivery  by  29  July,  this  would  suggest  the  latter.  16  The  operational 
records  make  no  specific  mention  of  it,  but  the  CLS  called  in  Raymond  Quilter  and  James 
Gregory  of  the  GQ  Parachute  Co.  at  this  time.  17  However,  the  operational  records  do  refer 
to  the  successful  testing  of  "Quilter  parachutes"  on  30  July  1940,18  and  a  secondary  source 
refers  to  Gregory  and  Quilter  producing  a  modified  parachute  "within  a  week"  of  being 
called  in.  19  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  Quilter  product  was  selected  by  Strange  at 
Henlow  on  27  July. 
Quilter  simply  redesigned  the  parachute  pack  to  reverse  the  parachute's  opening 
sequence: 
"When  the  man  jumped,  the  parachute  pack  containing  the  canopy  and  rigging 
lines  was  broken  from  his  back  by  a  series  of  progressively  stronger  ties,  and 
hung  from  the  aircraft.  As  he  fell,  the  rigging  lines  were  dragged  from  this 
pack  and  by  the  time  the  canopy  appeared,  the  man  was  the  length  of  the 
rigging  lines,  20  feet  below.  A  final  tie,  holding  the  apex  of  the  canopy  to  the 
pack,  then  broke  and  the  parachute  was  fully  extended  leaving  the  pack  and 
static  line  attached  to  the  aircraft.  This  method  of  deployment  was  an 
improvement  upon  that  of  the  American  [Irvin]  pattern  being  more  controlled 
and  simpler,  and  giving  approximately  only  a  fifth  of  the  shock  previously 
experienced.  iM 
Thus  there  was  less  opportunity  for  the  rigging  lines  to  become  entangled  with  the  canopy, 
because  they  were  fully  extended  before  the  canopy  emerged  from  the  pack.  Quilter's  new 
system  was  subsequently  linked  to  an  improved  harness  designed  by  Irvin,  which William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  124 
incorporated  the  latter's  patent  quick  release  box.  The  result  was  christened  the  X-type, 
and  continued  in  British  airborne  service  until  the  1960S.  21 
Testing  Quilter's  parachutes  with  sandbag  dummies  began  on  30  July  1940.  The  system 
functioned  perfectly,  with  the  parachutes  deploying  fully  at  heights  as  low  as  one  hundred 
feet.  A  post-test  conference  decided  that  the  Irvin  training  canopies  were  to  be  retained  for 
use  with  Quilter's  modified  packs,  five  hundred  of  which  were  to  be  provide  at  a  rate  of 
one  hundred  per  week.  The  remaining  Irvin  ancillary  equipment  was  to  be  returned  to 
Henlow.  The  new  equipment  was  to  be  put  through  five  hundred  dummy  drops  before  live 
training  resumed.  22  The  dummy  tests  began  the  next  day,  as  did  the  transfer  of  the  Irvin 
canopies  to  the  GQ  works  at  Brookland  for  conversion.  The  CLS  Operational  Record 
Book  refers  to  the  receipt  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  modified  parachutes  on  2  August  1940, 
and  the  despatch  of  a  further  one  hundred  and  fifty  canopies  and  harnesses  to  Brookland 
for  modification  the  same  day.  23  On  7  August  1940  Strange  informed  No.  2  Commando 
that  parachute  training  would  re-commence  the  following  day.  24 
Raymond  Quilter's  work  was  extremely  efficient  and  highly  praiseworthy,  but  it  is 
possible  that  the  underlying  motive  for  it,  and  indeed  for  calling  in  the  GQ  Parachute  Co., 
was  not  totally  altruistic.  The  parachute  that  killed  Driver  Evans  was  an  Irvin  product,  and 
it  would  be  logical  to  expect  the  manufacturer  to  be  called  into  any  investigation. 
However,  this  does  not  appear  to  have  been  the  case.  The  only  secondary  source  to  link 
Irvin  to  Quilter's  modifications  is  Irvin's  biography,  and  then  only  indirectly.  Irvin  is 
credited  with  modifying  the  X-type  parachute  harness  "whilst  Quilter  and  Gregory  were 
working  on  the  deployment  systenf'.  25  CLS  operational  records  for  the  period  only 
mention  Irvin  once,  when  he  attended  a  private  conference  at  the  CLS  on  23  July  1940, 
26 
two  days  before  Driver  Evans  was  killed.  In  contrast,  Quilter's  name  first  appears  in  a 
list  of  conference  attendees  at  the  CLS  on  30  July,  and  frequently  thereafter.  It  is  also 
highly  likely  that  he  was  at  Henlow  on  27  July,  and  that  the  modified  parachute  selected  by 
Strange  on  29  July  was  hiS.  27 
Irvin's  lack  of  involvement  is  unusual  to  say  the  least,  and  contrasts  sharply  with  events 
following  the  death  of  another  trainee,  Trooper  Watts,  when  a  modified  parachute  failed  on 
27  August  1940.28  Quitter  was  on  the  scene  immediately  to  investigate  the  cause,  which 
turned  out  to  be  the  method  of  securing  the  parachute  within  the  modified  pack.  He  was 
also  allowed  to  formulate  the  necessary  modifications  the  same  day,  and  to  put  them  into 
effect  at  the  GQ  works  two  days  later.  This  was  of  course  laudable,  but  it  begs  the 
question  why  Irvin  was  not  consulted  with  similar  rapidity  following  the  death  of  Driver William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  125 
Evans.  This  is  all  the  more  curious  because  his  biography  claims  that  Irvin  had  prior 
29 
misgivings  at  the  way  in  which  his  parachute  was  being  adapted.  Indeed,  this  may  have 
been  the  reason  for  his  visit  to  the  CLS  on  23  July  1940. 
The  speed  with  which  Quilter  and  Gregory  produced  their  modified  deployment  system 
also  arouses  suspicion.  It  could  merely  be,  as  the  secondary  sources  invariably  imply,  30 
due  to  patriotic  diligence.  However,  it  could  also  mean  that  work  was  underway  before  the 
death  of  Driver  Evans,  and  that  his  demise  provided  a  means  to  avoid  placing  a  lucrative 
parachute  monopoly  in  the  hands  of  a  neutral  foreign  national,  for  Irvin  was  an  American 
citizen.  Motivation  could  therefore  have  been  pragmatic,  in  order  to  guarantee  access  to 
future  parachute  production.  Dividing  production  between  producers  in  this  way  also 
followed  RAF  procurement  procedures  established  in  the  inter-war  period,  when  the  Air 
Ministry  spread  funding  wide  and  thin,  to  save  manufacturers  from  bankruptcy  and 
preserve  their  production  facilities  against  future  need.  This  had  the  useful  side-effect  of 
stimulating  competition  and  driving  down  prices. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  potential  profit  offered  by  parachute  production  cannot  be 
discounted  either.  The  Air  Ministry  authorised  the  purchase  of  10,000  Irvin  training 
parachutes  on  10  June  1940,31  a  huge  order  by  contemporary  standards,  and  one  that  was 
potentially  the  first  of  many.  Home-grown  enterprises  like  the  GQ  Parachute  Co.  wished 
to  get  a  market  share.  Nor  would  it  be  surprising  if  the  military  wished  to  assist  them  for 
patriotic  reasons;  the  fact  that  Quilter  was  "an  ex-officer  of  the  Grenadier  Guards"  may 
also  have  been  significant  . 
32  Quilter's  re-design  immediately  earned  him  an  order  for  five 
hundred  parachute  packs.  More  significantly,  mating  it  with  the  Irvin  training  canopy 
guaranteed  his  company  a  half  share  in  any  further  parachute  production,  an  arrangement 
that  offered  potentially  huge  profits.  Of  course,  there  may  have  been  nothing  sinister  about 
Irvin's  apparent  lack  of  involvement  in  the  re-design  of  his  parachute.  He  may  have  been 
involved  but  unacknowledged  in  the  source  material,  or  he  may  have  absented  himself  for 
some  reason.  It  could  also  be  that  Quilter's  and  Gregory's  involvement  was  attributable  to 
Strange's  penchant  for  direct  action.  Nonetheless,  the  available  evidence  suggests  that 
Irvin  could  have  been  deliberately  sidelined,  for  pragmatic  reasons  at  best,  or  for 
chauvinism  and  financial  gain  at  worst. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  the  fact  remains  that  the  CLS  staff  and  their  civilian  advisers/suppliers 
overcame  an  unforeseen  problem  with  commendable  speed.  In  the  process,  however,  a 
further  problem  became  apparent:  the  suitability  of  the  aircraft  allotted  to  the  CLS  for 
parachuting. William  F  BucWingham,  2000  Chapter  5  126 
Il.  The  Second  Stumbling  Block.,  The  Provision  of  Aircraft  for  the  CLS  - 
Availability  or  Duplicity? 
According  to  the  Air  Ministry  conference  of  10  June  1940,  the  Armstrong  Whitworth 
Whitley  was  the  only  suitable  aircraft  available  for  parachuting.  "  It  is  unclear  how  this 
conclusion  was  reached,  but  while  it  may  be  an  exaggeration  to  suggest  that  the  Air 
Ministry  deliberately  chose  the  Whitley  for  its  unsuitability,  it  would  have  been  a  prime 
candidate  had  that  been  the  case.  This  was  the  certainly  the  opinion  relayed  to  Churchill 
by  the  DCO,  Admiral  Sir  Roger  Keyes  on  27  July  1940: 
"I  am  strongly  of  the  opinion  that  the  Whitley  machines  are  thoroughly 
unsatisfactory.  They  can  carry  only  eight  men,  who  would  have  to  sit 
throughout  the  passage  overseas,  huddled  up  in  the  bomb  tube  in  great 
discomfort,  and  then  drop  through  the  middle  of  a  small  hole,  with  no  margin 
whatever  for  error  in  poise.  Conditions  which  are  calculated  to  damp  the  light- 
hearted  enthusiasm  with  which  these  young  men  volunteer  for  a  hazardous 
adventure.  " 
He  went  on  to  mention  that  the  Air  Ministry  was  considering  the  Bristol  Bombay  as  an 
alternative,  although  there  was  a  shortage  of  suitable  engines,  and  recommended  that 
efforts  be  made  to  secure  Douglas  DC  aircraft  direct  from  the  US.  In  the  interim,  he 
suggested  that  six  Douglas  aircraft  belonging  to  the  Dutch  airline  KLM  be  obtained,  by 
charter  if  necessary.  34  Keyes  closed  by  calling  upon  Churchill  to  use  his  influence  to 
secure  the  Dutch  aircraft.  35 
The  Air  Ministry  responded  promptly  by  despatching  an  officer  to  the  US  to  hunt  for 
surplus  Douglas  aircraft,  and  by  approaching  a  Mr  van  Kleffens  at  the  Dutch  Foreign 
Ministry  about  the  KLM  machines.  The  latter  initiated  a  farcical  sequence  of  events, 
which  failed  to  secure  the  Dutch  aircraft  for  the  CLS,  and  that  exposed  Air  Ministry 
administrative  confusion,  if  not  outright  duplicity,  in  the  process.  Van  Kleffens'  response 
on  2  August  1940  was  first  to  ask  why  the  aircraft  were  considered  indispensable,  and  to 
enquire  what  provision  would  be  made  for  replacing  them  in  the  event  of  loss  or  damage. 
Only  then  did  he  offer  to  approach  KLM.  36  Ismay  received  a  further  note  the  next  day 
from  Sir  Arthur  Street,  head  of  the  Air  Ministry  department  involved,  informing  him  that 
he  [Street]  had  been  unable  to  contact  van  Kleffens  to  pursue  the  matter  further.  37 
However,  on  5  August  1940,  Ismay  was  informed  that  separate  Air  Ministry  departments 
were  trying  to  acquire  the  KLM  aircraft  for  parachuting  and  for  use  in  West  Africa  . 
38  The 
source  of  the  information  is  unclear,  although  it  may  have  come  from  the  Foreign  Office, 
but  appears  to  have  been  prompted  by  a  telephone  conversation  with  Keyes.  The  letter William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  127 
also  claimed  that  the  Air  Ministry  had  failed  fully  to  explore  UK  produced  civil  aircraft  for 
parachuting,  suggested  the  De  Havilland  Frobisher  as  a  candidate,  and  expressed  an  intent 
to  seek  clarification  from  Street  in  person  . 
39  The  outcome  of  this  is  unknown,  although  on 
9  August  1940  Ismay  himself  wrote  a  curious  letter  to  van  Kleffens,  informing  him  that  he 
no  longer  required  the  aircraft,  which  the  Air  Ministry  were  attempting  to  secure  for 
another  project.  40  Van  Kleffens  replied  three  days  later,  thanking  Ismay  and  finishing  with 
a  cryptic  reference  to  the  KLM  aircraft  being  turned  to  "another  good  purpose  for  the 
ý  41 
Allied  cause'. 
This  would  suggest  that  Ismay  either  erroneously  believed  that  the  KLM  aircraft  were  no 
longer  required  at  the  CLS,  or  that  he  knew  that  they  had  already  been  obtained  by  the  Air 
Ministry  and  assigned  elsewhere.  It  is  likely  they  ended  up  in  Africa,  for  an  Air  Ministry 
paper  on  12  August  1940  mentioned  their  suitability  for  the  "trans-African  route"  because 
they  were  equipped  for  tropical  climeS.  42  This  is  doubly  curious,  because  Churchill  wrote 
to  Ismay  on  10  August  1940,  asking  him  specifically  whether  the  DCO  was  to  get  the 
KLM  aircraft,  and  offering  to  put  pressure  upon  the  Dutch  authorities  to  secure  them.  43 
Ismay's  reply  was  unenlightening,  merely  referring  amongst  other  matters  to  the  fact  that  it 
was  not  possible  to  acquire  the  KLM  aircraft  (downgraded  to  four  rather  than  the  original 
six),  and  to  the  Frobisher  being  investigated  as  a  possible  alternative.  44  Thus,  despite 
acknowledging  the  suitability  of  the  Douglas  aircraft  for  parachuting,  45  the  Air  Ministry 
nonetheless  assigned  them  elsewhere,  which  does  not  suggest  a  high  level  of  commitment 
to  the  airborne  project.  The  result  of  this  episode  was  that  the  CLS  was  left  with  the 
Whitley  and,  as  that  aircraft  was  the  cause  of  the  first  rupture  in  the  joint  command 
structure  of  the  CLS,  it  may  be  enlightening  to  examine  it  in  a  little  more  detail. 
The  Whitley  was  a  twin-engine  monoplane,  designed  to  meet  Air  Ministry  specification 
B.  3/34  issued  in  July  1934.  This  was  one  of  the  first  specifications  for  a  pure  bomber,  as 
opposed  to  a  dual-purpose  "bomber-transport".  This  explains  the  Whitley's  unsuitability 
for  parachuting,  and  it  is  ironic  that  it  originated  from  a  prototype  1935  bomber-transport, 
which  was  re-designed  as  a  bomber  to  meet  the  new  specification.  46  The  CLS  shared 
Keyes'  opinion  of  the  Whitley,  and  considered  it  to  be  a  major  factor  in  the  high  wastage 
rate  amongst  the  first  Commando  trainees.  47  Strange  described  the  aircraft  as: 
11  ... 
dark  and  gloomy  with  its  hole  in  the  middle  [of  the  floor],  and  ... 
bad  for  the 
nerves.  The  sight  of  other  men  disappearing  through  the  hole  is  an  unpleasant 
one,  and  the  prospect  of  scraping  one's  face  on  the  side  is  not  encouraging.  iA8 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  128 
Another  member  of  the  CLS  staff,  an  RAF  parachute  pioneer  from  the  1920s,  expressed  a 
similar  opinion,  and  pointed  out  that  the  latter  mishap  was  virtually  guaranteed  for  at  least 
half  the  jumpers  in  a  full  load  of  ten: 
"And  that  Whitley  was  diabolical! 
...  The  fuselage 
...  was  never  made  for 
passengers,  let  alone  ones  with  bulky  parachutes  on  their  backs.  It  was  merely 
a  dark,  narrow  tunnel  designed  to  join  the  nose  to  the  tail.  Into  this  sewer-like 
passageway  one  crawled  on  hands  and  knees  to  take  a  seat  on  the  cold  floor, 
five  men  forward  of  the  hole  and  five  aft  if  there  was  a  full  stick  of  ten 
jumpers.  Being  on  the  forward  side  was  much  preferred.  From  aft,  there  was  a 
tendency  for  the  legs  to  be  blasted  backwards  as  they  entered  the  slipstream 
and,  as  the  body  pivoted,  for  the  face  to  be  smashed  against  the  forward  edge 
of  the  hole.  'Ringing  the  bell'  it  was  called.  qA9 
it  is  thus  hardly  surprising  that  Polish  parachute  trainees  at  Ringway  in  1941  composed  a 
song  that  began  ""The  Whitley  soars  through  the  clouds  like  a  tomb  ...  Inside  are  ten 
paratroopers  as  if  they  were  dead 
...... 
50 
Events  following  the  death  of  Driver  Evans  lowered  confidence  in  the  Whitley  further 
still.  On  31  July  1940  the  static-line  bar  came  adrift,  dumping  sandbag  dummies  and 
unopened  parachutes  to  the  ground,  and  nearly  taking  the  despatcher  with  them.  51  Another 
dummy  drop  came  close  to  catastrophe  when  a  parachute  canopy  became  snagged  on  a 
Whitley's  tail  wheel,  almost  causing  a  crash.  This  was  caused  by  excessive  slipstream,  and 
resulted  in  an  edict  that  Whitleys  could  only  drop  parachutists  in  a  tail-high  attitude,  with 
the  engines  throttled  back,  and  at  an  airspeed  of  not  more  than  ninety  miles  per  hour.  52  A 
fairing  was  subsequently  fitted  to  the  tail-wheels  of  Ringway's  Whitleys  after  a  similar 
mishap  in  September  1940.53  Alarming  as  these  accidents  were,  they  were  relatively  easily 
remedied,  but  confidence  was  not  so  easily  restored.  Thus,  when  Strange  informed  Rock 
on  7  August  1940  that  parachute  training  would  recommence  the  next  day,  Rock  refused  to 
allow  Army  personnel  to  use  the  Whitley  without  a  direct  order  from  either  the  DCO  or  the 
War  Office.  54  Strange's  response  was  to  point  out  that  "...  it  was  not  customary  in  the  RAF 
to  suspend  training  just  because  a  man  got  killed",  55  and  the  next  day  personally  led  three 
CLS  instructors  injumping  with  the  new  parachutes  to  demonstrate  his  confidence.  56 
Rock,  however,  was  adamant,  and  relayed  his  decision  to  the  War  Office,  with  a  request 
that  Bristol  Bombay  aircraft  be  substituted  for  the  Whitley. 
The  War  Office  backed  Rocles  stand,  and  the  Air  Ministry's  response  was  a  conference 
entitled  "Present  Situation  in  Respect  of  the  Development  of  Parachute  Training",  held  on 
12  August  1940.57  The  conclusions  were  distributed  to  the  Chiefs  of  Stafý  Churchill  and 
the  War  Office.  These  boiled  down  to  making  do  with  the  Whitley  and  "...  either  accept  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  129 
8  current  casualty  rate  or  give  up  for  the  time  being  the  idea  of  parachute  troope  Left 
with  little  option,  the  War  Office  lifted  the  Whitley  ban  on  14  August  1940,59  and 
parachute  training  re-commenced  the  following  day.  60  Because  the  War  Office  had  no 
independent  access  to  RAF  aircraft,  the  Air  Ministry's  pronouncements  were  accepted  at 
the  time,,  and  have  remained  unchallenged  ever  since.  Consequently,  the  12  August  1940 
paper  merits  detailed  examination,  because  it  casts  doubt  on  this  received  wisdom,  and 
provides  evidence  of  Air  Ministry  inconsistency,  if  not  deliberate  obstructionism. 
The  paper  began  by  reiterating  the  Air  Ministry  position  from  10  June  1940,61  Which  was 
that  production  of  dedicated  transport  aircraft  was  not  feasible,  that  parachuting  had  to  be  a 
secondary  role  for  bombers,  and  that  the  Whitley  was  the  only  option  available.  That  no 
more  than  a  handful  of  Whitleys  had  been  assigned  to  Ringway  was  justified  with  the 
circular  argument  that  "...  all  the  commandos  [sic]  were  not  yet  available  or  trained".  This 
conveniently  overlooked  the  fact  that  the  Air  Ministry  had  previously  promised  the  CLS 
twenty-one  Whitleys,  62  or  that  six  aircraft  might  be  insufficient  to  meet  the  training  needs 
of  five  hundred  parachutists.  The  Whitley's  limitations,  and  particularly  the  aperture  exit, 
were  acknowledged,  but  it  was  pointed  out  that  no  suitable  aircraft  with  doors  were 
available. 
This  was  justified  by  a  brief  explanation  of  the  shortcomings  of  possible  alternatives.  The 
Frobisher  was  ruled  out  because  parachutists  might  strike  the  tail  after  exiting  the  aft 
mounted  door.  The  door  on  the  De  Havilland  Flamingo,  a  small  production-run  twin- 
engine  airliner,  was  too  small,  and  the  type  was  not  currently  in  production  or available  in 
sufficient  numbers.  63  The  Bristol  Bombay  was  considered  suitable  for  dropping 
parachutists,  but  only  three  of  the  twenty-one  in  the  UK  had  engines,  64  which  were  claimed 
to  be  in  short  supply.  In  addition,  the  Air  Ministry  still  considered  the  Bombay  unsuitable 
because  it  was  unarmed  65  and  the  type  was  in  any  case  required  for  vital  RAF 
communication  worký  including  ferrying  replacement  pilots  to  Fighter  Command.  66 
Douglas  DC  aircraft  were  also  deemed  suitable,  but  the  five  KLM  machines  in  the  UK 
were  considered  best  employed  on  the  "trans-Africa  route",  because  they  were  fitted  out 
for  tropical  operation.  Reports  of  surplus  Douglas  civil  aircraft  in  the  US  were  considered 
erroneous.  The  new  Short  Stirling  heavy  bomber  was  suggested  as  a  possible  long-term 
alternative,  pending  investigation  of  door  modifications  and  the  rectification  of  more 
general  centre  of  gravity  problems.  67 
Authoritative  as  all  this  appears,  it  does  not  stand  up  to  detailed  scrutiny.  First,  it  is 
unclear  how  the  conclusion  that  the  Stirling,  Flamingo  and  Frobisher  had  unsuitable  doors William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  130 
was  reached.  The  only  establishment  qualified  to  make  such  judgements  was  the  CLS,  but 
operational  records  make  no  mention  of  such  aircraft  being  present  at  Ringway  or  being 
examined  by  personnel  at  this  time.  The  Stirling  was  later  employed  in  a  limited  capacity 
for  parachuting,  but  with  a  large  opening  at  the  rear  underside  which  proved  as  unpopular 
and  dangerous  as  the  Whitley  aperture.  This  did  not  occur  until  April  1944,68  however, 
and  in  any  case  the  CLS  did  not  examine  the  Stirling  until  January  1941.69  Similarly,  the 
Flamingo,  or  its  military  incarnation  the  Hertfordshire,  was  not  examined  by  Ringway  until 
April  1941 
. 
70  The  CLS  does  not  appear  to  have  examined  the  Frobisher,  but  line  drawings 
show  the  door  a  significant  distance  from  the  tail,  casting  doubt  upon  the  Air  Ministry's 
specific  reservations.  71  In  any  event,  it  is  difficult  to  envisage  the  aircraft  being  any  more 
problematic  than  the  Whitley,  with  its  ninety  miles  per  hour  speed  limit  and  tail-high 
dropping  attitude. 
The  Air  Ministry  objections  to  the  Bristol  Bombay  were  equally  flimsy.  The  Bristol 
Pegasus  powerplant  installed  on  the  Bombay  was  widely  used  by  RAF  aircraft  in  a  variety 
of  marks,  which  should  have  widened  its  availability.  72  Given  this,  it  should  have  been 
possible  to  divert  a  handful  to  re-equip  existing  Bombay  airframes.  A  mere  six  engines 
would  have  allowed  the  CLS  to  replace  its  entire  complement  of  Whitleys,  and  thirty-six 
would  have  restored  the  entire  UK  Bombay  complement  to  airworthiness.  Neither  do  the 
objections  to  the  Bombay's  lack  of  armament  stand  up.  The  aircraft  was  originally 
equipped  with  two  machine-gun  turrets,  which  may  have  been  removed  and  faired  over  on 
UK  based  transport  versions.  73  The  same  objection,  incidentally,  should  have  ruled  out  the 
unarmed  Douglas  machines.  Neither  did  the  supposed  drawbacks  of  the  Bombay  deter  the 
Air  Ministry  from  assigning  six  of  them  to  the  first  operation  carried  out  by  the  British 
parachute  force,  against  the  Tragino  aqueduct  in  southern  Italy  in  February  1941.  It  took 
the  personal  intervention  of  the  CLE's  commander  to  obtain  six  Whitleys  instead,  upon 
which  all  operational  planning,  training  and  calculations  had  been  based.  74  In  fhimess,  it 
should  be  pointed  out  that  the  operation  was  mounted  from  Malta  and,  as  the  Bombay  was 
used  extensively  in  the  Middle  East,  75  it  may  have  been  a  matter  of  availability  rather  than 
obstructionism. 
The  Air  Ministry  claim  that  available  Bombays  were  fully  occupied  is  also  questionable, 
for  a  Bombay  from  No.  271  Squadron  arrived  at  the  CLS  on  6  August  1940  for  parachute 
tests.  76  Indeed,  this  was  the  only  parachute  aircraft  available  at  Ringway  during  the  War 
Office  ban  on  the  Whitley.  Removing  the  door  and  rigging  a  strong  point  for  attaching 
static-lines  modified  the  aircraft,  although  the  latter  was  less  than  robust.  As  a  member  of 
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"The  door  had  been  taken  off  and  a  handle  had  been  fixed-  to  the  fuselage 
structure  on-  the  le-ft  of  the  door,  to  which  the  end  of  ourstatic  line  was  tied.  I 
noticed  after  the  first  three  [parachutists]  had  jumped  the 
-handle 
became  very 
1 
77  loose' 
. 
Nonetheless,  all  members  of  A  and  B  Troops  completed-  a  single  jump  without  mishap  on 
12  August  1940,  a  total  of  seventy-seven  jumps.  78  Twenty-two  more  were  carried  out  the 
following  day,  and-  a  further  thirty-four  on  14  August  1940,  when  the  Bombay  returned.  to 
No.  271  Squadron.  79 
Why  the  Bombay  came  to  Ringway  is  unclear.  It  may  have  been  another  example  of 
Strange's  unofficialstring  pulling.  More  likely,  it  was  part  of  an  Air  Ministry  contingency 
plan  to  deflect  criticism  for  failing  to  provide  an  alternative  parachute  aircraft  during  the 
War  Office  ban  on  the  Whitley,  and  to  cast  the  Army',  s  action  in  a  bad-  light.  It  was  a 
-remarkable 
coincidence  that  the  aircraft  only  appeared  at  Ringway  after  the  War  Office 
ban  on  the  Whitley,  and  was  recalled  the  very  day  that  it  was  lifted.  The  fact  that  the 
commander  of  No.  271  Squadron  visited  the  CLS  on  9  August  1940,  to  gather  information 
on  parachuting,  80  reinforces  the  hypothesis  that  the  Bombay  was  present  with  Air  Ministry 
sanction.  Moreover,  the  aircraft  spent  nine  days  at  the  CLS,  which  contradicts  the  claim 
that  all-  airworthy  Bombays  were  -fully  engaged  in  vital  communications  wort 
The  most  damning  evidence  of  Air  Ministry  duplicity  stems  from  the  fact  that,  despite  Air 
Ministry  protestations,  there  does  appear  to  have  been  another  suitable  aircraft  available; 
the  Handley  Page  Harrow.  81  Originally  designed  as  a  bomber-transport,  the  Harrow  was 
ordered  off  the  drawing  board-  with  structural  modifications  to  enhance  its  bombing 
capabilities  in  1935,  to  Air  Ministry  specificationB.  29135.  One 
-hundred  aircraft,  including 
two  prototypes,  were  produced  and  in  service  by  December  1937.82  The  type  served  as  a 
makeshift  bomber  in  the  late  1930s,  although  a  "central  requirement"  of  this  service  was 
the  "...  ability  to  revert  to  the  transport  role  once  that  short-term  service  ... 
had  ended".  83 
The  five  squadrons  concerned  were  re-equipped  in  1939,  and  the  Harrows  were  withdrawn 
to  No.  19  Maintenance  Unit  (MU)  at  Kemble.  Reconfiguring  them  into  transports  began  in 
march  1940.  By  May  1940  at  least  ten  modified  examples,  nicknamed  "Sparrows",  were 
in  service  with  No.  271  Squadron  for  general  transport  duties.  84  The  Harrow  was  therefore 
already  in  service  as  a  transport  aircraft  before  Churchill  issued  his  parachute  directive.  It 
was  available  in  roughly  the  same  numbers  as  the  promised.  Whitley  Group,  and-  it  was 
serving  with  the  same  squadron  that  supplied-  the  solitary  Bombay  to  the  CLS  at  the 
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Like  the  Bombay,  the  Harrow  was  a  twin-engine,  high-wing  monoplane,  which  in  its  final 
form  was  capable  of  carrying  twenty  fully  equipped  troops  or  9,500  pounds  of  cargo.  85  It 
86  87  possessed  a  starboard  side-door,  and  was  originally  equipped  with  gun  turrets.  The 
performance  of  the  Harrow  was  inferior  to  that  of  the  Whitley,  especially  in  regard  to 
speed,  118  but  this  was  a  minor  flaw,  if  not  a  positive  advantage  in  a  parachute  aircraft, 
particularly  bearing  inmind  the  speed  limit  imposed  on  the  Whitley  following  the  tail- 
wheel  fouling  episode.  The  Harrow  remained  in  service  in  the  European  theatre 
throughout  the  Second  World.  War,  the  last  example  being  withdrawn  from  service  in  April 
1945 
. 
89  Some  examples  were  fitted  out  for  casualty  evacuation  after  D-Day.  Ironically, 
these  were  involved  in  ferrying  I'  Airborne  Division  casualties  back  to  the  UK  from 
Arnhem  in  September  1944.90 
The  Harrow  was  thus  suitable  and-  available  for  parachuting  service.  Why  the  Air 
Ministry  failed  to  suggest  it,  or  to  send  a  Harrow  to  the  CLS  with  or  instead  of  the 
Bombay,  is  open  to  speculation.  Given  its  widespread  use,  it  is  also  oddthat  the  type  does 
not  figure  in  the  primary  or  secondary  accounts.  Only  one  of  the  latter,  a  technical  source, 
makes  a  frustratingly  off-hand  reference  to  a  single  Harrow  serving  at  Ringway  atan 
undetermined  time,  91  although  there  is  no  mention  of  this  in  the  operational  records.  It  is 
inconceivable  that  the  Air  Ministry  was  unaware  of  the 
-Harrow,  and  it  is  di  ff--jcult  to  escape 
the  conclusion  that  the  Harrow  did  not  figure  because  the  Air  Ministry  did.  not  wish  it  to. 
There  are  thus  a  number  of  clear  inconsistencies  in  the  Air  Ministry's  12  August  1940 
paper,  The  key  to  understanding  the  Air  Ministry's  perspective  lies  in  its  repeated 
insistence  that  parachuting  bad  to  be  an-altemativerole  -for 
bombers.  This  appears  illogical 
until  it  is  remembered-  that  the  Air  Ministry's  overriding  preoccupation  was  strategic 
bombing.  The  rationale  for  this  then  becomes  clear,,  and.  was  twofold.  The  Air  Ministry 
was  looking  to  avoid-  the  diversion  of  production  capacity  to  transport  aircraft,  whilst 
simultaneouslyattempting  to  use  the  parachute  requirement  as  justification  for  an 
expansion  of  bombing  resources.  It  is  therefore  no  coincidence  that  the  only  aircraft 
considered  "possibly"  suitable  for  parachuting  in  the  12  August  1940  paper  was  the  Short 
Stirling  bomber,  Thesame  logic  explains  why  the  Whitley  had  to  be  the  "only"  current 
parachuting  option,  irrespective  of  the  availability  of-more  suitable  aircraft  in-  even- 
extremely  limited.  numbers.  To  paint  the  Stirling  as  too  suitable  risked-  diversion  of  that 
type  to  parachuting,  whereas  assigning  the  obsolescent  Whitley  justified-  replacing  that  type 
with  more  modem  aircraft.  Similarly,  acknowledging  the  suitability  of  the  Bombay, 
Frobisher  or  Hertfordshire,  or  indeed  the  existence  of  the  Harrow,  invited  the  possibility  of 
them  being  placed  in  production  at  the  expense  of  bomber  constructiom  This  is  finther William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  133 
reinforced  by  the  unattributed  claim  that  the  Air  Ministry  failed  to  investigate  fully  the 
possibilities  offered  by  British  civil  aircraft  manufacturers.  92  Acknowledging  the 
suitability  of  Douglas  aircraft  ran  no  such  risk,  for  any  such  would  be  obtained,  if  at  all, 
from  US  manufacturers,  which  would  not  affect  domestic  British  aircraft  production. 
Admittedly,  this  conclusion  is  largely  based  on  speculation,  but  it  fits  the  evidence,  and 
particularly  the  covertly  unfavourable  Air  Ministry  reaction  to  Churchill's  parachute 
requirement  in  early  June  1940.93  It  can  therefore  be  argued  that  the  Air  Ministry 
deliberately  failed  to  supply  the  CLS  with  sufficient  aircraft  for  two  reasons.  First,  this 
would  hamstring  the  project,  with  the  possibility  that  it  might  be  abandoned  altogether  as  a 
result.  Second,  it  allowed  the  Air  Ministry  to  minimise  its  commitment  to  the  project 
whilst  maintaining  a  show  of  co-operation.  This  was  by  no  means  the  end  of  the  matter, 
for  aircraft  provision  and  suitability  became  the  subject  of  a  heated  debate  in  1941.  In  the 
interim,  however,  the  CLS  was  obliged  to  embark  upon  the  development  of  a  British 
parachute  force  with  literally  a  handful  of  aircraft,  all  of  which  were  unsuitable,  if  not 
outright  dangerous.  It  can  also  be  argued  that  hamstringing  the  project  underlay  the  12 
August  1940  paper's  advocacy  of  a  further  seemingly  reasonable  step:  the  development  of 
military  gliders. 
III.  Rounding  Out  the  Parachute  Idea:  Enter  the  Glider 
The  Air  Ministry  first  alluded  to  gliders  during  its  10  June  1940  conference.  94  The  12 
August  1940  paper  expanded  upon  the  theme,  in  pointing  out  that  the  Air  Ministry  was 
"...  beginning  to  incline  to  the  view  that  dropping  troops  ... 
by  parachute  is  a  clumsy  and 
obsolescent  method  and  that  there  are  far  more  important  possibilities  in  gliders".  German 
parachute  successes  were  acknowledged,  but  with  the  rider  that  "...  it  seems  to  us  [the  Air 
Ministry]  at  least  possible  that  this  may  be  the  last  time  that  parachute  troops  are  used  on  a 
serious  scale  in  major  operations".  It  was  claimed  that  good  progress  had  been  made,  and 
that  the  RAF  had  "...  already  got  a  suitable  glider  for  carrying  a  number  of  troops,  and  they 
can  be  put  into  production  quickly,  easily  and  cheaply".  95 
Gliders  also  figured  significantly  in  a  further  Air  Ministry  paper  on  31  August  1940,96 
partly  prompted  by  badgering  from  Churchill.  This  went  on  to  cite  German  success  with 
gliders  against  Belgian  defended  positions  (clearly  a  reference  to  Eben  Emael),  and  the 
advantages  of  gliders  for  troop  transportation.  Gliders,  it  was  claimed,  could  deliver  troops 
more  safely,  in  compact  groups,  and  with  all  their  equipment.  They  could  land  in  very 
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tow  more  troops  in  a  glider  than  they  could  carry  for  parachuting.  In  addition,  wooden 
gliders  would  not  impose  additional  strain  upon  aircraft  manufacture.  The  paper  closed  by 
stating  that  air  superiority  and  immediate  support  from  land  forces  were  prerequisites  for 
any  airborne  operations,  and  emphasised  the  need  for  firm  employment  principles  to  avoid 
wasted  effort. 
As  with  the  use  of  bombers  for  parachuting,  the  Air  Ministry's  advocacy  of  gliders 
appears  reasonable,  but  does  not  stand  up  to  close  scrutiny.  Its  reservations  on  the  utility 
of  parachutes,  for  example,  were  proved  wildly  inaccurate  by  subsequent  events.  Reading 
the  future  is  a  precarious  business,  but  the  Air  Ministry's  opinion  was  also  at  odds  with  the 
frenzied  measures  simultaneously  taking  place  in  the  South  of  England  to  repel  German 
parachute  landings,  in  which  the  RAF  was  fully  involved.  97  It  thus  appears  that  the  Air 
Ministry's  scepticism  toward  the  parachute  was  coloured  more  by  reluctance  to  provide  the 
necessary  transportation,  than  concern  over  tactical  efficiency. 
Admittedly,  matters  did  move  relatively  swiftly.  No.  22  Group  ordered  the  formation  of  a 
Glider  Section  at  the  CLS  on  30  July  1940,  with  effect  from  8  August,  98  and  aircraft, 
equipment  and  personnel  began  to  arrive  at  the  CLS  on  7  August  1940.99  They  had  been 
previously  engaged  in  tests  to  ascertain  the  radar  profile  of  gliders  as  part  of  anti-invasion 
measures  at  Christchurch.  "'0  According  to  Heam,  the  glider  pilots  were  promptly  arrested 
by  Strange  when  they  arrived  unannounced,  although  operational  records  show  that  the 
CLS  was  warned  of  their  arrival  on  3  August  1940.101  This  was  Strange's  standard  tactic 
when  matters  required  clarification.  He  allegedly  "...  had  an  understanding  with  John 
Rock  that  when  they  received  contrary  instructions  from  their  respective  Services,  one 
would  place  the  other  under  arrest  so  that  the  least  constructive  of  the  orders  could  be 
ignored".  '02  Wing-Commander  "Mungo"  Buxton  visited  Ringway  on  9  August  to  arrange 
further  glider  experiments,  and  presumably  to  clarify  matters  with  Strange.  103  Strange 
discussed  the  formation  of  a  separate  glider  sub-organisation  at  the  Air  Ministry  on  11 
August  1940.104  Official  Air  Ministry  authorisation  for  a  Glider  Flight  at  the  CLS  was 
received  on  13  August  1940,105  and  Wing-Commander  Buxton  was  temporarily  posted  in 
to  oversee  its  establishment  on  23  August  1940.106 
Laudably  swift  as  this  was,  it  did  not  really  add  up  to  much  in  practical  tenns,  and 
certainly  not  as  much  as  the  Air  Ministry's  pronouncements  inferred.  It  is  also  unclear 
which  glider  the  Air  Ministry  was  referring  to  as  being  ready  to  go  into  production.  Otway 
refers  to  the  requirement  for  the  RAF's  first  glider,  the  eight-seat  General  Aircraft  Hotspur 
mk.  1,  being  put  to  the  manufacturer  in  June  1940.107  This  may  have  been  the  case,  but William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  135 
there  is  invariably  a  lag  between  a  requirement  being  put  to  a  manufacturer  and  the 
manufacturer  coming  up  with  a  suitable  design.  Thus,  even  allowing  for  the  highly 
creditable  fact  that  the  prototype  for  Spec.  10/40  made  its  maiden  flight  on  5  November 
1940ý'O'  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  the  design  was  finalised  as  early  as  12  August  1940.  The 
Air  Ministry  was  therefore  being  rather  economical  with  the  truth  when  it  claimed  to  have 
a  model  ready  for  production  on  that  date. 
In  the  fullness  of  time,  gliders  proved  to  be  a  vital  addition  to  the  British  parachute 
project,  albeit  one  which  falls  largely  outside  the  time-span  of  this  work.  The  standard 
British  Airborne  Division  organisation  included  an  entire  glider-transported  brigade,  which 
represented  a  third  of  the  division's  infantry  strength.  These  were  called  "Airlanding 
Brigadee',  to  distinguish  them  from  their  parachute  counterparts.  In  addition,  virtually  all 
the  division's  support  elements,  light  transport  and  equipment  was  delivered  by  glider, 
including  signals,  artillery,  anti-tank  and  field  ambulance  units.  109  The  majority  of  this  was 
carried  in  twenty-five  seat  Airspeed  Horsa  gliders,  whilst  heavier  items  were  carried  in 
General  Aircraft  Hamilcars,  the  largest  and  heaviest  Allied  glider  used  in  the  Second 
World  War.  The  latter  had  a  payload  of  seven  tons,  which  included  specially  designed 
light  tanks.  Both  these  gliders  came  from  specifications  issued  in  September  1940,  and 
were  produced  with  similar  speed  to  the  Hotspur.  The  Horsa  first  flew  in  September  1941, 
and  the  Hamilcar  in  March  1942.110  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  there  was  a 
significant  time-lag  before  both  types  were  available  in  numbers.  The  Horsa  made  its 
combat  debut  November  1942,  when  a  handful  were  despatched  (and  lost)  in  the  ill-fated 
raid  upon  the  German  heavy  water  plant  at  Vermork  in  Norway,  and  the  type  was  not 
available  in  numbers  until  the  following  year,  being  employed  in  Sicily  in  mid-1943.111 
The  Hamilcar  did  not  make  its  operational  until  the  Normandy  invasion  in  June  1944. 
The  glider  idea  therefore  proved  to  be  a  good  one,  but  whether  that  was  because,  or  in 
spite,  of  the  Air  Ministry  is  open  to  speculation.  This  is  apparent  in  the  disparity  between 
the  Air  Ministry's  apparent  enthusiasm  for  the  glider  idea,  and  the  resources  they  actually 
allocated  to  it.  The  first  increment  to  arrive  at  Ringway  on  7  August  1940  consisted  of  two 
First  World  War  vintage  Avro  504  biplanes,  four  ground-crew  NCOs,  at  least  one  civilian 
, 
4port  glider,  and  a  Ford  motor  car  for  towing.  112  This  grew  to  six  single-seat  and  one  two- 
seat  sport  sailplanes  commandeered  from  civilian  owners,  113  whilst  the  towing  complement 
was  augmented  by  two  Lysander  co-operation  aircraft  and  at  least  one  Tiger  Moth  biplane. 
Moreover,  the  powered  machines  may  have  been  assigned  to  the  CLS  for  general  duties, 
rather  than  purely  as  glider  tugs.  114  The  complement  of  Avros  was  reduced  to  one  when 
the  other  was  written  off  in  a  ground  accident.  '15 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  136 
To  be  fair,  the  Air  Ministry  could  only  provide  what  existed,  and  the  handful  of  hastily 
camouflaged  civilian  sailplanes  were  the  only  gliders  in  existence  in  the  UK.  Even  the 
application  of  camouflage  paint  proved  problematic,  because  of  their  highly  varnished 
fmish,  and  the  CLS  had  to  seek  assistance  from  civilian  experts.  116  The  glider  shortage 
was  so  acute  that  it  was  proposed  at  one  point  to  use  the  airfrarnes  of  powered  aircraft  as 
makeshift  gliders  for  research  purposes.  117  Thus,  until  the  Hotspur  appeared,  the  glider 
section  was  obliged  to  "...  train  as  best 
... 
[it] 
...  could  a  nucleus  of  glider  instructors  and  tug 
pilots"  with  the  motley  and  inadequate  means  at  its  disposal.  118  This  attitude  was 
admirable,  but  the  practical  limitations  imposed  by  such  constraints  severely  limited  the 
scope  and  value  of  the  work.  Consequently,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  question  why  the  Air 
Ministry  bothered,  particularly  as  the  assigned  tug  aircraft  proved  inadequate  to  tow  a 
Hotspur  when  the  latter  did  appear.  '  19  It  would  surely  have  made  more  sense  to  set  up  the 
necessary  administrative  arrangements  and  await  the  arrival  of  the  production  gliders, 
rather  than  cluttering  up  the  already  inadequate  facilities  at  Ringway. 
Having  recommended  the  glider  with  such  enthusiasm,  the  Air  Ministry  could  have  been 
motivated  by  a  desire  to  be  seen  to  be  taking  action.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  also  possible 
that  the  suggestion  of  gliders  as  an  alternative  to  parachuting  was  merely  a  time-wasting 
ploy,  intended  to  allow  the  Air  Ministry  to  avoid  providing  sufficient  parachute  transports. 
if  so,  the  Air  Ministry  was  again  attempting  a  double  gambit  to  secure  additional  resources 
for  bombing.  The  conference  of  10  June  1940  referred  to  large  gliders.  120  The  justification 
for  specifying  large  gliders  became  clear  in  the  paper  of  12  August  1940,  which  suggested 
that  gliders  could  also  be  employed  as  additional  fuel  tanks  for  bombers,  or  to  carry 
additional  bombs.  121  This  shows  that  Air  Ministry  was  again  playing  a  double  game. 
Despite  citing  the  German  example  as  justification,  it  was  not  intending  to  emulate  it.  122  It 
was  attempting  to  stymie  the  airborne  project,  whilst  ensuring  it  received  full  benefit  from 
any  air  provision  made. 
Churchill  had  been  monitoring  the  situation  personally,  and  was  not  impressed.  On  6 
August  1940,  when  informed  that  five  hundred  parachutists  were  undergoing  training,  he 
scrawled  "I  said  5000"  on  the  report,  123  and  on  10  August,  he  requested  further 
clarification  from  Ismay.  124  This  did  not  appear  until  the  end  of  that  month,  via  the  Air 
Ministry  papers  of  12  and  31  August  1940,  and  a  detailed  minute  from  the  Director  of 
Combined  Operations  on  24  August  1940.125  Ismay's  synthesised  report  also  appeared  on 
31  August  1940  . 
126  Thus  Churchill  was  aware  of  the  Air  Ministry's  new  enthusiasm  for 
gliders,  and  his  response  to  Ismay's  report  clearly  illustrated  his  suspicions: William  F  Buddrigham,  2000  Chapter  5  137 
"Of  course  if  the  Glider  scheme  is  better  than  parachutes,  we  should  pursue  it, 
but  is  it  being  seriously  taken  up?  Are  we  not  in  danger  of  being  fobbed  off 
with  one  doubtful  and  experimental  policy  and  losing  the  other  which  has 
already  been  proved?  Let  me  have  a  full  report  of  what  has  been  done  about 
the  Gliders.  " 
127 
This  sceptical  reaction  was  relayed  to  the  Chief  of  the  Air  Staff,  128  and  a  response  from 
the  Vice-Chief  of  Air  Staff  and  the  Air  Ministry's  Department  of  Plans  appeared  on  5 
September  1940.129  This  reiterated  glider  activity  to  date,  and  claimed  that  twelve  eight- 
seat  gliders  were  under  construction,  and  that  the  design  of  an  eight-ton  tank-carrying 
glider  was  in  progress.  It  also  reported  a  preliminary  investigation  into  a  forty-seat  design, 
and  closed  by  referring  to  a  joint  conference  scheduled  for  5  September  1940,  to  formulate 
a  unified  airborne  policy  with  the  War  Office  and  the  Director  of  Combined  Operations.  130 
It  is  doubtful  whether  this  satisfied  Churchill,  given  his  jaundiced  view  of  the  Air 
Ministry,  which  he  had  previously  described  to  his  personal  secretary  as  "a  most  cumbrous 
and  ill-working  administrative  machine".  13'  Nonetheless,  he  was  obliged  to  accept  the  Air 
Ministry  testimony  because  there  was  no  independent  means  of  verifying  it,  in  much  the 
same  way  as  the  War  Office  was  obliged  to  accept  the  Air  Ministry's  word  on  the 
suitability  and  availability  of  aircraft.  However,  the  5  September  1940  conference  did 
provoke  a  heated  and  extended  debate  on  the  operational  role  the  new  airborne  force. 
Before  examining  that  debate,  however,  it  will  first  be  necessary  to  examine  the 
development  of  the  British  Airborne  infrastructure,  in  order  to  set  out  the  background  for 
that  debate. 
IV.  Reorganising  and  Improvising  the  Infrastructure:  Ringway  to  April  1941 
The  addition  of  a  glider  section  further  exacerbated  the  problems  facing  Louis  Strange  in 
the  period  mid-June  to  the  beginning  of  September  1940.  Nonetheless,  creditable  progress 
was  made,  particularly  considering  the  handicaps  under  which  the  CLS  was  operating. 
CLS  trainees  had  completed  at  least  four  hundred  and  sixty-four  parachute  descents  by  I 
September  1940ý  132  integrated  into  three  overlapping  courses  of  varying  lengths. 
According  to  a  CLS  operational  summary,  C  and  D  Troops  took  twenty  days  (9  -  29  July 
1940)  to  complete  one  jump  each,  A  and  B  Troops  completed  three  descents  each  in  only 
six  days  (23  -  29  July  1940).  Parachute  training  for  both  courses  ceased  temporarily  on  29 
July  1940  as  a  result  of  the  death  of  Driver  Evans.  133  E  and  F  Troops  commenced  training 
on  19  August  1940,  and  completed  their  course  on  3  September  1940.134 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  138 
These  figures  and  dates,  however,  do  not  tally  with  the  daily  entries  in  the  operational 
record  book.  Jumps  by  A  and  B  Troops,  for  example,  are  detailed  for  10  August  1940 
using  the  271  Squadron  Bombay,  and  the  same  course  is  recorded  as  achieving  one  jump 
each  on  12  August  1940,  fourteen  days  after  the  summary  claims  the  completion  of  three 
jumps  each.  On  the  other  hand,  the  third  course  commencement  date  of  19  August  1940 
tallies  with  the  operational  records.  135  This  could  have  been  the  CLS  attempting  to  cast  the 
best  light  on  its  activities,  orjust  a  genuine  error  in  transcription.  Given  that  parachute 
training  was  suspended  twice  in  the  period  22  July  -I  September  1940  following  trainee 
fatalities  and  the  dispute  over  the  Whitley's  suitability,  paperwork  errors  are  explicable  if 
not  excusable.  The  fact  that  Strange  prided  himself  on  being  no  bureaucrat  might  also  be 
significant. 
The  CLS  had  also  written  a  ten-week  training  syllabus  by  3  September  1940,  although 
how  closely  this  was  followed  in  the  initial  period  is  a  matter  of  conjecture,  and  it  may 
have  actually  based  on  experience  gained  from  the  first  three  courses.  The  first  four  weeks 
were  devoted  to  individual  training,  including  weapons,  sabotage  and  map  reading. 
Trainees  then  passed  to  the  CLS  for  three  weeks,  aimed  at  "...  training  men  to  drop  with 
[aircraft  slung]  equipment  containers  as  a  drill  movement".  136  The  first  week  was  spent  in 
ground  training,  followed  by  an  aircraft  jump  from  eight  hundred  feet.  Week  two  included 
two  more  jumps,  in  pairs  from  five  hundred  feet.  The  third  week's  training  included  two 
more  aircraft  jumps  with  equipment  and  weapons  containers,  first  in  sticks  of  four,  and 
then  in  sticks  of  eight.  Trainees  then  spent  a  further  three  weeks  tactical  training  at  Tatton 
Park,  which  was  to  include  at  least  one  group  descent.  Thereafter  the  trainee  was 
presumably  considered  a  fully-fledged  parachutist.  From  week  eleven  onward,  provision 
was  to  be  made  for  drops  by  entire  Troops  or  more,  on  drop-zones  other  than  Tatton 
Park.  137 
Strange  was  also  involved  in  initiatives  to  reconfigure  the  CLS  to  meet  its  expanded 
responsibilities,  and  to  rationalise  the  CLS'  position  within  the  Whitehall  chain  of 
command.  Strange  broached  the  latter  at  the  joint  conference  on  12  August  1940. 
Although  not  mentioned  in  the  conference  conclusions,  operational  records  show  that 
Strange  attended  the  conference  to  discuss  transferring  responsibility  for  the  CLS  from  the 
Deputy  Director  of  Combined  Operations  (DDCO)  to  the  Air  Ministry's  Director  of 
Technical  Organisation  (DTO),  and  setting  up  separate  glider  and  development  sub- 
sections  within  the  CLS.  138  Strange  conferred  with  Keyes,  at  the  War  Office  the  next  day, 
and  reported  back  to  Air-Commodore  Capel  at  the  Air  Ministry.  139  Authorisation  for  CLS 
administrative  control  of  the  Glider  Flight  was  granted  on  13  August  1940.140  Strange William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  139 
attended  another  conference  to  discuss  the  expansion  and  subdivision  of  the  CLS  at  the  Air 
Ministry  on  19  August  1940,  and  Capel  visited  Strange  at  Ringway,  accompanied  by  one 
of  Keyes'  deputies,  on  26  August.  141 
It  is  unclear  if  Strange's  high-level  lobbying  was  solely  responsible,  but  the  desired  effect 
was  achieved  in  any  case.  Air  Vice-Marshal  Blount,  Air  Officer  Commanding  (AOC)  No. 
22  Group,  attended  a  conference  at  Ringway  with  Strange  and  Captain  Lindsay,  War 
Office  GS03,  on  31  August  1940,  the  same  day  that  No.  22  Group  assumed  total 
administrative  control  over  the  CLS.  Lindsay  was  deputising  for  Rock,  who  had  been 
hospitalised  by  a  parachute  accident  on  22  August.  142  It  is  logical  to  assume  that  the 
conference  discussed  the  expansion  and  re-organisation  of  the  CLS.  The  progress  report 
and  training  syllabus,  dated  I  September  1940,143  were  presumably  presented  to  Blount 
when  Strange  and  Lindsay  when  they  visited  him  at  No.  22  Group  the  same  day.  They 
appear  to  have  been  prepared  for  the  joint  conference  at  the  Air  Ministry  originally 
scheduled  for  4  September  1940.144  Strange  attended  finiher  discussions  at  the  Air 
Ministry  on  3  September  1940,145  and  details  from  the  progress  report  were  included  in  the 
Air  Ministry's  response  to  Churchill's  sceptical  reaction  to  its  glider  proposal.  146  No.  22 
Group  orally  authorised  Squadron-Leader  Benham  and  Major  Rock  to  assume  duties  as  Air 
Staff  Officers  (ASOs)  (Flying  and  Ground  respectively)  at  the  CLS  on  6  September 
1940,147  as  instructed  by  the  joint  conference  which  finally  went  ahead  on  5  rather  than  4 
September  1940.148  The  conference  also  instructed  No.  22  Group  to  prepare  detailed 
proposals  for  subdividing  the  CLS,  149  which  led  to  a  conference  at  Ringway  to  discuss  the 
matter  on  12  September  1940. 
No.  22  Group's  report  appeared  on  6  October  1940.150  The  CLS  was  renamed  the  Central 
Landing  Establishment  (CLE),  and  added  a  new  headquarters  element  and  Development 
Unit  (DU)  to  the  existing  two  departments.  These  too  were  renamed,  becoming  the 
Parachute  Training  Squadron  (PTS)  and  Glider  Training  Squadron  (GTS)  (see  Fig.  1). 
This  new  structure  was  formally  adopted  on  I  October  1940,151  although  Air  Ministry 
bureaucracy  took  a  further  six  days  to  process  the  changes.  A  meeting  to  assess  progress 
was  held  at  the  Air  Ministry  on  18-19  October  1940,152  details  of  which  were  incorporated 
into  a  report  for  Churchill  on  8  November  1940.153 William  F  Buckingham,  2000 
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Figure  1-  Central  Landing  Establishment  with  effect  from  1  October  1940 
140 
in  fact,  the  process  of  change  commenced  at  Ringway  on  18  September  1940,  with  the 
arrival  of  Group-Captain  L.  G.  Harvey,  from  the  Air  Ministry's  Directorate  of  Repair  and 
Servicing,  to  command  the  expanded  venture.  '54  This  appointment  was  justified  on  the 
grounds  that  the  majority  of  the  CLE's  work  was  technical  in  nature,  155  although  politics 
may  also  have  played  a  part  in  his  posting  in  over  Strange.  The  latter  retained  command  of 
the  PTS,  and  his  cavalier  attitude  to  bureaucratic  niceties  was  doubtless  a  major  factor  in 
his  sidelining.  Harvey  was  joined  by  Wing-Commander  Nigel  Norman,  who  was  to  serve 
as  his  Senior  Air  Staff  Officer  (SASO),  156  alongside  Rock  in  his  capacity  as  attached  War 
Office  GSOI.  Additional  personnel  to  flesh  out  the  new  organisation  continued  to  arrive 
into  October  1940.  Wing-Commander  Buxton  assumed  command  of  the  DU  on  21 
September,  and  Captain  W.  B.  P.  Bradish  of  the  Royal  Fusiliers  arrived  to  act  as  Instructor 
of  Infantry  Tactics  and  liaison  between  the  CLE  and  No.  2  Commando.  Flying-Officer 
Tim  Hervey  MC  reported  to  take  command  of  the  GTS  on  3  October,  and  Squadron- 
Leader  Maurice  Newnharn  DFC,  who  was  later  to  command  the  PTS,  reported  for 
administrative  duties  on  4  October.  157  A  steady  flow  of  non-commissioned  specialist 
personnel  also  reported  over  the  same  period.  The  arrival  of  RAF  Sergeant  Page  for  duty 
as  "Flight  Sergeant,  Disciplinary"  on  23  September  1940  arguably  marks  the  point  when 
the  CLE  became  properly  regularised.  158  Harvey  formally  inspected  his  new  command  on 
7  October  1940,159  the  day  after  22  Group  presented  its  expansion  proposals  to  the  Air 
Ministry.  He  had  been  at  Ringway  for  almost  three  weeks  at  that  point,  and  the  delay  was 
presumably  to  conceal  the  degree  of  changeover  carried  through  without  official'sanction. 
The  re-organisation  into  the  CLE  was  a  positive  and  necessary  step,  especially  from  an 
administrative  perspective.  Being  commanded  by  a  well  connected  Group-Captain  with  a William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  141 
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...  wide  circle  of  acquaintances  and  insinuating  ways",  160  rather  than  an  abrasive  and 
unorthodox  Squadron-Leader,  cannot  have  harmed  the  CLE's  prospects.  That  said,  Harvey 
was  present  and  presumably  complicit  in  carrying  through  the  unauthorised  re- 
organisation,  which  suggests  he  was  not  averse  to  bending  the  rules  himself.  However,  the 
re-organisation  did  little  to  alleviate  the  lack  of  aircraft,  although  the  CLE  again  profited 
from  Louis  Strange's  efforts  in  other  areas.  For  example,  he  obtained  two  surplus  Whitley 
fuselages  from  the  Armstrong  Whitworth  works  at  Coventry  on  11  September  1940,  which 
allowed  more  realistic  air  drill  training.  161 
Strange  had  also  gathered  men  with  parachute  expertise  to  the  CLS.  As  well  as  co-opting 
volunteers  from  the  staff  at  RAF  Henlow,  he  obtained  three  men  who  had  been  stunt 
parachutists  with  Cobham's  Flying  Circus  in  the  1930s.  Bruce  Williams  and  Harry  Ward 
were  already  serving  in  the  RAF,  the  former  as  an  Air  Gunner  with  a  Boulton  Paul  Defiant 
squadron,  162  and  the  latter  with  Coastal  Command.  Williams  was  recruited  by  Strange 
personally  on  leaving  hospital  after  being  shot  down  over  the  English  Channel,  163  while 
Ward  emulated  Strange  in  being  directed  to  Ringway  during  a  visit  to  the  Air  Ministry  in 
early  August  1940.  Bill  Hire  was  persuaded  to  volunteer,  with  the  inducement  of  a 
commission,  from  his  civilian  job  as  a  dance-hall  manager.  164  The  operational  records 
show  Williams  was  at  Ringway  by  27  July  1940,  when  he  visited  Henlow  with  Strange  to 
test  modified  parachutes.  Hire  was  posted  to  the  PTS  on  31  October,  and  Ward  was 
serving  there  by  27  November.  165  Strange  also  arranged  the  transfer  of  Flight-Lieutenant 
Earl  B.  Fielden  to  the  CLS  from  No.  24  Squadron  on  5  August  1940.166  Fielden  had 
worked  as  a  pilot  with  Cobham's  Flying  Circus  and  with  Williams,  Hire  and  Ward  in  the 
1930s.  167  Williams  appears  to  have  been  a  particularly  useful  acquisition.  According  to 
Ward: 
"Bruce  Williams  had  an  inventive  mind,  and  from  very  limited  resources  he 
provided  the  apparatus  for 
...  ground  training;  a  mock  fuselage  of  a  Whitley  for 
practising  the  aircraft  drills  and  the  exit  through  the  hole;  suspended  harnesses 
for  learning  the  parachuting  position  and  how  to  cross  the  liftwebs  to  face 
down  the  line  of  drift;  and  jump  platforms  for  landing  practice.  He  also 
introduced  the  'fan'  trainer  for  dropping  troops  from  the  rafters  on  the  end  of  a 
wire  at  a  reasonable  rate  of  descent 
... 
It  [the  fan]  was  a  frightening  apparatus, 
and  a  useful  progression  toward  the  even  greater  challenge  of  the  drop  from  an 
aircraft.  Later,  when  more  knowledge  and  funds  became  available,, 
improvements  to  the  'synthetic  apparatus'  would  be  made,  but  it  was  Bruce 
Williams  who  introduced  much  of  the  kit  for  which  others  would  one  day  be 
given  the  credit.  ,  168 
However,  arguably  Strange's  greatest  legacy  to  the  CLE  was  the  development  of  the 
captive  balloon  for  parachute  training.  He  visited  the  RAF  Balloon  Development William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  142 
Establishment  (BDE)  at  Cardington  on  I  August  1940,  and  examined  an  Airship  Mooring 
Mast  and  an  "W'  type  observation  balloon.  Parachutes  were  despatched  to  Cardington  the 
next  day,  169  and  successful  tests  with  sandbags  were  carried  out  by  Warrant  Officer 
Rudland,  from  the  Parachute  Repair  Section  at  the  ominously  numbered  No.  13  MU  at 
Henlow.  170  An  order  was  then  placed  for  a  large  passenger  cage  for  the  standard  R-type 
balloon.  Newnharn  claims  Strange  was  inspired  by  observation  balloon  crewmen  from  the 
First  World  War,  who  were  issued  with  parachutes  as  a  means  of  escape  in  the  event  of 
attack.  17'  This  is  feasible,  given  Strange's  service  in  that  conflict,  although  the  use  of 
balloons  for  parachute  training  was  not  entirely  new.  The  Poles  used  the  technique  before 
19399  172  and  Strange  may  have  picked  up  the  idea  from  expatriate  Polish  personnel.  '73 
Harry  Ward  was  despatched  to  Cardington  to  test  the  prototype  cage  on  27  November 
1940.174  He  was  favourably  impressed: 
"[it  was  a]  ... 
lovely  sensation!  Real  fair-ground  stuff  ..  No  slipstream  to  cause 
malfunctions.  Less  chance  of  twisted  [rigging]  lines.  Less  likelihood  of 
1W 
bloody  noses  fromrý  ing  the  bell'.  Better  observation  of  pupils'  performance. 
1,  Definitely  a  winner.  "' 
The  major  difference  between  a  balloon  and  aircraft  jump  was  that  the  parachutist  fell 
approximately  two  hundred  feet  in  dead  air  before  his  canopy  deployed.  The  Air  Ministry 
claimed  this  four  second  free-fall  produced  "...  an  additional  thrill",  176  although  whether 
the  author  actually  experienced  the  thrill  is  open  to  conjecture.  Air  Ministry  enthusiasm 
was  doubtless  enhanced  by  the  prospect  of  balloons  reducing  the  CLE's  aircraft 
requirements.  The  balloon  proved  to  be  a  very  useful  training  tool  that  allowed  instructors 
to  call  instructions  to  trainees  during  their  descent.  It  was  not  universally  popular, 
however.  Ward  claimed  that  a  parachute-qualified  Army  captain  who  tested  the  prototype 
cage  with  him  on  27  November  1940  "...  insisted  that  jumping  from  a  balloon  was  the  most 
terrifying  thing  he  had  ever  done".  177  Williams  shared  this  opinion  when  he  jumped  from 
the  first  operational  training  balloon  on  8  April  1941.178  This  was  located  at  Tatton  Park, 
but  only  after  a  two-month  wrangle  between  a  variety  of  agencies  including  Lord  Egerton, 
various  Air  Ministry  departments,  the  Ministry  of  Works  and  the  Cheshire  War  Agriculture 
Executive  Committee.  179  Typically,  Williams'  descent  preceded  official  Air  Ministry 
approval  for  using  Tatton  for  balloon  jumping  by  eight  days,  and  occurred  four  days  before 
the  local  Works  department  received  permission  to  construct  a  balloon  installation.  1"0 
This  suggests  that  bureaucracy  was  responsible  for  the  four-month  delay  between  the 
balloon  test  and  its  operational  debut.  Newnham  cites  a  shortage  of  materials,  due  to William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  143 
priority  barrage-balloon  production,  as  being  the  culprit.  181  Williams  had  previously 
advocated  constructing  a  Soviet-style  parachuting  tower,  but  the  Air  Ministry  initially 
demurred  due  to  the  cost,  after  an  engineering  firm  quoted  E30,000  for  a  three  hundred  and 
fifty-foot  tower.  181  in  the  event,  balloon  jumping  became  an  integral  part  of  British 
military  parachute  training  until  the  early  1990S.  183 
improvisation  also  played  an  important  part  in  allowing  the  GTS  and  DU  to  perform 
research  and  development  work  for  future  reference.  Four  sport  gliders  were  despatched 
from  Ringway  to  Tatton  Park  to  assess  the  viability  of  accurate  moonlight  landing  on  the 
night  of  29-30  September.  "  A  daylight  test  a  week  later  proved  the  feasibility  of  towing 
two  gliders  simultaneously  and  that  the  latter  were  capable  of  locating  and  landing  on 
target  from  a  range  of  fourteen-mile  flight.  185  The  DU  also  discovered  that  gliders  could 
not  be  launched  "hands  off'  when  a  Minimoa  sport  glider  overtook  its  tug  during  take-off 
on  14  October  1940.186  DU  operational  records  make  an  enigmatic  reference  to  "six  troop 
carrying  gliders"  being  present  at  Ringway  at  the  end  of  October  1940.187  What  these  were 
is  a  mystery,  for  the  prototype  eight-seat  Hotspur  made  its  maiden  flight  on  5  November 
1940ý  188  and  operational  records  show  that  the  first  production  Hotspur  did  not  fly  at  the 
CLE  until  21  January  1940.189 
GTS  gliders  took  part  in  a  series  of  "Operational  Exercises"  for  the  DU,  starting  with  a 
two-glider  demonstration  for  the  Duke  of  Kent  at  Tatton  Park  on  26  September  1940.  The 
fifth  exercise,  carried  out  on  26  October  1940,  involved  landing  two  gliders  alongside  a  rail 
viaduct  near  Macclesfield,  Cheshire,  in  a  mock  sabotage  attack  for  the  benefit  of  War 
Office  observers.  '90  Some  of  these  involved  gliders  and  paratroops,  such  as  that  carried 
out  for  CIGS  Sir  John  Dill  and  other  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  representatives  on  13 
December  1940.  Five  sport  gliders  represented  the  yet-to-arrive  Hotspurs,  and  two 
Whitleys  dropped  two  sticks  of  eight  fidly  equipped  paratroops.  The  objective  was  a  mock 
ammunition  dump  at  Tatton  Park.  All  landings  were  completed  within  a  two  hundred  yard 
radius  in  under  a  minute.  The  "...  CIGS  was  very  impressed".  191 
Such  spectacular  demonstrations  were  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule,  for  the  bulk  of 
the  DU's  work  was  more  prosaic.  Corporal  Carter  of  No.  2  Commando  was  killed  on  19 
November  1940,192  when  the  snap-hook  connecting  his  parachute  to  the  strop  snagged 
open  on  the  coaming  around  the  Whitley's  aperture.  This  disconnected  the  parachute  from 
the  static-line,  which  meant  it  could  not  open.  The  DU  began  an  investigation 
immediately,  and  by  27  November  1940  a  locking  safety  pin  for  the  snap  hook  had  been 
designed,  tested  and  released  by  the  DU  for  general  use.  193  It  was  officially  accepted  by William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  144 
the  CLE  three  days  later.  194  Other  work  included  experimenting  with  methods  of  dropping 
containers,  the  results  of  which  were  passed  to  Armstrong  Whitworth  for  further 
development,  195  testing  and  fitting  tail-wheel  spats  to  the  CLE's  Whitleys  to  prevent 
parachutes  fouling  them,  196  and  building  wooden  mock-ups  of  seats  for  Whitley 
passengers.  The  latter  were  found  unsatisfactory,  presumably  due  to  the  cramped  confines 
of  the  Whitley's  fuselage,  and  issue  mattresses  were  used  instead.  197 
Similar  innovations  were  created  for  the  GTS.  These  included  the  "sector  light"  for  night 
towing,  tested  on  6  November  1940.  It  consisted  of  a  lamp  with  three  shrouded  filters, 
fitted  to  the  tail  of  the  tow  aircraft.  A  red  light  warned  the  glider  pilot  that  he  was  flying 
higher  than  the  tug,  amber  too  low,  and  green  indicated  the  glider  was  correctly  aligned.  198 
The  device  worked,  but  cloud  limited  its  usefulness.  An  electrical  device  that  indicated  the 
c6angle  of  the  dangle"  between  glider  and  tug  superseded  it,  allegedly  suggested  by  an 
unnamed  Australian  sport  glider  pilot  serving  at  Ringway.  199  Drawings  were  approved  on 
12  December  1940,  and  successful  tests  were  carried  out  on  following  consecutive 
nightS.  200  Even  basic  parameters  had  to  be  ascertained,  such  as  the  optimum  length  for 
towlines.  If  the  line  were  too  long,  the  glider  remained  on  the  ground  after  the  tug  was 
airborne,  and  if  too  short  it  became  airborne  before  the  tug,  with  equally  dangerous 
results.  201  All  manner  of  temporary  expedients  were  tried,  tested  and  discarded  or  not. 
These  including  using  Swallow  light  aircraft  with  their  propellers  removed  as  makeshift 
gliders,  with  co-opted  ground  crew  serving  as  rear  counter-weights.  The  views  of  the  latter 
can  be  well  imagined.  202  Other  work  included  the  development  of  a  standardised  "glider- 
patter",  and  the  creation  of  "...  new  if  unauthorised  trades  and  duties  for  gliding...  with 
carefully  defffied  duties  and  methodology".  203  The  GTS  also  wrote  a  detailed  ground 
training  syllabus,  which  was  updated  to  reflect  experience.  Wright  refers  to  the  inclusion 
of  air  photograph  interpretation  training,  when  these  proved  more  useful  than  maps.  204 
The  down  side  of  this  trial  and  error  approach  was  that  a  considerable  amount  of  time  and 
effort  was  wasted  on  projects  that  turned  out  to  be  blind  alleys.  The  Rotachute,  for 
example,  was  the  invention  of  a  German  national  called  Hafner.  This  was  suggested  as  a 
substitute  for  parachutes  and  gliders  at  the  joint  conference  on  5  September  1940.205  The 
device  consisted  of  "...  a  man  sitting  in  a  cradle  suspended  from  a  propeller,  which 
resembled  and  acted  in  a  similar  manner  to  a  falling  leaf' 
. 
206  The  5  September  conference 
authorised  further  investigation,  whilst  noting  reservations  from  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Air 
Staff  (Technical).  Hafner  was  at  that  time  interned  as  an  enemy  alien,  but  a  model 
Rotachute  was  dropped  from  a  CLE  Tiger  Moth  aircraft  on  5  November  1940.207  A  finther 
model,  with  a  three-foot  rotor  span  and  weighing  four  and  a  half  pounds  was  tested  on  11 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  145 
November,  and  a  full  scale  example  weighing  three  hundred  Pounds  was  ready  for  test 
dropping  from  a  balloon  the  same  day.  208  Detailed  drawings  for  a  model  with  a  ten-foot 
span  were  completed  on  24  November,  209  and  a  successfully  test  carried  out  at  Tatton  on 
14  and  18  March  1941  . 
210  The  attraction  for  the  Air  Ministry  presumably  lay  in  the 
Rotachute's  propeller,  which  would  allow  it  to  be  classified  as  an  aircraft,  and  would 
therefore  place  it,  and  the  personnel  who  used  it,  fumily  within  their  jurisdiction. 
Similar  effort  was  expended  in  investigating  the  use  of  gliders  for  parachuting,  partly  to 
augment  the  carrying  capacity  of  parachute  aircraft  during  operations,  and  to  circumvent 
the  shortage  of  training  aircraft.  Flight-Lieutenant  Hodges  at  the  CLE  mooted  the  idea  on 
12  September  1940,  and  recommended  that  doors  be  included  in  the  design  of  the  forty- 
seat  glider  then  under  consideration  . 
21  '  No.  22  Group  passed  the  idea  back  to  the  CLE  for 
further  consideration  on  19  September  1940,212  and  to  the  Air  Ministry  on  the  same  day.  213 
it  was  also  passed  to  Combined  Operations  and  the  War  Office.  214  The  result  was  the 
Airspeed  Horsa  glider,  which  Otway  claims  was  designed  specifically  for  parachuting. 
The  design  had  doors  on  either  side  of  the  fuselage  to  allow  simultaneous  exits,  a  means 
for  despatching  supply  panniers  from  within  the  craft,  and  six  under-wing  cells  with 
remote  release  mechanisms  for  supply  containers.  Despite  all  this  design  and  production 
effort,  however,  the  idea  had  been  rendered  unnecessary  by  the  time  production  Horsas 
215 
appeared  in  June  1942  . 
The  GTS  was  hampered  by  the  lack  of  suitable  gliders,  but  there  was  no  lack  of  pilots. 
The  GTS  inherited  the  services  of  military  personnel  with  civilian  glider  experience  from 
the  CLS,  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  PTS  profited  from  the  experience  of  Williams,  Hire 
and  Ward.  The  GTS's  commander,  Squadron-Leader  Tim  Hervey,  had  been  chief 
instructor  at  the  Dunstable  Gliding  Club  in  the  1930s,  while  Squadron's  chief  instructor, 
216 
John  SaffTey,  had  fulfilled  a  similar  role  at  the  London  Glider  Club.  The  second  major 
problem  was  therefore  the  shortage  of  facilities.  The  GTS  placed  a  minimal  strain  on  the 
CLE's  aircraft,  but  it  nonetheless  occupied  scarce  accommodation  at  Ringway,  not  least 
because  its  gliders  required  weatherproof  storage.  According  to  Newnham,  the  DU  and 
aircraft  maintenance  accounted  for  one  of  the  CLE's  allotted  hangars,  and  the  PTS  had  the 
other,  although  maintenance  on  the  Establishment's  well-worn  Whitleys  often  spilled  over 
into  both.  217  The  GTS  practice  of  using  motor  cars  to  launch  gliders  was  also  a  hazard  on 
an  operational  airfield.  The  obvious  solution  was  to  re-locate  the  GTS  to  a  dedicated 
airfield  of  its  own,  but  this  proved  more  easily  said  than  done. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  146 
Air  Marshal  Hollinghurst  raised  the  matter  with  the  Air  Ministry  in  a  letter  on  8  October 
1941,  in  which  he  outlined  the  problems  faced  by  the  GTS  at  Ringway  and  requested  an 
alternative  location 
. 
21"  The  Air  Ministry  allocated  it  airfields  at  Ratcliffe  and  Rearsby, 
although  these  had  been  earmarked  as  bombing  ranges.  Bomber  Command  was  informed 
on  12  October  1940,219  and  promptly  lodged  a  strong  protest  on  23  October  1940.220  The 
CLE  was  informed  on  16  October,  221  and  Newnharn  and  Hervey  visited  them  on  18 
October  1940 
. 
222  However,  the  Ministry  of  Aircraft  Production,  which  was  disinclined  to 
move  out  for  the  GTS  or  Bomber  Command,  already  occupied  both  locations.  223 
The  CLE  located  another  suitable  airfield  at  Side  Hill  near  Newmarket,  which  was 
inspected  by  Wing-Commander  Norman  on  8  November  1940,  and  by  Newnham,  Hervey 
and  others  on  13  November.  224  A  detailed  survey  of  the  area  confirmed  its  SUitability,  225 
which  was  relayed  to  the  Air  Ministry  on  18  November,  226  although  operational  records 
227 
show  that  permission  to  use  the  new  site  had  been  granted  the  day  before.  The  CLE 
issued  a  movement  order  on  20  November  1940,  an  advance  party  was  despatched  on  21 
November,  and  all  flying  at  the  CLE  was  suspended  on  22  November  to  allow  equipment 
228 
and  personnel  to  be  prepared  for  the  move.  Things  then  went  awry.  The  transfer  was 
suspended  on  24  November  1940,  following  objections  from  Bomber  Command  and  the 
Jockey  Club,  and  the  advance  party  was  recalled  to  Ringway  on  6  December  1940.229 
According  to  Wright,  Side  Hill  was  an  emergency  Bomber  Command  landing  site  "in 
[operational]  bomber  territory",  but  the  squadrons  that  used  it  were  unconcerned  by  the 
presence  of  the  GTS.  The  objections  thus  presumably  originated  at  a  higher  level.  230 
Hervey  began  a  survey  of  other  suitable  locations  on  5  December  1940,231  and  reported 
his  findings  on  12  December,  having  located  seven  possible  sites.  232  An  Air  Ministry 
conference  on  II  December  1940  nwowed  the  choice  to  an  unfinished  airfield  at 
Shobden,  or  Haddenham  near  Thame.  The  latter  was  the  CLE's  preferred  option,  233  and 
the  Air  Ministry  authorised  the  GTS  to  relocate  to  Haddenham  on  20  December  1940.  The 
CLE  issued  a  movement  order  ten  days  later,  and  another  advance  party  left  Ringway  for 
Haddenham  on  31  December.  234 
The  GTS's  new  home  was  littered  with  wheel-less  cars  as  an  anti-invasion  measure,  and 
lacked  a  surfaced  access  road  and  accommodation  for  aircraft  or  personnel.  The 
obstructions  were  cleared  on  1  January  1941  for  the  GTS's  powered  aircraft,  whilst  the 
gliders  were  transported  by  road.  235  Orders  for  the  necessary  work  and  equipment  had 
been  issued  to  the  local  works  and  other  departments  in  December  1940.  These  included 
the  erection  of  twelve-bay  Bessoneau-type  hangars,  236  which  began  on  2  January.  237 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  147 
Personnel  accommodation  had  to  be  obtained  locally.  Other  ranks  were  housed  in  a  barn 
leased  from  a  Mr  Purser  for  three  pounds  per  week  plus  rates,  and  officers  in  a  large 
adjacent  house  owned  by  a  Colonel  Sedgewick.  Suitable  terms  were  presumably  agreed, 
given  that  powers  to  requisition  the  Colonel's  property  were  not  invoked.  238  The  GTS  was 
thus  firmly  ensconced  in  its  new  home,  and  commenced  flying  gliders  on  3  January  1940, 
although  it  was  not  authorised  to  do  so  until  5  January.  239  By  that  time  over  thirteen  hours 
of  glider  flying  time  had  been  logged 
. 
240  The  GTS  therefore  faced  the  New  Year  with  the 
location,  if  not  the  means,  to  carry  out  its  brief  of  training  glider  PilotS. 
241  Whilst  waiting 
for  new  trainees  to  arrive,  GTS  gliders  participated  in  trials  at  the  Air  Fighting 
Development  Unit  (AFDU)  Duxford,  to  determine  glider  vulnerability  to  fighter  attack. 
242 
March  1941  saw  the  GTS  mark  up  two  notable  firsts.  Corporal  Weston  was  responsible 
for  the  first  "prang"  in  the  history  of  Army  gliding,  when  he  crashed  a  Kite  glider  through 
the  roof  of  the  Sergeants'  Mess,  243  and  Sergeant  Strathdee  became  the  first  Army  glider 
pilot  to  fly  Solo. 
244  In  April  1941  the  GTS  received  its  first  eight-seat  Hotspur  glider, 
245 
was  renamed  No.  I  Glider  Training  School,  and  its  home  airfield  was  re-designated  RAF 
Thame.  246 
V.  From  Training  to  Demonstrations  and  Operations:  The  CLE  and  11  Special 
Air  Service  Battalion  to  April  1941 
By  April  1941,  the  airborne  project  had  made  significant  progress,  particularly  given  the 
prevailing  conditions.  In  some  instances,  existing  problems  were  exacerbated  by 
additional  factors  outside  Ringway's  control.  On  2  October  1940,  for  example,  a 
consignment  of  faulty  Whitley  under-carriage  jacks  rendered  all  the  Establishment's 
parachuting  aircraft  unserviceable  for  nine  days.  247  In  addition,  German  bombs  intended 
for  Manchester  hit  Ringway  on  the  night  of  22-23  December.  One  struck  Hangar  No.  5 
248 
and  damaged  an  unspecified  DU  aircraft  and  several  others.  However,  even  allowing 
for  such  mishaps,  the  degree  of  progress  could  arguably  have  been  greater  had  the  CLE  not 
been  obliged  to  provide  parachute  personnel  and  equipment  for  testing  and  demonstration 
purposes  in  addition  to  training. 
For  example,  No.  2  Commando  maintained  a  detachment  of  parachute-trained  men  on 
qandby  for  this  10  September  1940,249  and  the  DU  began  a  series  of  operational  exercises 
from  26  September  1940.  Within  a  month  these  activities  expanded  to  include  mock 
assaults  for  high-ranking  observers,  such  as  that  at  Macclesfield  on  26  October  1940.250 
On  3  December  1940,  thirty-two  paratroopers  participated  in  an  exercise  on  Salisbury 
Plain  at  the  express  request  of  Montgomery.  In  the  process  they  commandeered  Crown William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  148 
Prince  Olaf  of  Norway's  car  to  attain  their  objective.  The  Prince  was  so  impressed  by  this 
graphic  display  of  "Airborne  Initiative"  that  "...  he  treated  the  paratroopers  to  a  round  of 
beers  when  he  was  eventually  reunited  with  his  vehicle  outside  a  pub  in  Shrewton" 
. 
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Other  such  activities  included  the  combined  parachute  and  glider  assault  before  the  CIGS 
at  Tatton  Park  on  13  December  1940,252  and  exercise  Dragon  at  Camberley  in  Surrey  on  6 
January  1941,  which  was  attended  by  the  CinC  Home  forceS.  253  A  similar  exercise  was 
held  on  Salisbury  Plain  on  19  February  1941,  for  Dill  and  Alan  Brooke.  254 
These  demonstrations  were  necessary  to  maintain  a  high  profile  for  the  airborne  idea,  but 
they  disrupted  unit-based  training,  and  therefore  impeded  11  Special  Air  Service  (SAS) 
Battalion,  as  No.  2  Commando  was  renamed  on  21  November  1940,255  in  achieving  full 
operational  status.  This  is  largely  why  it  took  until  24  December  1940  for  all  members  of 
No.  11  SAS  Battalion  to  complete  basic  parachute  training.  There  then  remained  advanced 
256 
group  parachute  training,  which  was  scheduled  for  completion  by  February  1941.  The 
problem  was  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  some  Commando  volunteers  required  instruction 
in  basic  infantry  skills,  which  explains  Rock's  recommendation  that  fighting  airborne 
troops  be  drawn  exclusively  from  the  infantry.  257  According  to  Otway,  it  actually  took  five 
months  to  train  one  hundred  and  seventy-six  men  to  a  level  corresponding  with  "section 
training  in  an  infantry  battalion".  258 
In  addition  to  all  this,  11  SAS  Battalion  was  in  a  state  of  organisational  flux  for  much  of 
the  time.  The  one  hundred  and  seventy-six  volunteers  were  originally  organised  to  operate 
in  Commando  sections  of  ten,  but  were  re-organised  into  sections  of  eight  after  their  arrival 
at  Ringway,  possibly  to  suit  the  capacity  of  the  projected  Hotspur  glider.  In  December 
1940  they  were  re-organised  back  into  sections  of  ten,  to  reflect  the  supposed  capacity  of 
the  Whitley.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  Whitleys  involved  in  the  Tragino,  raid  in 
February  1941  carried  sticks  of  six,  presumably  because  of  the  additional  weight  of  the 
arms  and  equipment.  259  Some  small-unit  experience  was  gained  through  the  employment 
of  11  SAS  Battalion  for  demonstrations  and  as  an  exercise  enemy  for  conventional  troops 
training  to  repel  a  German  airborne  assault.  This  was  by  osmosis  rather  than  design,  and 
therefore  to  a  lower  standard  than  more  systematic  training  would  have  allowed. 
Arguably  the  most  disruptive  activity  undertaken  by  the  CLE  and  11  SAS  Battalion  was 
also  the  most  spectacular.  Operation  Colossus,  carried  out  in  February  1941,  was  the  first 
British  parachute  operation  in  history.  260  It  also  absorbed  the  majority  of  the  CLS's 
resources  for  the  better  part  of  a  month.  261  The  timing  of  the  operation  was  not  accidental, 
for  December  1940-January  1941  marked  an  increase  in  Army-RAF  acrimony  over  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  149 
future  of  the  airborne  projeCt.  262  This,  with  the  gloomy  strategic  background,  supports  the 
popular  view  that  the  operation's  motive  was  twofold.  First,  a  successful  airborne 
operation  would  demonstrate  that  the  new  British  airborne  force  merited  further 
development.  The  fact  that  the  CLE's  commander  personally  oversaw  the  operation  from 
its  mounting-base  in  Malta,  and  flew  on  one  of  the  aircraft  involved  illustrates  the 
importance  attached  to  the  venture  by  Ringway.  263  Secondly,  a  successful  operation  would 
provide  a  valuable  propaganda  victory,  to  prove  that  Britain  remained  a  force  to  be 
264 
reckoned  with. 
The  target  of  the  operation  was  the  Tragino  Aqueduct  in  Southern  Italy,  originally 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Air  Ministry  as  a  potential  bomber  target  by  the  British  civil 
engineering  firm  involved  in  its  construction.  It  was  assumed  that  destruction  of  the 
aqueduct  would  disrupt  the  supply  of  drinking  water  to  the  province  of  Apulia,  which 
included  the  ports  of  Bari,  Brindisi  and  Taranto.  This  lent  the  venture  a  strategic  as  well  as 
propaganda  dimension,  for  those  ports  were  staging  points  for  the  supply  and 
reinforcement  of  Italian  forces  in  Albania  and  North  Africa.  Air  Ministry  planning  for  a 
bombing  attack  began  on  5  December  1940 
'26 
5  but  the  target  was  subsequently  deemed 
unsuitable  and  passed  to  Combined  Operations,  who  decided  upon  an  airborne  operation 
because  the  distance  between  the  coast  and  the  target  precluded  an  amphibious  insertion. 
The  operation  was  approved  on  II  January  194  1.266  On  13  January  PTS  staff  made  night 
jumps  over  Ringway  to  test  both  the  concept  and  new  lights  to  aid  rallying  in  the  dark.  267 
The  whole  of  II  SAS  Battalion  volunteered  en  masse,  and  thirty-nine  were  selected, 
including  seven  officers  and  three  interpreters,  two  of  whom  were  of  Italian  origin.  Code 
named  11V  Troop,  this  group  began  intensive  training,  and  moonlight  drops  by  sticks  of 
the  volunteers  began  on  14  January  1941  . 
268  A  scale  model  of  the  target  was  housed  in 
Harvey's  office,  and  a  full  size  mock-up  was  constructed  at  Tatton  Hall  Park  for  training. 
The  training  was  hazardous  in  itself  Lance-Sergeant  Dennis  drowned  on  the  night  of  22 
January  1940  when  high  winds  blew  him  into  the  lake  at  Tatton  Park 
'269  and  several 
volunteers  became  hung-up  in  trees  there  from  the  same  hazard  on  I  February, 
necessitating  intervention  by  Knutsford  Fire  Brigade.  270  As  Ward  later  commented, 
11  ... 
January  was  not  a  good  time  for  training  paratroop  e'.  271  Nonetheless,  X  Troop  left 
RAF  Mildenhall  for  Malta  on  7  February  1941,272  and  the  operation  was  launched  on  the 
night  of  10/11  February. 
The  plan  was  to  drop  the  paratroops  within  striking  distance  of  the  target,  which  would  be 
demolished.  X  Troop  would  then  withdraw  to  the  coast  for  extraction  by  submarine  on  the 
night  of  15116  February  1941.  However,  things  did  not  go  as  planned.  The  aqueduct  was William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  150 
demolished,  but  the  projected  disruption  to  drinking  water  supplies  did  not  materialise,  and 
the  entire  force  was  captured  traversing  the  sixty  mountainous  miles  to  the  extraction  point. 
This  spared  them  the  disappointment  of  discovering  that  the  Admiralty  had  ordered  their 
extraction  submarine  to  abandon  the  rendezvous,  273  which  led  to  allegations  that  the  raiders 
were  written  off  by  the  planners  from  the  start  . 
274  Strictly  speaking,  Operation  Colossus 
was  therefore  a  failure.  On  the  other  hand,  it  caused  "alarm  and  consternation  ...  across  the 
whole  of  Italy",  and  prompted  "stringent  air-raid  and  anti-parachute  precautionS".  275  This 
partly  fulfilled  the  raid's  strategic  brief,  because  it  diverted  Italian  troops  away  from 
operations  in  Albania  and  North  Africa.  The  operatiorfs  secondary  aim,  of  demonstrating 
that  Britain  at  bay  was  still  a  force  to  be  reckoned  with,  was  therefore  also  achieved. 
The  raid  also  profited  the  CLE  and  II  SAS  Battalion,  because  it  proved  the  feasibility  of 
airborne  operations,  and  provided  valuable  operational  experience.  The  latter  highlighted 
the  need  for  more  detailed  and  up  to  date  aerial  photography.  The  day  before  the  raid  it 
was  discovered  that  there  were  in  fact  two  aqueducts,  necessitating  last  minute  adjustments 
to  the  plan,  and  when  the  raiders  reached  the  objective,  they  discovered  that  the  target's 
supporting  pillars  were  constructed  of  brick  rather  than  concrete,  which  obliged  further 
last-minute  improvisation.  The  raid  also  showed  that  night  dropping  techniques  required 
further  refinement,  and  uncovered  undetected  equipment  problems.  An  electrical  fault  in 
the  release  mechanism  resulted  in  some  containers  failing  to  drop,  and  preparations 
showed  that  the  existing  soft  containers  were  unsatisfactory.  When  fully  loaded  these 
66 
...  sagged  so  much  that  the  bomb  doors  could  not  be  closed  ... 
[and] 
...  metal  containers 
manufactured  especially  for  this  operation  provided  the  pattern  for  containers  used  in  the 
1276  later  stages  of  the  war'  . 
The  Tragino  operation  also  provided  welcome  publicity  for  the  new  airborne  arm,  which 
was  experiencing  difficulty  in  attracting  sufficient  new  volunteers,  and  retaining  those  it 
already  had.  The  story  of  the  raid  was  the  first  public  disclosure  that  Britain  possessed  an 
airborne  capability.  Italian  reporting  of  the  raid  was  widely  quoted  by  the  British  press,  277 
and  interest  in  the  story  was  heightened  by  the  subsequent  execution  of  one  of  X  Troop's 
interpreters,  following  his  identification  as  an  Italian  national.  278  On  the  other  hand,  there 
were  also  some  unwelcome  results.  Bruce  Williams,  who  accompanied  the  raiders  as  a 
despatcher,  279  was  charged  with  "unlawful  disclosure  of  classified  information"  to  a  British 
reporter  on  his  return,  and  court-martialled.  280  His  removal  may  have  been  due  to  internal 
CLE  politics,  a  possibility  discussed  in  more  detail  below. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  151 
Operation  Colossus  showed  that  the  labours  of  the  personnel  at  Ringway  had  not  been  in 
vain.  By  April  1941,  the  CLE  had  been  re-organised  into  a  structure  capable  of  at  least 
addressing  its  expanded  brief  to  train  a  British  airborne  force.  The  CLE  was  functioning 
properly  as  a  co-ordinating  centre,  its  in-house  R&D  centre  was  providing  solutions  to 
problems  as  they  occurred,  and  its  parachuting  and  gliding  wings  were  established  and 
functioning  in  their  own  dedicated  locations.  That,  arguably,  was  as  much  as  could  be 
expected  without  additional  support  and  guidance  from  above.  Unfortunately,  the  latter 
were  not  immediately  forthcoming,  because  the  background  to  the  CLE's  development  had 
been  a  growing  divergence  of  opinion  between  the  War  Office  and  Air  Ministry  regarding 
the  role,  size  and  composition  of  the  new  airborne  arm.  There  could  be  no  further  progress 
until  this  divergence  was  rectified. 
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73  Bombays  serving  in  the  Middle  East  from  September  1939  were  used  as  night  bombers  and  retained  their 
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74  Newnharn,  p.  27;  for  a  detailed  account  of  the  raid,  see  Karel  Margry,  'Tragino,  194  1:  BritahYs  First 
Paratroop  Raid".  After  the  Battle  (No.  81,1993), 
_pp. 
8-29 
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81  1  am  again  indebted  to  Mr  Simon  Moody,  Department  of  Research  and  Information  services  at  the  RAF 
museum,  Hendon,  for  guiding  me  to  the  references  for  the  Harrow 
82  C.  17L  Barnes,  Handley  Page  Aircraft  Since  1907,  pp.  372-375 
83  Mason,  p.  301 
84  Barnes,  p.  378;  and  Mason,  pp.  301-302 
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90  Mason,  p.  302;  andThetford,  p.  312 
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WrighL  p.  14 
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organisation  used  by  60'Airborne  Division  in  Normandy  in  1944  and  at  the  Rhine  Crossings  in  1945,  and  by 
11  Airborne  Division  at  Arnhem;  see  Otway,  Appendix  "0",  "Orders  ofBattle",  pp.  438-445 
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been  higher  because  it  was  not  policy  at  that  time  to  record  the  number  of  parachute  descents  on  a  daily  or 
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135  ibid.,  CLE  ORB,  entries  for  10/08/1940,12/08/1940  &  19/08/1940 
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164 
see  Ward,  pp.  142-143 
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166  ibid.,  CLE  ORB,  entry  for  05/08/1940 
167  Ward,  p.  143 
169  Ward,  p.  149;  the  fan  consisted  of  a  drum  of  cable  attached  to  a  standard  parachute  harness,  mounted  atop 
a  high  indoor  Platform.  The  drum  was  fitted  with  paddles,  the  air  resistance  of  which  slowed  the  revolutions William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  5  158 
of  the  drum  when  a  trainee  stepped  off  the  platform  to  that  of  a  parachute  descent;  it  therefore  took  some  cold 
courage  to  take  that  step.  One  trainee  who  used  the  apparatus  in  the  1970s  likened  the  impact  to  that  of 
"jumping  from  a  six-foot  wall";  see  Michael  Asher,  Shoot  To  Kill,  p.  81 
169  PRO  AIR  29/512,  CLE  ORB,  entries  for  01/08/1940  &  02/08/1940 
170  Newnham,  p.  49;  and  Ward,  p.  149 
171  Newnharn,  p.  49;  for  details  of  balloon  observer's  use  of  parachutes  in  the  First  World  War,  see  for 
example  Quarrie  (Airborne  Assault),  op.  cit.,  pp.  26-28 
172  parachute  training  was  included  in  the  training  of  Polish  Army  officer  cadets  from  August  1937  as  one  of 
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Staff  Jan  iozef  Lorys  (retd.  ),  16/06/1998.1  am  indebted  to  Mr  Andrzej  Suchcitz,  Secretary  of  the  Polish 
Institute  and  Sikorsky  Museum,  'for  both  arranging  and  providing  a  location  for  the  interview,  and  to  Colonel 
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trainees  or  instructors;  either  variation  is  possible,  and  it  is  thus  not  impossible  that  Strange  picked  up  on  the 
idea  of  using  balloons  at  some  earlier,  unrecorded  meeting;  see  PRO  AIR  29/512,  CLE  ORB,  entry  for 
28/10/1940;  Polish  input  into  the  establishment  of  British  Airborne  Forces  is  discussed  more  fully  below 
174  ibid.,  CLE  ORB,  entry  for  27/11/1940 
175  Ward,  p.  IS  1;  for  a  colourful  account  of  this  test  visit,  see  ibid.,  pp.  149-152 
176  quoted  from  extract  in  Newnham,  p.  50 
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accompanied  Ward  to  Cardington  for  the  balloon  test:  see  Newnham,  p.  50;  and  PRO  AIR  29/512,  CLE 
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178  see  Ward,  p.  152;  and  PRO  AIR  29/512,  CLE  ORB,  entry  for  08/04/1941 
179  for  highlights,  see  PRO  AIR  2/4586,  doc.  49A,  letter  from  Works  Area  No.  4  to  Air  Ministry  re: 
permission  to  establish  Balloon  Landing  Ground  at  Tatton  Park  dated  20/02/1941;  doe.  53A,  letter  from 
RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command  to  Air  Ministry,  dated  02104/1941;  doc.  53C,  letter  from  Lord  Egerton's 
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park,  dated  07/02/1941;  doc.  53C,  letter  from  Cheshire  War  Agriculture  Executive  Committee  to  CLE 
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`  ibid.,  doe.  54A,  letter  from  Director  of  Works  to  Supervising  Engineer  No.  4  Works  Area  authorising 
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Director  of  Organisation  to  HQ  RAF,  Bracknell  authorising  establishment  of  Balloon  Landing  Ground  at 
Tatton  I-jail  Park,  dated  16/04/1941 
181  Newnham,  p.  50 
182  Ward,  p.  149.  A  tower  was  eventually  constructed  and  used  for  ground  training  at  Ringway,  influenced 
by  the  Polish  tower  constructed  at  their  own  parachute  training  centre  at  Leven  in  Fife  in  1941,  rather  than 
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from  polish  Army  HQ  and  whatever  the  Poles  were  able  to  beg,  borrow  or  steal,  including  the  help  of  a  local 
Scottish  construction  firm.  It  was  opened  at  a  public  ceremony  on  20  July  1940;  see  Cholewczyski,  op.  cit., 
p.  49;  for  photographic  evidence  of  the  Ringway  tower,  see  Peter  Harclerode  "Go  to  It":  The  Illustrated 
History  of  the  6'h  Airborne  Division,  pp.  27-28,  and  plates  on  pp.  29,30 
113  the  balloon  was  superseded  by  the  Brittan  Norman  Islander  aircraft,  on  the  grounds  of  economy,  see 
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CHAPTER  SIX 
Divergence  at  the  Top:  The  War  Office,  the  Air  Ministry, 
and  the  First  Stage  of  the  Development  of  the  British 
Airborne  Force 
The  Central  Landing  Establishment  lacked  unified  direction  for  the  first  ten  months  of  its 
existence,  but  the  effects  of  this  on  the  process  of  establishing  an  airborne  training 
infrastructure  were  minimal.  Differences  of  opinion  on  the  role,  shape,  and  size  of  the 
airborne  force  only  became  apparent  after  the  initial  steps  had  been  taken,  when  guidance 
for  further  development  was  sought.  This  chapter  will  examine  how  the  Army's  view  of 
the  airborne  force  shifted,  and  the  Air  Ministry's  reaction  to  that  shift.  It  will  also  compare 
and  contrast  the  underlying  philosophies  of  the  two  services,  and  detail  the  progress 
achieved  by  the  end  of  April  1941  and  Churchill's  reaction  thereto. 
L  From  Raiding  to  a  Larger  Role:  The  Army  Begins  to  Shift  its  View 
At  the  outset,  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  accepted  that  airborne  operations  would  be 
limited  in  size  and  scope.  The  Air  Ministry  envisaged  parachute  troops  being  deployed  for 
sabotage,  limited  missions  to  seize  locations  for  that  purpose  or  possibly  pending  relief 
from  ground  forces.  '  The  merging  of  airborne  recruiting  with  that  for  special  service  units 
2 
generally  indicates  that  the  War  Office  initially  concurred  in  this.  However,  both  services 
had  their  own  very  different  reasons  for  accepting  the  raiding  rationale.  The  Air  Ministry 
favoured  the  raiding  rationale  because  it  minimised  the  resources  they  had  to  provide,  and 
a  platform  for  Ru-ther  reductions.  The  War  Office's  tacit  agreement  was  equally 
pragmatic,  but  oriented  in  the  opposite  direction. 
,A 
parachute  raiding  force  provided  a 
cadre  and  test  bed  for  future  expansion,  and  reduced  the  pressure  on  the  Army  in  the 
immediate  post-Dunkirk  period.  Neither  was  it  long  before  the  Army  began  to  think  in 
larger  terms  than  raiding  for  the  new  airborne  force.  By  early  September  Major  Rock  was 
arguing  that  it  be  employed  as  a  spearhead  for  a  major  offensive,  such  as  the  seizure  of  a 
Channel  port  for  an  invasion  of  France.  3 
The  War  Office's  thinking  was  not  immediately  apparent.  There  was  certainly  no  inkling 
of  it  at  the  joint  conference  at  the  Air  Ministry  on  5  September  1940.  The  upshot  of  this 
was  to  cap  the  size  of  the  new  force  at  3,000.  It  was  to  be  operational  by  the  spring  of 
1941,  and  used  primarily  for  raiding.  The  bulk  of  the  force  was  to  be  carried  in  gliders, 
whilst  the  parachute  requirement  was  reduced  to  a  three  hundred  strong  pathfinder  group, 
whose  primary  task  was  to  secure  landing  zones  for  the  gliders.  The  conference 
recommended  that  the  remaining  two  hundred  parachute  volunteers  be  used  as  saboteurs. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  164 
The  prospect  of  using  the  airborne  force  for  spearhead  operations  in  the  future  was  held  out 
as  a  sop  to  the  Army,  and  it  was  also  acknowledged  that  the  Middle  East  provided  "greater 
opportunities"  for  airborne  deployment.  4  That,  however,  was  as  far  as  the  Air  Ministry 
was  willing  to  go  in  accommodating  the  wishes  of  the  War  Office. 
The  Air  Ministry  thus  appeared  to  have  carried  the  day,  not  least  because  RAF  officers 
outnumbered  Army  attendees.  Of  the  nine  named  attendees,  only  three  -  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Boume  RM  (representing  the  Director  of  Combined  Operations),  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Stephenson  from  the  War  Office,  and  Major  Rock  -  were  not  serving  RAF 
5 
officers.  This  was  something  of  an  imbalance  for  ajoint  conference,  and  Air  Ministry 
satisfaction  doubtless  increased  after  Ismay  passed  on  Churchill's  favourable  reaction  on 
6 
13  September  1940  . 
However,  War  Office  quiescence  did  not  imply  agreement.  It  was  obliged  in  part  because 
the  Army  was  experiencing  difficulty  in  obtaining  sufficient  parachute  volunteers  to  fill  the 
existing  Commando  establishment.  This  provided  a  rather  poor  basis  on  which  to  argue 
for  any  expansion  of  the  airborne  commitment.  The  Army's  reaction  was  also  muted 
because  the  War  Office  was  still  mulling  over  the  possibilities  offered  by  gliders.  The  fact 
that  the  Director  of  Military  Operations  and  Planning  at  the  War  Office  did  not  disseminate 
the  conclusions  of  the  5  September  1940  conference  until  18  September  supports  this,  7  and 
expansionist  War  Office  thinking  was  doubtless  encouraged  by  enquiries  about  airborne 
forces  from  outside  the  UK.  Middle  Eastern  Command  raised  the  matter  of  setting  up  a 
PTS  there  twice  on  16  September  1940,  asking  for  the  necessary  War  Establishment, 
medical  and  administrative  details  for  parachute  volunteers,  and  samples  of  special 
8 
equipment  and  specialist  personnel.  A  similar  request  was  received  from  India  in  early 
October.  9 
War  Office  thinking  crystallised  as  a  result  of  an  Air  Ministry  call  for  a  filfther 
conference  on  2  October  1940.10  This  prompted  a  high-level  internal  meeting  at  the  War 
office,  which  re-affirmed  adherence  to  the  target  of  training  a  3,000  strong  airborne  force 
by  1941.  More  importantly,  it  agreed  that  it  should  be  made  clear  to  the  Air  Ministry  that 
the  Army  would  have  expanded  requirements  after  that  date  and  that  these  would  include 
light  tanks,  artillery  and  other  heavy  equipment.  "  In  fact,  the  Army  did  not  reveal  its 
hand,  apart  from  an  ambiguous  closing  comment  from  an  Army  attendee  to  the  effect  that 
modification  of  the  airborne  agreement  reached  might  become  necessary  at  a  later  date.  12 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  165 
Why  the  War  Office  did  not  to  lay  its  cards  on  the  table  at  this  point  is  unclear,  but  it  was 
certainly  not  due  to  any  change  of  mind.  The  CLE  and  the  relevant  War  Office 
departments  subsequently  busied  themselves  obtaining  data  for  possible  alternative  loads 
for  gliders.  The  War  Office  passed  a  list  of  weights  and  measures  for  a  variety  of  military 
equipment  to  Rock  on  10  November  1940.  This  included  details  of  tanks,  Universal 
Carriers,  trucks,  motorcycle  combinations  and  Bofors  light  anti-aircraft  guns.  13  It  was 
supplemented  on  22  November  1940  by  a  list  of  current  locations  for  a  variety  of  units. 
These  included  some  equipped  with  light  3.7  inch  howitzers,  along  with  the  weight  and 
crew  requirements  of  the  weapon.  14  A  finther  letter  on  12  December  1940  discussed  the 
suitability  of  tentative  glider  designs  for  the  carriage  of  vehicles.  15 
In  parallel  with  this,  the  War  Office  continued  low-key  encouragement  for  external 
commands  interested  in  establishing  airborne  forces  outside  the  UK.  The  War  Office 
replied  to  the  enquiries  from  Middle  Eastern  Command  on  II  October  1940  with  a  pr6cis 
of  the  current  airborne  policy  in  the  UK,  permission  to  establish  a  PTS  in  the  Middle  East 
for  local  use,  and  an  offer  to  update  the  War  Establishment  already  supplied.  It  also 
warned  that  no  additional  aircraft  could  be  expected  from  the  UK.  16  Middle  Eastern 
Command  responded  four  days  later  with  undiminished  enthusiasm.  Bombay  and 
Wellington  aircraft  were  thought  to  be  available  locally,  it  was  planned  to  commence 
parachute  training  by  January  1941,  and  previous  demands  for  parachute  instructors  and 
samples  of  special  equipment  were  repeated;  arrival  of  the  former  was  considered  vital 
before  2  November  1940,  for  some  unexplained  reason.  17  Sadly,  this  enthusiasm  proved 
misplaced.  The  next  contact  from  Middle  East  Command  on  the  subject  did  not  occur  until 
4  December  1940,  when  the  War  Office  was  informed  that  HQ  RAF  Middle  East  claimed 
it  had  no  aircraft  for  use  by  a  local  PTS,  and  requested  an  expert  from  the  UK  to  advise 
further.  After  this  the  matter  appears  to  have  been  dropped.  18  Hopes  for  an  Indian  PTS  at 
this  time  proved  to  be  similarly  misplaced.  At  the  end  of  January  1941  the  War  Office 
recommended  that  Indian  Command  postpone  raising  Indian  parachute  battalions  until  the 
position  was  clarified  in  the  UKý  citing  the  shortage  of  suitable  aircraft  as  justification.  19 
The  War  Office  provided  the  Air  Ministry  with  the  first  official  confirmation  of  its 
revised  requirement  on  II  November  1940,  when  it  announced  that  a  further  decision  on 
the  shape  of  the  airborne  force  was  necessary  to  include  heavy  weapons,  light  armour  and 
transport.  20  The  Air  Ministry  may  have  already  been  aware  of  the  War  office's  shifting 
views,  possibly  via  the  CLE.  A  report  compiled  by  the  CLE  for  the  Air  Ministry  on  31 
October  1940,  for  example,  expanded  the  suggested  functions  for  the  airborne  force  to  six, 
including  "spearhead  offensive  action  within  a  five  hundred  mile  radius  of  action".  It  also William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  166 
gave  the  opinion  that  "...  an  airborne  force  in  excess  of  5,000,  fully  trained  [and]  with  light 
artillery  and  transport  could,  by  concentrated  effort,  be  available  by  May  1942  ý9.21  This 
doubtless  came  as  a  surprise  to  the  Air  Ministry,  which  was  presumably  satisfied  up  to  this 
point  that  it  had  succeeded  in  whittling  the  airborne  project  down  to  a  more  appropriate 
size. 
Il.  Digging  in  of  Heels:  The  Air  Ministry's  Reaction  To  the  War  Office's  Shift 
ofFocus 
The  Air  Ministry  reaction  was  swift.  A  draft  response  was  circulated  internally  and  to  the 
CLE  by  the  Air  Ministry's  Director  of  Military  Co-operation,  Group-Captain  Goddard,  on 
the  same  day  that  the  War  Office  letter  was  received.  22  Goddard's  minute  examined  the 
matter  from  the  ground  up,  including  questioning  the  viability  of  Ringway  for  the  CLE, 
and  expressed  his  personal  support  for  the  airborne  project  on  the  grounds  that  "...  this 
nation  [i.  e.  Britain]  more  than  any  other  will  need  its  'Flying  Columns"'.  Goddard 
incorporated  comments  received  by  16  November,  and  the  finished  document  was  passed 
to  the  Air  Ministry  Department  of  Plans  on  23  November  1940.23  Goddard  began  by 
bluntly  stating  that  the  aims  of  the  5  September  1940  conference  were  no  longer  attainable, 
and  that  the  Army  requirement  for  two  invasion  corps  necessitated  "...  decisions  at  the 
highest  level  to  establish  a  definite  [airborne]  programme  and  levels  of  priority".  The 
minute  then  went  on  to  examine  and  comment  upon  virtually  every  facet  of  airborne 
progress  to  date.  The  decision  to  train  soldiers  as  glider  pilots  was  questioned: 
"They  [the  glider  pilots]  will  be  required,  in  effect,  to  make  spot  landings  in 
swift  succession  and  in  order,  on  unknown  places  with  a  dead  stick  in  a  large 
engineless  aeroplane,  having  been  released  from  their  tows  over  some 
unknown  place,  possibly  in  twilight.  This  is  no  task  for  a  beginner  who  is 
primarily  a  soldier".  24 
The  need  for  RAF  control  over  the  flying  side  of  airborne  operations  was  also  stressed, 
using  the  naval  role  in  amphibious  operations  as  an  analogy  to  illustrate  several  points. 
The  lack  of  an  overall  strategic  plan  for  the  development  and  employment  of  the  airborne 
force  was  raised,  as  was  the  need  firmly  to  establish  what  the  n-dnimum  demands  of  an 
airborne  force  were  to  be,  and  the  date  by  which  they  were  to  be  realised.  The  paper 
closed  with  the  suggestion  that  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  appraise  Churchill  of  the  situation. 
Goddard's  minute  caused  a  furore  in  the  Air  Ministry.  Open  hostility  to  the  airborne  idea 
rose  to  the  surface,  as  the  following  quote  from  an  internal  communication  from  the  Vice William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  167 
Chief  of  Air  Staff,  Arthur  Harris,  to  the  Air  Ministry's  Director  of  Plans  on  30  November 
1940  shows: 
"From  the  original  idea  of  a  force  of  parachutists,  the  scheme  has  progressed 
rather  like  a  Snowball  [sic]  and  now  has  reached  considerable  dimensions.  I 
can  find  no  trace  of  this  scheme  [i.  e.  the  War  Office  requirement  for  two 
airborne  invasion  corps]  ever  having  received  Chiefs  of  Staff  blessing  and  I 
think  that  ... 
before  we  are  irretrievably  committed  we  ought  to  have  a  clear 
indication  of  the  purpose  for  which  these  air-borne  [sic]  troops  are  required  and 
into  what  strategical  plan  they  are  to  fit".  25 
The  minute  prompted  more  than  mere  acerbic  comment  from  the  pro-bomber  lobby.  A 
joint  conference  was  scheduled  at  the  Air  Ministry  for  11  December  1940.  It  closely 
followed  Goddard's  lead,  and  was  intended  "...  to  avoid  specifics  and  determine  basic 
ý  26 
principles  only  for  immediate  action  by  the  Air  Ministry'.  Three  types  of  airborne 
operation  were  envisaged;  invasion  spearhead,  tactical  involvement  in  the  land  battle,  and 
espionage  and  sabotage  operations.  Gliders  were  to  be  used  for  large  operations,  whilst 
paratroops  were  to  be  used  primarily  for  marking  glider  landing  zones,  for  sabotage 
operations,  and  possibly  for  small  scale  operations  to  seize  tactical  points.  The  Air 
Ministry  was  thus  willing  to  go  some  way  to  accommodate  Army  requirements,  although 
the  stipulations  which  followed  showed  that  they  were  not  willing  to  move  very  far. 
Paratroops  were  ". 
.  -not  to  be  employed  en  masse  for  [unstated]  reasons  decided  by  the  Air 
Staff  and  General  Staff',  and  the  ceiling  of  five  hundred  paratroops  was  not  to  be  exceeded 
without  specific  Chiefs  of  Staff  sanction;  this  included  the  training  of  foreign  troops  at 
Ringway.  The  matter  of  who  should  provide  personnel  for  glider  pilot  training  was  raised, 
with  the  suggestion  that  the  RAF  provide  these  because  the  task  required  the  same  level  of 
skill  as  piloting  a  bomber.  The  agenda  also  suggested  agreement  be  reached  as  to  the 
immediate  requirements  for  glider  pilot  and  parachute  training,  which  additional  airfields 
could  be  provided,  and  that  an  airborne  progress  timetable  be  agreed.  Two  appendices 
were  attached  to  the  agenda,  a  progress  report  by  the  CLE,  and  a  suggested  organisation 
for  an  Aerodrome  Capture  Group,  presumably  provided  by  the  War  Office. 
The  minutes  of  the  11  December  1940  conference  reflect  some  disagreement  over  the 
proposals  in  the  Air  Ministry's  agenda.  The  five  hundred  parachutist  limit  was  challenged 
by  the  Commander  in  Chief  Home  Forces  in  absentia,  with  the  transmission  of  his  wish  for 
as  many  paratroops  as  possible  over  that  limit,  and  a  request  that  a  total  of  three  hundred 
Polish  and  two  hundred  Free  French  personnel  should  also  receive  parachute  training.  Air 
Ministry  representatives  cagily  agreed  to  the  C  in  C's  requests,  providing  that  it  did  not 
require  an  expansion  of  the  existing  training  organisation,  and  with  a  rider  against  any William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  168 
"...  tendency  to  assume  aircraft  would  be  available  for  extra  parachutists  when  trained". 
Both  these  pronouncements  ring  rather  hollow.  The  former  because  CLE  complaints  over 
the  dearth  of  parachuting  aircraft  must  have  been  common  knowledge  at  the  Air  Ministry, 
and  the  latter  because  it  conveniently  overlooked  the  Air  Ministry's  pledge  to  turn  over  a 
whole  Whitley  Group  for  parachute-droPPing  duties,  made  back  in  June  1940.27 
The  chairman  of  the  conference  also  departed  from  the  agenda  to  raise  the  matter  of 
labelling  gliders  as  such.  This,  he  suggested,  was  a  misnomer  on  the  grounds  that  the  large 
gliders  envisaged  were  in  fact  very  large  powered  troop  carriers:  the  fact  that  their  power 
was  on  the  end  of  a  tow-rope  made  no  difference  except  to  increase  handling  difficulties. 
The  chairman  also  pointed  out  that  the  planned  twenty-five  seat  craft  was  the  same 
dimensions  as  the  Short  Stirling  heavy  bomber,  and  that  making  "spot"  landings  in  such  a 
machine  was  the  equivalent  to  landing  the  largest  powered  troop-carrying  aircraft  with  a 
dead-stick.  28  The  underlying  reason  for  the  chairman's  assertion  appears  to  have  been  to 
support  the  Air  Ministry's  growing  conviction  that  only  bomber  pilots  would  be 
sufficiently  qualified  to  fly  the  large  gliders  then  under  development.  This  is  supported  by 
the  comment  made  by  DCAS  Arthur  Harris  at  the  close  of  the  meeting: 
"The  idea  that  semi-skilled,  unpicked  personnel  (infantry  corporals  have,  I 
believe,  even  been  suggested)  could  with  a  maximum  of  training  be  entrusted 
with  the  piloting  of  these  troop  carriers  is  fantastic.  Their  operation  is 
equivalent  to  forced  landing  the  largest  sized  aircraft  without  engine  aid  -  than 
which  there  is  no  higher  test  of  piloting  skill.  5129 
For  their  part,  the  Army  appears  to  have  been  indifferent  as  to  where  the  pilots  came 
from.  One  of  the  War  Office  representatives  at  the  conference,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stephenson,  pointed  out  that  the  Army  was  not  insistent  on  glider  pilots  being  soldiers. 
The  important  thing  was  that  pilots  were  provided,  a  fundamental  difference  in  approach  to 
which  we  shall  return.  The  Air  Ministry  may  have  been  angling  to  make  flying  gliders  an 
alternative  job  for  bomber  pilots,  presumably  because  this  would  require  an  expansion  in 
bomber  pilot  numbers.  The  Air  Ministry  Deputy  Director  of  Operations  and  Planning  was 
swift  to  point  out  that  any  increase  in  glider  pilot  provision  would  mean  a  reduction  of 
RAF  resources  to  the  tune  of  three  hundred  and  fifty  bomber  pilots  per  month,  although  the 
basis  for  this  assertion  was  not  given.  The  conference  also  proposed  that  a  paper  be 
prepared  for  transmission  to  higher  authority  for  a  decision.  The  conference  closed  by 
commenting  that  the  airborne  project  was  doomed  to  failure  unless  more  glider  pilots  could 
be  found  from  existing  output,  but  this  was  impossible  due  to  -other  aircrew  requirements. 
one  suggested  option  was  to  expand  flying  training  per  se  to  make  up  the  shortfall,  with William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  169 
the  redirection  of  war-weary  bomber  crews  to  glider  duties  as  a  second  possible  long-term 
option. 
The  11  December  1940  conference  thus  failed  to  meet  its  stated  objective  of  establishing 
clear  principles  for  Air  Ministry  immediate  action.  In  fact,  the  opposite  happened,  for  the 
conference  threw  up  more  differences  than  it  resolved.  It  did  have  one,  perhaps 
unexpected  side-effect,  however,  in  that  it  prompted  both  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office 
into  officially  stating  their  position  with  regard  to  the  airborne  project,  in  papers  which 
appeared  in  late  December  1940  and  early  January  1941  respectively. 
111:  Cards  on  the  Table  at  Last.  The  Papers  of  23  December  1940  and  10 
January  1941 
The  Air  Ministry  set  out  its  airborne  position  in  another  paper  compiled  by  Goddard, 
entitled  'Trovision  of  Airborne  Forces  -  Air  Ministry  Aspect",  which  appeared  on  23 
December  1940;  30  it  was  passed  to  the  War  Office  by  I  January  1941  . 
31  The  paper  began 
by  pointing  out  the  impossibility  of  planning  or  providing  resources  for  the  airborne  force 
in  the  absence  of  an  operational  or  strategic  plan.  It  then  reiterated  the  Air  Ministry's  view 
of  what  airborne  operations  should  consist  of  as  detailed  in  the  agenda  for  the  II 
December  conference.  This  was  followed  by  a  promotion  of  the  RAF's  role,  as  the  "most 
competent  provider  of  the  necessary  skill,  expertise  and  equipment  for  airborne 
operations7'.  The  staff  at  Ringway  might  have  disputed  this  claim.  It  also  insisted  that  all 
pilots  for  airborne  forces  had  to  remain  in  the  RAF.  The  latter  point,  interestingly,  ignores 
the  previous  Air  Ministry  line  that  the  Army  should  provide  personnel  for  training  as  glider 
pilots. 
This  was  followed  by  a  series  of  wide-ranging  recommendations.  The  lack  of  a  strategic 
plan  for  the  employment  of  the  new  airborne  force  was  cited  as  justification  for 
maintaining  the  parachute  effort  at  its  current  level,  albeit  with  the  addition  of  sufficient 
trained  RAF  pilots  to  allow  flirther  research  and  development  work,  small-scale  tactical 
training  exercises,  and  demonstrations.  It  was  also  suggested  that  airborne  facilities  be 
established  in  India  because  this  would  be  more  convenient  for  the  deployment  of 
parachute  troops  in  the  Mediterranean,  an  assertion  which  indicates  that  the  Air  Ministry 
was  privy  to  the  enquiries  from  India  and  Middle  Eastern  Command.  The  paper  then  went 
on  to  reject  the  German  model  of  air-landing  operations,  because  of  the  high  loss  of 
powered  aircraft  this  entailed.  In  the  RAF,  these  machines  were  bombers  and  therefore 
11  ...  too  valuable  to  risk7'. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  170 
Having  disposed  of  peripheral  issues,  the  paper  then  got  down  to  its  real  purpose  by 
laying  out  the  Air  Ministry's  view  of  how  the  airborne  force  should  be  developed.  It 
recommended  that  inserting  troops  by  parachute  should  be  restricted  to  minor  operations, 
and  to  the  first  flights  of  major  airborne  operations,  because  parachuting  was  considered  an 
inefficient  and  costly  method  of  using  personnel  and  aircraft.  Gliders  were  considered  to 
be  the  superior  and  desirable  alternative,  with  stocks  of  the  appropriate  types  to  be 
established  as  and  when  possible.  However,  it  was  made  clear  that  the  process  of 
equipping,  producing  and  employing  gliders  and  providing  the  necessary  pilots  was  "...  not 
to  be  at  the  expense  of  RAF  Commands  now  engaged  in  major  operations,  until  the 
adoption  of  a  [airborne]  plan  for  execution  requires  if'.  It  also  recommended  that  the 
existing  programme  be  abrogated,  and  that  the  existing  plan  be  abandoned  as  impossible  to 
achieve,  although  it  stressed  that  the  Air  Ministry  wished  to  be  governed  by  the  Ministry  of 
Aircraft  Production,  the  War  Office  and  the  Director  of  Combined  Operations.  The  paper 
closed  on  a  more  conciliatory  note,  by  holding  out  the  possible  availability  of  obsolete 
aircraft  for  airborne  use  by  1942,  and  suggesting  that  the  situation  might  change  if  the 
supply  of  pilots  were  to  outstrip  that  of  aircraft.  The  establishment  of  a  separate  airborne 
service,  with  its  own  organisation  and  uniform  was  also  dismissed  as  impractical  under  the 
present  circumstances. 
Little  was  new  in  the  23  December  1940  paper.  The  dissatisfaction  with  the  parachute, 
for  example,  and  the  wish  to  see  it  largely  replaced  by  the  glider,  merely  reiterated  Air 
Ministry  views  first  expressed  in  August  1940.32  What  was  new  was  the  clarity  with  which 
Air  Ministry  opinion  was  expressed.  Gliders  were  not  merely  suggested  as  an  alternative 
to  the  parachute,  but  their  status  as  such  was  taken  as  read,  and  the  fact  that  airborne 
development  was  not  to  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  other  RAF  activities  under  any 
circumstances  was  stated  equally  bluntly.  For  all  its  change  of  tone,  the  paper  was 
nonetheless  largely  more  of  thesame,  and  contained  as  many  flaws  as  those  that  preceded 
it.  The  lack  of  a  strategic  plan  for  airborne  development  and  employment  was  cited  as 
justification  for  back-pedalling:  this  was  a  reasonable  argument,  but  one  which  overlooked 
theý  fact  that  Air  Ministry  fudging  at  joint  conferences  to  resolve  the  matter  was  proving  a 
major  obstacle  to  the  formulation  of  any  firm  policy.  Similarly,  the  tone  of  the  document 
implies  that  existing  aircraft  provision  at  Ringway  was  sufficient,  which  was  blatantly  not 
the  case  as  the  Air  Ministry  well  knew.  The  suggestion  that  additional  airborne  facilities 
should  be  provided  in  India  was  a  rather  surprising  development,  given  that  the  home 
airborne  establishment  was  so  seriously  undermanned  and  equipped  at  that  time. 
Consequently,  it  looks  suspiciously  like  a  cynical  attempt  to  hamstring  the  CLE  further  by 
diffiising  the  scant  resources  available,  and  possibly  get  the  whole  project  moved  away William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  171 
from  the  centre  of  events  where  it  could  be  more  easily  sidelined.  Neither  does  the  carrot 
of  possible  future  diversion  of  obsolete  aircraft  to  the  airborne  force  ring  quite  true.  As  we 
have  seen,  the  Air  Ministry  had  to  date  made  no  effort  to  divert  the  already  obsolete  Bristol 
Bombay  and  Handley  Page  Harrow  aircraft  to  the  airborne  project,  nor  to  provide,  even  on 
a  temporary  basis,  the  promised  %itley  Group.  The  offer  appears  to  have  been  mere 
window  dressing. 
Goddard's  paper  therefore  merely  restated  the  Air  Ministry's  existing  position,  albeit  in  a 
clearer  and  blunter  form.  The  provision  of  an  airborne  force  was  still,  six  months  after  its 
official  establishment,  considered  an  unwarranted  diversion  of  resources  for  which  the  Air 
Ministry  was  willing  to  provide  only  the  bare  minimum  equipment  and  effort.  Indeed, 
there  were  some  at  the  Air  Ministry  who  felt  that  Goddard's  opposition  had  not  gone  far 
enough,  as  illustrated  by  DCAS  Harris's  comments  on  receipt  of  a  draft  of  Goddard's  paper 
on  24  December  1940: 
"The  attached  draft  by  the  DMC  seems  suited  to  the  purpose  to  which  I 
understand  you  intend  to  put  it.  The  main  points  seem  to  be  to  put  to  the  War 
office  and  PM  [are] 
that  the  ideas  of  soldier  pilots  to  [fly]  gliders  is  hopeless 
that  the  prospect  of  360  efficient  big  glider  pilots  by  spring  [of  1941]  is  equally 
hopeless  -  as  of  100  to  that  matter 
no  amount  of  wishing  and  waving  can  push  aside  these  facts" 
. 
33 
Given  his  enthusiasm  for  strategic  bombing,  Harris's  reaction  was  predictable,  but  others 
within  the  Air  Ministry  were  less  extreme,  albeit  possibly  due  to  a  wish  to  avoid 
unnecessary  unpleasantness  rather  than  any  heartfelt  support  for  the  airborne  project. 
Goddard,  in  a  letter  to  the  Vice  Chief  of  Air  Staff  on  31  December  to  confirm  despatch  of 
his  paper  to  the  War  Office,  34  added  a  post-dated  pS.  35  In  this,  whilst  he  recommended 
that  prior  Army  requests  for  a  brigade-size  airborne  force  be  rejected  on  the  grounds 
contained  in  his  paper,  Goddard  also  referred  to  the  head  of  Army  Co-operation  Command 
being  informed  that  Churchill  was  concerned  on  hearing  that  airborne  progress  was  not 
proceeding  as  planned,  and  added  his  opinion  that  the  Prime  Minister's  endorsement 
should  be  sought  on  the  proposals  contained  in  the  paper. 
Churchill's  reaction  could  be  guessed,  given  his  previous  ones  to  the  downgrading  of  the 
parachute  force  for  5,000  to  five  hundred,  and  to  the  Air  Ministry,  s  introduction  of  the 
glider  into  the  airborne  equation.  In  the  event,  he  does  not  appear  to  have  been  consulted, William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  172 
because  within  ten  days  of  receiving  Goddard!  s  paper,  the  War  Offlice  responded  with  one 
of  its  own.  Entitled  "Airborne  Troops  -  Policy  For",  this  set  out  Army  airborne 
36 
requirements  far  in  excess  of  the  limits  preferred  by  the  Air  Ministry.  Compiled  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Stephenson,  37  the  paper  began  by  laying  out  the  Army's  "General 
Requirements".  These  were  for  two  five-  hundred  strong  Aerodrome  Capture  Groups  of 
parachutists,  to  be  tasked  to  capture  not  only  aerodromes,  but  also  to  seize  small 
bridgeheads  or small  tactical  features.  They  were  to  be  capable  of  operating  in  all  terrain, 
for  a  maximum  of  thirty-six  hours,  and  within  a  five  hundred-mile  radius  of  their  launching 
base. 
At  a  stroke  the  Army  was  looking  to  double  the  existing  parachute  provision,  and  to  re- 
orientate  the  parachute  force  toward  supporting  conventional  operations  rather  than 
raiding,  which  would  thus  require  more  RAF  resources.  The  War  Office  paper  did  not  stop 
there,  for  it  also  contained  a  detailed  table  of  organisation  for  what  it  termed  "Invasion 
Corps"',  of  which  it  required  two.  Each  was  to  contain  four  infantry  battalions  and  a 
substantial  tail  of  support  units,  including  a  light  tank  squadron,  a  battery  of  3.7  inch 
howitzers,  two  light  anti-aircraft  batteries,  an  anti-tank  battery  and  medical  and  supply 
detachments  (see  Fig.  2).  The  entire  Corps  was  to  be  air  portable,  although  it  was  not 
planned  to  move  the  whole  force  in  one  lift.  Instead,  sufficient  air  resources  were  expected 
to  enable  the  simultaneous  lift  of  a  small  brigade  HQ,  two  infantry  battalions,  the  light  tank 
squadron,  the  3.7  inch  and  both  light  anti-aircraft  batteries  and  elements  of  the  supply  and 
medical  detachments,  a  force  in  the  region  of  1700  men.  Smaller  operations,  employing 
around  two  to  three  hundred  men  without  the  heavy  weapons,  were  also  envisaged.  This 
airlanding  force  was  to  be  capable  of  operating  for  three  days  without  resupply,  also  within 
a  five  hundred  mile  radius  of  its  launch  base.  The  paper  closed  by  pointing  out  that  whilst 
no  specific  date  for  establishment  of  the  new  units  was  included,  "...  we  [the  War  Office] 
can  only  say  that  it  should  be  as  early  as  productive  resources  allow". 
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Figure  2-  Proposed  Anmy  "Invasion  Corps",  as  detailed  in  WO  Paper  of  10  January 
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The  War  Office  paper  contained  a  great  deal  that  was  new,  at  least  to  the  Air  Ministry. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  size  of  the  two  Invasion  Corps,  including  the 
two  five  hundred  strong  parachute  detachments,  totalled  somewhere  in  the  region  of  5,000 
men,  and  thus  roughly  met  Churchill's  original  directive,  albeit  largely  with  glider  rather 
than  parachute  troops.  38  Whilst  the  paper  clearly  stated  War  Office  requirements,  those 
requirements  were  somewhat  optimistic  given  current  resources,  even  allowing  for  Air 
Ministry  obstructionism.  This  shows  that  there  was  also  an  element  of  mutual 
misunderstanding  involved,  over  and  above  mere  inter-service  rivalry,  which  became 
clearly  apparent  in  the  aftermath. 
JV.  -  Mutual  Misunderstanding  and  Differing  Philosophies:  Air  Ministry,  the 
War  Office  and  the  Shape  of  the  Airbome  Force 
The  first  Air  Ministry  reaction  to  the  War  Office  paper  of  10  January  1941  appeared  four 
days  later.  In  a  letter  dated  14  January,  Goddard  acknowledged  receipt,  and  suggested  that, 
as  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  positions  were  at  such  variance,  a  joint  paper  on  the 
matter  be  prepared  for  submission  to  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  Committee  for  adjudication.  He 
also  recommended  that  particular  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  proposed  ratio  between 
parachute  and  glider  troops,  on  the  as  yet  unproven  grounds  that  the  former  required  more 
RAF  resources.  He  reiterated  the  Air  Ministry  view  that  parachute  troops  should  be  a 
minority  in  whatever  force  was  finally  approved,  and  requested  that  the  War  Office 
formulate  a  specific  Home  airborne  establishment  for  tactical  development  and  joint  anti- 
invasion  training  with  Home  Forces  "...  as  distinct  from  any  requirement  for  offensive 
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operations  overseas". 
Much  of  this  was  predictable  and  unremarkable,  apart  from  his  final  point  regarding  a 
separate  airborne  Home  establishment.  This  suggests  that  Goddard,  and  by  extension  the 
Air  Ministry,  had  failed  to  grasp  that  the  Army  did  not  view  No.  11  SAS  Battalion  as  a 
research  and  development  testbed,  but  as  a  cadre  for  an  operational  airborne  force  which 
was  unavoidably  but  temporarily  involved  in  non-operational  activities.  This  could  have 
course  have  been  a  deliberate  misreading  of  the  matter,  a  contention  supported  by  Air 
Ministry  behaviour  to  date.  It  could  also,  however,  have  arisen  as  a  result  of  fundamental 
differences  in  approach  by  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office,  generated  by  their  relative 
dependence  upon  technology  and  differing  histories.  This  is  a  point  to  which  we  shall 
return. 
The  second  reaction  to  the  paper  arrived  at  the  War  Office  the  day  after  Goddard's  letter, 
in  a  very  detailed  document  from  the  CLE 
. 
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paper,  by  recommending  that  engineer  units  be  included  in  the  Invasion  Corps  (presumably 
by  Rock  who  was  a  Royal  Engineer),  and  that  the  reduced  one-lift  portion  of  the  Corps  be 
altered  to  include  an  anti-tank  capability.  It  was  also  suggested  that  reconnaissance 
elements  using  motor-cycle  combinations  and  scout  cars  be  included  in  the  larger 
organisation,  and  that  the  list  of  possible  missions  for  the  new  force  be  amended  in  the 
light  of  study  of  likely  German  airborne  action  in  the  event  of  an  invasion  of  the  UK. 
These  included  rear  attacks  in  conjunction  with  conventional  assault,  isolating  the 
prospective  battlefields  from  the  German  rear,  seizing  and  holding  defiles  and  river 
crossings  to  prevent  enemy  demolition  or  retreat,  flanking  attacks,  feint  attacks  and  raids  to 
disrupt  German  communications.  These  suggestions  are  of  course  eminently  sensible, 
although  it  is  intriguing  to  note  their  similarity  in  wording  to  those  put  forward  by  Major  J. 
T.  Godfrey  in  his  1935  paper  "Winged  Armies",  41  which  in  turn  bore  striking  similarities 
to  contemporary  Soviet  airborne  thought.  42 
it  is  the  second  part  of  the  document,  consisting  of  a  list  of  answers  to  specific  questions, 
which  provides  evidence  that,  for  its  part,  the  War  Office  had  little  idea  of  what  its  new 
airborne  force  required  from  the  RAF,  or  indeed  the  paucity  of  RAF  resources.  Thus,  the 
CLE  had  to  point  out  that  there  were  insufficient  Wbitleys  available  to  carry  two  hundred 
and  fifty  parachutists  and  all  their  kit,  even  assuming  that  each  Whitley  could  carry  ten 
passengers.  43  It  was  also  pointed  out  that  an  increment  of  that  size  did  not  conform  to  the 
existing  organisation  of  II  SAS  Battalion.  The  Fighting  Wing  of  the  latter  unit  was  three 
hundred  and  seventy  two  strong,  and  required  thirty-seven  Whitleys  for  a  single  lift.  The 
CLE  also  informed  the  War  Office  that  speculation  on  glider  numbers  was  "pie  in  the  sky" 
because  the  necessary  gliders  were  not  yet  built,  although  it  did  offer  some  very 
provisional  estimates  based  upon  the  War  Office  paper;  one  hundred  and  sixty-three 
twenty-five  seaters,  and  sixteen  tank  carriers. 
The  following  comments  were  less  blunt,  if  equally  negative.  The  CLE  were  thus  unable 
to  estimate  accurately  the  number  of  glider  pilots  required,  but  suggested  a  ceiling  of  three 
hundred  and  thirty-four,  whilst  stressing  that  this  would  merely  be  to  lift  the  proposed 
Army  force  and  not  for  airborne  forces  as  a  whole.  The  CLE  also  considered  the  light  anti- 
aircraft  component  of  the  Army's  requirement  problematic,  because  the  Bofors  AA  gun 
was  too  tall  and  heavy  for  existing  glider  designs,  a  rather  surprising  lapse  on  the  Army's 
part,  given  its  ongoing  mauling  at  the  hands  of  the  Luftwaffe.  On  the  other  hand,  -not  all  the 
CLE's  responses  were  doom  and  gloom.  The  prospect  of  lightening  the  Bofors  gun  for 
airborne  use  was  held  out,  and  the  availability  of  an  unspecified  "four  ton  carrier"  (possibly 
a  Bren-Gun  Carrier)  meant  that  it  might  be  possible  to  equip  airborne  artillery  with  a William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  175 
heavier  piece  than  the  3.7  inch  howitzer.  It  was  also  recommended  that  production  of  that 
type  be  pushed  at  the  expense  of  the  projected  tank  carrier,  because  it  was  faster  and  had 
less  rigid  landing  requirements  due  to  its  smaller  size  and  weight.  Nonetheless,  the  fact 
that  the  War  Office  was  raising  such  matters  after  issuing  its  airborne  requirement  suggests 
a  lack  of  proper  research,  and  that  it  had  therefore  put  together  its  requirements  without 
considering  their  feasibility. 
This  provides  a  fin-ther  indicator  of  the  fundamental  differences  between  the  War  Office 
and  the  Air  Ministry  approaches  to  the  airborne  project,  and  indeed  to  operating  procedures 
generally.  The  Army  had  become  accustomed  to  developing  things  on  the  hoof,  arguably 
as  a  result  of  around  two  centuries  of  being  obliged  to  operate  on  a  shoestring,  at  short 
notice  and  in  a  variety  of  far-flung  locations,  a  tendency  reinforced  by  the  relatively  low 
technological  level  of  Army  equipment.  In  this  sense,  the  formation  of  an  airborne  force 
was  merely  the  latest  in  a  long  line  of  forced  improvisations,  like  the  formation  of  Light 
Infantry  units  in  the  18'h  century,  or  of  the  Machine  Corps  and  Royal  Tank  Regiment 
during  the  First  World  War.  That  is  not  to  say  that  technology  was  unimportant,  quite  the 
opposite  as  the  latter  two  examples  show.  However,  the  Army's  primary  resource 
remained  the  individual  soldier,  for  whom  technology  was  considered  an  adjunct  rather 
than  a  raison  d61re.  44  The  RAF  viewed  things  rather  differently.  For  it,  technology,  in  the 
shape  of  its  aircraft,  was  the  reason  for  being,  and  every  RAF  serviceman  was  employed  at 
whatever  level  to  assist  in  the  servicing,  maintenance  and  flying  of  that  technology  for 
whatever  purpose. 
This  goes  some  way  to  explaining  the  individual  services'  widely  differing  approaches, 
over  and  above  internal  politicking  and  inter-service  rivalries.  For  the  Army,  the  parachute 
and  glider  were  merely  the  latest,  albeit  unusual,  methods  of  delivering  soldiers  to  the 
battlefield;  thereafter,  the  troops  involved  completed  whatever  mission  they  had  been 
assigned  using  the  same  methods  as  more  conventional  soldiers.  The  airborne  troops  may 
have  been  trained  to  a  higher  standard,  or  equipped  with  slightly  different  equipment,  but 
fundamentally  they  were  the  same.  On  the  other  hand,  delivering  such  troops  to  the 
battlefield  placed  the  RAF's  raison  d'gtre,  its  aircraft,  directly  at  risk.  This  explains  a 
whole  series  of  caveats  attached  by  the  Air  Ministry  to  its  participation  in  the  airborne 
force  from  the  outset,  such  as  the  preference  for  airborne  operations  take  be  launched  in 
darkness,  45  or  its  initial  insistence  that  unarmed  aircraft  were  too  vulnerable  for  parachute 
dropping.  46  Arguably  the  most  costly  example  of  this  was  the  rigid  adherence  to  the 
principle  that  the  RAF  exercise  total  control  over  the  flying  side  of  airborne  operations. 
This  principle  backfired  badly  at  Arnhem,  where  the  senior  RAF  officer  involved  in William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  176 
planning  ignored  the  realities  of  the  ground  end  of  the  operation.  He  thus  ruled  out  a  coup- 
de-main  on  or  near  the  Arnhem  road  bridge,  and  placed  the  landing  zones  for  I'  Airborne 
Division  ridiculously  far  from  its  objectiveS.  47 
These  widely  differing  internal  imperatives  and  attitudes  were  exacerbated  further  by 
mutual  incomprehension,  if  not  wilful  ignorance,  between  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office 
regarding  their  respective  resources,  capabilities  and  intentions  generally.  This  was  a 
direct  result  of  British  government  policy  in  the  inter-war  period  that,  in  pursuit  of  fiscal 
savings,  deliberately  encouraged  inter-service  rivalry  as  a  divide-and-rule  measure  at 
ministerial  level.  48  Not  only  did  this  heighten  such  rivalry  to  mutually  deleterious  levels,  it 
also  virtually  guaranteed  rigid  compartmentalisation  and  thus  a  lack  of  intercourse  between 
the  Army  and  RAF.  This  was  not  the  whole  story,  of  course,  for  the  very  high  level  of 
Army-RAF  co-operation  which  existed  in  the  Empire  during  the  inter-war  period  shows 
that  personnel  from  both  services  were  perfectly  capable  of  co-operating  for  the  common 
good,  away  from  the  strictures  of  Whitehall.  49  This  is  further  illustrated  by  the  fact  that 
Army-RAF  relations  at  the  CLE  were  generally  harmonious,  and  any  discord  which  did 
arise  was  frequently  the  result  of  policies  set  on  high.  But  at  the  top,  old  habits  died  hard, 
and  the  results  of  high-level,  mutual  ignorance  undoubtedly  played  their  part  in  retarding 
the  inter-service  co-operation  necessary  for  the  establishment  of  the  British  airborne  force. 
The  differing  approaches  of  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  are  clearly  apparent  in  the 
preparation  of  the  joint  airborne  paper  recommended  by  Goddard  for  presentation  to  the 
Chiefs  of  Staff.  This  is  particularly  the  case  with  a  run  of  correspondence  between 
Goddard  and  Lieutenant-General  Nye;  presumably  the  War  Office  considered  that  the 
matter  now  merited  the  attention  of  a  higher  rank  than  Lieutenant-Colonel  Stephenson  at 
SD4.  This  correspondence  not  only  illustrates  the  differences  of  approach  generally 
between  the  two  agencies,  but  also  provides  further  clarification  of  their  respective  views 
of  the  airborne  project,  and  thus  warrants  detailed  examination. 
Nye  made  the  first  move,  by  despatching  a  detailed  draft  memo,  which  he  suggested  form 
the  basis  of  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  paper,  to  Goddard  on  19  January  1941 
. 
50  The  memo 
reiterated  the  size,  shape  and  projected  role  of  the  Army's  airborne  requirement  as 
presented  in  the  paper  of  10  January,  and  added  an  admission  that  it  was  impossible  to 
provide  any  more  than  an  approximate  forecast  of  its  future  airborne  requirements.  These 
would,  however,  include  the  establishment  of  flirther  airborne  training  facilities  in  the 
Middle  East,  using  paratroops  from  the  UK  and  glider  pilots  trained  in  India.  The  Air 
Ministry  was  requested  to  investigate  the  possibility  of  producing  gliders  in  India  as  well;  a William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  177 
table  of  projected  glider  production  figures  was  included  as  a  separate  appendix,  which 
elicited  a  pencilled  comment  from  Goddard  that  it  contained  "all  [the]  wrong  numbers". 
Nye  estimated  that  "normal"  bomber  pilots  would  be  able  to  transfer  to  flying  gliders  "...  in 
about  two  days".  This  proved  wildly  optimistic.  He  also  requested  that  twelve  glider 
pilots  be  allocated  to  the  CLE  on  a  permanent  basis.  This  number  was  considered 
sufficient  for  both  research  and  development  work  and  as  a  training  cadre.  The  memo 
closed  with  a  list  of  suggestions  for  future  policy.  These  included  establishing  the  two 
proposed  Invasion  Corps,  one  at  Home  and  one  in  the  Middle  East,  and  readying  them  for 
operations  as  quickly  as  possible;  that  the  necessary  (but  unknown)  number  of  gliders  be 
ordered  forthwith  and  stored  until  needed;  and  that  the  Air  Ministry  form  and  maintain  a 
pool  of  bomber-cum-glider  pilots  in  readiness  for  operations  at  short  notice.  It  was  also 
suggested  that  glider  pilots  for  use  in  India  be  drawn  from  RAF  personnel  serving  there; 
that  the  establishment  of  the  Middle  East  training  facility  be  sanctioned  pending  an 
examination  of  possible  facilities  for  glider  pilot  training  in  India;  and  that  the  General 
Staff  and  Air  Staff  continue  to  examine  airborne  problems  in  conjunction  with  research 
and  development  work  at  the  CLE. 
Some  of  this  was  reasonable,  some  less  so,  and  some  totally  unrealistic.  Being  unable  to 
provide  a  specific  timetable  or  organisation  for  employment  was  unhelpful,  for  example. 
Not  only  did  it  play  directly  into  the  hands  of  the  obstructionist  lobby  within  the  Air 
Ministry  by  refusing  a  seemingly  fair  request  for  a  projected  time  scale,  it  was  also 
unreasonable  to  expect  the  RAF  to  allocate  its  by  no  means  plentiful  resources  on  the  off 
chance  that  the  War  Office  might  wish  to  use  them.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the  request 
for  the  formation  of  a  pool  of  potential  glider  pilots,  and  the  suggestion  that  bomber  pilots 
could  convert  to  gliders  in  two  days  clearly  displays  the  paucity  of  War  Office  knowledge 
regarding  the  realities  of  training  pilots  of  any  description.  Goddard's  response  did  not 
appear  for  seventeen  days,  a  delay  which  prompted  Stephenson  to  complain  to  Rock  that 
the  "...  Air  Ministry  are  being  very  sticky  over  the  airborne  forces  Chiefs  of  Staff  paper"  in 
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a  letter  at  the  end  of  January  1941. 
Goddard's  reply  to  Nye's  memo  actually  appeared  on  5  February  1941,  following  internal 
discussion  at  the  Air  Ministry.  Medhurst,  the  Air  Ministry's  Director  of  Plans,  passed 
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comments  to  Goddard  on  4  February  1941.  The  latter  opined  that  the  Army  proposals 
were  unsatisfactory  because  they  were  based  upon  recent  exercises  by  the  CLE  at 
Camberley  in  Surrey,  53  which  relied  excessively  on  the  German  example  rather  than  the 
British  point  of  view;  the  latter  was  unfortunately  left  unclarified.  Medhurst  complained 
further  that  "...  enthusiastic  and  persuasive  representatives  from  the  CLE  have  also William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  178 
probably  cried  their  wares  too  successfully  at  these  exercises"'54  to  the  high  ranking 
observers  from  both  services  . 
55  He  was  also  of  the  opinion  that  Nye's  paper  was  of  no  use 
for  formulating  the  Chiefs  of  staff  paper  because  it  was  "divorced  from  reality",  and 
because  it  took  no  account  of  other  RAF  commitments  both  at  Home  and  overseas. 
Medhurst's  comments  were  quoted  verbatim  in  Goddard's  response  to  Nye,  which  went 
straight  to  the  point  by  stating  there  was  no  way  the  Air  Ministry  could  consider  using 
Nye's  memo  as  the  basis  for,  the  joint  paper.  Goddard  then  informed  Nye  that  the  Air 
Ministry  was  willing  to  continue  with  developing  and  training  airborne  forces  to  "form  a 
sound  basis  on  which  to  build  up  a  suitable  organisation  when  the  precise  need  is  clear,  and 
the  pilot  and  aircraft  situation  permits".  The  CAS  was  quoted  as  being  anxious  to  discuss 
the  future  of  airborne  forces  with  the  CIGS,  but  progress  was  unlikely  until  both  parties 
were  able  to  agree  basic  principles.  Goddard  closed  on  a  conciliatory  note  by  pointing  out 
that  recent  joint  discussions  had  contained  little  divergence  of  opinion,  that  the  problem  lay 
in  the  fact  that  what  the  "Air  Ministry  don't  like  is  committing  ourselves  to  the  provision  of 
specific  forces  to  take  part  in  unspecified  operations",  and  suggested  that  further 
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discussions  be  arranged  . 
Goddard's  letter  was  blunt  and  to  the  point  by  past  standards,  but  Nye's  response,  which 
appeared  on  7  February  1941,  was  blunter  still.  He  began  by  acknowledging  that  a  high 
level  meeting  between  the  respective  staffs  on  formulating  the  paper  for  the  Chiefs  of  Staff 
committee  might  be  a  good  idea,  although  he  considered  there  was  little  point  in  holding  a 
meeting  because  the  Army  and  RAF  views  were: 
44  ...  poles  apart.  My  personal  reaction  is  - 
a.  To  Hell  with  principles  -  give  me  the  problem 
We  want  to  decide  either  that  our  Airborne  forces  are  required  or  that  they  are 
not  required 
if  they  are  required  we  want  to  decide  on  what  scale,  so  that  orders  for  the 
necessary  material  may  be  placed  at  once  with  no  further  delay  [original 
emphasis]  ... 
We  are  faced  with  a  practical  problem  which  demands  practical 
steps  to  be  taken  to  meet  it  and  a  discussion  on  abstract  principles  seems  to  me 
will  not  get  us  anywhere".  57 
Nye's  response  highlights  perfectly  the  fundamental  difference  in  the  operating 
philosophies  of  the  Army  aýd  RAF.  Goddard,  however,  was  not  overawed,  and  replied  in 
equally  forthright  terms  the  same  day.  5"  He  began  by  acknowledging  that  the  airborne William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  179 
problem  was  big  and  novel,  which  therefore  "couldn't  be  disposed  of  by  a  few  snap 
decisions  and  a  wave  of  the  hand".  The  crux  of  the  matter  was  the  War  Office's  refusal  to 
respond  to  the  specific  points  in  his  own  paper  of  23  December  1940,  an  action  which 
would  allow  principles  to  be  established  for  finther  development.  This  comment 
graphically  illustrates  the  depth  of  mutual  misunderstanding,  and  is  further  reinforced  by  a 
following  query  over  the  necessity  for  CLE-type  facilities  in  the  Middle  East  and  India: 
"Do  any  such  requirements  exist?  It  is  for  you  to  say.  This  is  what  we  have  asked  you  to 
say  and  you  give  no  guidance".  The  fact  that  the  War  Office  had  stated  their  requirement 
quite  clearly  would  suggest  that  what  the  War  Office  considered  to  be  an  operational 
necessity  was  viewed  by  the  Air  Ministry  as  a  bargaining  counter.  This  may  also  explain 
Goddard's  comment  that  the  Air  Ministry  was  not  convinced  of  the  need  for  two  airborne 
brigade  groups  "...  now  or  in  1942". 
Similar  narrowness  of  view  framed  the  Air  Ministry's  approach  to  the  glider  problem.  It 
was  felt  unwise  to  place  advance  orders  for  gliders  before  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  had  ruled  on 
the  future  of  the  airborne  force,  and  as  the  existing  gliders  had  yet  to  be  air  tested,  holding 
back  on  orders  would  not  lengthen  the  inherent  delay.  This  was  perfectly  reasonable  from 
a  routine  aircraft  procurement  perspective,  but  contradicted  Goddard's  request  for  the 
Army  to  provide  precise  details  of  their  glider  requirement  for  tactical  development,  and 
precise  details  of  the  numbers  of  men  and  types  of  equipment  which  they  wanted  to  be 
carried.  There  are  two  major  flaws  in  this,  apart  from  the  fact  that  the  War  Office  paper  of 
10  January  1941  arguably  supplied  the  requisite  information.  First,  it  again  reflects  the  Air 
Ministry's  assumption  that  the  existing  airborne  establishment  was  developmental  rather 
than  operational,  a  point  not  recognised  by  the'War  Office.  Second,  it  does  not  recognise 
the  circular  nature  of  the  demand  for  precise  details,  insofar  as  it  was  impossible  for  the 
Army  to  definitively  furnish  any  such  details  without  unrestricted  physical  access  to  the 
gliders.  This  was  clearly  impossible  with  craft  which  had  yet  to  be  air  tested,  and  the 
CLE's  reservations  over  the  suitability  of  the  Bofors  light  anti-aircraft  gun  for  carriage  by 
glider  illustrates  the  futility  of  attempting  to  proceed  with  estimates  based  upon  yet  more 
paper  estimates.  59 
Blunt  as  it  was,  Goddard's  letter  largely  reflected  previously  stated  Air  Ministry  opinion, 
with  the  addition  of  attempts  to  place  responsibility  for  the  airborne  impasse  squarely  on 
the  shoulders  of  the  War  Office.  What  it  termed  the  stagnation  of  ideas  was  blamed  on  the 
fact  that  the  War  Office  would  not  agree  to  a  realistic  airborne  build-up  for  future  rather 
than  current  need.  There  were  also  several  references  to  War  Office  failure  to  respond  to 
the  Air  Ministry  paper  of  23  December  1940,  although  the  reply  on  10  January  1941  would William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  180 
appear  to  meet  that  criterion  in  content  if  not  precise  form.  There  was  also  an  attempt  to 
pass  blame  upwards  as  well.  Goddard's  closing  remark  claimed  that  the  outcome  of 
previous  discussions  had  resulted  in  "...  existing  commitments  being  accepted  because 
some  of  the  principal  people  attending  ...  were  not  aware  of  the  governing  factors  and 
agreed  to  do  impossible  things  on  an  unsound  basis".  This  was  of  course  fair  comment, 
although  it  could  be  argued  that  any  such  ignorance  was  largely  due  to  the  Air  Ministry 
failing  to  make  the  governing  factors  sufficiently  clear,  for  whatever  reason. 
Frank  as  it  was  the  exchange  between  Nye  and  Goddard  merely  cast  the  differences 
between  their  respective  departments  into  harsher  relief,  rather  than  bringing  progress 
toward  the  necessary  consensus.  The  Air  Ministry  felt  the  War  Office  was  attempting  to 
dragoon  it  into  an  ill  thought-out  and  potentially  costly  venture,  whereas  the  War  Office 
considered  the  Air  Ministry's  attitude  to  be  needlessly  obstructive.  The  differences  were 
neatly  encapsulated  by  Stephenson  in  a  letter  to  Rock  on  7  February:  "The  whole  trouble 
with  the  Air  Ministry  is  that  they  love  to  discuss  a  policy  on  a  basis  of  its  limitations  and 
restrictions  instead  of  on  the  basis  of  what  is  needed  [and]  seeing  later  if  it  is 
1 
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practicable'  . 
The  irony  is  that  Goddard  appears  to  have  been  not  unsympathetic  to  the  airborne  cause. 
His  more  contentious  comments  to  the  Army  appear  to  have  arisen  largely  from  relaying 
the  views  of  others  at  the  Air  Ministry,  rather  than  his  own.  Certainly,  his  communications 
on  the  matter  within  the  Air  Ministry  were  usually  fair  and  balanced,  and  he  also  put  up  a 
ferocious  defence  of  the  CLE  against  the  Vice-Chief  of  Air  Staff  even  after  his  heated 
exchange  with  Nye.  Criticism  was  levelled  against  the  CLE  over  its  apparently  low  flying 
time  in  January  194  1,  which  totalled  only  one  hundred  and  fifty  flying  hours.  Goddard 
responded  with  a  very sharp  letter  detailing  the  small  size  of  both  the  CLE  staff  and  its 
resources,  and  cited  extenuating  circumstances.  These  included  bad  weather,  disruption  of 
the  CLE's  normal  training  programme  for  special  operations  training,  the  lack  of  gliders 
and  qualified  glider  instructors,  and  the  fact  that  the  claimed  figure  took  no  account  of 
participation  by  CLE  aircraft  in  joint  exercises,  which  were  not  logged  at  the  CLE.  61 
Whatever  his  personal  view  of  the  airborne  project,  Goddard  appears  to  have  approached  it 
with  a  high  degree  of  professionalism,  and  therefore  deserves  some  sympathy,  for  his 
stance  placed  him  squarely  in  the  firing  line  between  his  own  ministry  and  the  War  Office. 
The  upshot  of  Goddard's  exchange  with  Nye  was  a  joint  conference  at  the  Air  Ministry 
on  19  February  1941.  This  was  intended  to  clarify  general  co-operation  matters  between 
the  Army  and  RAF,  but  the  airborne  problem  received  brief  examination.  Thus  it  was William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  181 
acknowledged  that  there  might  have  to  be  some  change  to  the  agreed  scheme  in  order  to 
meet  the  expanded  War  Office  requirement,  it  was  recommended  that  an  order  be  placed 
with  the  Ministry  of  Aircraft  Production  for  the  necessary  gliders,  although  the  number 
was  as  yet  undetermined.  It  was  also  agreed  that  a  joint  paper  should  still  be  prepared  for 
consideration  by  the  Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  that  formal  discussions  should  be  held  between 
the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  to  produce  a  satisfactory  draft.  62 
This  was  progress,  albeit  limited,  and  Goddard  moved  swiftly  to  capitalise  upon  it. 
Goddard  distributed  a  letter  of  his  own  to  a  variety  of  Air  Ministry  departments  on  26 
February  1941,  stating  that  the  airborne  project  was  in  the  balance,  and  informing  them  of 
the  meeting  and  its  outcome.  63  Appended  to  it  was  a  longer  piece,  originally  intended  to 
set  the  matter  out  in  more  detail  for  the  CLE's  parent  Group,  64  although  copies  were 
subsequently  passed  to  the  CLE  via  No.  70  Group,  to  HQ  Bomber  Command,  the  War 
65 
Office  and  the  Director  of  Combined  Operations.  As  well  as  laying  out  the  current 
situation,  this  contained  details  of  measures  intended  to  expedite  matters,  including 
research  into  the  suitability  of  new  bomber  types  for  parachuting  and  glider-towing, 
modifications  to  new  Whitleys  for  the  same  purpose,  and  measures  to  expand  the  cur-rent 
glider  pilot  training  programme. 
The  19  February  conference  also  appears  to  have  cleared  the  air  between  Goddard  and 
Nye.  The  latter  contacted  Goddard  in  a  much  more  civil  letter  on  7  March  19413, 
requesting  clarification  as  where  the  agreed  paper  on  the  airborne  force  was  to  originate,  in 
order  to  avoid  duplication  of  effort.  66  Goddard's  response  was  prompt  and  equally 
conciliatory,  including  as  it  did  apologies  for  the  delay  since  the  conference,  and  promising 
answers  as  soon  as  possible.  For  good  measure,  he  also  included  an  update  on  the  glider 
situation,  informed  Nye  that  Army  Co-operation  Command  had  agreed  to  an  expansion  of 
the  parachute-training  programme.  The  letter  closed  with  the  hope  that  his  efforts  were 
66  ...  not  considered  dilatory",  by  pointing  out  that  matters  were  moving  as  swiftly  as 
possible  at  his  end,  and  that  he  always  attempted  to  meet  War  Office  requirements;  the 
latter  point  was  probably  true,  from  a  personal  view  if  not  a  ministerial  one.  67 
in  the  event,  the  joint  paper  was  compiled  at  the  Air  Ministry.  A  draft  was  passed  to 
Stephenson  at  the  War  Office  by  Goddard  on  17  March  1940.68  This,  with  some  minor 
alterations,  69  formed  the  core  of  the  finished  article,  which  first  appeared  on  24  March 
1941  ,  entitled  "Paper  on  Airborne  Policy".  '70  The  paper  was  extremely  detailed  and,  after  a 
brief  background  summary,  was  divided  into  three  main  sections.  The  first  covered  the 
RAF  side  of  the  matter,  detailing  specific  measures  taken  to  date  regarding  the  provision  of VVilliarn  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  182 
aircraft,  gliders  and  pilots  (including  yet  again  the  questionable  assertion  that  the  Whitley 
was  the  only  aircraft  found  suitable  for  parachuting),  and  a  list  of  additional  provision 
necessary  for  expansion.  The  second  detailed  the  Army  side  of  the  matter,  and  consisted 
of  little  more  than  a  rehash  of  Nye's  19  January  paper,  with  a  list  of  factors  necessary  for 
its  realisation.  The  final  section  was  a  list  of  specific  issues  for  the  Chiefs  of  Staff 
Committee  to  address.  These  included  providing  confirmation  that  an  airborne  force  of  the 
size  envisaged  by  the  Army  was  contemplated,  whether  more  gliders  would  be  required  for 
use  in  India,  and  whether  a  CLE  was  to  be  set  up  in  the  Middle  East  and/or  India. 
The  paper  may  have  been  finished  by  24  March,  but  it  then  appears  to  have  lost 
momentum  in  the  course  of  being  passed  around  for  comment  before  despatch  to  the 
Chiefs  of  Staff.  A  copy  was  only  passed  to  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Air  Staff  for  comment 
71  f(  mm  on  6  April  1941,  or  instance,  and  the  paper  was  not  despatched  for  War  Office  co  ent 
until  12  April.  72  The  proposals  in  the  paper  also  generated  other  problems  in  their  own 
right.  The  General  Staff  was  obliged  to  contact  the  Air  Staff  directly  on  10  April,  for 
example,  regarding  Treasury  "jibbing"  at  the  cost  of  the  glider  order  placed  with  the 
MiMstry  of  Aircraft  Production,  which  was  in  the  region  of;  E8  million.  As  the  General 
Staff  considered  themselves  and  the  Air  Staff  to  be  on  a  "...  sticky  wicket  because  their 
[airborne]  requirements  were  not  yet  finalised",  proposals  were  sought  for  a  joint  paper 
justifying  the  matter.  73 
Thus,  after  ten  months,  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  were  finally  moving  toward  an 
airborne  concensus,  although  it  would  be  unwise  to  read  too  much  into  this.  Both  sides 
were  still  a  long  way  from  unanimity,  and  it  is  perfectly  possible  that  progress  could  have 
bogged  down  again  in  mutual  recrimination  and  backsliding  had  the  Air  Ministry  and  War 
office  been  left  to  their  own  devices.  Certainly,  the  Air  Ministry  side  of  the  Chiefs  of 
Staff  policy  document  shows  that  it  was  far  from  convinced  about  the  need  for  an  airborne 
force  as  envisaged  by  the  Army.  In  the  event,  however,  this  turned  out  to  be  irrelevant, 
because  outside  influences  were  about  to  intervene,  in  the  shape  of  Winston  Churchill. 
V.  Unimpressed  with  Progress:  Churchill's  Visit  to  Ringway,  26  April  1941 
Churchill  had  been  instrumental  in  the  establishment  of  the  British  airborne  force,  and 
had  monitored  developments,  although  not  particularly  closely.  Had  he  done  more,  it  is 
highly  likely  that  substantial  progress  would  have  been  achieved  earlier.  Churchill  visited 
Ringway  on  the  windy  Saturday  of  26  April  1941,  accompanied  by  Ismay  and  Air  Marshal 
Sir  Arthur  Barratt,  conunander  of  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command,  where  a  special William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  61  183 
demonstration  was  laid  on  for  his  benefit.  74  The  CLE  was  well  aware  that  the  ongoing 
impasse  between  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  over  the  direction  of  the  airborne  force 
could  well  end  in  the  whole  idea  being  abandoned.  This  had  been  the  imperative  behind 
the  Tragino  Raid  two  months  previously,  and  it  was  the  fear  which  obliged  all  the  stops  to 
be  pulled  out  for  the  Prime  Minister's  visit,  including  some  shameless  stage  managing. 
Around  four  hundred  paratroops  were  drawn  up  for  inspection,  and  demonstrations  of 
ground  training  and  special  airborne  equipment  were  arranged  in  the  CLE's  two  hangars.  75 
Six  camouflaged  Kirby  Kite  sport  gliders  and  the  first  production  eight-seat  Hotspur  were 
76 
trucked  in  from  the  GTS.  The  crowning  effort  was  to  be  a  mock  assault  on  Ringway's 
control  tower,  with  a  mass  drop  by  forty-four  paratroops  using  all  five  of  the  CLE's 
serviceable  Whitleys.  The  paratroops  were  actually  Free  French  trainees,  who  were 
drafted  in  with  their  instructors  merely  because  they  were  available.  The  radio  in  one  of  the 
Whitleys  had  been  rigged  into  a  public  address  system,  with  which  Wing-Commander 
Norman  intended  to  give  a  running  commentary.  77  Not  to  be  outdone,  Louis  Strange 
concealed  a  further  hundred  troops  on  the  parachute  dropping  zone  on  his  own  initiative, 
with  orders  to  emerge  simultaneously  with  the  dropped  men  to  make  the  attackers  appear 
more  numerous.  The  day  of  the  demonstration  was  windy,  with  gusts  up  to  thirty-five 
m.  p.  h.,  and  Strange  took  additional  precautions.  He  made  a  private  arrangement  with  the 
chief  pilot,  Flight-Lieutenant  Fielden,  to  drop  the  instructors  only  on  his  signal  if  the  wind 
remained  above  the  official  safety  limit.  This  was  made  covertly  to  prevent  it  being 
countermanded  by  higher  CLE  authority.  78 
Predictably,  some  of  these  measures  almost  backfired.  The  Kite  gliders  made  good 
landings  directly  on  target,  but  the  Hotspur's  assault  landing  turned  into  an  extremely  long 
glide,  due  to  a  combination  of  pilot  inexperience  and  the  machine's  sailplane-based 
design.  79  Worse,  concern  over  the  windspeed  had  delayed  the  Whitleys'  take-ofý  which 
meant  that  the  paratroops  in  them  were  obliged  to  spend  a  considerable  period  in  dark, 
cramped  and  uncomfortable  positions.  Consequently,  when  Norman  asked  the  lead  aircraft 
whether  it  was  ready  for  take-off  over  the  tannoy,  the  pilot  replied  "No,  I'm  not  ready  to 
take-off  -  five  of  my  blighters  have  fainted!  "80  Nonetheless,  the  drop  went  smoothly 
despite  the  wind,  although  one  source  claims  there  were  six  refuSalS.  81  This  would  not 
have  been  visible  to  the  spectators. 
Churchill  appears  to  have  been  impressed  with  the  enthusiasm  and  effort  he  found  at 
Ringway.  An  over-enthusiastic  colleague  injured  one  participant  in  an  unarmed  combat 
display,  82  and  Wright  refers  to  Churchill  ferociously  attacking  an  imaginary  enemy  with  a William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  184 
fighting  knife,  presumably  a  Fairburn-Sykes,  "  in  an  unguarded  moment.  84  He  was  also 
subjected  to  a  good  deal  of  sales  talk  from  the  CLE  staff  in  between  demonstrations. 
Newnhain  refers  to  Harvey,  Norman,  Strange  and  Rock  expanding  "...  views,  confidences 
,  85 
and  difficulties  to  a  sympathetic  Prime  Minister"  and  Ward  recounts  Strange  talking 
86 
animatedly  to  Churchill  following  the  parachute  descent.  Their  activities  were  noted  by 
none-CLE  RAF  officers.  Air  Marshal  Barratt  apparently  "...  showed  some  apprehension  as 
to  what  amount  of  line-shooting  was  going  oif',  despite  being  a  supporter  of  the  airborne 
idea.  87  Less  enthusiastic  observers  also  relayed  this  back  to  the  Air  Ministry,  as  shown  by 
a  subsequent  comment  from  the  Air  Ministry  Director  of  Plans:  "It  is  unfortunate  that  the 
Prime  Minister  in  his  visit  to  the  CLE  apparently  only  received  the  possibly  one-sided  view 
of  the  local  enthusiasts.  ,  88 
Churchill  was  less  than  impressed  with  the  efforts  of  the  higher  echelons  who  bore 
responsibility  for  what  he  saw.  Churchill  had  gone  to  Ringway  expecting  to  see  something 
approaching  a  fiilly  functioning  airborne  force.  Instead,  after  almost  a  year,  he  was 
presented  with  a  partially  trained  force  of  paratroops  which  numbered  less  than  a  tenth  of 
his  original  requirement,  and  a  glider  force  consisting  of  six  civilian  sport  machines  and  a 
single  purpose-designed  one  which  could  carry  six  men,  backed  up  by  a  training 
establishment  struggling  to  maintain  the  present  level  of  development.  His  reaction  was 
swift.  On  28  April  1940  he  passed  a  demand  to  Ismay: 
"Let  me  have  this  day  the  minute  which  I  wrote  in  the  summer  of  last  year 
directing  that  5,000  Parachute  Troops  were  to  be  prepared,  together  with  all  the 
minutes  of  the  departments  concerned  which  led  to  my  afterwards  agreeing  to 
reduce  the  number  to  500.1  shall  expect  to  receive  the  office  files  by  midnight. 
Let  me  have  all  the  present  proposals  for  increasing  the  Parachute  and  Glider 
89  force  together  with  a  timetable  of  expected  results". 
ismay  complied,  in  a  letter  which  reiterated  the  salient  points  of  the  matter  since  June 
1940,  including  justification  for  reducing  the  projected  force  from  the  5,000  figure,  and  Air 
Ministry  reservations  on  committing  resources  to  a  project  without  firm  outlines.  90  He 
attached  to  it  a  draft  paper  from  Goddard  at  the  Air  Ministry's  Department  of  Military  Co- 
operation,  justifying  the  RAF's  actions  and  position,  91  and  a  folder  of  graphs  and  charts  for 
estimated  glider  production.  92 
It  took  Churchill  four  weeks  to  digest  this.  To  his  credit,  he  acknowledged  that  the  blame 
for  the  lack  of  airborne  progress  rested  ultimately,  if  unfairly,  upon  him,  as  his  eventual 
response  to  Ismay,  on  27  May  1941,  made  clear.  It  is  therefore  fitting  to  give  the  last  word William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  6  185 
on  the  first  phase  of  the  establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force  to  the  man  who  set  the 
wheels  driving  in  the  right  direction: 
"This  is  a  sad  story,  and  I  feel  myself  greatly  to  blame  for  allowing  myself  to 
be  overborne  by  the  resistance  which  was  offered.  One  can  see  how  wrongly 
based  these  resistances  were  when  we  read  paragraph  6  of  the  Air  Staff  paper 
in  light  of  what  is  happening  in  Crete,  and  may  be  soon  happening  in  Cyprus 
and  in  Syria.  93 
See  also  my  minute  on  gliders.  94  This  is  exactly  what  has  happened.  The 
gliders  have  been  produced  on  the  smallest  possible  scale,  and  so  we  have 
practically  now  neither  parachutists  nor  the  gliders  except  these  500. 
Thus  we  are  always  behind-hand  the  enemy.  We  ought  to  have  5,000 
parachutists  and  an  Air-borne  division  on  the  German  model,  with  any 
improvements  which  might  suggest  themselves  from  experience.  We  ought 
also  to  have  a  number  of  carrier  aircraft.  These  will  all  be  necessary  in  the 
Mediterranean  fighting  of  1942,  or  earlier  if  possible.  We  shall  have  to  try  to 
retake  these  islands  which  are  being  so  easily  occupied  by  the  enemy.  We  may 
be  forced  to  fight  in  the  wide  countries  of  the  East,  in  Persia  or  Northern  Iraq. 
A  whole  year  has  been  lost,  and  I  now  invite  the  Chiefs  of  Staff,  so  far  as  is 
possible,  to  repair  the  misfortune. 
The  whole  file  is  to  be  brought  before  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  this  evening.  1"5 
The  airborne  ball  was  thus  placed  firmly  where  it  should  have  been  placed  originally,  in 
the  lap  of  the  Chiefs  of  Staff,  who  could  monitor  the  matter  properly.  Churchill's  original 
error  had  been  to  attempt  to  oversee  matters  personally  which,  given  the  heavy 
responsibilities  of  his  office,  was  impractical.  He  may  have  assumed  that  the  Air  Ministry 
and  War  Office  could  be  trusted  to  address  the  matter  in  the  way  he  intended,  and  that 
petty  rivalries  could  be  put  aside  for  the  greater  good.  If  that  were  the  case,  then  he  was 
sorely  mistaken.  Thus,  although  Churchill blamed  himself,  real  responsibility  for  the  lost 
year  rested  with  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office,  irrespective  of  degree,  for  his  initial 
requirement,  whilst  vague,  was  arguably  clear  enough  to  allow  a  good  deal  more  progress 
than  was  actually  achieved.  This  time,  however,  there  could  be  no  excuse  for  "mistaking" 
Churchill's  airborne  requirement,  or  any  doubt  of  his  resolve  to  see  it  realised. 
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CHAPTER  SEVEN 
To  the  Verge  of  Adequate  Provision:  The  RAF  and  the 
Development  of  the  British  Airborne  Infrastructure,  April 
1941  -  January  1942 
By  April  1941,  the  British  airborne  infrastructure  was  in  a  paradoxical  position.  On 
paper,  there  had  certainly  been  progress.  The  initial  organisation  had  been  reformed  into 
specific  departments  for  administration,  parachute  training,  glider  training,  and  research 
and  development.  A  basic  parachute  training  course  was  turning  out  parachutists  for  the 
British  Army,  the  Special  Operations  Executive  (SOE)  and  a  variety  of  Allied  nations,  and 
the  fledgling  British  parachute  force  had  carried  out  its  first  live  sabotage  raid.  In  practical 
terms,  however,  little  had  changed.  The  Central  Landing  Establishment  (CLE)  remained 
dependent  on  a  literal  handful  of  unsuitable  and  increasingly  decrepit  aircraft,  which 
placed  severe  limitations  upon  the  work  of  the  CLE's  constituent  departments.  In  the  case 
of  the  Parachute  Training  School  (PTS),  this  was  exacerbated  by  a  shortage  of  parachutes 
and  qualified  instructors,  while  the  Glider  Training  Squadron  (GTS)  remained  reliant  upon 
a  handful  of  camouflaged  civilian  sailplanes  and  pre-production  Airspeed  Hotspur  gliders. 
Consequently,  ten  months  after  the  order  to  create  a  large-scale  British  airborne  force  had 
been  given,  the  CLE  remained  incapable  of  providing  training  for  more  than  a  handful  of 
trainees,  and  then  only  up  to  a  very  basic  standard. 
Within  a  further  nine  months,  the  situation  had  been  drastically  reversed,  albeit  mostly  on 
the  parachute  side.  The  PTS  had  metamorphosed  into  a  truly  mass  training  organisation, 
which  by  January  1942  had  provided  basic  parachute  training  for  an  entire  British 
parachute  brigade  and  a  large  number  of  Allied  personnel,  and  was  poised  to  proceed  with 
an  advanced  training  schedule.  Glider  progress,  which  was  hamstrung  by  a  lack  of  suitable 
machines,  was  less  spectacular,  although  this  too  changed  for  the  better  in  the  course  of 
1942.  Thus  the  glider  force  was  able  to  launch  its  first  live  operation,  a  raid  into  Norway, 
in  November  that  year.  '  There  was  no  single  reason  for  this  shift  in  airborne  fortune. 
Rather,  it  resulted  from  several  congruent  sources  involving  RAF  personnel  and  attitudes., 
at  Ringway  and  elsewhere.  This  chapter  will  therefore  concentrate  upon  the  RAF  side  of 
matters  after  Churchill's  visit  to  Ringway.  It  will  show  how  the  airborne  idea  received 
increasing  support  from  within  the  RAF  as  its  existence,  requirements  and  potential 
became  more  widely  recognised  within  that  service.  It  will  examine  efforts  by  Ringway 
staff  to  circumvent  their  problems,  argue  that  bureaucratic  inertia,  as  well  a  deliberate 
obstructionism,  became  an  important  factor  in  the  tardy  response  in  providing  the  CLE 
with  the  resources  it  needed,  and  show  how  these  resources  were  finally  obtained.  it  will William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  191 
also  reveal  a  factor  which  is  rarely,  if  ever,  acknowledged  overtly  in  the  primary  or 
secondary  material;  the  appearance  of  empire  building  within  the  CLE.  Finally,  it  will 
detail  how  the  airborne  infrastructure  became  absorbed  into  the  body  of  the  RAF,  and  how 
it  lost  much  of  its  original  autonomy  in  the  process.  Before  moving  on  to  this,  however,  it 
will  first  be  necessary  to  place  Churchill's  April  visit  in  its  proper  context. 
Churchill's  visit  to  Ringway  on  26  April  1941  was  undoubtedly  the  second  watershed  in 
the  establishment  of  a  British  airborne  force,  the  first  being  his  original  insistence  on  the 
creation  of  such  a  force.  However,  it  would  be  overstating  the  case  to  say  that  he  was 
solely  responsible  for  breathing  new  life  into  a  stymied  project,  as  many  of  the  secondary 
accounts,  and  particularly  those  from  a  CLE  perspective,  suggest.  It  would  be  more 
accurate  to  say  that  Churchill's  intervention  lent  additional  impetus  to  a  process  which  was 
already  underway,  albeit  slowly  and  not  particularly  efficiently.  His  involvement  in  April 
1941  therefore  replicated  his  original  parachute  directives  in  June  1940,  which  had  the 
same  effect  upon  pre-existing  but  low-key  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  consideration  of 
the  airborne  idea. 
There  is  evidence  to  support  this  view.  Consider,  for  example,  the  response  to  Churchill's 
unfavourable  reaction  to  what  he  found  at  Ringway.  The  Air  Ministry  was  extremely 
quick  off  the  mark  when  Ismay  relayed  the  Prime  Minister's  Churchill's  testy  demand  for 
all  paperwork  appertaining  to  the  airborne  projeCt.  2  Within  twenty-four  hours  a  very 
detailed  paper  was  drafted,  accompanied  by  graphs  and  charts  for  projected  glider 
production. 
3  The  paper  included  a  pr6cis  of  progress  to  date  as  requested,  justified 
downsizing  the  original  parachute  requirement,  and  detailed  measures  in  hand.  Predictably, 
given  the  Air  Ministry's  stated  preference,  the  paper  concentrated  on  gliders,  and 
particularly  on  the  new  Airspeed  Hotspur.  Measures  to  rectify  faults  discovered  in  the  pre- 
production  machines  were  detailed,  and  much  was  made  of  the  planned  delivery  schedule. 
Seventeen  Hotspurs  were  slated  for  delivery  in  May  1941,  four  hundred  by  February  1942, 
and  a  prototype  fifteen-seat  machine  was  also  expected  in  May  1941.4 
The  speed  with  which  this  very  detailed  document  was  produced  inevitably  raises  the 
suspicion  that  the  Air  Ministry  had  prepared  it  in  advance,  as  a  measure  to  deflect  possible 
criticism.  Given  the  Air  Ministry's  undoubted  mastery  of  the  bureaucratic  game,  this  is 
perfectly  feasible.  On  the  other  hand,  it  could  also  indicate  that  at  least  some  departments 
within  the  Air  Ministry  were  following  airborne  developments  closely,  and  had  the 
necessary  information  immediately  to  hand.  This  supports  rather  better  the  suggestion  that 
churchill's  interven  tion  hastened  ongoing  efforts  rather  than  initiated  them.  The  relative William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  192 
paucity  of  activity,  and  the  leisurely  pace  of  that  which  did  occur  in  the  immediate 
aftermath  of  Churchill's  visit,  provides  fin-ther  evidence  to  support  this  line.  Drafts  for  a 
5 
Chiefs  of  Staff  paper  on  the  airborne  force  were  not  circulated  until  mid-May  1941,  and 
6 
an  interim  report  only  appeared  on  31  May  1941,  four  days  after  the  Prime  Minister  issued 
his  appeal  for  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  to  "...  repair  the  [airborne]  MiSfortunei%7  Further 
evidence  can  be  found  in  the  records  from  less  exalted  levels,  where  in  some  instances 
Churchill's  April  demands  created  coriffision  by  returning  to  matters  which  many 
departments  considered  resolved.  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command,  for  example, 
responded  to  an  enquiry  from  the  Director  of  Military  Co-operation  in  early  May  1941  by 
pointing  out  that  it  had  dealt  with  the  same  enquiry  in  March  1941,8  and  again  on  29  April 
1941;  a  copy  of  the  latter  document  was  attached  as  proof9 
it  is  therefore  difficult  to  quantify  precisely  the  impact  of  Churchill's  intervention  in  April 
and  May  1941  solely  on  the  basis  of  primary  documentation.  This  does  not  diminish  its 
importance,  which  can  be  measured  from  subsequent  airborne  developments  over  the  next 
seven  months.  It  does,  however,  put  his  contribution  into  context,  and  illustrates  that  the 
situation  was  more  complex  than  is  routinely  portrayed.  Churchill's  intervention 
undoubtedly  impacted  most  at  high  level,  because  that  was  where  his  influence  could  best 
be  brought  to  bear.  His  reaffirmation  of  support  for  airborne  project  was  thus  arguably 
sufficient  on  its  own,  for  it  made  it  clear  that  the  idea  would  not  be  allowed  simply  to  fade 
away.  it  also  provided  useful  support  for  the  War  Office  in  its  subsequent  struggles  with 
the  Air  Ministry  over  expansion  of  the  airborne  force.  Unfortunately,  Churchill's  influence 
was  less  noticeable  at  lower  levels,  and  particularly  at  the  CLE.  This  was  ironic,  given  that 
it  was  Churchill's  visit  to  Ringway  that  sparked  his  intervention,  but  the  fact  remains  that 
there  was  still  a  considerable  lag  before  the  benefits  of  the  Prime  Minister's  intervention 
became  apparent  at  the  airborne  coalface. 
1.  A  Shift  in  Attitude:  The  Growth  of  Support  for  the  Airborne  Project  Within 
the  RAF 
For  the  first  six  months  of  its  existence,  Ringway  was  handicapped  by  a  lack  of  support 
from  higher  in  its  chain  of  command.  This  did  not  stem  from  Air-Marshal  Barratt,  head  of 
RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command,  and  the  Director  of  Military  Co-operation,  Group- 
Captain  Goddard,  who  were  broadly  supportive  of  the  project,  within  the  parameters  set  by 
their  other  responsibilities.  Goddard's  letter  to  Barratt  on  7  March  1941,  for  example, 
illustrates  this.  10  The  failure  stemmed  from  No.  22  Group,  Ringway's  immediate  superior 
formation,  which  remained  lukewarm  about  its  responsibility.  This  changed  for  the  better William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  193 
when  responsibility  for  the  CLE  passed  to  No.  70  Group,  commanded  by  Air-Commodore 
Cole-Hamilton.  Cole-Hamilton  visited  Ringway  on  I  January  1941,  and  assumed  his  new 
responsibilities  shortly  thereafter.  '  I 
No.  70  Group  entered  into  the  task  of  overseeing  the  CLE  with  commendable  enthusiasm. 
On  3  March  1941  it  began  lobbying  to  obtain  more  personnel  for  the  CLE,  which  Ringway 
had  been  requesting  without  success  for  several  months,  12  and  eleven  days  later  weighed  in 
to  assist  the  GTS  in  gathering  its  promised  resources.  13  Goddard's  7  March  1941  letter  to 
Army  Co-operation  Command  prompted  No.  70  Group  to  investigate  aircraft  provision  for 
Ringway.  This  included  authorising,  or  at  least  tolerating,  "unofficial"  CLE  inspections  of 
some  types.  14  The  results  of  these  investigations  were  passed  to  RAF  Army  Co-operation 
Command  on  9  April  1941,  with  a  refreshingly  candid  pr6cis  of  airborne  progress  to  date. 
Cole-Hamilton  cut  straight  to  the  heart  of  the  matter  by  directly  challenging  the  Air 
MUUstry  line  on  the  provision  of  aircraft  for  the  airborne  project,  which  decreed  that 
parachute  dropping  had  to  be  an  alternative,  and  therefore  ancillary,  role  for  bombers.  No. 
22  Group  was  bluntly  criticised  for  slavishly  following  the  Air  Ministry  line  in  this  regard. 
Cole-Hamilton  then  cited  the  vital  part  that  dedicated  transport  aircraft  had  played  in 
Luftwaffe  airborne  operations  as  evidence  for  reassessing  the  suitability  of  aircraft 
previously  denied  the  CLE.  15 
Predictably,  No.  70  Group's  forthright  reporting  caused  waves  at  the  Air  Ministry.  Not  all 
of  these  were  negative,  with  one  staff  officer  at  the  Air  Ministry  supporting  the  challenge 
to  the  party  line  on  transport  aircraft  policy.  An  internal  Air  Ministry  memo  on  2  June 
1941  recommended  that  Britain  should  "cease  playing"  with  airborne  forces,  and  suggested 
that  if  it  really  was  impossible  to  produce  dedicated  transport  aircraft,  the  project  was 
unfeasible  and  should  be  abandoned.  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command  was  criticised 
for  failing  to  push  the  matter  on  an  official  basis,  and  the  Air  Ministry's  insistence  that 
current  aircraft  production  restrictions  precluded  building  transport  aircraft  was  also 
comprehensively  rejected.  The  memo  pointed  out  that  the  Blackburn  Botha  had  remained 
in  production  for  a  full  year  after  it  was  known  to  be  unsuitable,  that  the  resources  thus 
wasted  would  have  been  better  spent  on  producing  aircraft  for  airborne  use,  and  claimed 
that  the  Air  Ministry  was  in  fact  wasting  production  effort  on  too  many  different  types  of 
bomber.  The  memo  closed  by  suggesting  that  the  possibility  of  acquiring  transport  aircraft 
from  the  US  should  be  re-investigated,  and  ended: William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  194 
"I  appreciate  that  the  whole  question  is  one  of  relative  priorities,  but  in  view  of 
the  course  of  the  war  to  date,  I  should  have  thought  the  irnportance  of  transport 
aircraft  to  the  Amy  was  too  obvious  to  need  arguing".  16 
Whether  this  memo  reached  No.  70  Group  is  unclear.  Cole-Hamilton,  however,  was  not 
merely  content  to  pass  his  views  up  the  chain  of  command  on  paper.  On  24  August  1941 
he  took  the  opportunity  of  pushing  the  CLE's  cause  in  a  non-agenda  addition  to  an  Air 
Ministry  conference  called  to  discuss  the  provision  and  training  of  RAF  for  the  airborne 
force.  Cole-Haiiii1ton  cited  serious  shortfalls  in  the  development  and  production  of  gliders, 
and  questioned  the  viability  of  the  Air  Ministry's  glider  production  schedule.  He  also 
pointed  out  that  the  provision  and  modification  of  bombers  for  parachuting  and  glider- 
towing  was  also  seriously  behind  projected  progress,  and  that  under-resourcing  at  the  PTS 
was  threatening  both  the  viability  of  the  fledgling  parachute  force,  and  the  projected 
expansion  of  that  force  at  home  and  in  India.  The  CLE,  in  Cole-Hamilton's  considered 
opinion,  was  being  kept  in  the  dark,  and  required  information  as  soon  as  possible  if  it  were 
to  carry  out  its  appointed  tasks.  17 
Cole-Hamilton's  support  for  his  new  charge  at  Ringway  was  not  only  courageous,  but 
also  self-effacing.  No.  70  Group  passed  a  copy  of  the  minutes  of  the  22  August  conference 
to  the  CLE  at  the  end  of  that  month,  accompanied  by  a  covering  letter;  this  did  not  mention 
Cole-Hamilton's  unscheduled  intervention  at  all.  18  It  is  intriguing  to  speculate  on  what 
might  have  happened  had  Louis  Strange  received  a  similar  level  of  support  from  No.  22 
Group  a  year  previously.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  point  here  is  that  from  the  beginning  of 
1941  ,  the  lines  of  communication  linking  the  CLE  to  the  rest  of  the  RAF  were  finally 
functioning  properly.  In  the  long  term,  this  turned  out  to  be  a  double-edged  sword  for  the 
CLE.  No.  70  Group's  support  was  not  provided  without  strings,  a  development  covered 
more  fully  below. 
Il.  The  Ongoing  Stumbling  Block  The  Search  for  Aircraft  for  the  CLE 
The  most  critical  problem  facing  the  CLE  from  the  outset  was  the  lack  of  aircraft.  The 
twenty-one  additional  machines  promised  to  Ringway  in  june  1940  failed  to  materialise, 
leaving  the  CLE  reliant  in  April  1941  upon  the  original  six  VAlitley  bombers  posted  there 
ten  months  previously.  19  This  provision  was  clearly  inadequate  to  provide  basic  parachute 
training,  and  the  shortage  was  exacerbated  by  a  host  of  other  factors.  First,  there  was  an 
open-ended  commitment  to  provide  basic  parachute  training  for  SOE  and  foreign 
personnel,  with  the  latter  being  by  the  far  the  larger  of  the  two.  20  Polish  personnel  began  to 
arrive  at  Ringway  from  the  end  of  October  1940,21  followed  by  larger  groups  from  early William  F  Buckirigham,  2000  Chapter  7  195 
22 
March1941.  Free  French  trainees  were  also  present  at  the  PTS  from  13  February  1941, 
and  were  inspected  there  by  de  Gaulle  in  early  March.  23  Second,  there  was  the  matter  of 
aircraft  serviceability.  In  a  paper  on  12  June  1941,  for  example,  the  CLE  pointed  out  that 
of  the  six  Whitleys:  on  establishment,  there  were  rarely  more  than  five  in  serviceable 
24 
condition,  and  usually  only  three  under  normal  training  routine.  Instances  of  engine 
failure  in  the  air  were  not  unknown.  Much  of  the  problem  was  due  to  the  fact  the  CLE's 
Whitleys  were  equipped  with  Armstrong  Siddeley  Tiger  powerplants,  rather  than  the  more 
powerful  and  reliable  Roll-Royce  Merlin  units  used  on  Whitley  Mark  IVs  and  after. 
Obtaining  spare  parts  for  the  Tiger  units  became  increasingly  problematic  as  time  went 
25 
on. 
Third,  the  CLE's  aircraft  required  frequent  modification,  which  inevitably  cut  into  flying 
time.  This  was  largely  carried  out  in-house  by  the  CLE's  Development  Unit  (DU),  but  the 
aircraft  still  had  to  be  withdrawn  from  flying  duties  for  the  work  to  be  completed.  26 
Examples  of  these  modifications  were  the  fitting  of  tail-wheel  spats  to  prevent  parachutes 
fouling  them,  which  was  carried  out  on  all  the  CLE's  Whitleys,  beginning  on  16  November 
1940,  and  the  fitting  of  doors  to  cover  the  static-line  attachment  point,  which  was  carried 
out  the  following  month.  27  Fourth,  the  CLE  was  reliant  on  its  Whitleys  for  research  and 
development  work  on  behalf  of  the  DU.  New  or  modified  items,  like  parachutes  or  supply 
containers,  could  only  be  tested  properly  by  dropping  them  from  an  aircraft,  and  the  CLE's 
Whitleys  were  the  only  properly  configured  aircraft  available.  28  Finally,  in  addition  to  all 
this,  Ringway  also  expected  provide  a  host  of  ancillary  services  in  addition  to  basic 
parachute  training.  These  included  advanced  parachute  training,  providing  aircraft  for  the 
trained  parachute  cadre  to  participate  in  proliferating  joint  exercises  with  the  Army  and 
Home  Guard,  and  for  VIP  demonstrations. 
it  is  clear  from  this  that  the  CLE's  need  for  additional  aircraft  was  more  pressing  than 
ever,  but  this  cut  little  ice  with  the  Air  Ministry,  which  continued  to  promise  little  and 
provide  less.  This  is  clear  from  the  limited  concessions  that  combined  pressure  from  No. 
70  Group,  the  Director  of  Military  Co-operation  and  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command 
was  able  to  produce  by  7  March  1941.  Prior  requests  were  about  to  bear  fruit,  with  the 
imminent  delivery  of  new  Whitleys  with  factory-fitted  parachute  modifications,  although 
these  were  all  slated  for  Bomber  Command  squadrons  and  not  Ringway.  The  Air  Ministry 
also  granted  permission  for  Ringway  to  investigate  the  suitability  of  the  Vickers 
Wellington  as  a  back-up  parachute  transport,  with  a  single  example  being  allotted  to  the 
CLE  for  tests.  Apart  from  this,  all  the  Air  Ministry  was  offering  was  an  agreement  to 
allow  Bomber  Command  to  assess  the  suitability  of  new  aircraft,  including  the  Short William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  196 
Stirling,  Avro  Manchester  and  Handley  Page  Halifax,  f  29  or  parachuting.  Bomber 
Command  was  also  empowered  to  allow  the  CLE  access  to  these  aircraft,  at  its  own 
discretion.  Significantly,  no  guarantees  were  given  in  the  event  of  all  or  any  of  these  types 
proving  suitable.  As  the  Director  of  Military  Co-operation  took  pains  to  stress,  access  did 
not  constitute  envisaged  "...  allotment  of  aircraft  to  the  CLE,  and  should  not  take 
precedence  over  operational  requirements".  30 
Quite  how  Bomber  Command  Was  to  assess  these  new  bomber  aircraft  for  airborne 
suitability  without  reference  to  the  CLE  was  not  explained,  especially  as  Ringway  was  the 
only  establishment  qualified  to  carry  out  such  an  assessment.  In  the  event,  the  CLE  had 
already  taken  matters  into  their  own  hands  without  awaiting  Air  Ministry  permission.  The 
CLE's  deputy  commander,  Wing-Commander  Norman,  inspected  the  Stirling  on  I  January 
1941  at  Shorts'  factory,  and  used  the  same  route  to  inspect  the  Avro  Manchester,  prototype 
Avro  Lancaster  and  the  Handley  Page  Halifax,  on  27  and  31  March  1941  respectively.  His 
findings  gave  little  grounds  for  optimism.  The  Stirling  suffered  from  pre-existing  centre  of 
gravity  problems,  and  was  thus  considered  the  "least  promising".  Balance  problems  were 
also  thought  likely  with  the  Manchester/Lancaster,  and  all  three  types  also  had 
prohibitively  high  stalling  speeds  for  dropping  parachutists.  31  The  Halifax  appeared  more 
suitable.  It  had  six  large  wing  cells,  which  were  ideal  for  carrying  containers,  the  four- 
engine  lay-out  allowed  the  pilot  to  minimise  the  slipstream  when  dropping  parachutists  by 
throttling  back  the  inboard  engines,  and  the  manufacturer  offered  to  provide  a  wooden 
mock-up  fuselage  for  troop  trials.  In  Norman's  opinion,  the  Halifax  would  nonetheless 
require  considerable  modification,  including  the  re-positioning  of  gun  turrets,  bomb  racks 
and  ammunition  stowage.  32  He  therefore  recommended  that  Ringway  obtain  an  example 
for  tests. 
33 
CLE  personnel  also  gained  access  to  a  further  aircraft  type,  and  their  conclusions  cast 
serious  doubt  on  the  Air  Ministry's  trustworthiness  and/or  competence.  The  Air  Ministry 
had  rejected  the  De  Havilland  Flamingo  airliner,  known  in  its  military  guise  as  the 
Hertfordshire,  as  unsuitable  for  parachuting  in  August  1940.34  The  CLE,  with  the 
connivance  of  No.  70  Group,  gained  access  to  a  surviving  example  of  this  type  at  the  De 
Havilland  works  at  Hatfield  on  5  April  1941.35  Its  findings  directly  contradicted  the  Air 
Ministry's.  According  to  the  report  passed  to  No.  70  Group,  "...  subject  to  inj 
modifications  ...  the  Hertford  [sic]  appears  the  most  suitable  aircraft  yet  inspected,  taking 
all  Army  requirements  into  account".  The  Air  Ministry  had  cited  the  machine's  small  exit 
door  as  the  main  reason  for  rejecting  the  Hertfordshire  in  1940.  The  CLE  considered  this  to 
be  easily  modified.  It  also  found  the  aircraft  to  be  stable,  with  a  high  cruising  and  low William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  197 
stalling  speed,  and  to  have  ample  space  for  up  to  sixteen  parachutists  or  a  comparable  load 
of  freight.  36 
It  is  possible  that  the  Air  Ministry  made  a  genuine  mistake  when  inspecting  the 
Hertfordshire,  given  that  there  was  virtually  no  experience  on  which  to  base  an  assessment 
in  August  1940.  However,  even  if  that  were  the  case,  it  does  not  excuse  the  Air  Ministry 
for  not  reconsidering  the  type  later,  when  the  requisite  experience  had  been  accrued.  It  is 
therefore  far  more  likely  that  the  Air  Ministry's  main  motivation  in  rejecting  the 
Hertfordshire  was  to  avoid  diverting  resources  from  bomber  construction  to  produce  a 
transport  aircraft.  The  fact  that  the  formwork  for  constructing  the  Hertfordshire  was  being 
broken  up  as  surplus  to  requirements  at  Hatfield  at  the  time  of  the  CLE's  inspection 
reinforces  this  conclusion.  It  is  doubtful  that  the  CLE  staff  had  much  faith  in  the  7  March 
1941  assurances  from  the  Air  Ministry,  but  bringing  the  full  facts  of  the  Hertfordshire  story 
to  light  must  have  lowered  it  yet  further. 
Depressing  as  the  series  of  aircraft  inspections  prompted  by  No.  70  Group  were,  they  at 
least  clarified  one  point.  If  the  CLE  were  going  to  obtain  additional  aircraft,  they  would 
have  to  be  Whitleys,  however  unsuitable  they  might  have  been,  or  Wellingtons.  A  detailed 
report  on  the  suitability  of  the  Wellington  appeared  in  mid-May  1941,  and  concluded  that 
the  type  was  suitable  for  parachuting  with  modifications  comparable  to  those  on  the 
Whitley.  In  particular,  the  roomier  and  lighter  fuselage  was  considered  much  better  for 
troop  morale,  although  its  higher  speed  caused  wider  ground  dispersion  during  stick  jumps. 
The  report  was  compiled  by  the  CLE  on  12  May  194  1,  from  data  gathered  from  tests  that 
began  at  the  beginning  of  that  month.  37 
In  fairness,  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  the  Air  Ministry's  reluctance  to  supply  aircraft  to 
the  CLE  was  not  based  solely  on  inter-service  rivalry,  dogma  or sheer  bloody- 
mindednesss.  Bomber  Command  was  the  only  home-based  British  force  engaged  in 
offensive  action  at  this  time,  however  imperfectly,  38  and  the  Air  Ministry's  concern  that  its 
resources  should  not  be  diverted  away  unless  absolutely  necessary  is  perfectly 
understandable,  and  legitimate.  The  unfortunate  fact  for  Ringway  was  that  the  Whitley 
and  Wellington  were  not  just  the  only  aircraft  in  service  suitable  for  airborne  use,  they 
were  also  the  current  mainstays  of  Bomber  Command.  In  December  1940,  for  example, 
Whitleys  and  Wellingtons  comprised  ninety-six  of  the  one  hundred  and  thirty  four  bombers 
(thirty-five  Whitleys  and  sixty-one  Wellingtons)  despatched  for  a  major  strike  against  the 
German  industrial  city  of  Mannheim,  39  and  the  situation  remained  largely  the  same 
throughout  194  1.  That  November,  when  Ringway  was  expanding  its  output  to  one William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  198 
hundred  parachute  trainees  per  week,  a  major  raid  on  Berlin  included  one  hundred  and  one 
Wellingtons  and  forty-two  Whitleys  in  the  total  force  of  one  hundred  and  sixty-nine.  "  No 
wonder  then  that  Ringway  failed  to  get  any  Wellingtons  apart  from  their  test  example,  and 
that  the  pro-bombing  lobby  within  the  Air  Ministry  was  prepared  to  be  extremely 
economical  with  the  truth  in  order  to  keep  its  Whitleys.  Given  this,  it  is  doubly  ironic  that 
Churchill  had  been  promoting  the  bomber  offensive  against  Germany  since  November 
1940,  and  with  the  same  degree  of  enthusiasm  he  exhibited  for  airborne  forces.  41 
Of  course,  it  is  doubtful  if  the  re-direction  of  the  handful  of  aircraft  the  CLE  were  asking 
for  would  have  made  any  difference  to  the  strategic  bombing  effort.  It  is  therefore  more 
likely  that  Bomber  Command  and  the  Air  Ministry  were  motivated  by  a  desire  to  avoid 
setting  an  unfavourable  precedent,  rather  than  with  the  specific  fate  of  a  handful  of  aircraft. 
This  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  there  were  surplus  machines  around.  These  were  not  part 
of  a  secret  Air  Ministry  stockpile  intended  to  deny  them  to  Ringway,  however.  Rather, 
they  were  "lost"  within  the  machinery  of  the  RAF,  and  kept  there  out  of  reach  of  Ringway 
and  Bomber  Command  by  a  combination  of  bureaucratic  inertia  and  indifference,  which 
slowed  and  exacerbated  the  most  well  intentioned  initiatives  from  on  high.  Churchill 
himself  referred  to  the  Air  Ministry  as  a  "most  cumbrous  and  ill-working  administrative 
machine"q 
42  and  whilst  the  target  of  his  displeasure  may  have  been  no  worse  than  the  War 
office  and  Admiraltyq  his  assessment  was  absolutely  accurate  in  this  instance. 
The  CLE  was  certainly  no  stranger  to  the  RAF's  institutional  inertia  and  indifference.  On 
12  June  194  1,  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command  passed  on  an  enquiry  via  No.  70  Group 
asking  whether  the  CLE  still  had  any  use  for  two  parachute-modified  Whitleys,  which  had 
been  authorised  by  the  Air  Ministry,  but  not  delivered,  for  tests  in  February  1941.43  This 
was  the  same  day  that  the  CLE  issued  its  paper  highlighting  the  decrepitude  of  its  existing 
aircraft,  and  the  dire  need  for  more.  44  This  combination  of  ignorance  and  indifference  to 
the  realities  of  life  at  Ringway  was  by  no  means  restricted  to  paperwork.  On  I  June  1941, 
the  CLE  took  delivery  of  a  Whitley  Mark  III  aircraft,  which  was  to  be  broken  down  for  the 
fuselage  to  be  used  for  ground,  or  synthetic,  training.  However,  on  inspection  at  Ringway 
the  aircraft  was  found  to  be  airworthy,  and  enquiries  to  the  machine's  former  owners  at 
No.  41  Group  confirmed  that  it  had  indeed  been  despatched  for  disposal  in  an  airworthy 
condition. 
As  a  result,  Group-Captain  Harvey  requested  permission  from  No.  70  Group  on  26  June 
1941  to  exchange  it  for  one  of  the  CLE's  original  aircraft,  which  had  recently  been  written- 
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in  far  better  condition  than  the  ones  actually  used  on  flying  training  [by  the  CLE]  despite 
the  fact  that  every  effort  has  been  made  by  all  concerned  to  obtain  suitable 
replacements"  . 
45  No.  70  Group  took  three  days  to  pass  Harvey's  request  to  RAF  Army  Co- 
operation  Command,  which  it  did  on  29  June  1941.46  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command 
sat  on  the  request  for  ten  days,  and  then  asked  No.  43  Group  to  inspect  the  Whitley  and 
confirm  its  airworthiness.  47  No.  43  Group  moved  rather  faster,  and  personnel  from  No.  75 
Maintenance  Unit  (MU)  at  RAF  Wimslow  inspected  the  machine  on  10  July  1940.  They 
reported  that  "Whitley  K8991  is  a  perfectly  serviceable  aircraft  and  is  suitable  in  every 
respect  for  flying  duties  [and]  for  modification  to  meet  the  requirements  of  PTS 
p  'ingWay 
".  48  No.  43  Group  relayed  this  verdict  back  to  RAF  Army  Co-operation 
Command,  49  who  then  informed  No.  70  Group  that  "channels  had  been  activated  to 
complete  the  requested  exchange  on  an  official  basis",  with  the  rider  that  repairs  to  the 
crashed  Whitley  were  to  cease  forthwith.  The  same  letter  added  insult  to  injury  by 
informing  the  CLE  that  Whitley  K8991  had  been  discarded  in  an  airworthy  condition  by  an 
Operational  Training  Unit  (OTU)  because  "...  they  had  no  further  use  for  a  Whitley  Mark 
50 
III  aircraft"  . 
Final  permission  to  effect  the  exchange,  and  for  the  CLE  to  retain  both  airframes  for 
flying  and  synthetic  duties,  finally  arrived  on  17  July  1941.51  This  meant  it  had  taken  six 
weeks  to  carry  out  a  simple  exchange  of  a  serviceable  aircraft  for  an  unserviceable  one  at 
the  same  location.  Two  further  points  should  also  be  noted.  First,  it  took  the  CLE  twenty- 
six  days  to  confirm  that  the  machine  in  question  was  airworthy,  and  to  request  permission 
to  effect  the  exchange.  Second,  RAF  departments  that  were  sympathetic,  or  at  least 
neutral,  toward  the  CLE  handled  the  matter  in  its  entirety,  and  it  still  took  over  three  weeks 
from  the  date  Ringway  requested  permission  for  the  exchange.  This  illustrates  the 
potential  that  existed  for  bureaucratic  obstructionism  within  the  RAF  machinery,  although 
it  is  interesting  to  see  that  the  neutral  departments  moved  with  greater  speed  than  Ringway 
and  its  immediate  superiors. 
Whitley  K8991  was  not  the  only  surplus  machine  located  by  the  CLE.  Harvey's  response 
to  being  granted  permission  to  use  the  latter  aircraft  was  to  badger  No.  70  Group  for  more, 
and  to  inforIn  them  of  another  surplus  Whitley  located  by  staff  at  the  CLE.  Flight- 
Lieutenant  Williams,  from  the  CLE's  DU,  discovered  a  Whitley  Mark  III  standing  idle  at 
RAF  Kemble.  Enquiries  on  the  spot  revealed  that  that  it  had  been  left  in  the  open  for 
approximately  nine  months,  during  which  it  had  sustained  weather  damage  to  its  fabric 
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considered  it  surplus  to  requirements,  and  told  Williams  that  they  would  be  happy  to  have 
it  off  their  hands. 
When  informed  of  this  on  15  July  1941,  Harvey  immediately  attempted  to  obtain  it 
through  official  channels.  52  On  this  occasion  RAF  bureaucracy  moved  rather  more 
quickly,  and  the  matter  was  resolved  within  a  week,  albeit  not  in  the  way  the  CLE  would 
have  preferred.  On  17  July,  RAF  Kemble  informed  the  CLE  that  the  Whitley  was  officially 
assigned  to  a  gunnery  school  at  Porthcawl  in  South  Wales,  and  provided  its  maintenance 
records.  5'  Despite  the  fact  that  it  had  been  standing  idle  for  the  better  part  of  a  year, 
however,  officialdom  ruled  that  it  was  "impossible"  for  it  to  be  re-assigned  to  the  CLE  on 
18  July  1941  . 
54  No.  70  Group  took  up  the  matter  on  behalf  of  Ringway  on  19  July  194  1,55 
but  with  no  more  success  than  Harvey.  The  CLE  did  not  get  the  aircraft,  with  the  decision 
being  ruled  final  on  21  July  1941.56 
Thus  the  CLE  had  literally  stumbled  across  two  surplus  Whitleys  within  a  matter  of  days. 
It  would  be  convenient  to  ascribe  this  to  deliberate  obstructionism  on  the  part  of  the  Air 
Ministry,  but  the  evidence  does  not  support  that.  It  is  clear  that  the  aircraft  concerned  had 
in  fact  fallen  through  the  cracks  in  the  RAF's  administrative  machinery.  This  does  not 
totally  absolve  the  Air  Ministry  from  blame,  however,  for  it  clearly  shows  that  the  Air 
Ministry  effort  to  locate  additional  Whitleys  for  the  CLE  was  minimal  at  best.  Given  that 
the  CLE  was  able  to  locate  two  surplus  aircraft  by  accident,  it  is  reasonable  and  logical  to 
assume  that  there  were  more  similarly  awaiting  discovery.  Also,  both  the  machines  were 
Tiger  powered  Mark  Ills,  and  were  not  assigned  to  operational  Bomber  Command  units, 
presumably  because  of  the  engine  spares  problems  cited  above.  If  OTUs  and  Gunnery 
Schools  were  willing  to  have  such  machines  scrapped  or  left  to  rot  in  the  weather,  it  would 
have  cost  the  Air  Ministry  nothing  to  order  all  Whitley  Mark  Ills  assigned  to  Ringway. 
Indeed,  it  could  have  been  presented  as  a  gesture  of  goodwill,  and  gone  some  way  to 
relieving  the  pressure  upon  the  Air  Ministry.  As  it  was,  slackness  was  to  cost  it 
considerably  more,  for  when  higher  authority  finally  forced  the  Air  Ministry  to  provide 
Ringway  with  more  aircraft,  the  most  modem  Whitley  Mark  Vs  were  specified.  The  next 
section  will  detail  how  this  considerable  turnabout  was  achieved. 
Ill.  pressure  from  Above  Succeeds  Where  Pressure  from  Below  Failed.  Air 
Ministry  Concessions  to  the  Airbome  Force  jý, 
Ultimately,  it  was  pressure  from  above  that  forced  the  Air  Ministry  to  meet  its  self- 
formulated  obligations  to  the  CLE.  This  can  be  viewed  as  proof  of  Churchill's  high  level 
pressure  bearing  fruit,  albeit  after  a  delay.  On  4  June  1941,  RAF  Army  Co-operation William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  201 
Command  informed  No.  70  Group  that  discussions  were  underway  between  the  Air 
Ministry  and  War  Office,  with  a  view  to  significantly  increasing  the  size  of  the  British 
airborne  force.  57  No.  70  Group  passed  this  on  to  the  CLE  the  next  day,  with  the  request 
that  Ringway  prepare  to  implement  the  expansion  forthwith.  58  Group-Captain  Harvey's 
response  was  swift  and  blunt.  To  date,  the  PTS  had  trained  six  hundred  parachutists  for  the 
British  Army,  and  a  total  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  foreign  and  SOE  personnel.  At  that  rate, 
and  with  existing  resources,  it  would  take  until  January  1943  to  train  a  further  5,000 
parachutists,  as  per  Ringway's  original  brief  Even  then,  this  schedule  was  dependent  upon 
the  CLE  ceasing  participation  in  joint  exercises  and  demonstrations  immediately,  and  the 
provision  of  a  full  Group  of  Whitleys-59 
Harvey  was  pitching  things  high  with  his  request  for  an  entire  Bomber  Group,  but  his 
forthright  response  had  the  desired  effect,  for  No.  70  Group  requested  that  the  CLE  set  its 
views  down  on  paper  for  upward  transmission.  60  The  result  was  the  CLE's  paper  of  12 
June  1941,  entitled  "Pilot  and  Aircraft  Requirements  for  Expanded  Output  of  PTS".  This 
broke  down  the  implications  of  the  one  hundred  per  week  expansion  in  terms  of  drops  per 
month  and  flying  hours,  and  moderated  the  demand  for  additional  aircraft.  Twelve  Mark  Il 
or  nine  Mark  V  Whitleys  were  considered  the  absolute  minimum,  the  differential  being 
based  on  the  Mark  V's  longer  fuselage  and  more  powerful  and  reliable  Rolls-Royce  Merlin 
engineS. 
61  Three  ratios  were  employed:  one  pilot  for  every  three  hundred  trainees,  one 
Whitley  II  per  three  hundred  and  seventy-five  trainees,  and  one  Whitley  V  per  five 
hundred  trainees.  It  was  also  stressed  that  these  projections  made  no  provision  for  aircrew 
training,  modifications  or  operational  exercises,  although  it  was  felt  that  there  might  be 
sufficient  slack  to  allow  a  limited  amount  of  experimentation  and  work  for  the  SOE.  62 
Ringway  produced  a  training  programme  based  on  these  projections  on  23  June  1941,  with 
a  list  of  additional  accommodation  and  synthetic  training  requirements.  63  A  further  list  of 
answers  to  specific  questions  from  No.  70  Group  appeared  on  27  June  1941.64 
Before  detailing  how  the  CLE  met  the  demand  for  an  expansion  of  output,  it  will  first  be 
necessary  to  examine  briefly  the  high  level  background  to  those  events,  for  the  sake  of 
Clarity.  65  The  Army  was  looking  to  augment  its  existing  parachute  battalion  by  something 
in  the  region  of  1,800  soldiers,  and  by  early  July  1941  was  about  to  pass  detailed  proposals 
for  this  expansion  to  the  CIGS  for  approval.  Brigadier  Nye  at  the  War  Office  inadvertently 
passed  this  fact  to  the  Air  Ministry  on  4  July  1941.  Nye  was  responding  to  an  enquiry  by 
Air  Chief  Marshal  Freeman  as  to  why  the  Army  had  not  yet  provided  the  CLE  with 
sufficient  trainees  to  utilise  fully  Ringway's  capacity  of  one  hundred  per  week.  66  It  is 
unclear  what  prompted  Freeman's  enquiry,  for  at  that  time  the  CLE  had  not  compiled  a William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  202 
definitive  list  of  additional  resources  necessary  for  the  output  expansion,  let  alone 
implemented  it.  However,  whatever  the  motivation,  the  information  elicited  by  Freeman 
drew  a  predictably  hostile  response  from  the  Air  Ministry.  The  aim  of  this  was  twofold;  to 
forestall  both  the  Army's  ambitions  and  the  CLE's  attempt  to  increase  its  resources.  The 
fact  was,  even  at  this  late  stage,  some  senior  members  of  the  Air  Ministry  hierarchy 
remained  unconvinced  that  the  British  airborne  project  was  viable  or  necessary,  and 
certainly  not  in  the  form  the  War  Office  envisaged. 
However,  by  the  time  the  Air  Ministry's  response  appeared  on  8  August  1941  in  a  paper 
entitled  "British  Airborne  Force  Policy",  67  the  Air  Ministry  had  decided  to  make 
concessions.  This  was  over  a  month  since  the  Army's  intentions  had  become  known,  and 
the  content  of  the  paper  suggests  that  there  had  been  intensive  argument  between  the  pro 
and  anti  airborne  lobbies  within  the  Air  Ministry.  This  would  explain  why  the  8  August 
paper  had  a  rather  schizophrenic  air  to  it.  The  first  part  basically  objected  in  principle  to 
any  enlargement  of  the  airborne  force  or  its  training  infrastructure,  and  used  every 
conceivable  piece  of  evidence  to  support  this  view.  It  closed  with  the  opinion  that  an 
airborne  force  configured  for  anything  larger  than  raiding  was  a  "...  luxury  that  this 
country,  and  particularly  Bomber  Command,  cannot  afford".  " 
Having  purged  itself  of  reactionary  opinion,  the  paper  then  went  on  to  list  a  number  of  far 
more  positive  proposals.  It  was  recommended  that  all  responsib 
' 
ility  for  creating  the 
airborne  force  be  passed  to  the  Army,  preferably  in  the  person  of  a  single  Army  officer. 
The  Air  Ministry  also  suggested  supplying  enough  Whitleys  to  allow  a  full  battalion  lift, 
and  that  all  Whitley  and  Halifax  pilots  in  RAF  No.  4  and  No.  6  Groups  receive  glider-tow 
training.  The  requirement  for  five  hundred  dedicated  glider  pilots  was  also  agreed,  and  it 
was  suggested  that  RAF  pilots  of  a  low  medical  category  be  supplied  if  the  Army  was 
unable  to  find  sufficient  personnel  itself.  Finally,  it  was  recommended  that  RAF  Transport 
Command  should  investigate  all  possible  sources  of  aircraft  for  parachute  dropping  and 
glider  towing.  69  This  was  significant  progress  indeed,  although  the  Air  Ministry  had  of 
course  made  similar  recommendations  before  and  then  failed  to  act  upon  them.  On  this 
occasion,  however,  the  Air  Ministry  came  up  with  the  goods,  and  Ringway's  complement 
of  Whitleys  was  increased  to  twelve  Mark  V  machines  by  II  October  194  1.70 
The  8  August  recommendations  were  largely  confirmed  by  an  internal  Air  Ministry 
conference  on  22  August  1941.  Whilst  the  offer  to  supply  glider-pilots  was  withdrawn) 
this  was  offset  by  allotting  the  CLE's  Glider  Training  Unit  (GTU)  a  larger,  but  unfinished, 
airfield  at  Shobden  . 
71  The  commitment  to  train  RAF  aircrew  in  the  necessary  specialist William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  203 
techniques  was  upheld,  and  the  conference  concluded  that,  dependent  upon  Bomber 
Command  opinion,  it  would  be  possible  to  withdraw  bomber  crews  for  a  one-week 
refresher  course  at  Ringway  prior  to  any  large-scale  airborne  operation.  72  Bomber 
Command  opinion,  when  it  appeared  on  30  August  1941,  was  lukewarm  but  broadly 
agreed  with  the  conference  conclusions.  Specific  caveats  concerned  the  training  of  aircrew 
in  airborne  techniques.  The  proposal  that  this  take  place  at  their  home  bases  was  accepted 
only  because  it  presented  the  least  potential  disruption  to  bombing  operations.  The  need  for 
an  entire  week's  refresher  training  was  also  disputed,  with  a  few  flying  hours  being 
considered  sufficient.  Bomber  Command  also  took  the  opportunity  to  point  out  that  one, 
unfortunately  unidentified,  bomber  squadron  had  already  been  earmarked  for  parachute 
work  in  the  event  of  an  invasion  of  the  UK.  There  was,  however,  "...  no  question  of 
collective  exercises  with  this  squadron!  '.  73 
All  this  would  suggest  that  the  anti-airborne  lobby  within  the  RAF  had  finally  accepted 
that  a  large-scale  British  airborne  force  was  a  reality  that  could  and  would  be  pushed 
through,  irrespective  of  their  objections.  This  looks  to  be  particularly  the  case  with  the 
Bomber  Command  communication  of  30  August  1941,  which  actually  post-dated  official 
War  office  notification  of  its  intent  to  expand  its  existing  parachute  force  by  at  least  two 
battalions  by  three  days.  The  new  brigade  was  scheduled  to  complete  formation  by  I 
October  1941,  and  the  CLE  was  requested  to  be  ready  to  implement  the  one  hundred  per 
week  training  rate  with  effect  from  1  November  1941.  Initial  parachute  training,  including 
that  of  replacements  for  routine  wastage,  was  scheduled  for  completion  by  the  end  of 
january  1942.74  The  fact  that  this  was  passed  down  to  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command 
with  only  a  few  minor  caveats  two  days  later  provides  further  evidence  that  the  Air 
Ministry  was  becoming  reconciled  to  the  inevitable.  75 
IV.  Laying  the  Foundations:  Prepailng  the  PTS  for  Mass  Training,  September 
to  November  1941 
By  the  end  of  August  1941,  the  way  was  clear  for  the  CLE  to  begin  planning  to  increase  its 
output  in  earnest.  To  this  end,  the  CLE  was  reorganised  into  the  Airborne  Forces 
Establishment  (AFE)  on  I  September  1941,76  the  major  change  of  which  was  the 
concentration  of  all  glider  pilot  training  in  a  dedicated  Organisation  under  RAF  Flying 
Training  Command  (see  Fig.  3).  On  4  September  1941  Harvey  updated  No.  70  Group  on 
the  latest  thinking  from  the  AFE,  77  as  the  CLE  had  been  renamed  three  days  previously. 
No.  70  Group  raised  two  main  diffidulties  with  these  recommendations.  First,  it  was 
considered  unreasonable  to  expand  the  CLE  establishment  for  the  Output  increase  if  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  204 
new  rate  would  only  be  required  to  train  just  2,500  additional  paratroops.  Second,  it 
doubted  the  ability  of  the  PTS  to  maintain  the  output  increase  through  the  winter  months, 
given  the  notoriously  poor  weather  at  Ringway.  The  latter  circumstances,  it  was  argued, 
would  also  oblige  an  increase  in  synthetic  training  facilities,  for  use  by  parachute  trainees 
during  inclement  weather. 
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No  I  Glideffraining  School 
RAF  Haddenham(fromO2/11/1941) 
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No  I  Glider  Operational  Training  Unit 
RAF  Netheravon  (from  01/01/1942) 
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Figure  3-  Airborne  Forces  Establishment  and  Glider  Training  Organisation, 
beginning  1  September  1941 
No.  70  Group's  queries,  whilst  perfectly  valid,  are  interesting  for  another  reason.  They 
show  that  support  for  the  airborne  idea  by  Ringway's  superior  was  by  no  means 
unquestioning,  and  the  same  was  the  case  with  the  next  link  up  the  chain.  RAF  Army  Co- 
operation  Command  had  expressed  agreement  with  the  negative  sentiments  expressed  in 
the  Air  Ministry  paper  of  8  August  1941.  A  covering  letter,  which  RAF  Army  Co- 
operation  Command  attached  to  the  copy  of  the  paper  for  No.  70  Group,  fully  supported 
the  Air  Ministry's  "different  concept"  for  a  British  airborne  force  from  the  German 
example.  This  concept,  which  in  effect  meant  confming  the  airborne  force  to  raiding,  was 
considered  to  be  entirely  appropriate  for  likely  British  needs.  The  letter  closed  with  the 
following  opinion: 
"I  do  not  see  that  we  shall  ever  be  in  a  position  to  Jay  off  a  bomber  group  from 
their  primary  task  of  bombing  to  prepare  for  an  operation  of  this  kind  [i.  e.  a William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  205 
parachute  operation]  and  one  has  only  to  instance  the  delay  in  the  production  of 
gliders  and  the  preparation  of  an  aerodrome  which  have  occurred  during  the 
last  eight  months  to  bear  out  this  argurnerif  5.78 
The  upshot  of  No.  70  Group's  queries  was  a  joint  conference  at  the  Air  Ministry  on  9 
September  1941,79  where  Harvey  was  to  present  the  AFE's  expansion  proposals  in  detail.  80 
The  head  of  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command,  Air  Marshal  Sir  Arthur  Barratt,  chaired 
the  conference.  81  Attendees  included  Harvey  and  Rock  from  the  AFE,  several  Army  and 
RAF  officers  from  Barratt's  Command,  Cole-Hamilton  from  No.  70  Group,  representatives 
from  a  variety  of  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  departments,  and  the  officer  selected  to 
command  what  was  to  become  the  I  s'Parachute  Brigade,  Brigadier  Richard  Gale,  MC.  82 
This  high-powered  gathering  was  able  to  make  some  far-reaching  decisions. 
First,  the  role  of  the  PTS  was  properly  defined.  Its  activities  were  to  be  restricted  solely 
to  the  provision  of  parachute  training,  leaving  the  Army  to  ensure  that  trainees  were 
sufficiently  fit  to  undergo  that  training.  To  this  end,  an  Army  Training  Centre  (ATC), 
under  Army  control  but  including  RAF  instructional  staff,  was  to  be  set  up,  complete  with 
a  balloon.  Trainees  were  not  to  be  billeted  at  Ringway  for  parachute  training,  but  were  to 
commute  between  their  own  accommodation  and  Ringway  on  a  daily  basis  during  training 
at  the  PTS.  The  rationale  for  this  was  to  avoid  the  delay  inherent  in  constructing  sufficient 
accommodation  at  Ringway.  Small  groups  of  officers  and  NCOs  from  the  new  brigade 
were  to  be  put  through  the  PTS  before  mass  training  commenced,  to  allow  them  to  act  as 
instructors  at  the  ATC. 
Second,  the  PTS  training  course  was  settled  at  six  jumps  per  trainee,  two  from  a  balloon, 
two  individual  aircraft  jumps,  and  two  stick  jumps.  If  possible,  it  was  planned  for  at  least 
one  of  these  to  take  place  at  night.  An  intake  rate  of  two  hundred  trainees  every  fourteen 
days  was  scheduled,  utilising  twelve  Whitleys  for  parachuting  and  an  Avro  Anson  for  air 
experience  flights.  This  schedule  was  planned  also  to  include  the  training  of  five 
replacements  per  month,  and  to  provide  trained  paratroopers  with  a  minimum  of  one 
aircraft  jump  every  two  months  to  maintain  their  skills.  Other  matters  discussed  included 
expanding  AFE  accommodation  and  facilities  at  Ringway,  the  need  for  additional 
organisational  personnel,  and  the  ongoing  shortage  and  poor  serviceability  of  the  AFE's 
aircraft. 
83 
Events  began  to  move  in  a  more  positive  direction  following  the  joint  conference  on  9 
September  194  1.  On  8  October  Whitley-equipped  No.  41  Group  was  ordered  to  release 
five  Whitley  Mark  Vs  and  an  Avro  Anson  for  use  at  the  AFE,  and  to  replace  Ringway's William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  206 
existing  Mark  11  and  Ills  with  Mark  Vs  as  the  latter  became  available.  84  RAF  Army  Co- 
operation  Command  authorised  the  issue  of  the  additional  aircraft  to  the  AFE  on  II 
October  1941,  bringing  its  total  up  to  the  requested  twelve,  85  although  this  total  included 
the  worn  out  original  complement.  No.  41  Group  reported  completion  of  the  five-macIdne 
transfer  on  12  October  1941.86  This  was  not  quite  the  end  of  the  matter,  for  Ringway 
subsequently  discovered  that  some  machines  from  No.  102  Squadron  were  unmodified  for 
parachuting,  and  the  factory-fitted  modifications  for  parachuting  had  been  removed  on 
others.  This  required  eight  hours  remedial  work  per  machine,  and,  although  it  was 
87 
admitted  that  this  was  not  considered  an  insurmountable  problem,  No.  70  Group 
requested  further  details  in  order  to  avoid  similar  problems  in  the  future.  '8 
On  15  October  1941  No.  70  Group  began  to  chase  additional  NNUtleys  to  replace  the 
worn  out  examples  on  Ringway's  behalf,  by  pointing  out  that  they  should  be  issued  within 
five  days  if  the  1  November  deadline  were  to  be  achieved.  "  According  to  RAF  Army  Co- 
operation  Command,  two  Whitley  Mark  Ills  had  been  allotted  to  the  AFE  on  14  October 
and  were  en  route,  and  the  Air  Ministry  was  willing  to  release  three  Mark  Vs  direct  from 
the  manufacturer,  providing  the  AFE  would  accept  them  without  parachute  modifications. 
The  new  machines  were  unlikely  to  be  delivered  by  20  October  as  requested,  however.  90 
In  the  event,  the  necessary  machines  did  appear  from  whatever  source,  for  the  I  November 
deadline  was  met,  and  the  first  course  at  the  increased  output  rate  of  one  hundred  per  week 
was  successfully  completed  on  15  November  1941.91 
important  as  they  were,  aircraft  were  not  the  AFE's  sole  concern,  and  a  good  deal  of  other 
equipment  was  required  for  training  the  I"  Parachute  Brigade.  The  AFE  requested  an 
additional  seven  hundred  and  fifty  parachutes  to  augment  its  existing  stock  on  21 
September  1941.92  The  request  was  passed  up  the  line,  93  and  arrived  at  the  Air  Ministry  on 
27  September.  94  By  8  October  1941  arrangements  had  been  made  to  transfer  three  hundred 
and  ninety4bur  parachutes  from  a  variety  of  RAF  MUs,  and  an  additional  three  hundred 
and  forty-six  had  been  ordered  from  Irvin  and  the  GQ  Parachute  Co.  The  latter  order  was 
to  be  delivered  at  a  rate  of  fifty  per  week  until  the  order  was  fulfilled.  95  A  variety  of 
ancillary  items  were  also  required,  including  one  hundred  and  fifty  more  protective 
helmets,  at  a  cost  of  six  shillings  and  sixpence  each.  96  The  helmets  were  needed  to 
minimise  concussion  casualties,  the  majority  of  which  resulted  from  "ringing  the  bell"  on 
exit  from  the  Whitley.  97 
Ringway  also  submitted  a  detailed  request  for  additional  ground  training  equipment  on  5 
October  1941.  These  included  swings,  jumping  stands,  trapezes,  Whitley  fuselages  and William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  207 
mock  up  bomb-cells  for  container  loading  training.  98  A  detailed  cost  breakdown  including 
everything  from  screws  and  nails  by  the  ounce  to  ropes  and  man-hours  was  attached,  to  the 
total  of  E326.9s.  9d.  99  By  8  October  1941  the  AFE  was  able  to  issue  an  optimistic  and 
very  detailed  interim  progress  report.  This  showed  that  progress  toward  the  I  November 
1941  deadline  for  the  output  increase  was  well  in  hand,  100  although  more  deficiencies  were 
constantly  coming  to  light.  On  21  October,  for  example,  Ringway  urgently  requested  three 
buses,  two  vans  and  a  prime  mover.  101  Even  with  these  unexpected  deficiencies,  however, 
by  1  November  1941,  Ringway  was  in  a  position  to  begin  the  task  Churchill  had  given  the 
CLS  over  a  year  previously:  the  training  of  a  large  scale  British  parachute  force.  As  we 
have  seen,  preparing  the  infrastructure  for  this  involved  a  good  deal  of  discord  between 
Ringway  and  its  supporters  and  other  elements  within  the  Air  Ministry.  This  was  not, 
however,  confffied  to  the  CLE's  relations  with  external  agencies,  and  the  emergence  of 
similar  tendencies  within  the  airborne  infrastructure  also  merit  examination. 
V.  New  Brooms  or  Empire  Building?:  Intemal  Politics  at  Ringway 
There  is  little  mention  of  internal  politics  being  a  factor  in  the  development  of  the 
airborne  infrastructure.  Only  one  secondary  account  mentions  it  explicitly,  and  the  popular 
and  accepted  line  is  one  of  unity  at  Ringway  in  the  face  of  external  difficulties.  However, 
matching  the  secondary  accounts  with  a  careful  examination  of  the  primary  material 
presents  a  rather  different  picture.  This  picture  is  one  of  empire  building,  patronage,  and 
the  shabby  treatment  of  dedicated  and  courageous  men  who  did  not  fit  into  their  superiors' 
vision  of  the  CLE. 
Internal  politics  at  Ringway  were  not  an  issue  before  the  arrival  of  Group-Captain  Harvey 
to  take  command  of  the  newly  created  CLE  on  18  September  1940.102  Harvey  did  not 
approve  of  Strange's  unorthodox  methods,  nor  of  the  barnstorming  mavericks  the  latter  had 
recruited  to  the  PTS.  Consequently,  Harvey  set  about  reforming  his  command  in  a  way 
more  to  his  liking.  Strange's  right-hand  man,  Bruce  Williams,  was  the  first  of  his  prot6g6s 
to  be  removed.  Williams  participated  in  the  Tragino  Raid  of  February  1941  as  a 
despatcher,  "  and  unwisely  spoke  to  a  British  reporter  on  his  return.  He  was  subsequently 
charged  with  "unlawful  disclosure  of  classified  information",  court-martialled,  and 
dismissed  from  the  CLE.  104  The  fact  that  details  of  the  raid  were  subsequently  released  for 
publication  in  newspapers  all  over  Britain  makes  Williams'  treatment  excessive  at  best, 
and  downright  suspicious  at  worst.  105 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  208 
Strange  himself  was  next  to  depart  Ringway,  posted  to  the  Merchant  Shipping  Fighter  Unit 
on  12  May  1941.106  He  does  not  appear  to  have  argued  the  matter,  possibly  because  he 
was  expecting  it,  as  the  following  quote  from  his  biography  suggests: 
"He  [Wing-Commander  Nigel  Norman,  deputy  commander  at  the  CLE]  used 
to  say  to  me  'You'd  better  look  out  Louis 
...  you  will  go  at  it  bald  headed.  It 
attracts  too  much  attention,  and  you!  ll  find  someone  taking  a  pot  at  you  one  of 
these  fine  days".  107 
This  comment  implies  that  Strange's  removal  originated  outside  the  CLE,  but,  as  second 
in  command  at  Ringway,  Norman  must  have  been  well  aware  of  Harvey's  dissatisfaction 
with  Strange.  This  dissatisfaction  was  clearly  expressed  in  a  letter  to  No.  70  Group  on  15 
july  194  1,  which  went  into  some  detail  on  the  need  to  put  the  CLE's  house  in  order. 
Harvey  considered  all  the  pilots  at  Ringway  had  been  there  "...  too  long  and  have  never 
really  recovered  from  the  months  they  had  with  Strange,  in  fact  the  whole  Squadron  still 
suffers  from  the  bad  effects".  Replacing  them  would  do  the  CLE"the  power  of  good",  and 
give  over  five  pilots  to  the  war  effort  who  were  young  enough  to  be  re-trained.  Earl 
Fielden,  the  former  Cobham's  Flying  Circus  pilot  brought  in  by  Strange,  was  referred  to  as 
an  old  gentleman  incapable  of  giving  an  order,  and  therefore  incompatible  with  the 
expected  pressure  involved  in  increasing  the  output  of  the  PTS.  108  This  criticism  did  not 
emerge  until  two  months  after  Strange's  departure,  which  would  suggest  that  Harvey  had 
spent  the  intervening  period  attempting,  and  failing,  to  bend  the  existing  PTS  staff  to  his 
will.  Harvey  then  embarked  upon  a  wholesale  purge  of  the  PTS,  which  removed  all 
Strange's  appointees  and  many  of  those  who  served  under  him.  The  most  significant  step 
in  this  process  was  the  installation  of  Squadron-Leader  Maurice  Newnham  as  head  of  the 
PTS  from  his  post  as  the  CLE's  administration  officer.  109 
Strange's  immediate  successor  had  been  Squadron-Leader  Jack  Benham,  Chief  Parachute 
instructor  at  the  PTS,  who  officially  assumed  command  of  the  PTS  on  5  June  194  1.110 
Benham  had  been  at  the  PTS  virtually  from  the  beginning,  '  11  but  was  superseded  by 
Newnham  on  11  July  194  1.112  This  was  a  curious  substitution  because  Newnham  had  no 
practical  experience  for  the  job,  his  sole  involvement  with  airborne  forces  being  the 
formulation  of  measures  to  repel  German  airborne  attack  upon  the  UK,  before  transferring 
to  Ringway  in  a  purely  administrative  capacity.  113  Indeed,  he  did  not  make  a  parachute 
jump  until  after  his  appointment  to  command  the  PTS.  '  14  No  official  reason  was  given  for 
Benham!  s  sidelining,  and  his  departure  is  not  mentioned  in  the  operational  records  at  all. 
According  to  Newnham,  Benham  pulled  strings  to  obtain  a  transfer  to  India  to  help  set  up  a 
parachute  school  within  a  fortnight  of  assuming  command  of  the  PTS  at  Ringway.  He  did William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  209 
not  elaborate  upon  why  Benham  sought  a  transfer  from  Ringway,  but  did  relate  that 
Benham  was  subsequently  found  medically  unfit  and  lost  the  Indian  posting  as  a  result.  115 
it  is  therefore  logical  to  assume  that  Benham  was  forced  out  by  Harvey  or  by  Newnham. 
with  Harvey's  tacit  approval.  This  suggestion  is  reinforced  by  a  comment  by  Harvey  in  his 
15  July  letter  to  Cole-Hamilton,  in  which  he  advised  hanging  fire  on  any  decision  on 
116  It  also  f  replacing  Fielden  until  the  "...  Newnham  -  Benham  fight!  '  was  resolved.  1tS  in 
with  Ward's  account,  which  blames  Newnham  rather  than  Harvey  for  the  subsequent 
removal  of  Fielden,  along  with  Flight-Lieutenant  Romanov  and  Pilot-Officer  MacMonnies, 
who  had  also  been  at  the  PTS  from  the  beginning.  117  It  is  thus  difficult  to  avoid  the 
conclusion  that  Newnham  was  the  placeman  charged  with  carrying  through  Harvey's 
shake-up  of  the  PTS.  It  is  of  course  not  unusual  for  a  new  commander  to  rearrange  a 
command  more  to  his  liking.  In  this  case,  however,  it  appears  that  Harvey  and  Newnham 
were  driven  by  an  empire-building  impulse  in  addition  to  a  legitimate  wish  to  remove 
perceived  harmful  influences  from  their  commands,  not  least  because  many  of  those  so 
ousted  from  Ringway  continued  in  airborne-connected  service,  immediately  or  later. 
Benham,  for  example,  may  have  been  judged  medically  unfit  to  command  the  Indian  PTS 
at  Chaklala,  but  this  did  not  prevent  him  from  continuing  to  train  SOE  specials,  and  indeed 
dying  with  them.  According  to  Ward,  he  was  posted  missing  whilst  acting  as  despatcher 
for  an  SOE  drop  somewhere  over  Europe,  '  18  an  event  also  recorded  by  Newnham.  119 
Bruce  Williams  went  on  to  serve  as  a  Lysander  pilot  in  Special  Operations,  120  and  Strange 
himself  returned  to  the  airborne  fold  as  Wing-Commander  Operations  for  No.  46  Group, 
one  of  two  dedicated  groups  for  airborne  service,  in  December  1943.121  Fielden  and 
_N4acMonnies 
served  with  the  other  dedicated  Group,  No.  38.122 
The  purge  and  substitutions  at  the  PTS  did  not  cease  with  the  removal  of  Benham  and  the 
pilots.  According  to  Ward,  he  and  Bill  Hire  became  marked  men  after  they  disagreed  with 
Newnharn  over  extending  the  length  of  the  PTS  basic  parachuting  course  for  the  one 
hundred  per  week  output  expansion.  The  prospect  of  promotion  for  the  two  instructors 
was  used  as  an  inducement,  to  which  Hire  impolitically  reacted  by  pointing  out  that  the 
same  would  therefore  apply  to  Newnharn  himself  Ward  was  subsequently  posted  to  Iraq 
after  the  arrival  of  a  Newnharn  protdgd  earmarked  as  his  replacement,  123  but  pulled  strings 
at  the  Air  Ministry  and  became  Air  liaison  Officer  to  HQ  Is,  Airborne  Division  at 
Netheravon.  Hire  turned  up  there  shortly  thereafter,  having  been  similarly  ousted.  124  All 
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of  any  lack  of  aptitude  or efficiency,  but  because  they  simply  failed  to  fit  the  approved 
profile  of  the  Ringway  hierarchy. 
To  be  fair,  it  does  not  appear  that  this  overly  affected  the  capability  of  Ringway  to  fulfil 
its  assigned  mission,  as  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  CLE  was  able  to  meet  the  deadline  for 
the  War  Office's  expanded  parachute  requirement.  Newnharn,  for  his  part,  was  aiming  to 
create  a  "sober  and  sensible  school  ... 
[to]...  debunk  the  myths  attached  to  parachuting  and 
reduce  it  to  an  everyday  affair".  125  As  Newnharn  saw  it,  tjýs  was  best  achieved  thus: 
"if  ..  responsibility  of  the  RAF  [is]  to  teach  soldiers  how  to  parachute,  then  it  should  be 
done  by  an  RAF  staff  and  kept  quite  separate  from  the  military  part  of  their  training.  "  126 
This  goal  was  achieved  by  I  November  1941,  and  proved  so  successful  that  it  has 
remained  the  template  for  British  military  parachute  training  ever  since. 
On  the  other  hand,  this  must  be  set  against  the  rather  shabby  treatment  of  the  original  PTS 
staff,  and  the  fact  that  such  self-serving  contrasts  badly  with  Strange's  selfless  behaviour, 
whose  efforts  provided  Harvey  and  Newnham  with  a  sound  foundation  on  which  to  build 
their  empires.  It  is  fitting  to  allow  Ward  the  final  word  on  the  matter,  with  his  comment 
upon  Strange's  removal  from  Ringway: 
"He  [Strange]  deserves  more  credit  than  he  ever  got  for  leading  that  small  band 
of  RAF  and  Army  pioneers  ...  It  would  be  easy  for  some  of  those  who  came 
later  to  smile  at  the  naivety  and  some  of  the  inadequacies  of  the  earliest  days  of 
airborne  training  in  Britain.  They  should  remember  that  Louis  Strange  had 
nothing  to  build  on:  they  built  on  Louis  Strange  19 
. 
127 
The  same  could  justifiably  be  said  about  the  efforts  of  Williams,  Benham,  Fielden, 
Romanov,  MacMonnies,  Hire,  Ward  and  a  host  of  others  whose  contribution  has  been 
similarly  overshadowed  because  what  early  British  airborne  history  there  is  has  been 
written  largely  by  Ringway's  winners  rather  than  the  losers. 
A  Reined  In  and  Reguladsed.  The  Airbome  Infrastnicture,  May  1941 
Januaty  1942 
The  introduction  of  empire-building  and  internal  politicking  to  Ringway  can  be  viewed  as 
part  of  a  wider  process  by  which  Ringway  was  regularised  and  incorporated  into  the  RAF 
proper.  The  CLE's  early  orphan-like  status  and  lack  of  support  from  its  superior,  No.  22 
Group,  was  undoubtedly  less  than  beneficial  when  it  came  to  obtaining  resources.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  also  allowed  the  CLE  a  great  deal  of  autonomy.  Equipment  problems,  for 
example,  were  dealt  with  in-house,  such  as  the  parachute  modifications  carried  out 
following  the  death  of  Driver  Evans  on  25  July  1940,  or  the  testing  and  provision  of  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  211 
aperture,  static-line  attachment  points  and  tail-wheel  shrouds  to  Ringway's  Whitleys.  It 
also  engendered  a  free-spirited,  barnstorming  image  which  applied  to  both  the  original 
instructional  staff  and  Commando  volunteers,  which  attracted  the  ire  of  Rock,  and  which 
Harvey  and  Newnham  took  such  pains  to  eradicate  in  the  PTS. 
However,  this  autonomy  was  gradually  whittled  away  over  time  as  the  CLE  came  to  be 
viewed  as  a  permanent  establishment  by  the  Air  Ministry,  and  at  least  one  organisation 
outside  it.  The  Ministry  of  Aircraft  Production  (MAP)  suggested  that  a  MAP  Technical 
Section  be  established  within  the  CLE  on  8  May  1941.128  An  internal  conference  was  held 
at  Ringway  to  discuss  the  proposal,  and  a  higher  level  meeting  to  discuss  the  matter  was 
recommended  by  the  RAF's  Director  of  Military  Co-operation  on  13  May  1941.129 
Overall,  response  to  the  MAP  proposal  was  mixed.  The  CLE  reacted  positively  on  18  May 
1941,130  although  it  was  already  in  regular  contact  with  the  MAP,  particularly  with  regard 
to  glider  production.  The  introduction  of  a  direct  conduit  would  therefore  avoid  the  inertia 
and  inevitable  delay  generated  by  passing  communications  through  several  different 
departments. 
No.  70  Group,  however,  considered  the  proposal  a  thinly  veiled  attempt  by  MAP  to  take 
over  the  CLE's  development  function,  which  was  judged  to  be  a  "most  unsatisfactory 
idea".  131  No.  70  Group's  negative  response  may  have  been  prompted  purely  by  a  desire  to 
protect  its  subordinate's  freedom  of  action.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  also  have  been 
prompted  by  pique  with  MAP  for  contacting  the  CLE  directly  rather  than  through  the 
appropriate  channels.  Whichever,  the  proposal  was  explored  finiher  with  a  whole  series  of 
joint  discussions  beginning  with  a  conference  on  22  July  194  1,132  followed  by  another  in 
early  August.  133  MAP  involvement  in  airborne  development  did  increase,  particularly  after 
formation  of  the  Airborne  Forces  Experimental  Establishment  (AFEE)  in  February 
1942.134 
Beneficial  as  it  undoubtedly  was,  its  switch  from  the  auspices  of  No.  22  Group  to  No.  70 
Group  nonetheless  undermined  the  CLE's  autonomy.  No.  70  Group  took  far  more  interest 
in  the  doings  of  its  subordinate.  Previously,  accidents  and  equipment  failures  had  been 
investigated  in-house  by  the  CLE,  and  any  remedial  action  or  equipment  modifications 
silnilarly  initiated  and  carried  through.  135  In  all  instances,  the  cause  was  tracked  down  and 
rectified  in  a  matter  of  days.  The  DU,  for  example,  designed,  tested  and  released  a  locking 
pin  for  the  snap-hook  linking  the  static-line  strop  to  the  parachute  pack  for  general  use 
within  a  week  of  a  failure  causing  a  fatality  in  November  1940.136 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  212 
This  convenient  practice  ceased  with  the  death  of  a  Polish  PTS  trainee,  Lieutenant 
137 
Twardawa,  in  a  parachuting  accident  on  19  June  1941.  Lieutenant  Twardawa's  death 
was  caused  by  a  failure  of  the  connection  between  the  strongpoint  in  the  aircraft  and  the 
parachute.  138  No.  70  Group  held  its  own  inquiry,  using  information  from  the  CLE.  The 
outcome,  which  appeared  on  18  July  1941,  cleared  the  despatcher  of  blame,  but  criticised 
PTS  instructional  procedures  and  requested  recommendations  for  amending  them.  139 
Ringway  furnished  these  on  19  June,  in  a  paper  headed  "Parachute  Dropping".  This 
suggested  limiting  the  number  of  trainees  to  eight  per  sortie,  and  that  all  sticks  of  trainees 
be  accompanied  by  two  RAF  instructors,  one  at  the  front  of  the  aircraft  and  one  at  the  rear. 
Polish  sticks  were  to  be  accompanied  by  an  additional  Polish  instructor,  to  translate  where 
necessary.  An  RAF  instructor  was  personally  to  attach  trainee  static-lines  to  their 
respective  strops,  and  to  lock  the  safety  pins.  This  was  to  be  double-checked  by  each 
trainee,  and  completion  of  the  drill  was  then  to  be  relayed  to  the  pilot  before  clearance  to 
take-off  would  be  issued.  140 
These  were  reasonable  precautions,  but  No.  70  Group  issued  a  series  of  additional 
recommendations  to  Ringway  on  24  July  1941.  These  included  the  need  to  revise  standard 
operating  procedures,  and  to  provide  additional  written  instructions  in  the  trainee's  native 
language  to  avoid  potentially  fatal  misunderstandings.  In  addition,  the  CLE  was  instructed 
to  investigate  the  current  method  of  attaching  the  static-line  to  the  aircraft  strong-point, 
with  a  view  to  making  the  snap-hook  locking  mechanism  simpler  and  foolproof  It  was 
also  suggested  that  a  method  be  devised  to  allow  the  trainees  to  hook-up  their  own  static- 
.f  ty.  141 
lines,  thereby  making  them  responsible  for  their  own  sa  e  Such  external  interference 
was  unheard  of,  and  struck  a  nerve  at  Ringway.  In  its  defence,  the  CLE  rapidly  pointed  out 
that  that  the  snap-hooks  used  until  Lieutenant  Twardawa's  death  were  of  a  pattern 
approved  by  the  Air  Ministry,  but  not  by  the  CLE,  which  had  introduced  the  safety 
locking-pin  on  its  own  initiative.  It  also  pointed  out  that  the  DU  had  developed  a  special 
connector  socket  to  replace  the  strop  hook  in  January  1941,  which  had  also  been  approved 
by  the  Air  Ministry,  but  which  had  yet  to  arrive  from  the  manufacturer.  It  was  intended  to 
fit  these  new  connectors  to  all  the  CLE's  aircraft  with  the  assistance  of  No.  30  MU,  and  the 
CLE  felt  this  would  solve  the  problem.  142 
No.  70  Group  disagreed,  and  requested  clarification  that  the  new  connector  would  allow 
trainees  to  fasten  their  own  static-lines  to  fixed  strops,  and  whether  the  connector  had  been 
fully  tested.  143  The  CLE  demurred  at  the  first  suggestion,  pointing  out  that  this  would 
require  longer  strops,  which  in  conjunction  with  the  additional  movement  required  would 
increase  the  chances  of  entanglement  within  the  aircraft.  This  was  a  very  relevant  point, William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  213 
given  the  cramped  dimensions  of  the  Whitley  fuselage.  With  regard  to  tests  upon  the  new 
connector,  it  was  confirmed  that  it  had  been  tested  prior  to  production,  and  further  dummy 
44  f 
tests  were  planned  before  putting  it  into  regular  service.  '  This  still  failed  to  molli  y  No. 
70  Group,  however,  which  reiterated  its  desire  for  trainees  to  do  their  own  hooking  up  and 
stated  that  it  "...  was  not  satisfied  that  current  procedures  were  unimprovable".  The  DU 
was  instructed  to  devise  a  system  to  allow  trainee  hooking-up,  and  for  particulars  of  the 
new  connector  to  be  forwarded  to  No.  70  Group  for  examination  and  approval  before  the 
device  was  used.  145 
The  CLE's  response  to  this  reflects  growing  exasperation.  It  was  stressed  that  the  first 
design  of  the  new  connector  had  already  been  modified  once  to  enhance  safety  at  the 
CLE's  instigation,  and  that  a  host  of  non-CLE  departments  and  personnel  had  been 
involved  in  the  design  and  testing.  Ringway  also  pointed  out  that  the  CLE's  Chief 
Technical  Officer,  who  would  also  be  responsible  for  carrying  them  out,  had  drawn  up  an 
extensive  programme  of  full-scale  dummy  tests.  Copies  of  all  test  reports  and  photographs 
f  110W.  146 
were  to  0A  further  report  detailing  modifications  and  successful  live  testing  of 
the  secure  panel  in  what  were  by  then  the  AFE's  Whitleys,  which  allowed  them  to  return  to 
carrying  ten  rather  than  eight  trainees,  followed  on  20  September  1941.147 
No.  70  Group  eventually  got  its  way  regarding  making  trainees  responsible  for  hooking- 
up  their  own  parachutes,  but  not  until  more  suitable  parachuting  aircraft  became  available. 
On  13  October  1941  the  AFE  issued  a  memo  misleadingly  entitled  "Flying  Accident  at 
Ringway  20  June  1941  ".  This  actually  concerned  the  need  to  modify  any  future  hooking- 
up  procedures  for  parachuting  from  Vickers  Wellington  aircraft,  and  pointed  out  that  it  was 
not  possible  for  trainees  in  Wellingtons  to  connect  parachutes  to  strops  themselves  because 
centre  of  gravity  problems  obliged  passengers  to  occupy  different  positions  for  take-off 
andjumping. 
148  Tests  with  the  Wellington  were  successfully  completed  by  5  November 
194  1,  and  an  official  operating  procedure  was  produced  at  the  same  time.  149  Nonetheless, 
No.  70  Group  continued  doggedly  to  pursue  the  matter,  and  was  still  seeking  confirmation 
of  both  the  modified  procedure  and  the  new  connector  at  the  beginning  of  November 
1940"  With  regard  to  the  latter,  No.  70  Group's  scepticism  appears  to  have  been 
justified.  The  AFE  reported  on  5  November  1941  that  the  situation  regarding  the  new 
connector  was  "deplorable",  because  the  entire  second  batch  received  had  failed  under 
testing,  and  all  such  connectors  delivered  to  date  were  being  returned  to  the  manufacturer 
for  investigation.  It  also  reported  that  no  satisfactory  system  for  making  trainees 
responsible  for  their  own  hooking-up  had  yet  been  devised.  151 vVilliarn  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  214 
it  should  be  noted  that  the  root  problem  here  was  the  unsuitability  of  the  aircraft  involved, 
rather  than  with  the  parachutes  or  personnel.  The  problem  with  the  Whitley  remained  its 
extremely  cramped  and  dark  fuselage,  which  inhibited  movement  by  passengers,  and 
especially  those  wearing  bulky  parachutes.  This  makes  the  CLE's  opposition  to  allowing 
trainees  to  hook-up  their  own  parachutes  understandable,  and  indeed  prudent.  The 
dilemma  was  eventually  overcome  with  the  introduction  of  the  more  suitable  aircraft,  such 
as  the  Armstrong-Whitworth  Albemarle  Mark  V  and  the  US-built  Douglas  C47.152  The 
fuselages  of  these  aircraft  were  roomy  enough  for  parachutists  to  attach  their  own 
parachute  strops  to  rails  or cables  running  along  its  entire  length,  and  that  of  the  C47  was 
large  enough  for  passengers  to  stand  upright.  153  This  meant  that  instructors  merely  had  to 
check  that  the  clips  were  properly  secured,  and  removed  the  need  for  strops  to  be 
permanently  attached  to  secure  panels  in  the  aircraft.  Instead,  they  could  remain  attached 
to  the  parachute  before  issue,  with  the  clip  being  temporarily  secured  within  easy  reach  on 
the  shoulder  of  the  parachute  harness. 
Aircraft  suitability  aside,  events  following  the  death  of  Lieutenant  Twardawa  clearly 
show  that  by  July  1941  Ringway  had  lost  the  freedom  from  supervision  it  had  enjoyed  a 
year  previously.  Neither  was  this  loss  restricted  solely  to  safety  or  practical  matters.  On 
16  September  1941  the  PTS  compiled  detailed  figures  for  parachute  training  at  Ringway 
from  its  inception  to  date,  which  were  forwarded  to  HQ  CLE  and  RAF  Army  Co-operation 
Command  the  next  day.  154  From  29  August  1941  the  channel  of  communications  to  and 
from  Ringway  had  been  standardised.  At  the  CLE's  suggestion,  everything  was  to  pass 
through  No.  70  Group,  then  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command,  and  thence  wherever.  151 
The  PTS's  figures  did  not  get  past  the  first  stage,  despite  the  fact  there  were  intended  for 
higher  authority.  No.  70  Group  acknowledged  receipt  of  the  paper  on  18  September  1941 
but  criticised  its  presentation  and  provided  an  approved  format  for  future  use.  156  The  PTS 
was  obliged  to  resubmit  the  information  in  the  new  format  on  24  September  1941.157 
Such  bureaucratic  nit-picking  was  not  totally  unprecedented  at  Ringway.  In  September 
1940  Churchill  had  returned  a  copy  of  a  conference  agenda  to  the  Air  Ministry  with  a 
scrawled  marginal  complaint  about  lack  of  clarity  and  a  demand  for  the  culprit's  name,  158 
to  which  the  Air  Ministry  apologised  promptly  and  profusely,  and  named  Group-Captain 
Goddard,  then  Deputy  Director  of  Plans.  1,59  This,  however,  was  rather  different  than  the 
sustained  and  successful  campaign  waged  by  No.  70  Group  to  bring  Ringway  into  the  RAF 
procedural  line.  In  some  ways  this  was  both  necessary  and  beneficial,  for  as  the  airborne 
project  expanded  it  inevitably  overlapped  with  other  RAF  activities.  In  June  1941,  for 
example,  Ringway  was  obliged  to  liaise  with  Fighter  Command  regarding  night William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  215 
parachuting,  which  threatened  to  interfere  with  night-fighter  operations  by  No.  9  GroUp.  160 
Nonetheless,  whilst  the  Air  Ministry  may  have  lost  the  battle  to  prevent  the  formation  of  a 
parachute  force,  it  won  the  secondary  struggle  to  establish  firm  RAF  control  over  virtually 
all  aspects  of  the  airborne  infrastructure.  This  was  equally  crucial,  for  it  allowed  the  Air 
Ministry  to  retain  a  useful  advantage  for  deployment  in  future  struggles  over  the  allocation 
of  resources. 
VII.  Slow  Marching:  Glider  DevelopmentS,  Apill  1941  -  Januaty  1942 
The  glider  portion  of  the  British  airborne  force  did  not  reach  fruition  until  after  the 
estabiishment  of  an  operational  parachute  force.  However,  glider  developments  still  merit 
examination,  and  not  merely  to  properly  round  out  the  airborne  story.  As  we  have  seen,  a 
considerable  amount  of  effort  and  resources  were  put  into  glider  development,  in  parallel 
with  the  establishment  of  the  parachute  force.  More  importantly,  glider  delivery  of  troops 
and  heavy  equipment  became  a  crucial  factor  in  the  large-scale  airborne  operations 
mounted  by  British  Airborne  Forces  from  1943  onward. 
By  April  1941,  the  original  Glider  Training  Squadron  had  been  renamed  No.  I  Glider 
Training  School  (GTS),  although  still  located  for  the  moment  at  the  recently  re-christened 
RAF  Thame  161 
. 
Despite  the  dedicated  location  and  new  name,  No.  I  GTS  remained 
severely  retarded  by  the  lack  of  gliders.  Unlike  the  parallel  shortage  of  parachuting 
aircraft,  this  was  largely  unavoidable,  for  the  necessary  machines  simply  did  not  exist,  and 
could  not  be  produced  from  thin  air.  Designs  were  commissioned  comparatively  swiftly, 
but  there  was  an  inevitable  lag  between  formulation  and  delivery.  The  delay  was 
exacerbated  by  the  need  to  liaise  with  other  departments.  The  MAP  contacted  Director  of 
Military  Co-operation  Goddard  following  distribution  of  his  November  1940  paper  on  the 
provision  of  an  airborne  force,  162  in  order  to  clarify  the  possible  ramifications  of  glider 
production  upon  the  MAP's  efforts.  163  This  prompted  finiher  discussion,  164  culminating  in 
an  Air  Ministry  decision  to  order  sufficient  gliders  for  the  War  Office's  two  projected 
16  166 
"Invasion  Corps",  on  19  February  1941  .5  The  order  was  placed  on  3  March  1941,  with 
the  rider  that  Goddard  and  the  GTS  should  "...  not  count  on  any  production  in 
quantity  ... 
before  late  Spring  1942".  167 
The  matter  was  more  complex  than  merely  ordering  sufficient  machines,  however,  not 
least  because  of  emerging  doubts  over  the  viability  of  designs.  The  first  purpose-designed 
British  military  glider  was  formulated  to  meet  Air  Ministry  Spec.  10/40,  later  christened 
the  Hotspu  r.  This  machine  first  flew  in  November  1940,168  and  was  testflown  by  CLE William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  216 
staff  on  21  January  1941.169  The  first  example  was  delivered  to  the  CLE  on  6  February 
19417  170  and  the  type  was  demonstrated  before  Churchill  at  Ringway  in  April  1941 
. 
171 
However,  the  design  had  been  produced  in  haste,  based  on  the  German  DFS  240  used  at 
Eben  Emael,  with  the  result  that  it  was  poorly  configured  for  British  requirements  when 
the  latter  were  properly  formulated.  The  Hotspur's  carrying  capacity  -  one  pilot  and  seven 
passengers  -  was  too  small,  and  the  sailplane-based  design  did  not  allow  short,  steep 
landing  runs  because  of  the  high  landing  and  stalling  speed  this  confeffed.  172 
A  pre-production  meeting  to'discuss  the  Hotspur  was  held  at  the  MAP  on  6  March 
1941,173  and  by  17  March  1941  it  was  advocated  that  procurement  of  the  type  be  restricted 
to  four  hundred,  for  training,  rather  than  operational,  purposes.  174  A  series  of  inspections 
and  tests  were  conducted  on  pre-production  Hotspurs  through  March  and  into  April  1941, 
to  determine  the  optimum  tow-cable  length.  175  These  tests  led  to  reductions  in  wing  span, 
changes  to  the  cockpit  canopy,  and  to  the  passenger  exit.  176  Despite  this,  production 
machines  were  still  far  from  satisfactory,  and  following  further  tests  in  September  1941, 
the  AFE  gave  its  considered  opinion  that  the  Hotspur  was  unsuitable  for  operations,  and 
did  not  therefore  justify  large-scale  production.  177  This  was  relayed  to  RAF  Army  Co- 
operation  Command,  178  which  nonetheless  ordered  the  continuation  of  trials,  179  although 
these  created  more  problems  than  they  resolved.  180  Despite  this,  proposals  to  use  the 
Hotspur  operationally  continued,  in  part  as  a  filler  until  production  of  a  larger  machine 
came  on-stream.  181  In  the  event,  Hotspur  was  never  used  operationally,  but  served  as  a 
basic  glider  trainer  until  1945.  Over  a  thousand  were  produced.  182 
The  Hotspur  story  clearly  illustrates  the  pitfalls  inherent  in  formulating  and  producing 
equipment  in  haste  without  fully  ascertaining  its  purpose.  In  fact,  the  Air  Ministry's  3 
March  1941  order  for  eight  hundred  gliders  actually  specified  the  twenty-five-seat  glider 
designed  to  meet  Spec.  26/40,  later  christened  the  Horsa.  1113  The  decision  was  endorsed  by 
the  War  Office  on  17  March  1941.184  However,  this  machine  only  existed  on  paper  at  that 
time,  which  incidentally  provides  a  further  example  of  the  War  Office  demanding 
equipment  without  fully  appreciating  the  difficulties  involved.  CLE  staff  either  discussed 
or  examined  a  mock-up  Horsa  with  civilian  manufacturers  in  January  1941,185  and  the  Air 
Ministry  was  informed  that  the  specification  had  been  fulfilled  at  the  end  of  that  month, 
with  detailed  drawings  scheduled  for  delivery  by  the  end  of  April  1941 
. 
1116  Churchill  Was 
provided  with  details  of  the  Horsa  in  May  194  1,187  and  it  first  flew  at  Heathrow  on  3 
September  1941.188 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  217 
Even  then,  it  was  still  not  merely  a  matter  of  placing  the  Horsa  in  mass  production.  There 
were  the  requisite  production  capacity  and  materials  to  find  which,  as  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 
Staff  pointed  out  at  the  end  of  March  1941,  might  affect  production  of  other  wooden 
aircraft  including  the  Avro  Anson  and  Miles  Magister  trainers,  and  the  Armstrong 
Whitworth  Albemarle  and  De  Havilland  Mosquito  bombers.  '89  There  was  also  the  matter 
of  cost.  In  April  1941  the  Imperial  and  Air  staffs  were  obliged  to  co-operate  to  fend  off 
complaints  from  the  Treasury  over  the  cost  of  projected  glider  production,  which  was 
estimated  by  the  Treasury  in  excess  of  eight  million  pounds.  190  This  figure  may  have 
included  the  giant  tank-carrying  glider  produced  to  meet  Air  Ministry  Spec.  27/40,  later 
christened  the  Hamilcar.  A  mock  up  of  this  machine  was  inspected  by  the  CLE  on  28  May 
1941,191  and  it  made  its  maiden  flight  at  the  end  of  March  1942.192 
The  Treasury's  concerns  were  doubtless  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  acquiring  the  Horsa 
meant  effectively  writing-off  the  resources  put  into  the  Hotspur,  and  because  it  was  not 
guaranteed  that  the  Horsa  would  prove  any  more  suitable  than  the  Hotspur.  Theoretical 
calculations  in  April  1941  suggested  that  towing  the  larger  machine  might  be 
problematic, 
193  and  the  Director  of  Military  Co-operation  cautioned  against  ordering  large 
numbers  of  Horsas  because  too  little  was  known  about  the  machine  in  October  1941,194  six 
weeks  after  its  first  flight.  These  reservations  supported  the  compromise  suggested  in 
March  1941  that  the  Hotspur  be  confined  to  training  pending  investigation  of  the  Horsa,  195 
which  were  reiterated  at  the  end  of  October  1941.196  This  meant  that  the  resources  put  into 
the  Hotspur  were  not  totally  wasted,  and  allowed  the  operational  glider  force  to  be 
standardised  on  the  Horsa  and  Hamilcar  when  they  entered  full-scale  production.  197 
The  second  major  obstacle  facing  the  No.  I  GTS  was  obtaining  sufficient  pilots  to  fly  the 
projected  glider  force.  The  glider  pilot  issue  had  been  an  Air  Ministry  -  War  Office 
football  since  the  proposal  to  use  glider  was  first  raised  in  August  1940.198  The  Air 
N4inistry  first  insisted  that  the  Army  provide  pilots,  before  reverting  to  the  view  on  10 
December  1940  that  only  fully  trained  bomber  pilots  were  equal  to  the  task.  199  The  first 
cohort  of  twelve  pilots  were  soldiers,  all  of  whom  soloed  on  the  GTS's  sport  gliders  by  5 
April  1941,200  along  with  sixteen  volunteer  RAF  pilotS.  201  This  was  complicated  by  the 
fact  that  the  Army  candidates  had  received  insufficient  basic  powered  flying  training 
during  their  initial  attachment  to  Army  Co-operation  Squadrons  for  that  purpose  up  until 
February  1941.  Nonetheless,  it  was  five  of  the  newly  qualified  Army  volunteers  who  flew 
the  gliders  at  the  Ringway  demonstration  for  Churchill  at  the  end  of  that  month.  202 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  218 
The  Air  Ministry  changed  its  position  on  the  source  of  glider  pilots  for  the  final  time  in 
August  1941.  This  was  presumably  because  the  Army  was  looking  to  the  RAF  to  provide 
eight  hundred  pilots  for  two  brigade-sized  glider  forces,  one  for  Home  deployment  and  one 
for  use  in  India  or  the  Middle  East.  203  An  internal  Air  Ministry  conference  held  on  22 
August  1941  announced  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  provide  this  number  of  pilots 
without  "immobilising"  bombers  by  stripping  their  crews  for  the  purpose.  It  was  therefore 
recommended  that  glider  pilots  be  Army  officers  or  NCOs  seconded  in  Army  uniform  for 
training  by  the  RAF,  and  that  they  also  be  fully  trained  for  ground  combat  . 
204  This  idea, 
subsequently  encapsulated  in  the  "total  soldier"  concept,  was  accepted  by  the  War  Office, 
which  also  agreed  that  candidates  should  conform  to  the  same  medical  standards  as  RAF 
flightcrew.  205  The  upshot  of  this  was  the  formation  of  the  Army  Air  Corps  on  21 
December  1941,  and  the  establishment  of  the  Glider  Pilot  Regiment  within  that  Corps  in 
February  1942.  By  August  1942  the  Regiment  had  grown  to  two  battalions,  and  was 
commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  George  Chatterton  following  the  death  of  John  Rock  in 
a  gliding  accident  in  October  1942  . 
206  These  later  developments  finally  placed  the  glider 
pilot  issue  firmly  in  the  Army's  court,  leaving  the  RAF  responsible  solely  for  their  flight 
training  in  the  same  way  it  provided  parachute  training  for  the  parachute  battalions. 
Back  at  RAF  Thame,  No.  I  GTS  and  the  DU  were  fully  occupied  in  the  interim,  with  both 
glider  development  and  working  with  the  troops  who  would  ultimately  be  incorporated  into 
the  Airlanding  Brigades  of  the  British  I'  and  6th  Airborne  Divisions.  The  first  joint  glider 
exercise  was  held  at  Thame  on  20  February  194  1,207  with  troops  from  the  Oxfordshire  and 
208 
Buckinghamshire  Light  Infantry,  and  another  was  held  on  12  March.  This  began  a 
partnership  that  climaxed  just  after  midnight  on  6  June  1944,  at  Benouville  in 
Normand  Y.  209  Gliders  from  Thame  also  participated  in  a  joint  demonstration  with  the  PTS 
before  the  King  at  Windsor  on  25  May  1941.  As  with  the  PTS,  growing  glider 
involvement  in  demonstrations  and  exercises  obliged  the  formation  of  a  dedicated  unit 
under  the  CLE  umbrella.  Thus  the  Glider  Exercise  Flight,  later  Unit  (GXU)  was  set  up  at 
Ringway  on  9  July  1941,  to  be  equipped  with  ten  single-engine  tugs  and  ten  Hotspurs,  as 
both  types  became  available  . 
2'0  The  GXU  carried  out  the  first  glider  experience  flights  for 
green  troops  from  the  Royal  Welch  Fusiliers  on  11  October  1941,211  following  the  War 
office's  decision  to  transform  31  Independent  Brigade  Group  into  an  Airlanding  Brigade 
Group  on  10  October 
. 
212  Twenty-one  troops  of  the  Ox  &  Bucks  were  lifted  to  participate 
in  exercise  "Cotton"  on  26  October,  and  were  inspected  by  GOC  Western  Command  after 
landing.  A  further  demonstration  was  held  for  the  recently  appointed  "Commander  Para- 
Troops  and  Airborne  Troops",  Acting  Major-General  F.  A.  M.  Browning,  on  12  November 
1941.213 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  7  219 
Glider  development  work  was  also  carried  out  at  Thame,  or  elsewhere  by  personnel  from 
No.  1  GTS  and  the  DU,  in  parallel  with  flying  and  tactical  training.  Wing-Commander 
Norman  and  Flying-Officer  Kronfeld  attended  a  conference  at  the  MAP  to  discuss  the 
Hotspur  on  6  March  1941,  for  example.  A  winch  to  allow  tug  aircraft  to  reel  in  glider  tow- 
lines  after  release  was  tested  rather  unsuccessfully  at  the  end  of  that  month,  and  officers 
from  the  glider  side  of  the  DU  inspected  a  mock-up  of  the  tank-carrying  Hamilcar  glider 
on  28  May  1941  . 
214  Representatives  from  the  tow-rope  manufacturer  R.  Malcolm  Ltd. 
visited  Thame  on  21  March  1941,  and  tests  were  held  to  ascertain  the  type  and  length  of 
. 
215  GX  tow-line  required  for  the  Hotspur  on  10  April  LU  gliders  also  participated  in  a  series 
of  tests  to  assess  the  German  glider  threat  at  the  Air  Fighting  Development  Unit  (AFDU)  at 
RAF  Duxford  in  Cambridgeshire.  Carried  out  between  n-0-November  and  December 
1941,  the  tests  were  intended  to  allow  the  formulation  of  counter-measureS.  216  The  GXU 
also  carried  out  stowage  and  stability  trials  with  the  Hotspur,  following  a  landing  fatality 
and  injuries  caused  by  unsecured  weapons  and  equipment,  on  19  December  1941.217 
Thus,  by  the  end  of  1941,  the  PTS  was  finally  in  a  position  to  embark  upon  its  original 
task  of  training  a  large  scale  parachute  force,  and  the  GTS  was  similarly  poised,  awaiting 
only  the  arrival  of  sufficient  suitable  gliders.  It  now  remains  to  examine  how  the  War 
office  formulated  a  role,  and  provided  the  men,  for  the  establishment  of  operational 
parachute  and  airlanding  brigades. 
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CHAPTER  EIGHT 
From  Maverick  Raiders  to  a  Conventional  Force:  The 
Transformation  of  11  SAS  Battalion  Into  the  10"t  Parachute 
Brigade 
Over  the  period  1940  to  early  1941,  the  Army  created  a  serni-operational  parachute  force, 
in  the  shape  of  No.  11  Special  Air  Service  Battalion.  Failure  to  attract  sufficient  volunteers 
of  the  right  calibre  meant  that  in  reality  II  SAS  Battalion  remained  understrength, 
although  the  fact  that  the  unit  was  configured  and  trained  for  small-scale  raiding  operations 
obviated  this  problem  to  degree.  The  Tragino  Raid  proved  the  viability  of  such  operations, 
at  least  up  to  a  point,  in  February  1941.  As  we  have  seen,  this  raiding  focus  was  largely 
mandated  by  the  Army's  shortage  of  manpower  following  its  ejection  from  mainland 
Europe,  and  the  failure  of  the  Air  Ministry  to  supply  sufficient  aircraft  to  train  for  anything 
larger,  although  the  War  Office  harboured  grander  airborne  ambitions  virtually  from  the 
outset.  These  were  realised  at  the  beginning  of  1942,  by  which  time  the  Army  had 
transformed  and  expanded  its  band  of  parachute  raiders  into  a  brigade  of  three  parachute 
battalions,  with  another  battalion  in  the  pipeline. 
However,  this  was  by  no  means  the  seamless  and  logical  progression  portrayed  in  the 
official  histories  and  secondary  accounts.  This  chapter  will  therefore  concentrate  upon  the 
Army  side  of  matters,  and  argue  that  despite  its  early  interest  in  a  large-scale  airborne 
force,  the  Army  only  seriously  undertook  the  necessary  doctrinal  and  organisational 
investigations  from  July  1941,  and  after  the  decision  to  expand  the  airborne  force  had  been 
taken.  The  expansion  was  thus  carried  out  without  the  benefits  that  systematic  research  in 
the  first  year  of  its  existence  could  have  afforded,  and  the  Army  was  consequently  obliged 
to  reshape  its  existing  airborne  recruiting  and  training  procedures.  This  chapter  will  also 
reveal  a  factor  that  has  been  largely  overlooked  by  previous  historians.  This  is  the  degree 
to  which  the  British  transition  from  airborne  raiders  to  a  large-scale  force  for  use  in  support 
of  conventional  operations  utilised  Polish  input,  both  theoretical  and  practical. 
I.  No  Longer  a  Parochial  Concem:  Extemal  Interest  in  the  New  British 
Airborne  Force 
During  the  course  of  1941  the  new  British  airborne  force  shifted  from  being  merely  a 
matter  of  discussion  between  a  few  departments  and  officials  in  Whitehall.  The  Tragino, 
Raid  of  February  1941  had  been  widely  reported  in  the  press,  '  and  the  new  arm  thus 
became  an  object  of  public  interest.  In  July  1941  the  CLE  prepared  a  paper  for  public 
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consumption  at  the  behest  of  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command.  Entitled  "British William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  230 
Parachute  Troops",  the  stated  purpose  of  the  paper  was  to  put  the  latter's  capabilities  in 
their  proper  context  and  "...  not  to  allow  imagination  to  run  riot  so  they  [the  parachute 
troops]  appear  to  be  possessed  of  some  mystical  omnipotency".  3  This  would  suggest  that 
the  powers  that  be  were  aware  at  this  time  of  the  maverick  image  cultivated  by  some 
amongst  the  rank  and  file  of  11  SAS  Battalion,  and  which  was  later  vigorously 
4 
suppressed  . 
Despite  the  disclaimer,  the  paper  nonetheless  closed  on  a  rousing  note: 
"They  are  some  of  our  finest  stormtroopers  who  are  imbued  with  the  one 
ambition  of  getting  to  grips  with  the  enemy  in  whatever  role  ...  We  know  they 
will  give  a  good  account  of  themselves  in  whatever  circumstances  they  may 
find  themselves.  Good  luck  to  thenf'.  5 
An  official  press  visit  to  Ringway  was  arranged  in  October  1941.  A  Movietone  News 
newsreel  was  shot,  which  included  scenes  of  parachutists  making  mass  aircraft  jumps  and 
Group-Captain  Harvey  was  interviewed  at  length  on  the  role  of  the  AFE  and  airborne 
forces.  6  Interest  in  British  parachute  forces  was  not  confined  to  the  domestic  sphere.  in 
June  1941  the  Army  staff  at  the  CLE  prepared  a  paper  including  details  of  personal  kit, 
equipment  and  container  load  combinations  for  transmission  to  the  Turkish  government, 
following  a  request  from  the  latter  to  the  War  Office.  7  Precisely  what  prompted  the 
Turkish  enquiry  is  unclear,  for  the  War  Office  paper  appears  to  be  a  one  off.  Nonetheless, 
it  clearly  illustrates  that  the  British  airborne  force  had  moved  beyond  being  an  internal 
Whitehall  matter. 
Arguably  more  important  from  a  policy-forming  perspective  was  the  continued  official 
rnilitary  interest  from  British  commands  outside  the  UK.  Middle  Eastern.  Command  and 
India  had  expressed  interest  in  forming  airborne  forces  of  their  own  as  early  as  the  autumn 
of  1940,8  and  continued  to  follow  developments  thereafter  via  the  War  Office.  9  Despite 
initial  optimism,  the  Middle  Eastern  effort  was  stymied  by  shortages  of  suitable  equipment, 
particularly  aircraft,  and  lapsed  for  a  time  as  a  result.  10  However,  the  Indian  Commander- 
in-Chief,  General  Sir  Robert  Cassels,  was  a  firm  supporter  of  the  airborne  idea,  and  had 
rnore  clout.  He  authorised  the  formation  of  three  parachute  battalions  for  a  future  Indian 
parachute  brigade  on  2  December  1940,  and,  although  the  War  Office  advised  that  Indian 
developments  be  postponed  until  the  home  airborne  situation  was  clarified  at  the  end  of 
january  194  1,11  he  formed  an  Airborne  Troop  Committee  on  16  April  194  1.  The 
committee  was  headed  by  the  senior  RAF  staff  officer  in  India,  Air  Commodore  Claude- 
Wright,  with  a  brief  to  investigate  and  fabricate  solutions  to  problems  likely  to  affect  the 
establishment  of  a  parachute  brigade  and  training  infrastructure  in  India.  Cassels  went William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  231 
ahead  with  the  establishment  of  an  Indian  parachute  brigade  on  15  May  1941,  and  the  50  th 
Indian  Parachute  Brigade  was  officially  brought  into  existence  the  following  October.  12 
This  shows  that,  up  to  a  point,  Indian  airborne  progress  kept  abreast  of  that  in  Britain. 
indeed,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  Indians  were  actually  ahead,  for  the  British  October 
1940  decision  to  fonn  a  parachute  brigade  was  not  settled  beyond  doubt  until  the  end  of 
13  August  1941  . 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Indian  airborne  effort  promptly  ran  into  a  series  of 
equipment  problems,  not  the  least  of  which  was  a  lack  of  parachutes  and  aircraft.  The 
Indian  lead  was  therefore  more  apparent  than  real,  although  it  did  bear  fruit  in  the  end,  with 
the  initial  Indian  parachute  brigade  being  expanded  to  divisional  size  by  April  1945.14 
initial  Indian  progress  was  attributable  to  a  combination  of  factors,  foremost  of  which  was 
remoteness  from  Whitehall.  In  addition,  mutual  co-operation  between  the  Army  and  RAF 
in  India  was  built  on  the  considerable  degree  of  practical  experience  garnered  from  joint 
imperial  policing  operations  in  the  inter-war  period.  15  The  fact  that  the  movement  of 
troops  and  material  by  air  was  a  matter  of  routine  in  India  meant  that  much  of  the  co- 
operative  groundwork,  which  proved  necessary  in  Britain,  had  already  been  done. 
Forming  an  Indian  parachute  unit  was  therefore  merely  a  matter  of  training  for  a  new 
method  of  descent,  rather  than  a  shift  in  operational  thinking. 
Indian  developments  not  only  provided  Churchill  with  a  useful  prompt  for  use  at  homel 
but  also  with  a  pro-airborne  political  ally,  in  the  shape  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India, 
L.  S.  Amery.  Amery  wrote  to  Churchill  on  6  October  1941,  urging  the  establishment  of  a 
multi-divisional  airborne  force  in  India  for  strategic,  rather  than  merely  tactical, 
employment  in  the  Empire.  This  coincided  with  General  Cassels'  order  to  establish  an 
su  16  Indian  airborne  brigade,  and  Amery  also  cited  Wavell  as  a  pporter  of  the  project. 
Churchill  passed  this  to  the  Chiefs  Of  Staff  for  comment,  17  and  the  latter  responded  with  a 
very  detailed  and  fairly  accurate  appraisal  of  the  current  airborne  situation.  The  crux  of 
this  was  that  there  was  no  real  prospect  of  implementing  Amery's  proposals  without  a 
significant  shift  in  aircraft  production  priorities,  which  would  entail  a  significant  delay  in 
overall  aircraft  production.  The  Prime  Minister  passed  this  straight  on  to  Amery,  with  the 
pencilled  footnote  "Secretary  of  State  for  India:  have  you  any  further  comment?  ".  18 
Amery  did  indeed  have  some  further  comments,  which  must  have  been  music  to 
Churchill's  ears,  and  indeed  those  Of  the  Pro-airborne  lobby.  He  began  by  questioning  the 
Chiefs  of  Staffs  commitment  to  the  airborne  idea,  and  the  assumption  that  glider 
production  had  to  be  governed  by  the  availability  of  tug  aircraft.  He  also  recommended  a 
new  investigation  into  obtaining  transport  aircraft  from  the  US,  and  suggested  that  gliders William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  232 
could  be  built  in  India,  Canada  and  the  US  in  order  to  boost  production.  19  He  added  to  this 
list  five  days  later,  suggesting  that  cheap  and  unsophisticated  transport  aircraft  be  built 
20 
alongside  bombers  on  the  production  line.  Churchill  again  relayed  all  this  to  the  Chief  of 
Air  Staff  at  the  Air  Ministry,  on  13  November  1941.  "  - 
Amery  was  rehashing  ideas  that  had  been  floated  a  year  previously,  albeit  in  a  more 
forthright  manner,  and  the  Air  Ministry  response  was  equally  familiar.  Pre-war  funding 
parsimony  was  again  blamed  for  aircraft  shortages,  and  Amery's  enthusiasm  for  transport 
aircraft  was  dismissed  out  of  hand.  The  utility  of  such  machines  was  acknowledged,  but 
they  could  not  "...  properly  be  regarded  as  a  normal  means  of  transporting  or  maintaining 
troops  in  the  field  or  of  operating  a  transport  route  on  a  large  scale".  22  This  verdict  was  of 
course  proved  wildly  inaccurate  by  future  events,  for  which  the  Air  Ministry  could 
arguably  be  forgiven.  It  is  less  easy  to  dismiss  its  seeming  ignorance  of  the  extent  of 
Army-RAF  co-operation  in  the  Empire  between  the  wars.  It  is  therefore  difficult  to  avoid 
concluding  that  the  Air  Ministry  was  deliberately  ignoring  facts  that  did  not  support 
current  air  policy.  This  particular  piece  of  Air  Ministry  obfuscation  cannot  have  been 
intended  to  obstruct  the  Home  airborne  effort,  for  I"  Parachute  Brigade  had  commenced 
training  at  Ringway  on  I  November  1941.23  It  is  therefore  more  likely  to  have  been  a 
measure  to  try  and  avoid  supplying  additional  RAF  resources  for  an  expansion  of  the 
airborne  effort  overseas. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  the  question  refused  to  go  away  because  overseas  commands  continued 
to  agitate  for  their  own  airborne  forces.  In  the  Middle  East  Wavell's  successor  as  Middle 
Eastern  commander,  Sir  Claude  Auchinleck,  vigorously  reopened  the  matter  of 
establishing  an  airborne  force  in  the  Middle  East.  In  a  telegram  despatched  to  London  on 
20  January  1942,  addressed  to  every  senior  official  in  the  War  Office  including  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  War,  Auchinleck  insisted  that  "...  we  must  have  an  airborne  force  on 
the  spot".  He  also  claimed  that  the  lack  of  such  a  force  had  been  directly  responsible  for 
losing  a  "golden  opportunity"  to  destroy  Rommel  in  Libya,  and  recommended  that  an 
initial  airborne  increment  of  battalion  size  be  established  immediately,  using  local 
resources  allied  to  expertise  and  equipment  from  the  UK.  24 
Auchinleck's  enthusiasm  for  airborne  matters  may  have  dated  back  as  far  as  the  First 
World  War.  He  participated  in  attempts  to  relieve  Townshead's  encircled  forces  at  Kut  in 
Mesopotamia,  and  probably  saw  the  unsuccessful  attempts  to  supply  the  garrison  from  the 
air.  25  More  pertinently,  he  served  in  Kurdistan  and  India  throughout  the  inter-war  period, 
as  Colonel  of  the  I'  Punjabi  regiment  from  1929,  and  latterly  as  member  of  the  Expert William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  233 
Committee  on  the  Defence  of  India,  also  known  as  the  Chatfield  Committee.  He  would 
therefore  have  been  well  aware  of  the  scale  and  importance  of  air  transportation  in  the 
Empire  through  the  1920s  and  30s,  which  explains  his  accurate  appreciation  of  the 
potential  advantages  airborne  operations  offered  in  the  Middle  East.  Further  evidence  of 
Auchinleck's  penchant  for  unconventional  thinking  is  provided  by  the  fact  that  he 
authorised  the  formation  of  David  Stirling's  Special  Air  Service  raiders.  26 
Airborne  forces  were  eventually  deployed  in  the  Middle  East.  The  40'Parachute  Brigade, 
based  upon  151  Parachute  Battalion  transferred  from  India,  was  fonned  at  Kabrit  in  the 
Suez  Canal  Zone  in  November  1942,  supported  by  No.  4  Middle  East  [parachute]  Training 
School,  established  in  May  1942.  Both  units  moved  to  more  suitable  accommodation  at 
Ramat  David  in  Northern  Palestine  in  February  1943.27  I't  Parachute  Brigade  was  also 
deployed  to  North  Africa  from  the  UK  in  November  1942,  for  operations  in  Algeria  and 
Tunisia.  29  However,  they  came  too  late  to  participate  in  the  destruction  of  Rommel,  or 
indeed  to  aid  Auchinleck,  who  was  replaced  as  Commander-in-Chief  Middle  East  by 
Alexander  in  August  1942.29 
Amery  also  continued  the  push  for  the  establishment  of  an  airborne  capability  in  India. 
He  wrote  to  Churchill  on  19  January  1942,  the  same  day  that  Auchinleck  despatched  his 
telegram  to  the  War  Office.  Amery  reiterated  Auchinleck's  arguments,  emphasised  the 
quick-reaction  capability  an  airborne  force  would  provide  in  both  the  Middle  and  Far  East, 
and  urged  the  Prime  Minister  not  to  be  put  off  by  Air  Ministry  obstruction.  30  The  Indian 
and  the  Middle  Eastern  effort  were  clearly  being  orchestrated  to  some  degree.  Auchinleck 
berated  the  Indian  War  Office  for  the  lack  of  airborne  progress  by  telegram  at  the  end  of 
march  1942,31  and  Amery  passed  details  of  Indian  progress  to  the  Indian  government  on  5 
April  1942,  apparently  in  reply  to  Auchinleck's  complaints.  32  Amery's  letter  of  19  January 
1942  to  Churchill  is  particularly  noteworthy,  because  of  the  shrewd  analysis  of  the  root  of 
the  problems  being  encountered  by  the  airborne  effort  in  the  UK  and,  by  extension, 
elsewhere: 
11  1  still  believe  that  the  only  way  to  get  the  thing  on  an  adequate  scale  is  to 
insist  on  having  it,  on  whatever  scale  you  decide  on,  entirely  separate  from  the 
Air  Force.  Order  large  quantities  of  powerful  engines,  have  your  transport 
planes  and  gliders  built,  all  as  a  show  of  its  own.  Otherwise  the  Air  Staff  will 
always  point  out  how  few  are  the  bombers  or  pilots  that  can  be  spared  for  the 
task.  03 
These  were  prophetic  words  indeed,  and  it  is  fascinating  to  speculate  how  the  airborne 
effort  might  have  turned  out  had  Churchill  placed  it  in  the  hands  of  Amery  or a  similarly William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  234 
independent  and  capable  individual  at  the  outset,  rather  than  relying  upon  the  goodwill  of 
the  Whitehall  bureaucracies  involved. 
I/.  Refining  the  Home  Airborne  Requirement,  July  to  September  1941 
As  we  have  seen,  the  Army's  view  of  the  shape  and  role  of  its  new  airborne  force  began  to 
shift  well  before  Churchill's  April  1941  visit  to  Ringway  revitalised  the  airborne  project.  34 
The  War  Office  decided,  provisionally  and  unilaterally,  to  aim  for  a  brigade-size  parachute 
force  on  4  October  1940,35  and  only  officially  informed  the  Air  Ministry  of  its  decision  a 
month  later,  in  early  November  1940.36  Additional  details  were  furnished  in  January 
194  1,37  which  were  amended  shortly  thereafter.  38  The  upshot  was  an  airborne  concensus 
of  sorts  between  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  by  April  1941,  although  this  was  only 
achieved  after  a  series  ofjoint  conferences  and  the  production  of  ajoint  airborne  policy 
paper  for  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  in  March  1941  . 
39  Despite  the  high  level  of  interest  in  the 
airborne  idea  outside  the  UK,  developments  in  Britain  remained  the  crucial  element  in  the 
further  development  of  the  British  airborne  arm.  However,  Home  progress  was  by  no 
means  dynamic,  at  least  until  mid-way  through  1941.  The  idea  of  raising  airborne  units  of 
brigade  size  may  have  been  under  varying  degrees  of  consideration  since  September 
1940,40  but  until  early  July  1941  little  was  done  to  clarify  their  intended  purpose, 
composition  and  training,  or  where  the  necessary  personnel  were  to  be  drawn  fron-L  In 
fact,  when  the  War  Office  informed  the  Air  Ministry  of  its  crystallising  intent  to  expand 
the  airborne  force  by  a  further  1,800  men  on  4  July  1941,  the  proposal  was  by  no  means 
universally  accepted  within  the  Army  either.  41 
This  is  clear  from  a4  July  1941  memo  from  the  Assistant  Chief  of  the  Imperial  Staff 
(ACIGS),  Lieutenant-General  Haining.  Haining  pointed  out  that  the  Army  was  short  of 
manpower,  and  recommended  two  possible  courses  for  the  expansion  of  the  airborne  force. 
First,  that  the  expansion  be  postponed  until  Army  reorganisations  scheduled  for  November 
1941  were  completed,  or  second,  that  the  expansion  be  restricted  to  raising  a  single  new 
parachute  battalion,  with  the  remaining  two  battalions  being  raised  later.  42  Haining  passed 
his  proposals  to  Sir  John  Dill,  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  (CIGS)  for 
consideration.  Dill,  however,  considered  the  airborne  force  an  important  priority,  and  thus 
overruled  both  Haining's  proposals  in  a  pencilled  footnote  on  the  latter's  memo  on  5  July 
1941.  He  [Dill]  stated  that  the  airborne  expansion  had  to  be  pushed  ahead  in  spite  of  any 
adverse  effects  upon  the  "hard  pressed"  infantry  arm,  and  that  two  of  the  projected  three 
new  parachute  battalions  should  be  raised  immediately.  43  Further  evidence  that  the  Army 
had  failed  to  examine  the  practical  implications  of  expanding  the  airborne  force  until  July William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  235 
1941  can  be  found  in  a  detailed  paper  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Rock,  which  appeared  two 
days  after  Dill  made  his  decision.  4  Rock  acknowledged  that  the  crux  of  the  problem  was 
to  raise  the  extra  parachute  battalions  "...  without  disorganising  the  rest  of  the  Army",  and 
made  it  clear  that  there  was  no  easy  solution  to  this  dilemma. 
Rock  detailed  five  options  for  raising  new  parachute  recruits,  beginning  with  the  existing 
system  of  drawing  volunteers  from  across  the  Army.  This  was  considered  to  be  too  slow 
for  the  rapid  expansion  envisaged,  and  was  considered  wasteful  of  trained  manpower  from 
the  Army's  technical  corps.  Second,  Rock  rejected  restricting  voluntary  recruiting  to 
infantry  battalions  and  Infantry  Training  Centres  (ITCs),  because  it  would  merely 
compound  the  problem  by  allying  the  sluggishness  and  wastefulness  of  the  existing  system 
to  a  much  narrower  volunteer  pool.  The  third  option  was  to  raise  a  voluntary  battalion 
cadre  of  officers  and  NCOs  using  one  of  the  first  two  options,  and  to  draw  the  rest  from 
high  quality  manpower  selected  at  the  initial  call-up  stage.  This  would  ensure  a  flow  of  the 
best  recruits  to  parachute  units  and  was  considered  an  excellent  method  for  peacetime 
parachute  recruiting,  but  was  still  too  slow  for  the  current  situation.  Option  four  was  to 
draw  parachute  recruits  from  a  single  infantry  regiment  and  its  attendant  ITC,  and  to  draft 
in  non-jumping  personnel  from  elsewhere.  This  would  ease  administration,  and  allow  the 
inculcation  of  esprit  de  corps  in  the  new  unit,  but  again  from  a  limited  manpower  pool. 
option  five  was  the  most  radical.  Rock  suggested  scrapping  the  voluntary  principle 
altogether,  and  the  conversion  of  whole  infantry  battalions  en  masse,  with  only  the  proven 
medically  unfit  being  posted  elsewhere.  This  would  allow  the  expansion  to  proceed 
quickly,  with  a  minimum  of  administration  and  retain  the  original  unit's  esprit,  although 
Rock  did  acknowledge  that  this  was  a  very  risky  option.  In  particular,  imposing  the 
change  would  have  to  be  draconian,  with  no  release  on  compassionate  grounds  being 
allowed.  Rock  concluded  by  rejecting  the  first  two  options  as  "inefficient  compromises", 
and  opined  that  the  conversion  of  existing  battalions  was  the  only  practical  method  of 
expanding  the  airborne  force  with  the  necessary  speed,  in  spite  of  the  possible  dangers. 
Rock  therefore  recommended  that  the  second  parachute  battalion  (in  addition  to  11  SAS 
Battalion)  should  be  raised  by  either  the  existing  voluntary  system  or  battalion  conversion, 
that  the  third  parachute  battalion  be  raised  by  converting  an  existing  battalion,  and  that  all 
subsequent  reinforcements  be  volunteers  selected  at  call-up.  He  closed  by  examining  the 
impact  of  the  airborne  expansion  upon  II  SAS  Battalion,  and  by  stressing  the  need  for  a 
dedicated  parachute  brigade  headquarters  to  oversee  administration  and  training.  The 
future  of  11  SAS  Battalion  was  considered  dependent  upon  which  recruiting  method  was William  F  BucKingham,  2000  Chapter  8  236 
selected  for  the  additional  parachute  battalions  and  a  drastic  change  in  the  Commando 
terms  of  service  under  which  its  personnel  were  serving.  A  combination  of  the  CIGS's  and 
Rock's  views  formed  the  basis  for  a  War  Office  conference  on  23  July  1941.  The 
conference  aimed  to  settle  five  specific  points.  These  were  the  method  by  which  the 
additional  parachute  battalions  were  to  be  raised,  and  to  review  the  Commando  terms  of 
service  for  airborne  troops.  In  addition,  training  procedures  and  any  additional 
requirements  were  to  be  reviewed,  a  timetable  for  the  establishment  of  the  new  battalions 
was  to  be  formulated,  and  the  question  of  the  new  unit's  accommodation  was  also  to  be 
addressed  . 
45  Brigadier  Nye  chaired  the  conference,  and  its  conclusions  highlighted  the 
flaws  in  the  original  parachute  recruiting  system,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  the  Army  had  left 
them  virtually  unaddressed  for  the  best  part  of  a  year. 
The  conference  discussion  was  summarised  as  a  series  of  recommendations,  for  onward 
transmission  to  the  CIGS  for  approval.  Three  parachute  battalions  and  their  first  increment 
of  reinforcements  were  to  be  raised  and  trained  by  I  March  1942,  utilising  volunteers 
raised  through  the  existing  system,  but  mmus  the  cash  subsistence  and  option  to  Return  To 
Unit  (RTU).  This  was  to  be  partly  offset  by  the  introduction  of  an  unspecified  new 
parachute  pay  allowance,  which  was  to  be  widely  advertised  within  the  Army  as  a 
recruiting  inducement.  II  SAS  Battalion  was  to  retain  its  Commando  privileges,  but  only 
until  the  first  new  battalion  was  trained,  after  which  they  were  to  be  withdrawn.  A  cadre  of 
volunteer  officers  and  NCOs  was  to  be  provided  by  the  War  Office's  Department  of 
Organisation,  a  War  Establishment  for  parachute  battalions  was  to  be  drawn  up  using  the 
standard  infantry  battalion  as  a  template,  and  the  Royal  Engineers  were  to  provide  an  "Air 
Troop"  for  airborne  service.  A  dedicated  brigade  headquarters  was  to  be  formed,  initially 
for  administrative  and  training  purposes,  and  the  new  battalions  were  to  be  housed  at 
Hardwick  Hall  in  Derbyshire,  although  the  precise  capacity  of  that  location  had  to  be 
clarified.  Parachute  training  was  to  be  carried  out  at  the  CLE,  with  additional  instructors 
drawn  from  II  SAS  Battalion.  Officers  and  NCOs  for  the  new  battalions  were  to  be 
trained  in  small  batches  before  training  for  the  bulk  of  their  personnel  commenced. 
Finally,  no  action  was  to  be  undertaken  until  the  recommendations  were  approved  by  the 
46 
CIGS  . 
The  War  Office  informed  the  Air  Ministry  of  its  decision  to  raise  two  additional 
parachute  battalions  at  the  end  of  August  1941.  The  23  July  conference  conclusions  were 
quoted  virtually  verbatim,  along  with  a  request  that  the  CLE  be  ready  to  commence 
training  at  the  one  hundred  per  week  rate  f  47  rom  I  November  1941.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  the  relative  lack  of  airborne  progress  reflected  in  the  conference  conclusions  elicited William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  237 
surprise  from  at  least  one  high-ranking  Army  officer.  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Ronald 
Adam  wrote  to  the  Commander-in-  Chief,  Home  Forces  on  18  August  1941,  seeking 
authorisation  to  draw  parachute  recruits  from  Home  Forces  infantry  units,  and  closed  with 
the  following  comment:  "I  know  you  will  realise  the  necessity  for  doing  this  and  doing  it 
quickly.  I  am  horrified  to  find  how  few  trained  parachutists  we  have  at  present  in  the 
British  Army.  We  ought  at  least  to  have  had  5,000  by  now.  , 48  This  sense  of  shock 
suggests  that  high-level  expectations  of  airborne  progress  within  the  Army  paralleled  those 
of  Churchill. 
Another  conference  was  held  at  the  War  Office  on  26  August  1941,  to  consider  progress 
and  problems  arising  from  the  conclusions  of  the  23  July  conference.  This  was  attended  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Stephenson  from  War  Office  SD4,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Down, 
commander  of  11  SAS  Battalion  since  June  1941,  and  the  officer  selected  to  command 
what  was  to  become  I"  Parachute  Brigade,  Brigadier  Richard  Gale  MC.  Down  expressed 
dissatisfaction  with  Hardwick  because  of  the  poor  weather,  but  acknowledged  that  there 
was  currently  no  alternative.  He  also  raised  the  matter  of  parachute  pay,  which  he 
recommended  should  be  paid  at  the  same  rate  across  the  board,  and  suggested  that  the 
number  ofjumps  to  qualify  for  the  extra  pay  be  lowered  from  nine  to  three.  A  decision  on 
these  matters  was  postponed  for  later  consideration.  The  meeting  then  went  on  to  discuss  a 
variety  of  relevant  matters.  These  included  modification  of  the  airborne  recruiting  criteria 
for  all  Home  Forces  Commands,  the  need  to  allow  the  new  battalions  a  shaking  down 
period  prior  to  parachute  training  at  Ringway,  and  the  need  to  increase  the  proportion  of 
trained  reinforcements  to  twenty  per  cent  of  the  brigade's  as  yet  undecided  war 
establishment.  The  conference  concluded  with  a  list  of  recommendations.  An 
administrative  section  was  to  be  set  up  at  Hardwick  Hall  by  15  September  1941,  and  the 
camp  was  to  be  ready  to  accept  the  first  batch  of  new  parachute  trainees  by  the  same  date. 
It  was  also  recommended  that  the  new  unit's  war  establishment  be  agreed  as  soon  as 
possible,  that  names  of  putative  battalion  commanders  be  forwarded  to  Gale  for 
consideration,  and  that  volunteers  for  airborne  service  be  sought  amongst  Royal  Engineers 
(RE)  and  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps  (RAMC)  personnel.  49 
The  upshot  of  all  this  was  a  circular  similar  to  that  of  june  1940  to  raise  Commando 
50 
volunteers.  Issued  on  28  August  1941  by  the  Assistant  Adjutant  General,  the  circular 
was  distributed  to  all  Home  Forces  Commands,  and  was  directed  to  all  infantry  officers, 
and  enlisted  personnel  from  all  Field  Force,  Infantry,  Rifle  and  Machine  Gun  Battalions  in 
the  UK.  No  special  terms  of  service  were  offered,  apart  from  parachute  pay  at  a  rate  of 
four  shillings  per  week  for  officers  and  half  that  for  other  ranks,  payable  on  completion  of William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  238 
three  parachute  jumps.  Volunteers  were  to  be  keen,  intelligent  and  of  first  class  character, 
with  high  standards  of  weapon  training.  All  had  to  be  right-handed  shots,  and  soldiers  with 
spectacles  were  ineligible.  Captains  were  to  be  company  command  qualified,  and 
specialist  signal  and  mortar  officers  were  especially  required.  An  upper  limit  of  ten  other 
rank  volunteers  per  unit  was  set  in  order  to  avoid  "undue  depletion". 
Particular  attention  was  paid  to  physical  fitness,  with  a  long  list  of  conditions  being 
appended  to  the  circular.  Volunteers  were  to  be  between  the  ages  of  twenty  and  thirty  two, 
although  the  upper  limit  could  be  relaxed  for  officers  and  NCOs,  but  with  the  strict  proviso 
that  they  met  all  other  physical  standards.  All  were  to  be  passed  Al  fit,  were  to  weigh  a 
maximum  of  one  hundred  and  ninety-six  pounds  naked,  to  have  6/12  vision  in  each  eye, 
and  to  have  acuity  equivalent  to  at  least  Army  Hearing  Standard  Two.  Volunteers  were 
also  to  have  a  minimum  of  eight  sound  or  replacement  teeth  including  two  molars,  in  the 
upper  jaw,  which  were  to  be  in  "good  relation"  to  those  in  the  lower.  Nominal  rolls  of 
volunteers  were  to  be  returned  to  AG17  by  13  September  1941.51 
War  Office  planning  for  expanding  the  airborne  force  could  only  proceed  so  far,  without 
involving  the  RAF.  Predictably,  the  Air  Ministry  was  less  than  pleased  at  this  turn  of 
events,  and  produced  a  paper  at  the  beginning  of  August  1941  which  rejected  the  Army 
proposals  as  "unsatisfactory",  because  there  was  no  prospect  of  employing  the  airborne 
force  in  offensive  operations  before  1943.  The  projected  airborne  brigade  was  thus 
considered  "...  a  luxury  which  this  country,  and  particularly  Bomber  Command,  cannot 
afford".  52  The  Air  Ministry  had  changed  its  tune  by  22  August  1941,  however,  when  it 
held  an  internal  conference  to  discuss  provision  of  RAF  flying  personnel  for  the  airborne 
force  . 
53  This  was  followed  by  a  high-leveljoint  conference  at  RAF  Army  Co-operation 
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Command  headquarters  on  9  September  1941.  Chaired  by  Air  Marshal  Sir  Arthur 
Barratt,  the  meeting  was  attended  by  the  heads  and  key  members  of  all  the  organisations 
involved,  including  Rock,  Gale,  Cole-Hamilton  and  Harvey. 
The  outcome  of  the  meeting  was  a  clear  delineation  of  responsibilities  toward  the 
parachute  brigade  between  the  Army  and  RAF,  and  recommendations  for  current  and 
subsequent  implementation.  The  parachute  brigade  was  to  be  responsible  for  pre-drop 
traming  within  established  CLE  guidelines,  and  its  personnel  would  come  under  CLE 
control  for  live  parachute  training  only.  Ringway  also  retained  responsibility  for  technical 
and  equipment  development,  and  to  work  out  operational  procedures  with  and  for  the 
brigade.  This  included  training  selected  officers  and  NCOs  from  the  brigade  to  act  as 
ground  instructors  at  Hardwick  Hall,  stationing  an  RAF  parachute  instructor  and  a  five William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  239 
strong  RAF  parachute  packing  section  there,  and  seconding  an  RAF  liaison  officer  to  the 
brigade.  A  timetable  for  withdrawing  Army  tactical  and  parachute  instructors  from 
Ringway  was  agreed,  for  completion  by  I  November  1941.  Following  a  request  by 
Brigadier  Gale,  it  was  also  agreed  to  provide  a  balloon  at  Hardwick  Hall  by  the  same  date. 
Hardwick  Hall  was  accepted  as  a  temporary  location  for  the  brigade  whilst  undergoing 
parachute  training,  pending  the  construction  of  a  permanent  Army  camp  at  Ringway  or  any 
future  location  for  the  PTS.  In  the  interim,  Nissen  hut  accommodation  for  two  hundred 
and  fifty  pupils  was  to  be  constructed  at  Ringway  within  two  to  three  months  of  the 
meeting.  Brigade  personnel  were  to  be  cycled  through  the  PTS  in  fortnightly  batches  of 
two  hundred,  and  a  total  of  six  descents  was  agreed  as  the  qualification  standard,  consisting 
of  two  balloon  jumps,  and  four  from  an  aircraft  -  two  individual  and  two  as  part  of  a  stick. 
It  was  also  recommended  that  one  of  these  should  be  a  night  jump.  Air  requirements  for 
tactical  training  after  basic  parachute  qualification  were  also  discussed,  and  it  was  decided 
to  expand  the  CLE'S  Exercise  Unit  with  effect  from  I  December  1941,  in  order  to  provide 
combined  and  refresher  training  for  brigade  parachute  personnel.  " 
There  was  only  one  minor  amendment  to  the  conference  conclusions.  Six  days  later  the 
CLE  requested  that  Army  personnel  be  subject  to  RAF  administrative  and  disciplinary 
control  whilst  undergoing  training  at  the  PTS.  56  This  was  endorsed  on  29  September  1941, 
in  the  same  War  Office  communication  that  confirmed  Gale  as  OC  I'  Parachute  Brigade, 
and  delineated  his  responsibilities;  57  the  Air  Ministry  received  the  news  at  the  beginning  of 
58  October  1941. 
The  War  Establishment  (WE)  for  I"  Parachute  Brigade  was  also  settled  by  the  beginning 
of  October  1941.  This  consisted  of  a  brigade  headquarters,  and  three  parachute  battalions 
of  three  rifle  companies  each.  The  basic  parachute  building  block  was  the  section  of  ten 
men,  commanded  by  a  sergeant  rather  than  a  corporal  as  in  line  units.  This  meant  that 
parachute  battalions  had  a  much  higher  senior  NCO  ratio,  a  measure  intended  to  counteract 
possible  dispersal  on  landing.  A  RE  Air  Troop  of  four  officers  and  sixty  men  was  also 
attached  to  the  brigade,  along  with  a  skeleton  signal  staff  59  The  War  Office  also  pushed 
ahead  with  preparations  for  the  establishment  of  a  glider  brigade  at  this  time.  On  10 
October  1941,  all  Army  Home  Commands  were  officially  notified  that  31  Independent 
Brigade  Group,  currently  undergoing  mountain  training  in  North  Wales,  was  to  become  an 
Airlanding  Brigade  Group.  The  memo  laid  out  the  new  unit's  projected  roles  and  WE,  and 
included  a  report  from  the  AFE  on  preliminary  trials  with  the  Horsa  glider,  with  details  of 
possible  load  combinations.  60 William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  240 
Thus,  in  the  period  July  to  October  1941,  the  War  Office  had  finally  achieved  a  workable 
relationship  with  the  Air  Ministry,  and  had  a  mutually  agreed  programme  for  training  a 
parachute  brigade.  It  had  also  laid  the  groundwork  for  the  establishment  of  a  more  heavily 
equipped  glider  brigade,  which  could  be  developed  finiher  once  the  necessary  gliders 
arrived.  This  was  spectacular  progress  when  measured  against  previous  achievements,  but 
should  not  divert  attention  away  from  the  fact  that  the  Army  did  little  to  expedite  airborne 
matters  in  the  period  up  to  July  1941.  It  can  thus  be  argued  that  the  swift  progress  between 
July  and  October  1941  was  due  to  a  combination  of  favourable  circumstances  and  pure 
luck,  rather  than  design.  As  we  have  seen,  additional  elements  within  the  RAF  had 
become  converted  to  the  airborne  cause,  which  significantly  lessened  opposition  from  that 
quarter.  These  conversions  were  coincidental  rather  than  the  result  of  deliberate  Army 
cultivation,  however,  and  must  therefore  be  attributed  to  the  same  strand  of  luck  which 
placed  airborne  supporters  in  control  of  Army  decision-making  machinery  at  the  same 
time.  Had  Dill  and  Alanbrooke  not  been  staunch  supporters  of  the  airborne  idea,  or,  if 
there  had  been  more  serious  resistance  to  the  diversion  of  sorely  needed  troops  from  within 
the  Army,  events  could  have  gone  very  differently. 
of  course,  the  dire  straits  in  which  the  Army  found  itself  in  1940-41  should  be  taken  into 
account  as  mitigating  factors  in  this  analysis.  The  formation  of  Commando  and  airborne 
forces,  simultaneously  with  preparing  to  repulse  seemingly  imminent  German  invasion  and 
rebuilding  the  Army  proper  following  the  debacle  in  France,  was  a  noteworthy 
achievement  in  itself  On  the  other  hand,  shortage  of  personnel  and  equipment  should  not 
have  precluded  the  Army  from  carrying  out  research  and  even  some  limited  operational 
and  doctrinal  development,  if  only  on  paper.  This  it  did  not  begin  to  do  until  June  1941, 
however,  and  even  then  the  receipt  of  information  from  outside  the  British  military 
structure  prompted  it. 
Ill.  Unacknowledged  but  Plagiarised  Nonetheless:  The  Polish  General  Staff 
Contribution  to  Defining  the  British  Airbome  Role 
on  9  June  1941,  Colonel  Marecki  from  the  Polish  General  Staff  in  London  passed  a  paper 
and  request  to  visit  Ringway  to  Brigadier  Gubbins  at  the  War  Office,  intended  for  Colonel 
I'de  Rock"  at  the  CLE  . 
61  Gubbins  acknowledged  receipt  of  the  paper  on  20  June  1940,62 
and  passed  it  straight  to  Rock  for  comment.  63  Rock's  immediate  reaction  was  candid  about 
the  paucity  of  British  work  in  this  area: 
"Colonel  Marecki's  paper  is  most  interesting  and  I  hesitate  to  comment  on  it, 
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sort  ourselves.  The  reason  is  that,  in  the  present  phase  of  parachuting,  anything 
one  can  say  is  a  little  academic.  We  have,  however,  produced  one  paper  on  the 
use  of  parachute  troops,  for  the  benefit  of  Home  Forces,  but  I  don!  t  think  it  has 
got  beyond  [War  Office  department]  MT  1.  If  Colonel  Marecki  would  like  a 
copy,  I  will  send  him  one,  but  he  must  understand  that  it  is  unofficial.  I 
enclose  a  copy  of  my  comments  on  his  paper,  offered  rather  tentatively".  ' 
This  also  implies  that  Rock  realised  that  he  was  rather  too  close  to  the  trees  to  see  the 
wood.  This  was  the  inevitable  result  of  placing  responsibility  for  all  the  Army  side  of 
airborne  training,  research  and  development  on  the  shoulders  of  one  relatively  junior 
officer.  Thus  the  blame  for  this  lapse  lay  with  the  War  Office,  rather  than  with  the  man  on 
the  spot,  although  Rock's  excuse  rings  rather  hollow  considering  that  the  Poles  had 
managed  to  produce  their  paper  under  pressure  at  least  equal  to  that  under  which  the 
British  were  labouring.  Before  examining  the  Polish  paper  in  the  detail  it  merits,  it  will  be 
necessary  first  to  outline  briefly  British  thinking  on  the  matter  to  allow  meaningfiii 
comparison. 
Prior  to  the  emergence  of  the  Polish  General  Staff  paper,  War  Office  thinking  on  the  role 
and  practical  insertion  of  its  airborne  force  remained  rather  general.  It  was  based  upon 
Rocles  paper  of  July  or  August  1940,  when  he  suggested  that  the  airborne  force  be  used  to 
spearhead  a  cross-channel  invasion 
'65  and  upon  a  further  paper  from  October  1940.  The 
latter  recommended  six  functions  for  the  airborne  force,  including  acting  as  an  offensive 
spearhead  and  acting  as  a  self-contained  force  capable  of  localised  and  independent 
actions. 
66  This  was  fleshed  out  slightly  by  the  War  Office  in  January  1941,  which  listed 
possible  airborne  missions  as  cutting  off  enemy  units  from  reinforcement,  attacking  the 
enemy  rear  in  conjunction  with  land  forces,  capturing  airfields  and  carrying  out  "other 
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enterprises"  . 
This,  however,  was  as  far  as  consideration  of  practical  applications  and 
procedures  went,  with  the  Army  concentrating  its  attention  upon  formulating  tables  of 
Organisation  and  equipment  rather  than  how  they  were  to  be  used. 
The  Polish  General  Staff  paper  took  the  opposite  tack,  by  concentrating  on  practical 
rather  than  organisational  matters.  The  paper  was  nine  pages  long,  and  contained  thirty- 
eight  headed  sections,  arranged  in  four  parts.  It  began  by  stating  that  the  paper  was 
intended  as  a  guide  for  parachute  operations  up  to  battalion  strength.  This  was  followed  by 
a  brief  examination  of  the  purpose  of  parachute  units,  which  was  defined  as  being 
offensive  operations  "framed  by  tactical  and  operational  actions".  These  were  categorised 
as  offensive  land  action,  sea  landings  and  air  landing  of  major  forces  in  transport  aircraft. 
Their  employment  was  summarised  in  forthright  terms.  "...  recklessness  of  action,  the VVilliarn  F  BucWingham,  2000  Chapter  8  242 
quickness  and  energy  of  its  execution,  the  fullest  and  most  efficient  Utilisation  of  all 
j168 
available  means  of  combat  are  basic  elements  to  ensure  success. 
The  remaining  thirty-four  paragraphs  of  the  paper  examined  virtually  every  facet  of 
putative  parachute  operations  under  the  main  headings  "Co-operation  with  the  Air  Force", 
"Decision  to  Employ  Parachute  Units  and  Directions  for  this  Action",  and  "Co-operation 
with  Land  Forces".  These  ranged  from  delineating  command  responsibilities  between  air 
force  and  army  commanders  at  different  stages  during  parachute  operations,  suggesting 
procedures  and  prerequisites  for  launching  a  parachute  operation,  drills  for  landing  on  or 
wide  of  the  designated  target,  actions  for  opposed  and  unopposed  landings,  post-drop 
assembly,  action  on  achieving  the  objective,  and  speci  ic  reco  endations  for  p  achute  fi  mm  ar 
units  supporting  air  landing,  armoured  or  amphibious  operations.  More  mundane  matters, 
such  as  communications  within  parachute  units  and  the  treatment  of  POWs,  were  also 
covered,  although  the  rather  terse  treatment  of  the  latter  creates  the  inference  they  were  to 
be  dealt  with  out  of  hand.  69 
Rocles  admission  that  the  Polish  paper  was  detailed,  connected  and  far  ahead  of  British 
airborne  thinking  was  therefore  more  than  justified.  This  view  was  further  confirmed  by 
his  comments  following  a  more  thorough  analysis  of  the  paper;  Rock  only  felt  qualified  to 
comment  upon  two  of  its  paragraphs,  those  dealing  with  post-jump  reorganisation  and 
daylight  parachute  insertion  protected  by  fighter  aircraft  . 
70  He  suggested  that  dawn  was 
the  most  suitable  time  for  parachute  attack,  and  also  that  a  distinction  be  drawn  between 
large  and  small  parachute  operations  depending  on  the  number  of  aircraft  employed.  The 
former  corresponded  roughly  to  a  battalion  plus,  and  the  latter  lay  between  platoon  and 
company  strength.  Rock  also  opined  that  a  descent  within  five  hundred  yards  of  an 
occupied  objective  was  suicidal,  and  pointed  out  that  larger  forces  required  more  time  to 
reorganise,  and  therefore  should  be  inserted  at  a  greater  distance  from  the  objective.  He 
was  also  felt  that  drops  at  dusk  or  after  dark  held  the  best  prospect  of  success,  although  he 
also  acknowledged  that  re-assembly  difficulties  meant  that  this  was  only  really  suitable  for 
small-scale  operations.  This  was  justified  on  the  grounds  that  large-scale  parachute  attacks 
would  be  "very  rare"  in  war,  because  of  expected  difficulties  in  achieving  and  maintaining 
air  superiority.  71 
Rock's  comments  are  particularly  interesting  because  they  cast  light  upon  thinking  at  the 
hub  of  the  British  airborne  effort.  In  particular,  they  suggest  that,  despite  the  attention  paid 
to  the  large-scale  German  operations  in  the  Low  Countries  and  Crete,  British  airborne 
thinking  remained  blinkered  by  a  combination  of  the  paucity  and  unsuitability  of  its William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  243 
equipment,  and  by  the  wider  and  largely  negative  British  war  experience  to  that  date. 
Concern  over  post-drop  reorganisation,  for  example,  must  have  stemmed  from  the 
Whitley's  awkward  accommodation  and  exit.  This  lengthened  the  time  it  took  for  a  stick 
of  parachutists  to  leave  the  aircraft,  which  translated  into  "Aide  dispersion  of  the  stick  by 
the  time  it  reached  the  ground,  and  thus  exacerbated  problems  with  re-assembly. 
Similarly,  the  concentration  upon  small-scale  operations  stemmed  from  the  lack  of  aircraft 
for  anything  larger,  operationally  or  otherwise,  and  also  the  raiding  impulse  under  which 
the  British  airborne  force  had  originally  been  established.  The  automatic  assumption  of 
German  air  parity,  if  not  outright  superiority,  was  clearly  the  result  of  events  in  France  in 
May  and  June  1940,  and  more  recently  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  German  airborne 
invasion  of  Crete  probably  loomed  large  in  this  respect.  It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that 
the  Army  officer  most  closely  involved  in  British  airborne  development  at  this  time 
appears  to  have  had  little  faith  in  the  utility  of  the  brigade  organisation  then  being  pushed 
ahead  by  the  War  Office. 
On  the  other  hand,  Rock  questioned  the  utility  of  the  battalion  unit  in  parachute 
operations,  suggesting  that  brigade  or  even  divisional  airborne  units  would  be  a  more 
suitable  step  up  from  company  level  operations.  He  also  recommended  that  more 
emphasis  be  placed  upon  aerial  bombing  in  lieu  of  airborne  artillery,  including  time-on- 
target  (TOT)  night  raids  to  provide  cover  for  airborne  insertion.  72  Rocles  final  comment 
questioned  the  viability  of  Polish  command  and  control  proposals.  The  Poles  advocated 
commanding  airborne  operations  by  radio  from  one  or  more  aircraft  orbiting  over  the 
battlefield.  Rock  pointed  out  that  ground  radios  were  much  more  powerful  than  aerial  sets, 
and  suggested  that  parachute  forces  should  be  equipped  with  equipment  to  allow  them  to 
communicate  directly  with  friendly  ground  stations  instead.  He  also  disagreed,  quite 
sensibly,  with  the  Polish  idea  of  allowing  the  air  commander  to  retain  control  of  the 
parachute  force  after  landing,  on  the  grounds  that  such  an  arrangement  would  be  poorly 
placed  to  make  tactical  decisions.  73  Both  these  criticisms  were  eminently  sensible,  because 
the  Polish  proposals  were  somewhat  over-enthusiastic.  Relying  on  aircraft 
communications  and  control  not  only  assumed  air  superiority  for  the  attacking  force,  but 
also  entailed  risk  from  ground  fire  or mechanical  failure,  as  well  as  the  technological 
drawbacks  cited  by  Rock. 
That  Rock  only  felt  qualified  to  comment  upon  two  Points  from  such  a  large  and  detailed 
document  also  clearly  illustrates  the  British  failure  to  think  much  beyond  their  immediate 
airborne  circumstances.  The  British  paper  on  parachute  troops,  which  Rock  "Unofficially" 
passed  to  Marecki  via  Gubbins  shortly  after  6  July  1941,74  clearly  illustrates  this.  As  we William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  244 
have  seen,  the  Polish  GS  paper  was  overwhelmingly  concerned  with  the  practicalities  of 
parachute  operations.  In  contrast,  its  British  counterpart  was  by  its  own  admission 
intended  primarily  to  familiarise  non-airborne  commanders  and  staffs  with  parachute 
forces,  in  order  to  assist  in  joint  training  and  defence  against  airborne  attack.  '  it  was 
therefore  high  on  administrative  detail,  but  correspondingly  low  on  practical  information. 
Rock  began  with  a  pr6cis  of  airborne  operations  to  date,  which  stressed  the  decisive 
nature  of  the  German  airborne  operations  in  the  Low  Countries  in  May  1940,  before 
examining  the  prime  characteristics  of  parachute  troops.  Foremost  of  these  was  surprise, 
in  order  to  hit  "...  the  enemy  in  the  back  and  below  the  belt.  "  Details  of  British  paratroop 
equipment,  weaponry,  jump  procedures  and  drills,  and  a  list  of  likely  tasks  followed  this 
rather  awkward  contortion.  The  listed  tasks  included  the  seizure,  defence  and  preparation 
of  landing  zones,  diversionary  attacks  and  the  disruption  of  enemy  communications  in 
advance  of  the  main  airborne  force.  Secondary  tasks  included  attacks  in  conjunction  with 
friendly  ground  forces,  the  seizure  of  water  crossings  or  defiles,  feint  attacks  to  draw  off 
enemy  reserves,  and  sabotage.  All  this,  however,  took  up  less  than  half  of  the  paper.  The 
remainder,  headed  "Staff  Duties  in  Connection  with  British  Paratroops",  dealt  with 
administration,  including  lead  times  for  warning  orders,  transport  and  messing 
arrangements,  and  the  establishment  of  lines  of  communication  between  air  and  ground 
commanders  during  operations.  It  closed  with  small  sections  on  defence  against 
paratroops,  and  the  use  of  paratroops  in  joint  training  exercises.  76 
In  comparison  with  the  Polish  General  9taff  paper  therefore,  the  British  effort  appears  to 
be  very  much  a  case  of  putting  the  cart  before  the  horse.  In  mitigation,  it  must  be 
acknowledged  that  this  was  largely  because  the  initial  British  airborne  approach  was 
obliged  to  concentrate  upon  infrastructural  rather  than  operational  development.  It  may 
also  be  partly  because  the  Army  had  a  long  history  of  impfovisation,  and  thus  took  the 
ability  to  formulate  drills,  procedures  and  other  organisational  details  at  short  notice  for 
granted.  In  addition,  given  his  existing  responsibilities  at  the  CLE,  Rock  can  be  forgiven 
for  not  finding  time  to  consider  the  nitty-gritty  of  airborne  employment  in  the  same  way  as 
the  Poles.  However,  this  does  not  absolve  the  War  Office  from  failing  to  try,  particularly 
considering  the  amount  of  effort  expended  in  the  formulation  of  hypothetical  brigade 
organisation  tables. 
What  the  Poles  made  of  Rock's  paper  is  not  clear,  although  Marecki  did  succeed  in 
obtaining  access  to  Ringway,  along  with  American  observersý  at  the  beginning  of  July 
1941.77  For  their  part,  the  British  appear  to  have  been  more  impressed  with  the  Polish William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  245 
paper  than  their  overt  reaction  would  suggest.  The  practical  details  of  employing  the  new 
British  airborne  force  had  to  be  discussed  at  some  stage,  but  the  emergence  of  British 
discussion  documents  immediately  after  the  Polish  General  Staff  arrived  at  the  CLE  is 
stretching  the  concept  of  coincidence.  This  suspicion  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  there  is 
no  primary  evidence  of  Prior  British  discussion,  and  by  the  similarity  of  the  British  topics 
to  those  formulated  by  the  Poles.  On  21  June  1941  the  CLE's  Army  staff  produced  a  four- 
section  paper,  ostensibly  dealing  with  co-operation  between  the  RAF  Co-operation 
Command  and  parachute  troops.  Part  of  it  certainly  fell  within  this  remit,  but  the 
remainder  dealt  with  the  subsequent  use  of  paratroops  to  influence  the  immediate  battle 
situation,  and  the  transmission  of  tactical  information  from  parachute  troops  to  ground 
formations.  78  This  was  not  only  remarkably  similar  to  sections  of  the  Polish  paper,  but  was 
also  a  totally  new  line  of  thought  for  both  Ringway  and  RAF  Army  Co-operation 
Command,  and  arguably  outside  the  latter's  official  remit. 
In  addition,  the  21  June  paper  was  but  the  first  of  a  series  of  studies  emanating  from  the 
CLE  which  bore  more  than  passing  similarity  to  topics  examined  by  the  Poles.  These 
included  one  discussing  issues  surrounding  airborne  coup-de-main  operations  to  secure 
bridgeheads  for  advancing  armoured  forces,  79  and  another  which  took  a  wider  and  more 
doctrinal  approach.  The  latter  analysed  five  likely  roles  for  airborne  employment,  and 
cited  aspects  of  German  operations  in  1940  and  1941  in  support.  Thus  the  assault  on  Eben 
Emael  was  seen  as  a  parallel  for  attacking  beach  defences  or  seizing  bridgeheads,  whilst 
operations  in  Norway  and  the  Corinth  Canal  in  Greece  were  characterised  as  tactical 
operations  to  give  indirect  assistance  to  friendly  ground  operations.  The  larger  airborne 
assault  upon  Holland  was  considered  a  useful  template  for  strategic  operations  intended  to 
influence  the  course  of  a  whole  campaign.  Other  examples  cited  included  Crete,  which 
was  classified  as  an  independent  airborne  operation  against  an  isolated  objective,  and  the 
German  air  landing  of  reinforcements  in  Norway.  This  was  considered  of  possible  utility 
in  Iraq,  80  an  observation  which  may  have  been  intended  to  be  somewhat  tongue  in  cheek, 
given  the  fact  that  British  forces  had  been  carrying  out  that  type  of  operation  in  that  region 
since  the  1920s. 
of  course  the  CLE,  and  by  extension  the  War  Office,  would  have  been  blinkered  to  the 
point  of  stupidity  had  they  not  paid  attention  to  the  Polish  paper.  It  complemented  what 
little  British  thinking  there  was,  and  offered  a  firm  basis  for  further  investigation,  if  not  a 
significant  developmental  shortcut.  The  real  fault  with  the  British  reaction  to  the  Polish 
paper  is  therefore  not  the  fact  that  they  plagiarised  it,  but  that  they  failed  overtly  to 
acknowledge  the  fact,  either  at  the  time  or  subsequently.  There  is  no  mention  of  it  in William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  246 
Otway's  official  history  of  British  Airborne  Forces,  for  example,  and  it  does  not  figure  in 
any  of  the  secondary  works  either.  Had  the  paper  been  the  only  Polish  input  to  the 
expansion  of  the  British  airborne  force,  this  could  perhaps  be  written  off  as  an  unfortunate 
oversight.  However,  this  was  not  the  case,  for  the  Poles  made  a  number  of  practical 
contributions  to  the  British  airborne  effort.  These  too  have  gone  largely  unremarked  in  the 
British  record. 
Similarly  Unacknowledged:  Polish  Practical  Input  to  British  Parachute  /V 
Training  and  Equipment 
Polish  practical  input  into  the  British  airborne  effort  encompassed  both  the  training  side 
of  matters  at  Ringway,  and  the  conditioning  and  preparation  of  troops  to  undergo  that 
training,  which  was  to  be  a  key  requirement  in  the  expansion  of  the  British  parachute  force 
to  brigade  size.  With  regard  to  Polish  involvement  at  Ringway,  at  least  three  Polish  air 
force  officers  served  there.  Lieutenant  Bleicher,  a  former  instructor  from  the  Polish  State 
Gliding  School,  served  at  the  Development  Unit  (DU),  and  gave  a  lecture  on  Polish  gliding 
experience  in  May  1941.81  Two  other  Polish  lieutenants  played  a  more  significant  role  at 
the  Parachute  Training  School.  Jerzy  Gorecki  and  Julian  Gebolys  had  been  parachute 
instructors  at  the  Polish  parachute-training  centre  at  Bydgoszcz  before  the  outbreak  of  war 
in  1939,  and  appear  to  have  been  at  Ringway  when  Polish  special  forces  soldiers  arrived 
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there  for  training  in  October  1940.  As  Cholewczynski  points  out,  Gorecki  and  Gebolys 
were  the  "natural  choices"  for  training  Polish  pupils  at  the  PTS.  The  operational  records 
make  no  direct  reference  to  the  arrival  of  the  two  Polish  officers  at  Ringway,  although 
there  is  a  cryptic  reference  to  "...  new  Polish  officers  [being]  separated  for  Special 
Parachute  Instruction"  at  Ringway  at  the  end  of  September  1940.83  This  could  refer  to  the 
arrival  of  Gorecki  and  Gebolys,  or  the  first  increment  of  Polish  special  forces  soldiers. 
There  is  ample  additional  evidence  that  Gorecki  and  Gebolys  served  as  instructors  at 
Ringway.  Colonel  Jan  Lorys,  who  participated  in  one  of  the  first  Polish  special  forces 
training  courses  and  later  served  with  the  I'  Polish  Independent  Parachute  Brigade  at 
Arnhem,  distinctly  remembered  Gorecki  heading  a  "Polish  section"  at  Ringway  when  he 
underwent  training  there  in  the  autumn  of  1940  . 
84  In  mid-July  1941  Gorecki  himself 
penned  a  letter  on  Ringway-headed  notepaper,  85  and  Gebolys  appears  in  the  minutes  of  a 
joint  conference  between  the  Polish  General  Staff  and  the  Airborne  Forces  Establishment 
(AFE)  in  November  194  1.  The  latter  was  by  then  serving  as  a  RAF  Flying  Officer,  and 
had  requested  a  transfer  to  the  Indian  PTS  at  Chaklala.  The  Polish  General  Staff  response 
shows  that  it  was  in  no  doubt  as  to  Gebolys's  value  as  an  instructor:  "...  in  view  of  his Wlliiam  F  E3uckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  247 
[Gebolys's]  special  qualities  the  Polish  Command  cannot  release  him  for  this  purpose  as  he 
is  a  most  valuable  instructor  for  the  training  of  Poles".  The  Polish  General  Staff  also 
suggested  that  Gebolys  be  promoted  in  recognition  of  his  expertise,  a  request  which  Group 
Captain  Harvey  asked  be  put  in  writing  with  a  promise  that  Gebolys  would  then  be  posted 
to  the  AFE  with  the  rank  of  Flight  Lieutenant.  116 
It  would  therefore  appear  that  up  to  this  point  Gebolys  had  been  serving  at  Ringway  as  an 
attached  supernumerary  rather  than  as  part  of  the  permanent  cadre,  despite  his  nominal 
RAF  rank.  This  may  also  explain  his  transfer  request,  for  it  must  also  have  been  somewhat 
galling  to  serve  under  men  who  had  far  less  parachuting  experience.  Gebolys's  position 
was  thus  similar  to  that  of  Williams,  Ward  and  Hire  following  Strange's  departure  and  the 
elevation  of  Newnharn  as  commander  of  the  PTS,  although  they  of  course  lacked  the 
backing  of  a  General  Staff,  exiled  or  otherwise.  The  tone  of  Harvey's  reaction  at  the 
conference  also  suggests  both  that  he  was  aware  of  Gebolys's  presence  at  Ringway,  and 
that  he  shared  the  Polish  General  Staffs  high  opinion  of  him.  Given  this,  it  is  highly  likely 
that  Gebolys  was  involved  in  training  the  large  batches  of  Polish  troops  who  began  to 
87 
arrive  at  the  PTS  from  mid-April  1941,  and  possibly  also  the  earlier  and  smaller  Polish 
special  forces  contingents.  He  also  appears  to  have  accepted  the  refusal  of  his  request  for 
transfer  and  remained  at  Ringway.  Polish  primary  material  shows  that  Newnham. 
consulted  Gebolys  about  including  a  night  jump  in  the  training  of  Polish  paratroopers  in 
88  June  1942. 
That  Newnham  consulted  with  Gebolys  is  additionally  interesting  because  it  ties  in  with 
another  significant  aspect  of  his  contribution  to  British  military  parachuting.  According  to 
Cholewczynski,  Gebolys  was  responsible  for  introducing  the  British,  and  later  the 
Americans,  to  the  idea  of  the  parachutist  manipulating  the  rigging  lines  to  spill  air  from  the 
canopy,  in  order  to  exert  a  limited  degree  of  control  over  the  parachute  during  descent. 
This  technique  was  allegedly  christened  the  "Polish  Method"  as  a  result.  89  Newnharn 
makes  no  specific  mention  of  Poles  serving  at  Ringway  in  his  semi-official  history  of  the 
British  parachute  effort,  apart  from  a  passing  reference  to  a  "number  of  Polish 
interpreters".  90  Paradoxically,  however,  he  subsequently  refers  to  "Gebolys,  the  Polish 
instructor,  who  was  probably  one  of  the  best  parachutists  in  the  world",  before  also 
crediting  him  with  inventing  the  "Polish  Method"  cited  by  Cholewczynski.  91  Newnhanfs 
account  is  light  on  chronology,  and  he  does  not  provide  a  date  for  Gebolys's  development, 
although  there  is  primary  evidence  to  suggest  that  this  occurred  in  April  194  1.  The 
operational  records  refer  to  a  new  parachuting  technique  being  standardised  then,  and 
describe  Gebolys's  method  perfectly,  albeit  without  mentioning  his  name  or  origins.  92  The William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  248 
technique  is  also  described  in  a  memo  from  the  CLE  to  No.  70  Group  in  June  1941,  in 
response  to  concerns  raised  about  landing  injuries  at  the  parachute  demonstration  held  at 
Windsor  in  late  May  1941.93 
There  can  thus  be  no  doubt  that  Polish  instructors  served  at  Ringway,  and  made  at  least 
one  significant  contribution  to  British  military  parachuting  technique,  despite  the  fact  that 
they  are  not  overtly  accredited  in  the  official  accounts  or  operational  records.  Newnham's 
omission  may  have  been  an  oversight,  for  his  account,  whilst  extremely  detailed,  is  more 
of  a  personal  narrative  than  the  product  of  systematic  research.  The  failure  of  the  official 
and  operational  records  is  more  curious,  however,  especially  because  it  is  paralleled  by  a 
irmlar  failure  to  acknowledge  the  influence  of  Polish  training  in  what  eventually  became  sJu 
the  I  st  Polish  Independent  Parachute  Brigade.  Before  examining  the  content  of  this, 
however,  it  may  be  advisable  first  to  detail  briefly  the  evolution  of  the  Polish  parachute 
effort  in  Britain. 
The  impetus  for  raising  Polish  parachute  forces  in  Britain  came  from  the  Polish  General 
Staff  established  in  London  in  late  June  1940.  The  first  Polish  parachute  unit  was  raised  at 
the  behest  of  the  Sixth  (or  Special)  Bureau,  which  paralleled  the  work  of  SOE  and  was 
responsible  for  liaison  with  the  underground  Home  Army  in  Poland.  94  Drawn  largely  from 
polish  officer  personnel  evacuated  from  France,  it  was  christened  the  Cichociemni,  Polish 
for  "Silent  and  Unseqn",  and  was  intended  for  covert  operations-95  The  first  contingent  of 
Cichociemni  volunteers,  twenty  officers  drawn  from  the  Polish  4a,  Cadre  Rifle  Brigade, 
arrived  at  the  Special  Training  Centre  (STC)  at  Lochailort  near  Fort  William  in  Scotland, 
in  September  1940-96  All  Cichociemni  volunteers  subsequently  received  parachute 
training,  although  whether  this  was  all  carried  out  at  Ringway  is  unclear.  97  It  is  also 
unclear  precisely  when  and  from  where  the  first  Polish  personnel  commenced  their  training 
at  Ringway.  The  operational  records  clearly  refer  to  Polish  personnel  arriving  for  training 
on  28  October  1940,  although  the  commander  of  the  401  Cadre  Rifle  Brigade,  Colonel 
Stanislaw  Sosabowski,  claims  that  the  first  group  of  Cichodemni  trainees  from  his  unit  did 
not  arrive  at  Ringway  until  February  1941.  It  is  possible  that  the  October  1940  trainees 
were  drawn  from  elsewhere,  or  that  increments  of  the  4h  Cadre  may  have  been  diverted  to 
Ringway  after  leaving  their  parent  unit.  98  Be  that  as  it  may,  at  least  two  contingents  of 
Polish  officers  were  parachute  trained  by  14  March  1941,  for  they  carried  out  a 
demonstration  drop  for  Sosabowski  on  that  date.  99  A  further  twelve  numbered  all-officer 
Polish  courses  were  trained  at  Ringway  by  mid-August  1941,  totalling  fourteen  courses  in 
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A  much  larger  and  more  ambitious  Polish  airborne  undertaking  followed  the  covertly 
oriented  Cichociemni  effort:  the  transformation  of  the  entire  4th  Cadre  Rifle  Brigade  into  a 
parachute  unit.  Sosabowski's  involvement  with  this  transformation,  and  the  origins  of  the 
4'h  Cadre  itself,  merit  some  clarification.  Sosabowski  escaped  from  Poland  in  1939,  served 
with  the  reconstituted  Polish  army  in  France  in  1940,  escaped  again  to  Britain  from 
Dunkirk,  and  ended  up  in  Glasgow  with  many  other  evacuated  Polish  personnel.  His 
efficiency  in  organising  a  holding  camp  at  Biggar  brought  him  to  the  attention  of  the  senior 
Polish  commander  in  Scotland,  and  he  was  placed  in  command  of  the  Canadian  Officers 
Cadre  Brigade  in  July  1940.101  As  its  name  suggests,  this  unit  was  intended  to  provide  the 
commissioned  component  for  a  plan  to  raise  units  in  Canada  from  Polish  6migr6s  there. 
The  brigade  was  renamed  the  40'Cadre  Rifle  Brigade  in  mid-August  1940,  and  was 
assigned  a  coastal  defence  role  in  Fife  in  eastern  Scotland  in  October  1940,  occupying 
billets  around  Leven.  The  brigade's  origin  as  an  officer  cadre  explains  why  the  early 
contingents  of  Poles  trained  at  Ringway  were  all  of  commissioned  rank.  102 
Sosabowski  claimed  to  have  single-handedly  formulated  the  idea  of  transforming  the  4h 
Cadre  Rifle  Brigade  into  a  parachute  unit,  as  the  "shortest  way  home"  to  Poland,  a  view 
widely  cited  in  secondary  sources.  103  However,  whilst  he  was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  key 
players,  this  may  be  overstating  his  overall  responsibility.  According  to  one  account,  the 
original  impetus  for  members  of  the  4th  Cadre  to  attend  Ringway  for  training  came  from 
the  polish  General  Staff,  rather  than  Sosabowski,  albeit  "unofficially".  104  This  claim  is 
supported  by  the  fact  that  Sosabowski  appears  to  have  been  unconnected  with  the 
compilation  of  the  Polish  General  Staff  airborne  paper,  and  the  fact  that  the  Polish  Army 
had  been  pursuing  its  own  parachute  programme  before  September  1939,  which 
Sosabowski  appears  to  have  been  unaware  of  This  would  suggest  that  the  parachute  idea 
originated  higher  in  the  Polish  military  hierarchy.  Wherever  the  idea  originated,  however, 
Sosabowski  was  undoubtedly  responsible  for  training  the  4h  Cadre  for  its  new  role,  and  for 
setting  up  the  necessary  ground  training  facilities  in  Scotland  independently  of  Ringway. 
A  Polish  preliminary  parachute-training  centre  was  established  in  the  grounds  of  Largo 
House,  an  eighteenth-century  mansion  near  Leven,  and  was  ready  to  begin  work  in 
February  1941.105 
The  Polish  effort  commenced  without  official  guidance  from  British  forces,  although 
knowledge  of  British  techniques  was  doubtless  gleaned  from  Polish  personnel  who  had 
trained  at  Ringway,  and  through  unofficial  contacts  with  the  CLE.  The  operational 
records,  for  example,  record  that  two  Polish  officers  visited  Ringway  on  21  July  1941,  in 
order  to  gather  information  for  the  formation  of  a  Polish  brigade.  106  Despite  the  tone  of  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  250 
entry,  this  was  by  no  means  the  beginning  of  the  Polish  efforts,  but  it  proves  that  Ringway 
was  willing  to  offer  the  Poles  assistance.  This  was  subsequently  established  on  a  more 
official  basis,  as  shown  by  the  authorisation  for  CLE  Whitleys  to  participate  in  a  Polish 
parachute  demonstration  in  Scotland  in  September  1941.  The  fact  that  the  Poles  routed 
their  request  through  high-ranking  officers  at  the  War  Office  and  Air  Ministry,  complete 
with  invitations  to  the  demonstration  may  well  have  eased  the  granting  of  approval.  107 
Assistance  was  dependent  upon  British  needs  and  equipment  availability,  as  the  refusal  of 
an  earlier  Polish  request  for  their  own  dedicated  aircraft  shows,  108  but  overall  the  British 
appear  to  have  been  initially  favourably  disposed  toward  the  Polish  effort. 
That  the  Poles  were  aware  of  the  specifics  of  British  airborne  equipment  is  clear  from  the 
mock  Whitley  exits  fabricated  at  Largo  House.  Open-ended  barrels  were  mounted  in  the 
loft  of  a  stable  block,  which  allowed  trainees  to  practise  exit  drills,  by  dropping  through  the 
barrels  onto  PT  mats  spread  on  the  floor  below.  109  According  to  a  British  observer,  there 
were  three  such  mock  apertures  offering  drops  of  five,  six  and  eight  feet,  into  sawdust  and 
sand  rather  than  onto  PT  mats.  "o  Whatever  the  precise  details,  the  existence  of  such 
apparatus  shows  that  the  Poles  were  familiar  with  the  Whitley's  peculiar  exit,  and  that  they 
were  quite  capable  of  improvising  their  own  training  equipment  and  techniques.  These 
solutions  were  inspected,  and  in  some  cases,  copied  by  the  British. 
The  Poles  went  some  way  to  overcoming  their  lack  of  access  to  aircraft  by  erecting  a 
parachuting  tower.  Located  at  Ludlin  Links  near  Leven,  the  structure  was  between  sixty 
and  one  hundred  feet  high,  and  was  similar  but  not  identical  to  those  used  for  sport 
parachuting  in  Poland  in  the  1930s.  A  cable  from  a  drum  atop  the  structure  was  held  clear 
by  a  projecting  arm  and  attached  to  a  parachute,  which  was  kept  extended  by  a  metal  hoop 
the  same  diameter  as  the  canopy.  The  cable  was  raised  and  lowered  by  compressed  air, 
and  the  instructor  controlled  the  rate  of  descent  by  means  of  a  brake.  This  system  also 
allowed  the  instructor  to  coach  the  trainee  throughout  the  process.  The  platform  atop  the 
tower  accommodated  ten  trainees,  and  was  accessed  by  ladder.  ",  The  Polish  General  Staff 
granted  authorisation  for  Polish  Army  engineers  to  erect  the  tower,  along  with  a  E500  grant 
toward  the  cost,  in  January  1941.112  According  to  Cholewczynski,  two  Polish  engineer 
officers  drew  up  blueprints  with  advice  from  Gebolys,  whilst  the  actual  construction  was 
contracted  out  to  a  local  Scottish  firm.  The  tower  was  ceremonially  opened  on  20  July 
1941.113  The  six-month  delay  between  authorisation  and  completion  was  presumably  due 
to  difficulties  in  obtaining  the  necessary  materials  due  to  wartime  shortages. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  251 
The  Polish  tower  proved  its  worth  in  late  1941,  when  large  numbers  of  Polish  troops  who 
had  received  preliminary  training  at  Leven  began  to  pass  through  Ringway.  Polish 
training-related  injuries  were  conspicuous  by  their  absence,  as  noted  by  an  unnamed 
British  member  of  the  PTS  staff.  "The  Poles  are  very  consistent,  so  far,  no  injuries,  even  of 
a  minor  character  have  been  sustained".  114  Given  this,  it  is  therefore  no  surprise  that  a 
similar  tower  subsequently  made  an  appearance  at  Ringway.  Precisely  when  the  tower  was 
erected  at  Ringway  is  unclear,  for  there  is  no  reference  to  it  in  the  operational  records. 
Given  that  CLE  staff  carried  out  a  detailed  examination  of  the  Polish  example  in  July  194  1, 
it  is  logical  to  assume  it  was  sometime  after  that  date.  '  15  Photographs  in  Harclerode's 
work  on  the  British  6h  Airborne  Division  clearly  show  that  the  tower  was  in  use  at 
Ringway  when  personnel  for  the  Oh  Airborne  were  undergoing  parachute  training  in  mid- 
1943.116  The  same  work  also  acknowledges  the  Poles  as  the  originator  of  the  idea, 
unfortunately  without  citing  a  source.  '  17 
it  would  be  an  overstatement  to  claim  that  the  Polish  example  was  solely  responsible  for 
this.  According  to  Ward,  Bruce  Williams  had  unsuccessfully  recommended  a  tower  as  an 
alternative  to  the  balloon  for  preliminary  parachute  training,  when  the  latter  was  under 
consideration. 
118  There  may  also  have  been  an  American  angle  to  the  British  adoption  of 
the  idea.  The  parachuting  tower  had  been  an  integral  part  of  US  military  parachute  training 
from  the  outset,  "'  Ringway  had  played  host  to  US  officers  in  April  and  July  1941,  and  it  is 
feasible  that  some  interchange  on  training  techniques  occurred  during  these  Visits.  120 
Nonetheless,  it  cannot  be  entirely  coincidental  that  the  British  adopted  a  previously 
rejected  training  device  after  inspecting  the  functioning  Polish  example  at  Ludlin  Links. 
A  further  Polish  innovation  was  the  pre-parachute  training  set  up  in  the  grounds  of  Largo 
House.  Nicknamed  the  Monkey  Grove,  the  centre  consisted  of  a  large  assault  course 
equipped  with  a  variety  of  obstacles,  and  facilities  for  more  conventional  PT.  These 
included  fences,  rope  climbs,  swings,  jumps  and  a  trapeze  apparatus,  the  purpose  of  which 
was  to  harden  physically  the  trainee  in  preparation  for  parachute  training  proper.  121 
Cholewczynski  paints  a  vivid  portrait  of  activity  at  the  Monkey  Grove: 
"In  a  thickly  wooded  comer  of  the  estate,  the  [Polish]  Brigade's  sappers  ... 
built 
an  obstacle  course  of  devilish  contraptions  which  stretched  every  muscle  and 
honed  minds  and  body  for  the  rigors  [sic]  of  parachute  training.  Men,  scantily 
clad  in  athletic  shorts,  were  swinging  on  trapezes,  walking  balance  beams, 
climbing,  jumping,  tumbling,  all  at  double  time  with  instructors  constantly 
shouting". 
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The  essential  features  of  the  Monkey  Grove,  and  indeed  the  entire  Polish  preliminary 
training  effort,  were  subsequently  incorporated  into  what  became  the  Airborne  Depot  at 
Hardwick  Hall,  which  was  intended  to  fulfil  the  same  purpose.  The  primary  purpose  of  the 
Depot  was  the  "toughening"  of  prospective  parachute  training  candidates  for  the  rigours  of 
the  PTS,  including  a  series  of  tests  to  ensure  their  physical  and  mental  suitability. 
To  claim  that  the  Polish  Preliminary  Training  Centre  based  around  Largo  Hall  was  solely 
responsible  for  the  British  decision  to  set  up  a  similar  installation  would  again  be 
overstating  the  case.  There  was  clearly  a  need  for  a  British  Preliminary  airborne  trai  19 
establishment  of  some  description,  and  the  formation  and  training  of  the  Commandos 
provided  a  clear  and  relevant  British  precedent  for  just  such  a  development.  That  said,  it  is 
also  possible  that  the  CLE  inspection  of  the  Polish  facilities  in  Scotland  was  arranged  for 
the  specific  purpose  of  gathering  data  for  use  at  Hardwick  Hall.  Initially  this  appears 
unlikely,  because  the  CLE  report  did  not  appear  until  27  July  194  1,123  four  days  after  the 
decision  to  set  up  a  British  preliminary  training  centre  at  Hardwick  Hall  was  finalised.  124 
125 
However,  the  agenda  for  that  conference  was  compiled  by  17  July  1941,  and  it  is  clear 
from  the  conference  minutes  that  the  decision  to  set  up  a  British  preliminary  training 
establishment  had  already  been  taken,  leaving  only  the  location  to  be  settled. 
This  supports  the  contention  that  the  CLE  tour  of  the  Polish  establishments  in  Scotland 
was  arranged  in  order  to  gather  information  for  the  23  July  conference,  and  there  are 
several  possible  explanations  for  the  date  anomaly.  The  degree  of  detail  contained  in  the 
report  makes  it  logical  to  assume  that  the  four  Polish  establishments  discussed  were  visited 
in  person  by  at  least  one  member  of  the  CLE  staff.  An  official  visit  of  this  kind  must  have 
been  arranged  in  advance,  if  only  to  allow  the  necessary  transport  and  accommodation  to 
be  arranged,  and  the  installations  visited  were  in  one  instance  over  one  hundred  miles 
apart.  it  is  therefore  unlikely  that  they  were  all  visited  in  a  single  day.  126  Travel 
requirements  alone  make  it  perfectly  possible  that  the  visit  could  not  be  scheduled  in  time 
to  present  its  findings  for  the  23  July  conference,  and  it  is  also  unlikely  that  the  report  was 
compiled  the  instant  the  inspection  was  over.  In  addition,  there  was  no  real  need  for  the 
report  to  be  presented  to  the  conference  if,  as  it  appears,  the  decision  to  set  up  a 
preliminary  training  establishment  had  already  been  made.  Neither  was  the  CLE  visit  the 
last  to  Leven.  An  unknown  major  from  the  War  Office  wrote  to  Sosabowski  on  20  August 
1941,  having  been  favourably  impressed  with  all  he  had  seen  "last  weele'.  127 
The  final  area  where  Polish  developments  may  have  influenced  British  thinking  involved 
the  selection  of  personnel  for  parachute  training.  As  we  have  seen,  Rock  presented  a  series William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  253 
of  options  to  address  this  problem  on  7  July  1941,  the  most  radical  of  which  was  a  proposal 
to  scrap  the  voluntary  principle  and  convert  infantry  battalions  in  their  entirety  after 
separating  the  medically  unfit.  128  Whilst  obliged  by  circumstances,  and  proven  by 
subsequent  events,  this  idea  was  a  total  departure  from  prior  British  practice,  which  had 
never  been  even  hinted  at  previously.  It  was,  however,  the  method  chosen  by  Sosabowski 
for  the  formation  of  the  Polish  parachute  brigade.  Members  of  the  4h  Cadre  Rifle  Brigade 
were  not  given  a  choice  about  becoming  paratroopers,  and  only  those  who  failed  to  pass  a 
medical  board,  allegedly  set  up  with  advice  from  Ringway,  were  released  for  service  with 
Polish  units  elsewhere.  129  According  to  Sosabowskiý  this  policy  was  adopted  to  ensure 
"equality  of  sacrifice",  130  although  he  must  have  had  an  ulterior  motive.  The  supply  of 
Polish  recruits  to  maintain  Polish  units  in  Britain  was  beginning  to  run  short  by  1941,  and 
competition  was  fierce  for  those  available.  131  This  largely  explains  the  substantial 
diplomatic  effort  to  secure  the  repatriation  of  Polish  POWs  from  the  Soviet  Union  at  this 
time.  Had  he  adhered  to  the  voluntary  principle,  Sosabowski  therefore  ran  the  risk  of 
losing  personnel  who  opted  out  of  parachute  training,  with  little  chance  of  finding 
replacements. 
Precisely  when  Sosabowski  decided  to  scrap  the  voluntary  principle  is  unclear,  although 
it  is  logical  to  assume  it  coincided  closely  with  the  decision  to  transform  the  4  th  Cadre 
Brigade  into  a  parachute  unit,  given  the  circumstances  cited  above.  The  fact  that  the  Polish 
General  Staff  sanctioned  the  construction  of  the  Polish  parachuting  tower  in  January  1941, 
and  that  Sosabowski  claims  the  preliminary  training  centre  at  Largo  House  was  functioning 
132 
by  February  1941  ,  provisionally  dates  the  decision  to  scrap  the  voluntary  principle  to 
late  1940  -  early  1941.  Given  the  degree  of  "unofficial"  liaison  between  Ringway  and  the 
Poles,  and  the  fact  that  Sosabowski  visited  Ringway  in  person  in  March  1941  '133 
it  is 
perfectly  possible  that  Rock's  suggestion  that  British  non-volunteer  parachute  units  be 
formed  was  influenced  by  knowledge  of  the  functioning  Polish  example. 
Any  or  all  of  the  similarities  between  all  these  aspects  of  Polish  and  British  airborne 
development  may  have  been  coincidental  and  therefore  unconnected,  although  their  sheer 
number  makes  it  unlikely.  It  is  therefore  more  probable  that  the  Polish  input  to  the  British 
airborne  effort  was  deliberately  downplayed.  Initially,  this  May  have  been  because  of  the 
"unofficial"  nature  of  the  liaison,  but  the  later  motive  lies  in  the  subsequent  relationship 
between  the  allies,  especially  regarding  operational  control  of  the  I-"  Polish  Independent 
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From  a  British  perspective,  the  Poles  proved  to  be  less  than  co-operative  allies.  This  was 
due  to  their  vehement  insistence  that  their  units  remain  operationally  independent  of 
British  control,  and  answerable  directly  to  the  Polish  General  Staff  and  Polish  government 
in  exile.  This  tendency  was  not  confined  to  Sosabowski's  parachute  brigade.  Garlinskils 
work  on  relations  between  the  Poles  and  SOE  shows  that  the  Polish  General  Staff  s  Sixth 
Bureau  was  reluctant  to  integrate  its  covert  operations  with  those  of  the  SOE  virtually  from 
the  outset,  to  the  latter's  increasing  annoyance.  134  There  is  also  evidence  that  the  Poles 
took  less  than  kindly  to  the  British  style  of  discipline.  Sosabowski  wrote  to  the 
commander  of  the  STC,  requesting  clarification  of  unspecified  disciplinary  problems  with 
Polish  trainees  at  Lochailort,  at  the  beginning  of  January  1941  . 
13  '5  More  problems  arose  a 
year  later.  The  STC  contacted  Sosabowski  in  March  1942,  suggesting  Polish  officers  be 
made  aware  of  British  disciplinary  requirements,  and  that  a  Polish  liaison  officer  be 
attached  to  the  STC  staff.  136  There  also  appears  to  have  been  friction  at  this  time  over 
Polish  treatment  of  trained  men  who  refused  to  jump.  The  War  Office  forwarded  a  detailed 
explanation  of  the  relevant  Section  of  the  British  Army  Act  to  1"  Polish  Independent 
Parachute  Brigade  on  25  February  1942,  along  with  a  full  translation  of  the  Army  Act  in 
137 
February  1941  . 
With  specific  regard  to  Sosabowski's  parachute  brigade,  Anglo-Polish  relations  took  a 
turn  for  the  worse  once  the  Poles  had  completed  their  initial  parachute  training,  and 
following  the  establishment  of  the  British  I"  Airborne  Division  in  November  194  1.138  The 
new  division's  commander,  then  Brigadier  F.  A.  M.  Browning,  attended  the  Polish 
parachute  demonstration  in  Scotland  on  23  September  1941,  at  which  Sosabowski's 
brigade  was  officially  re-christened  the  I't  Polish  Independent  Parachute  Brigade.  The 
exercise  was  held  in  honour  of  the  Polish  Commander  in  Chief  General  Sikorski,  who 
issued  specially  commissioned  Polish  parachute  qualification  wings  at  the  end  of  the 
exercise; 
139  the  Polish  General  Staff  confirmed  the  change  of  title  on  4  October  1941.140 
Browning  decided  that  a  complete  and  fully  trained  Polish  parachute  brigade  was  too 
useful  an  asset  to  ignore,  and  Dover  neatly  sums  up  the  British  view  of  subsequent 
developments: 
"At  first,  Browning  was  most  enthusiastic  about  the  Polish  Brigade,  and  gave 
Sosabowski  every  support  in  acquiring  accommodation,  supplies  and 
equipment.  However,  as  time  passed  he  noticed  that  the  Polish  Brigadier 
...  was 
reluctant  to  show  any  enthusiasm  for,  or  understanding  of,  the  suggestion  that 
his  Brigade  be  attached  to  one  of  the  British  airborne  divisions 
...  He 
[Sosabowski]  just  could  not  understand  that  private,  nationalistic  wars  were 
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command  ... 
Sosabowski  continued  to  complain  that  he  had  insufficient  time  to 
train  his  troops  -  although  he  had  longer  than  anyone  else.  He  stressed  that  his 
Brigade  was  under  strength.  So  intense  was  his  desire  to  carry  out  an  operation 
in  his  native  Poland  that  he  may  have  exaggerated  these  handicaps.  if  his  unit 
was  not  committed  to  battle  until  the  fmal  stages  of  the  war,  then  the  chance  of 
its  being  engaged  at  full  strength  in  the  liberation  of  Poland  would  be  that 
much  greater. 
,  141 
The  Poles,  understandably,  saw  matters  rather  differently,  and  doubtless  considered  that 
their  input  to  the  British  airborne  effort  offset  any  perceived  requirement  for  gratitude. 
Nonetheless,  the  British  ultimately  gained  control  of  the  I't  Polish  Independent  Parachute 
Brigade  in  June  1944,  and  it  became  part  of  the  British  I"  Airborne  Division  on  10  August 
1944.142  Sosabowski,  however,  deepened  his  existing  unpopularity  with  his  British  allies 
by  raising  objections  to  the  plan  for  Operation  Comet,  which  ultimately  became  Operation 
Market  Garden.  143  He  then  compounded  this  error  by  being  proved  right,  by  reacting 
angrily  to  what  he  rightly  viewed  as  British  incompetence  at  a  staff  conference  at  Valburg 
during  the  Arnhem  battle,  and  then  criticising  Browning  in  person.  144  In  the  opinion  of 
Colonel  Lorys,  who  was  then  serving  as  a  captain  on  Sosabowski's  staff,  "This  was 
probably  the  final  nail  in  Sosabowski's  coffin,  daring  to  criticise  British  generals".  145 
Although  Lorys  was  speaking  with  hindsight,  his  verdict  is  borne  out  by  events  after 
Arnhem,  which  clearly  illustrate  the  depth  of  British  emnity  toward  Sosabowski  and,  to  a 
lesser  extent,  his  brigade.  On  17  October  1944  Montgomery  unfairly  and  inaccurately 
criticised  the  performance  of  the  I"  Polish  Independent  Parachute  Brigade  at  Arnhem  to 
the  CIGS,  and  requested  that  the  Brigade  be  removed  from  his  command.  146  On  20 
November  1944,  Browning  sent  the  assistant  CIGS  a  damning  critique  of  Sosabowski's 
performance  as  commander  of  the  lt  Polish  Independent  Parachute  Brigade  before  and 
during  the  battle  of  Arnhem.  This  characterised  him  as  rigid,  difficult  and  unwilling  to 
perform  his  fiill  part  in  events,  and  closed  with  the  recommendation  that  a  younger  and 
more  pliant  individual  replace  Sosabowski.  The  Polish  president  in  exile  duly  relieved 
Sosabowski  of  his  command  on  9  December  1944,  although  the  wording  of  the  letter 
informing  him  of  the  decision  implied  that  it  was  done  under  British  pressure.  Some  of  his 
erstwhile  Brigade  went  on  hunger  strike  in  protest  at  this  blatant  injustice,  but  to  no 
aVaii. 
147 
It  is  hard  not  to  agree  with  Middlebrook's  view  on  Sosabowski's  treatment  by  his  so- 
called  allies: 
"it  seems  likely  that  the  commanders  in 
... 
[the] 
...  ground-force  chain  of 
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Sosabowski  and  his  brigade  was  a  convenient  way  of  deflecting  blame  from  the 
failure  of  the  ground  forces  to  reach  Arnhem.  Browning 
...  may  have  been 
persuaded  to  write  that  damning  letter  to  the  Deputy  CIGS  which  resulted  in 
Sosabowski  becoming  the  scapegoat.  It  was  a  sharneful  act  by  the  British 
commanders". 
148 
The  fact  is  that  Sosabowski  had  marked  himself  out  as  an  awkward  customer  long  before 
the  battle  at  Arnhem,  through  his  resistance  to  British  control  of  his  brigade,  which  means 
that  Browning  also  had  a  motive  to  participate  in  his  downfall. 
The  scapegoating  of  Sosabowski  and  the  I't  Polish  Independent  Parachute  Brigade  thus 
provides  a  compelling  explanation  for  the  British  failure  to  acknowledge  overtly  the  full 
extent  of  Polish  input  into  the  establishment  of  their  own  airborne  force.  It  is  significant  in 
this  regard  that  there  is  no  mention  whatever  of  the  part  played  by  the  Poles  at  Arnhem,  or 
indeed  of  the  1'  Polish  Independent  Parachute  Brigade,  in  the  official  history  of  the  British 
airborne  divisions  published  in  1945.149  The  situation  in  Otway's  more  exhaustive  1950 
official  history  is  only  marginally  better.  The  I"  Polish  Independent  Parachute  Brigade  is 
listed  in  1'  Airborne  Division  order  of  battle,  but  the  formation  of  the  Polish  brigade 
receives  only  a  passing  mention,  and  their  activities  at  Arnhem,  whilst  acknowledged,  are 
restricted  to  the  barest  bones.  150  The  reason  for  this  is  clear.  The  scapegoating  of 
Sosabowski  and  his  men  was  still  fresh  in  mind  when  these  accounts  were  compiled  in  the 
immediate  post-war  period.  More  importantly,  the  officers  who  had  orchestrated  the 
episode  were  still  amongst  the  most  senior  in  the  British  military  hierarchy.  It  would 
therefore  have  been  impolitic,  not  to  say  foolhardy,  for  the  officers  involved  in  compiling 
the  official  accounts  to  challenge  received  wisdom,  even  in  the  unlikely  event  that  they  had 
access  to  all  the  facts. 
However,  all  this  lay  far  in  the  future.  The  imPOrtant  Point  is  that  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  the  Poles  provided  valuable  theoretical  and  practical  assistance  to  the  early  British 
airborne  effort.  All  that  remains  is  to  examine  the  process  which  that  assistance  tied  into, 
the  creation  of  the  British  I't  Parachute  Brigade. 
V.  Churchill's  Vision  Realised  at  Last:  Ist  Parachute  BfIgade  Becomes 
Reality 
Among  the  first  questions  to  be  answered  with  regard  to  the  formation  of  I"  Parachute 
Brigade  was  what  to  do  with  II  SAS  Battalion.  The  option  favoured  by  the  War  Office 
was  to  disband  the  unit,  whilst  retaining  some  of  its  personnel  as  instructors  at  the  CLE, 
and  some  as  a  cadre  for  distribution  across  the  brigade.  A  telegram  to  this  effect  was William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  8  257 
despatched  to  11  SAS  Battalion  on  15  July  1941,  which  required  the  battalion  staff  to 
categorise  and  return  details  of  personnel  suitable  for  such  future  service  within  three 
days.  151  The  War  Office  preference  was  prompted  by  the  rather  unreliable  reputation  II 
SAS  Battalion  had  acquired.  In  part,  this  was  due  to  Army  dissatisfaction  with  the 
Commando  terms  of  engagement  under  which  the  Battalion's  personnel  were  serving, 
which  had  been  long  been  considered  inimical  to  discipline.  152  This  was  exacerbated  by 
the  poor  standard  of  volunteers  obtained  from  ITCs  to  maintain  the  Battalion's 
establishment.  Rock  referred  specifically  to  this  in  his  7  July  1941  paper  on  raising 
additional  parachute  battalions,  in  which  he  claimed  that  up  to  twenty-five  per  cent  of  such 
volunteers  were  subsequently  lost  for  either  refusing  to  jump  or  involvement  in  crime.  153 
However,  these  views  failed  to  take  into  account  changes  in  11  SAS  Battalion's 
complexion  wrought  by  its  new  commander,  Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  E.  "Eric"  Down,  who 
took  command  from  Lieutenant-Colonel  Jackson  in  June  1941.  This  command  change- 
over  was  less  than  popular  with  at  least  some  elements  within  the  battalion,  and  Down  was 
greeted  with  boos,  catcalls  and  foot  stamping.  154  Down  allegedly  laughed  at  the  reaction 
he  elicited  when  he  informed  his  new  command  that  their  days  of  "ballet  dancing"  were 
over,  and  presumably  did  the  same  when  he  learned  that  he  had  been  christened  "Dracula" 
because  of  his  that  his  uncompromising  attitude.  155  This  is  well  illustrated  by  one  of  the 
original  Commando  volunteers,  Reg  Curtis.  On  one  occasion,  a  Whitley  forced  landed  due 
to  mechanical  failure  at  Tatton  Park,  and  the  parachutists  aboard  were  rushed  back  to 
Ringway  for  another  jump  to  prevent  them  losing  confidence.  When  the  second  jump  was 
carried  out  without  mishap,  one  of  the  men  involved  remarked  to  Curtis  "I  wonder  if  that 
f1rst  run  was  a  ploy  of  Dracula,  to  see  how  we  would  react  in  an  emergency?  "156 
)Mist  reprehensible  from  a  disciplinary  standpoint,  the  troops'  initial  reaction  was 
understandable,  for  Down's  arrival  heralded  a  radical  shift  in  the  nature  of  11  SAS 
battalion.  The  Army  had  been  expressing  dissatisfaction  with  the  Commando  system  for 
troops  undergoing  parachute  training  at  Ringway  since  August  1940,157  and  Down  was  to 
oversee  the  withdrawal  of  the  special  privileges  that  Commando  status  conferred.  Given 
that  this  involved  loss  of  not  only  pay  but  also  of  the  comparative  freedom  from  the  more 
tiresome  aspects  of  military  life,  it  is  unsurprising  that  some  members  of  II  SAS  Battalion 
were  unhappy.  The  prospect  was  sweetened  somewhat  by  the  introduction  of  special 
parachute  pay,  which  Down  attempted  to  have  paid  at  the  same  rate  to  officers  and  other 
ranks-158  The  key  factor  appears  to  have  been  Down's  powers  of  persuasion  and 
leadership,  however,  for  the  majority  of  11  SAS  Battalion  elected  to  remain  under  the  new 
regime. 
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Between  June  and  September  1941  Down  set  about  transforming  11  SAS  Battalion  from 
a  loose-knit  raiding  force  into  a  first  rate  conventional  infantry  battalion  that  merely 
utilised  an  unconventional  method  to  reach  the  battlefield.  The  battalion  moved  to  Bury 
for  a  period  of  intensive  weapon  training,  then  back  to  Knutsford  for  a  mixture  of  long- 
distance  route  marches  and  night  descents  from  the  balloon  at  Tatton  Park.  "'  In  all  this, 
Down  remained  a  harsh  taskmaster,  accepting-  only  the  highest  standards,  from  his  men  and 
himself  Reg  Curtis  reflects  the  view  from  within  the  battalion: 
"We  all  wondered  how  this  chap  [Down]  was  going  to  fare:  we  soon  found  out. 
For  starters  no  one  could  find  a  good  word  for  him:  Dracula  we  called  him;  but 
I  must  say  that  anything  we  could  do  he  could  do  better 
...  I  liked  his 
enthusiastic  way:  he  would  have  no  quibble  at  the  thought  ofjoining  us  on  a 
scheme,  competing  and  setting  the  pace  at  the  head  of  the  column  on  a  100 
mile  route  march.  "161 
it  was  through  leadership  like  this  that  Down  lost  the  nickname  Dracula  and  gained  the 
more  affectionate  label  "Charlie  Orange",  the  phonetic  code  for  CO,  or  commanding 
officer.  162  Down's  hard  driving  paid  off.  Gale  inspected  II  SAS  Battalion  in  his  capacity 
as  prospective  commander  of  I'  Parachute  Brigade,  with  a  mind  to  enacting  the  War 
office  recommendation  to  disband  the  unit.  Gale  was  so  impressed  by  the  changes 
wrought  by  Down  in  the  three  months  since  taking  command  that  he  opted  to  keep  the  unit 
intact.  Following  consultation  between  Gale  and  the  Commander  in  Chief  Home  Forces, 
General  Sir  Bernard  Paget,  II  SAS  Battalion  was  re-designated  the  I"  Parachute  Battalion 
on  15  September  194  1,  the  same  day  that  formation  of  the  I'  Parachute  Brigade  was 
formally  authorised.  163  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  despite  his  leading  role  in  shaping  the 
brigade,  Gale  was  not  officially  confirmed  as  its  commander  until  29  September  1941.164 
Gale  was  to  be  greatly  assisted  in  his  new  post  by  the  parallel  establishment  of 
Headquarters,  1"  Airborne  Division.  The  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  General  Sir 
Alan  Brooke,  pushed  through  the  choice  of  a  divisional  rather  than  a  force  title  against  the 
*i  opinion  of  the  War  Office.  The  Headquarters  was  initially  tasked  to  oversee  airborne 
training  and  development,  but  Brooke,  who  was  a  dedicated  airborne  supporter,  was 
clearly  thinking  ahead  to  a  further  expansion  of  the  airborne  force,  and  wanted  the 
necessary  command  infrastructure  set  up  in  advance.  This  became  clear  in  mid-January 
1942,  when  Brooke  informed  Commander  in  Chief  Home  Forces  that  henceforth  HQ  I" 
Airborne  Division  was  to  be  considered  an  operational  command,  and  was  to  be  fully 
integrated  into  the  command  structure  in  order  to  avoid  difficulties  in  the  future.  165  The 
officer  selected  to  lead  the  new  organisation  was  Brigadier  F.  A.  M.  "Boy"  Browning, 
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through  the  maze  of  War  Office  bureaucracy.  Browning  was  informed  of  his  new  post  on 
29  October  1941,  and  assumed  his  duties  with  the  acting  rank  of  Major-General  and  a 
small  staff  on  3  November  1941.166  Thus  for  the  first  time  the  British  airborne  force  had  a 
commander  tasked  specifically  to  deal  with  administration  and  development  rather  than 
operational  matters,  and  with  sufficient  authority  to  fight  its  comer  in  VAiitehall.  This 
meant  that  Gale  was  able  to  concentrate  upon  training  I't  Parachute  Brigade,  without  the 
distraction  of  having  to  fight  for  the  necessary  resources. 
1'  Parachute  Brigade's  2nd  and  Yd  Parachute  Battalions,  under  Lieutenant-Colonels  E.  C. 
W.  Flavell  and  G.  W. Lathbury  respectively,  began  forming  at  Hardwick  Hall  from  15 
September  1941,  where  an  administrative  headquarters  had  been  set  up  as  agreed  at  the 
War  Office  conference  of  30  August  1941.167  Formation  was  to  be  completed  by  1 
October,  168  which  would  allow  a  month  for  sorting  and  incorporating  volunteers,  and 
physically  hardening  them  for  the  rigours  of  parachute  training,  which  was  scheduled  to 
commence  on  1  November  1941.  This  hiatus  was  also  to  allow  Ringway  to  make  the 
necessary  preparations  for  increasing  its  training  output,  and  to  gather  the  necessary 
parachutes  and  other  training  equipment.  169  The  memo  circulated  to  all  Home  Forces 
Commands  at  the  end  of  August  1941  had  been  quite  explicit  about  the  type  of  volunteer 
required, 
170  but  many  of  the  men  reporting  to  Hardwick  were  nonetheless  far  below  the 
required  standard.  The  2nd  Parachute  Battalion's  Adjutant,  Captain  John  Frost: 
11 
...  was  astonished  to  see  the  way  in  which  commanding  officers  of  units  all 
over  Britain  had  taken  the  opportunity  of  playing  the  old  Army  game  of 
shunting  off  their  naughty  boys  and  misfits  when  the  call  had  gone  out  for 
volunteers  to  parachute.  Nearly  half  those  who  presented  themselves  at  the 
gates  of  the  parachute  battalions  during  this  period  were  unsuitable  for  one 
reason  or  another.  Some  of  them  had  conduct  sheets  ...  six  pages  long.  There 
were  few  good  NCOs  because  commanding  officers  often  would  not  let  them 
go:  071 
The  body  of  the  Army,  it  seems,  considered  one  call  for  volunteers  -that  for  Commandos 
in  june  1940  -  to  be  enough.  The  variable  quality  of  the  volunteers  arriving  at  Hardwick 
resulted  in  the  respective  battalion  staffs  intercepting  batches  of  volunteers  further  and 
further  from  the  camp  gates  in  order  to  cream  off  the  most  promising,  until  things  got  out 
of  hand  and  a  more  equitable  consensus  was  reached.  172 
Despite  these  difficulties,  however,  the  two  new  parachute  battalions  progressed  well  in 
their  pre-parachute  preparation.  Lathbury  and  three  of  his  company  commanders  visited 
Ringway  to  see  what  lay  in  store  for  them  on  15  October  1941,173  and  the  Airborne  Forces 
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Parachuting"  on  24  October  1941.174  An  advance  party  from  Hardwick  Hall  arrived  at 
Ringway  as  scheduled  on  I  November  1941,  and  a  total  of  two  hundred  and  fifty-five 
trainees,  consisting  of  "C"  Company  of  the  2  nd  Battalion  and  "X'  Company  from  the  3  rd 
Battalion,  commenced  parachute  training  the  next  day.  175  On  15  November  Ringway 
informed  RAF  Army  Co-operation  Command  that  No.  I  Parachute  Training  Course  was 
completed  successfully  at  1330  hours.  176  In  the  intervening  fourteen  days,  No.  I  Course 
had  completed  five  hundred  and  nineteen  balloon  jumps  and  1254  aircraft  jumps,  some  of 
them  in  front  of  Browning,  who  visited  Ringway  on  12  November  1941.177  Two  hundred 
and  forty-five  of  the  two  hundred  and  fifty  who  started  finished  the  course,  a  success  rate 
that  suggests  the  physical  hardening  at  Hardwick  was  doing  its  job.  178 
It  took  a  further  four  increments  to  run  all  the  volunteers  from  the  2nd  and  3  rd  Parachute 
Battalions  through  the  PTS  basic  parachuting  course.  The  second,  consisting  of  two 
hundred  and  seventy  trainees,  commenced  on  18  November  and  concluded  twelve  days 
later.  "'  The  operational  records  make  no  reference  to  any  losses  from  No.  2  Course,  but 
its  completion  brought  the  PTS's  monthly  drop  total  for  November  1941  to  1,443  balloon 
and  2,887  aircraft  descents.  180  Course  No.  3  began  training  on  5  December  1941,  the  five- 
day  delay  being  necessary  for  parachute  drying.  ""  This  course  tested  anew  departure  for 
the  PTS,  that  of  running  three  training  "syndicates"  simultaneously.  Two  of  these 
consisted  of  the  3d  Battalion's  "C"  Company,  and  "N'  Company  from  the  1"  Battalion,  a 
total  of  two  hundred  and  forty-six  all  ranks.  182  The  third  syndicate  was  made  up  of  twenty- 
four  Polish  trainees  from  the  I"  Polish  Independent  Parachute  Brigade,  who  had 
commenced  training  on  2  December.  183  It  should  be  noted  that  Poles  were  undergoing 
training  at  the  PTS  throughout  this  period. 
Completion  of  Course  No.  3  brought  the  total  of  descents  carried  out  by  the  PTS  in  the  six 
weeks  since  I  November  1941  to  5,239,  in  the  process  of  which  thirty-nine  trainees  had 
been  injured  to  an  extent  sufficient  to  prevent  them  completing  the  course.  This  was  a 
ratio  of  fifty  injuries  per  5,000  dropS.  184  Some  personnel  from  1  st  Parachute  Brigade  also 
undertook  other  activities  whilst  at  Ringway.  Men  from  the  1"  Parachute  Battalion  made  a 
total  of  two  hundred  and  sixteen  night  balloon  jumps  during  December.  185  A  party  of 
fourteen  NCOs  and  men  drawn  from  the  Ind  and  3rd  Parachute  Battalions  began  a  parachute 
packing  and  maintenance  course  on  8  December,  and  others  participated  in  trials  to  gather 
data  on  the  incidence  of  airsickness  amongst  airborne  troops,  and  its  effect  upon 
efficiency. 
186  The  three-syndicate  model  was  carried  over  into  Course  No.  4,  which 
commenced  on  17  December  1941  with  two  hundred  and  nine  trainees  from  the  2d  and  3rd 
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AFE,  was  rewarded  with  a  day  off  as  a  double  celebration.  187  The  final  and  much  smaller 
Course  No.  5  began  on  30  December,  with  twenty-five  trainees  including  two  padres.  This 
was  another  first  for  Ringway,  which  was  marked  dryly  in  the  operational  records  as  being 
the  "...  first  time  the  Parachute  Training  Squadron  has  had  the  honour  to  be  instrumental  in 
teaching  reverend  gentlemen  to  descend  from  the  clouds".  18" 
The  completion  of  Course  No.  5  arguably  marked  the  point  at  which  the  I'  Parachute 
Brigade  became  an  operational  entity,  with  all  its  jumping  personnel  having  completed  the 
basic  parachuting  course  and  received  their  qualification  wings.  The  monthly  drop  total 
for  December  1941  was  1,523  balloon  jumps  and  2,606  aircraft  jumps.  189  This  meant  that 
that  the  PTS  had  conducted  a  total  of  2,966  balloon  descents  and  5,493  aircraft  jumps  in 
the  two  month  period  since  1  November,  the  vast  majority  of  them  by  personnel  from  IS, 
Parachute  Brigade.  This  was  by  no  means  the  end  of  the  matter,  however.  Advanced 
parachute  training  for  all  three  Parachute  Battalions  was  scheduled  to  commence  on  3 
January  1942,  and  was  to  consist  of  two  stick  descents  and  a  night  balloon  jump  per 
man.  190  Large-scale  night  jump  training  was  something  of  an  unknown  quantity,  although 
in  the  event  it  proceeded  relatively  without  mishap.  No.  I  Advanced  Course  was 
completed  on  10  January  1942,  at  which  time  Ringway  reported  only  two  injuries  from  a 
total  of  one  hundred  and  ninety-six  balloon  descents  in  total  darkness.  There  were  no 
refusals,  and  whilst  the  experience  was  described  as  eery,  Ringway  recommended  that 
henceforth  such  training  be  included  in  the  standard  training  syllabus.  '9' 
That  two  entire  battalions  were  able  to  complete  basic  parachute  training  in  a  period  of 
eight  weeks  virtually  without  a  hitch  -  there  was  a  brief  dispute  over  transportation 
between  Hardwick  Hall  and  Ringway  in  mid-December'92  -  is  a  tribute  to  the  careful 
planning  and  preparations  made  at  Ringway  and  Hardwick  Hall.  As  a  result,  the  British 
Army  finally  possessed  something  approaching  the  force  of  5,000  parachutists  that 
Churchill  had  called  for  almost  exactly  eighteen  months  previously. 
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CHAPTER  NINE 
Conclusion 
The  appearance  of  the  operational  parachute  force  Churchill  had  ordered  in  June  1940 
was  but  the  first  in  a  series  of  British  airborne  milestones.  This  concluding  chapter  will 
therefore  begin  by  recounting  that  development  to  1945,  followed  by  a  brief  survey  of 
parallel  airborne  development  elsewhere.  This  will  set  the  scene  for  a  general  discussion 
of  the  value  of  airborne  forces,  before  refocusing  on  the  British  example. 
I.  British  Airborne  Development,  Januafy  1942  -  May  1945 
Events  progressed  rapidly  after  I't  Parachute  Brigade  attained  operational  status.  The 
Army  Air  Corps  was  created  as  an  umbrella  organisation  for  Parachute  and  glider  troops  on 
21  December  1941.  What  was  to  become  the  I"  Airlanding  Brigade  was  concentrated  in 
the  Newbury-Basingstoke  area  by  December  1941,  where  it  liaised  with  the  AFE  and 
trained  with  mock-up  gliders  whilst  awaiting  the  appearance  of  the  real  thing.  A  dedicated 
Glider  Pilot  Regiment  was  raised  to  fly  these  machines,  and  began  training  at  the 
beginning  of  January  1942.1  Through  1942  these  units  were  augmented  by  a  host  a 
divisional  troops.  These  included  a  postal  unit,  a  provost  company,  an  independent 
pathfinder  company,  a  reconnaissance  squadron  and  a  parachute  field  ambulance,  amongst 
others.  2  April  1942  saw  Hardwick  Hall  transformed  into  the  Airborne  Forces  Depot,  and 
the  2nd  Parachute  Brigade  established  under  a  newly  promoted  Lieutenant-Colonel  Down 
on  17  July  1942.  This  consisted  of  the  4th  Parachute  Battalion  transferred  from  ist 
Parachute  Brigade,  augmented  by  the  5th  (Scottish)  and  6th  (Royal  Welch)  Parachute 
Battalion,  formerly  the  7th  Battalion,  The  Cameron  Highlanders  and  I  Oth  Battalion,  The 
Royal  Welch  Fusiliers  respectively.  3 
On  I  August  1942  all  the  existing  parachute  battalions  became  part  of  the  new  Parachute 
Regiment  at  the  behest  of  I't  Airborne  Division's  commander,  Major-General  F.  A.  M. 
"Boy"  Browning.  The  maroon  beret  then  became  official  head-dress  for  all  Army  Air 
Corps  personnel.  This  was  not  popular  with  many  paratroopers  from  infantry  regiments 
that  already  possessed  distinctive  head-dress,  4  but  was  introduced  to  promote  an  airborne 
esprit  de  corps.  Legend  has  it  that  the  maroon  beret  was  selected  on  the  preference  of  the 
orderly  demonstrating  green,  blue  and  maroon  examples  for  Browning  and  the  CIGS 
General  Sir  Alan  Brooke.  5  The  maroon  beret  has  arguably  exceeded  Browning's 
expectations,  becoming  the  most  enduring  symbol  of  Airborne  Forces  not  only  in  Britain 
but  also  elsewhere.  6  At  the  same  time,  the  Airborne  flash  of  Bellerophon  astride  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  271 
winged  horse  Pegasus  and  the  Airborne  arm  of  service  colours;  (Cambridge  blue  and  claret) 
were  adopted.  7 
1'  Parachute  Brigade  made  its  collective  operational  debut  (a  company  from  the  2  nd 
parachute  Battalion  had  participated  in  the  raid  on  the  German  radar  station  at  Bruneval  in 
February  11  942),  8  following  a  move  to  North  Africa  in  November  1942.  During  this  period 
the  paratroops  acquired  their  nickname  of  "Red  Devils",  allegedly  from  their  German 
opponents.  1'  Airborne  Division  concentrated  at  Mascara  in  May  1943,  under  command 
of  Major-General  G.  F.  Hopkinson.  Hopkinson  had  succeeded  Browning  as  divisional 
commander  when  the  latter  was  elevated  to  Major-General  Airborne  Forces  on  5  May 
1943.9  1'  Airlanding  Brigade  and  I"  Parachute  Brigade  took  part  in  separate  operations  in 
Sicily  on  the  nights  of  9-10  July  and  13-14  July  respectively.  By  chance,  some  of  the  drop 
zone  selected  by  I'  Parachute  Brigade  had  also  been  chosen  by  elements  of  the  German  1' 
parachute  Division,  who  dropped  in  slightly  before  the  British,  prompting  the  first  clash 
between  airborne  forces  on  landing.  'O  2nd  Parachute  Brigade  was  slated  for  an  operation  on 
10-  11  july,  but  this  was  cancelled  because  ground  forces  secured  the  objective.  1' 
Airborne  Division  was  deployed  in  the  ground  role  for  the  occupation  of  southern  Italy, 
landing  at  Taranto  on  11  September  1943.  The  Division  then  advanced  to  seize  Foggia, 
during  which  operation  Major-General  Hopkinson  was  killed.  l"Airborne  Division  left 
Italy  by  ship  for  the  UK  in  November  1943.11 
Things  had  been  moving  apace  in  the  UK  in  I  st  Airborne's  absence.  On  23  April  1943 
the  War  Office  authorised  the  establishment  of  a  second  airborne  division.  Christened  6  th 
Airborne  Division  as  a  disinformation  measure,  the  new  division  was  built  around  an  initial 
cadre  of  3"'  Parachute  Brigade,  3"  Parachute  Squadron,  RE  and  224  th  Parachute  Field 
Ambulance.  These  were  all  re-assigned  I  st  Airborne  Division  units,  which  had  remained 
in  the  UK  when  the  latter  moved  to  North  Africa.  12  Command  of  the  new  division  was 
allotted  to  newly  promoted  Major-General  Richard  Gale  on  2  May  1943.  Gale,  it  should 
be  remembered,  had  originally  commanded  I't  Parachute  Brigade,  but  had  been  sidelined 
for  command  of  1'  Airborne  Division  in  favour  of  Browning,  largely  for  political  reasons. 
Under  his  command  6th  Airborne  Division  successfully  secured  the  left  flank  of  the 
Normandy  invasion  beaches  in  June  1944,  including  the  epic  operation  to  destroy  the 
German  gun  battery  at  Merville  by  Major  Terence  Otway's  9th  Parachute  Battalion.  13  The 
Division  also  participated  in  the  Rhine  crossings  in  March  1945  and  the  subsequent  ground 
advance  across  north  Germany.  14  After  standing  to  for  several  aborted  operations  in  the 
summer  of  1944,1t  Airborne  Division  was  virtually  destroyed  in  the  ill-conceived VVIlliam  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  272 
operation  to  seize  the  bridges  at  Arnhem  that  September.  It  ended  the  war  by  supervising 
the  surrender  of  German  personnel  in  Norway 
Thus,  in  the  period  between  Dunkirk  and  VE  Day  the  British  airborne  force  expanded 
from  a  handful  of  ill-equipped  parachute  raiders  to  a  force  well  in  excess  of  two  fully 
equipped  divisions  in  strength.  15  Before  examining  the  matter  of  whether  or  not  this  was  a 
worthwhile,  or  indeed  justifiable,  expansion,  it  will  first  be  necessary  to  sketch  in  airborne 
development  elsewhere,  in  order  to  put  the  British  example  in  its  wider  context. 
/I.  Airborne  Development  outside  the  UK,  Januaty  1942  -  May  1945 
As  detailed  in  Chapter  One,  despite  being  the  first  to  adopt  a  man-carrying  parachute  and 
form  a  dedicated  parachute  unit,  the  Italians  let  their  lead  slip  at  the  end  of  the  1920s. 
Italian  parachute  units  remained  in  being,  and  were  first  used  operationally  in  a  small 
operation  to  seize  the  Greek  island  of  Cephalonia  on  30  April  1941.  In  the  spring  of  1942 
the  Italian  parachute  force  was  expanded  to  divisional  size.  Christened  the  Folgore,  the 
division  had  two  2,500  strong  parachute  regiments.  Ajoint  airborne  invasion  of  Malta 
with  7'  Flieger  Division  in  August  March  1942  was  cancelled,  and  thereafter  Italian 
parachute  troops  were  employed  exclusively  in  the  ground  role.  16 
The  Soviets,  who  had  held  the  airborne  lead  through  the  1930s,  made  more  extensive  use 
of  their  huge  airborne  force  after  the  German  invasion  in  June  1941.  By  the  time  the 
Germans  invaded  the  Soviet  Union  in  June  1941,  the  Soviet  airborne  force  was  divided 
into  five  corps,  one  independent  brigade  and  a  host  of  smaller  units,  complete  with  an 
independent  administration  answerable  directly  to  the  Soviet  Ministry  of  Defence.  7 
Whilst  the  force  lacked  a  good  deal  of  equipment,  including  suitably  configured 
parachuting  aircraft  and  radios,  the  fact  that  the  Soviets  had  been  able  to  create  such  a 
capability  from  scratch  in  a  decade  was  a  highly  creditable  achievement  in  itself  Soviet 
airborne  doctrine  was  also  updated,  in  Article  28  of  the  1941  Field  Service  Regulations.  18 
It  was  under  this  brief  that  the  Soviet  airborne  arm  went  to  war  in  June  1941. 
Circumstances  after  22  June  1941  frequently  obliged  Soviet  airborne  troops  to  be  deployed 
in  the  infantry  role,  although  several  parachute  operations  were  carried  out  against  the 
German  invaders.  On  14  July  1941,  a  parachute  company  raided  a  German  vehicle 
concentration  near  Gorki,  the  first  of  many  diversionary  operations,  some  of  which  were 
carried  out  in  conjunction  with  partisan  groups.  Large  multi-brigade  parachute  operations 
were  also  carried  out  in  support  of  ground  operations.  These  included  drops  to  shield William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  273 
Moscow  in  December  1941  -January  1942,  and  operations  in  Support  of  ground  offensives 
in  the  regions  of  Viaz'ma  (January-February  1942),  Demiansk  (February-April  1942),  and 
in  the  crossing  of  the  Dnieper  in  September  1943.  Although  little  known  in  the,  West,  these 
were  comparable  in  size  and  scope  with  Western  airborne  operations. 
The  German  airborne  force  remained  idle  for  almost  a  year  after  their  large-scale 
employment  in  the  Low  Countries  in  May  1940.  Some  planning  for  the  projected  invasion 
of  Britain  was  undertaken,  including  a  scheme  to  seize  Brighton  and  high  ground  north  of 
Dover  to  protect  the  flanks  of  the  proposed  German  beachhead,  and  another  for  a  series  of 
coup-de-main  attacks  around  Dover.  19  These  were  hamstrung  by  several  factors,  not  least 
the  lack  of  high-level  commitment  to  Operation  Seeldwe  (Sealion),  as  the  invasion  was 
code-named,  and  the  absence  of  the  airborne  force's  commander;  Student  had  been 
wounded  by  friendly  fire  in  the  closing  stages  of  the  fight  for  Rotterdam  20  This  hiatus  was 
fortunate.  The  operations  in  the  Low  Countries  had  used  up  a  large  proportion  of  existing 
stocks  of  parachutes  and  gliders,  around  one  in  four  transport  aircraft  were  unserviceable, 
and  there  was  a  shortage  of  trained  Fallschirmjdger  to  replace  casualties.  21 
Student  returned  to  duty  in  January  1941,  by  which  time  German  attention  was  refocusing 
on  the  Mediterranean,  as  part  of  the  deception  measures  for  the  attack  on  the  Soviet  Union. 
Student  took  advantage  of  this  to  advance  the  airborne  cause,  and  succeeded  in  persuading 
Hitler  to  authorise  an  airborne  assault  on  Crete  during  a  personal  interview  on  21  April 
1941;  Hitler  confirmed  his  decision  in  Directive  No.  28  on  25  April  1941.22  He  also 
ordered  a  detachment  of  German  paratroops  to  capture  the  single  road  bridge  over  the 
Corinth  Canal,  which  linked  the  Peloponnese  to  the  Greek  mainland,  in  order  to  cut  off 
retreating  Allied  forces.  The  attack,  codenamed  Hannibal,  was  launched  on  26  April  1941. 
The  bridge  was  captured  intact,  but  not  before  most  of  the  retreating  Allied  troops  had 
escaped,  and  the  bridge  was  destroyed  shortly  after  when  a  near  miss  detonated  demolition 
charges  still  fixed  to  the  structure.  In  any  event,  Hannibal  forfeited  strategic  surprise  for 
the  attack  on  Crete  by  revealing  the  presence  of  German  airborne  troops  in  southern 
Europe.  23 
The  assault  on  Crete  was  launched  on  20  May  1941.  Luftwaffe  air  attacks  failed  to 
suppress  British  defences,  and  several  German  units  in  the  first  lift  were  virtually 
annihilated  on  landing,  and  many  of  the  survivors  were  widely  scattered.  The  second  lift 
was  supposed  to  go  in  on  the  afternoon  of  20  May,  but  reffielling  delays  wrecked  the 
schedule  and  the  problem  was  compounded  by  communication  failures  at  several  levels. 
By  dusk,  none  of  the  initial  German  objectives  had  been  fully  achieved.  The  most  critical William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  274 
of  these  was  the  failure  to  seize  the  airfield  at  Maleme,  to  facilitate  the  landing  of 
reinforcements. 
Luckily  for  Student's  men,  the  poor  communications  of  the  defenders,  in  conjunction 
with  the  scattered  nature  of  the  German  lodgements,  prevented  a  co-ordinated  counter 
attack.  Maleme  airfield  and  the  surrounding  area  were  finally  secured  on  the  afternoon  of 
21  May  1941.  Thereafter  the  balance  tipped  increasingly  toward  the  invaders,  leading  to  a 
British  evacuation  that  ceased  on  30  May,  although  mopping  up  continued  for  a 
considerable  period  thereafter.  24  The  battle  cost  the  Germans  6,698  casualties,  just  over 
half  of  which  were  fatalities.  1  653  of  the  dead  were  Fallschirmjqger,  which  represented 
around  one  in  four  of  the  airborne  force  deployed.  In  addition,  almost  two  hundred 
transport  aircraft  were  destroyed,  and  high  proportions  of  their  crews  were  also  killed.  25 
According  to  OtwaY,  Student  did  not  consider  this  price  to  be  excessive,  26  but  Hitler  was 
shocked  at  the  scale  of  the  casualties  and  informed  Student  on  19  July  1941  that  the 
"...  parachute  weapon  depends  on  surprise  -  the  surprise  factor  has  now  gone".  27  Whether 
this  was  justified  is  discussed  more  fully  below,  but  Hitler's  opinion  meant  that  Crete  was 
the  last  major  German  airborne  operation  carried  out  during  the  Second  World  War, 
although  not  the  last  per  se.  Glider  troops  successfully  rescued  Mussolini  from 
incarceration  in  the  Gran  Sasso  hotel  in  September  1943,  a  reinforced  parachute  battalion 
captured  the  island  of  Leros  in  the  Dodecanese  in  November  that  year,  and  an  SS  parachute 
unit  came  close  to  capturing  Tito  with  a  combined  parachute  and  glider  assault  on  25  May 
1944.  The  final  German  airborne  operation  of  the  war  was  a  night  parachute  drop  in 
support  of  the  German  offensive  in  the  Ardennes  in  December  1944.  Details  of  this 
operation  highlight  the  depths  to  which  the  once  mighty  German  airborne  arm  had  sunk  by 
that  time.  Fuel  and  aircraft  shortages  necessitated  an  attack  in  three  waves,  and  the  aircrew 
involved  had  no  experience  in  dropping  parachutists  or  night  flying.  The  attack  went  in  on 
the  night  of  16-17  December  1944,  but  only  ten  of  the  eighty  aircraft  located  the  drop  zone 
in  high  winds  and  snow;  others  dropped  their  human  cargoes  as  far  afield  as  Bonn  in 
Germany,  and  in  Holland.  Only  three  hundred  and  fifty  men  eventually  rallied. 
Thereafter,  a  combination  of  arctic  weather  and  US  sweeps  obliged  a  hundred  or  so 
survivors  to  break  out  for  the  German  lines  on  20  December  1944.  They  had  achieved 
little  except  to  Prompt  US  forces  to  pay  more  attention  to  rear  area  defence  for  a  short 
period. 
28 
The  Second  World  War  saw  the  establishment  of  two  finiher  airborne  forces.  The 
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instructors,  and  the  Imperial  Army  and  Navy  established  their  own  separate  airborne  arms. 
By  late  1941  the  Navy's  force  totalled  2,000  men,  and  that  of  the  Army  6,000;  the  Army 
force  also  included  a  glider  and  air-landing  element.  A  battalion-sized  force  of  naval 
paratroops  successfully  seized  a  Dutch  airfield  in  the  Celebes  islands  in  January  1942.  On 
14  February  1942  a  larger  operation  seized  British  and  Dutch  oil  refineries  at  Palembang, 
but  not  before  the  installations  had  been  seriously  damaged  by  demolition  charges,  and 
paratroops  were  dropped  in  support  of  Japanese  sea  landings  on  Timor  on  21  and  22 
February  1942.  The  last  major  Japanese  operation  came  on  6  December  1944,  when  US 
airfields  on  Leyte  in  the  Philippines  were  targeted  by  a  combined  night  parachute  and 
airlanding  attack.  Most  of  the  Japanese  transports  were  shot  down  before  reaching  their 
drop  points,  but  it  still  took  forty-eight  hours  to  eliminate  the  paratroops  that  got  through. 
In  that  time  they  succeeded  in  destroying  fuel  stocks  and  a  small  number  of  aircraft,  and 
damaging  a  number  of  others;  this  set  US  plans  back  by  around  two  weeks.  Ironically, 
much  of  the  mopping  up  was  carried  out  by  units  of  the  US  187  th  Parachute  Infantry 
29 
Regiment,  part  of  the  US  I 
Vh  Airborne  Division  that  was  stationed  in  the  area. 
Last  but  by  no  means  least  was  the  United  States,  whose  airborne  effort  ultimately 
dwarfed  that  of  all  the  rest  in  numbers  of  men  and  of  aircraft  . 
30  The  US  effort  closely 
paralleled  that  of  the  British,  albeit  without  the  constraints  in  men  and  equipment  suffered 
by  the  latter.  The  most  important  difference  from  a  structural  perspective  lay  in  the  fact 
that  the  United  States  Army  Air  Force  was,  as  its  title  suggests,  part  of  the  US  Army,  and 
not  an  independent  arm  like  the  RAF.  As  in  Britain,  control  of  the  new  airborne  force 
rapidly  became  a  bone  of  contention,  and  by  July  1940  the  infhntry,  engineers  and  air  corps 
branches  were  pushing  their  cases.  In  the  US  case,  however,  head  of  the  Army  General 
George  C.  Marshall  had  the  authority  to  make  the  necessary  decision  and  the  power  to 
enforce  it,  and  control  went  to  the  infantry  branch.  31  It  is  fascinating  to  speculate  how  the 
British  airborne  effort  might  have  profitted  from  a  similar  level  of  control  being  exerted 
over  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  at  the  same  time. 
A  Parachute  Test  Platoon  was  established  on  I  July  1940  at  Fort  Benning,  Georgia,  and 
the  f1rst  US  parachute  battalion  was  formed  on  16  September.  By  late  1941  there  were 
four  us  Army  parachute  battalions,  an  on  30  January  1942  it  was  decided  to  expand  the 
four  parachute  battalions  into  regiments.  A  dedicated  Airborne  Command  to  oversee  them 
was  established  on  21  March  1942.  In  September  the  456h  Parachute  Field  Artillery 
battalion  was  set  up  as  a  training  unit  for  further  airborne  artillery  units.  By  1945  there 
were  over  forty  parachute  infantry  battalions,  thirty  glider  infantry  battalions  and  a  variety 
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The  rapid  expansion  of  the  US  airborne  force  necessitated  the  formation  of  airborne 
divisions  on  the  German  and  British  model.  The  82d  and  101s,  Airborne  Divisions  were 
activated  on  15  August  1942,  the  I  Ph  Airborne  Division  on  25  February  1943,  and  the  17  th 
Airborne  Division  on  15  April  1943.  The  82d  Airborne  participated  in  the  fighting  in 
Sicily  and  Salerno  in  Italy,  before  being  withdrawn  to  join  the  101"  Airborne  in  the  UK  in 
February  1944;  the  101"  moved  straight  from  the  US  to  Britain  in  September  1943.  Both 
divisions  were  used  to  secure  the  western  flank  of  the  Allied  beachhead  in  Normandy  in 
June  1944,  participated  in  the  ill-fated  Operation  Market-Garden  in  Holland  in  September 
1944,  and  operated  in  the  ground  role  in  the  Ardennes  in  December  1944  -  January  1945, 
The  17aAirbome  Division  arrived  in  Europe  in  August  1944,  fought  in  the  ground  role 
from  December  1944  to  February  1945.  It  was  then  withdrawn  and  took  part  in  the 
airborne  operation  to  cross  the  Rhine  in  March  1945. 
The  I  l"i'Airbome  Division  served  in  the  Pacific  theatre  from  January  1944.  Elements  of 
the  division  made  a  total  of  four  combat  jumps  in  the  Philippines,  and  were  among  the  first 
US  troops  flown  into  Japan  after  the  Japanese  surrender.  Alongside  all  this,  it  should  also 
be  noted  that  the  US  also  developed  a  massive  airborne  training  infrastructure,  and 
produced  sufficient  transport  aircraft  and  gliders  not  only  to  deploy  this  vast  force,  but  also 
to  provide  air  lift  capability  for  Allied  airborne  forces  as  well.  For  example,  the  US  Army 
Air  Force  (USAAF)  lifted  the  entire  parachute  portion  of  the  first  wave  of  the  British  I  St 
Airborne  Division  into  the  Arnhem  area  in  September  1944.  The  only  British  parachute 
troops  to  jump  from  RAF  aircraft  there  were  I  st  Airborne's  pathfinder  unit,  21 
Independent  Parachute  Company.  32 
/it.  Sensible  Investment  or  Spectacular  Blind  Alley:  The  Value  and 
Effectiveness  of  Airbome  Forces 
This  brief  r6sum6  of  airborne  activity  during  the  Second  World  War  shows  that  the 
British  were  not  alone  in  putting  a  great  deal  of  effort  and  resources  into  their  airborne 
force,  although  it  does  not  automatically  follow  that  this  investment  was  justified.  Take, 
for  example,  opinions  expressed  by  the  first  large-scale  practitioners  of  airborne  warfare, 
the  Soviet  Union  and  Nazi  Germany.  The  severe  losses  incurred  by  Soviet  airborne  forces 
at  Viaz'ma,  Demiansk  and  in  crossing  the  Dnieper  between  January  1942  and  September 
1943  the  process  had  "...  a  sobering  effect  on  the  [Soviet)  High  Command's  view  of  the 
utility  of  parachute  troopSit.  33  This  did  not  deter  the  Soviets  from  using  parachute 
spearheads  in  their  attack  into  Manchuria  in  1945,  however.  Fifteen  separate  and  highly 
successful  operations  employed  forces  between  platoon  and  battalion  size,  to  seize  major William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  277 
transport  arteries,  command  installations  and  airfields  in  front  Of  advancing  Soviet 
arnioured  forceS.  34  It  is  also  significant  that  the  Soviets  maintained,  and  the  Russian 
Confederation  of  Independent  States  continues  to  maintain,  a  comparatively  huge  airborne 
force.  At  its  peak  in  the  1980s,  this  force  numbered  eight  full  divisions,  equipped  with 
custom  designed  and  parachute-droPPable  armoured  fighting  vehicles,  a  capability 
unmatched  by  any  other  military  in  the  world. 
Similarly,  German  losses  on  Crete  prompted  Hitler  to  turn  away  from  airborne  operations 
on  the  grounds  that  the  "...  parachute  weapon  depends  on  surprise  [and]  the  surprise  factor 
has  now  gone".  35  Hitler's  adverse  reaction  to  the  losses  sustained  by  "his"  Fal1schirmfter 
may  have  been  prompted  by  his  front  line  experience  during  the  First  World  War.  More 
importantly,  his  reaction  strongly  suggests  that  Hitler  considered  the  psychological  impact 
of  airborne  operations  to  be  paramount.  This  somewhat  blinkered  view  totally  overlooks 
the  potential  of  airborne  forces  in  a  less  spectacular  tactical  and/or  operational  context, 
although  subsequent  make  it  clear  that  Hitler's  views  were  not  universal  within  the 
German  military.  As  we  have  seen,  not  only  did  the  German  airborne  force  remain  in 
being  until  the  end  of  the  war,  but  it  also  carried  out  separate  small-scale  coup-de-main 
operations  aimed  at  liberating  Mussolini  and  capturing  Tito,  along  with  larger  and  more 
conventional  parachute  operations.  The  latter  included  dropping  reinforcements  in  North 
Africa  and  Sicily,  the  seizure  of  the  Dodecanese  island  of  Leros,  and  an  operation  in 
support  of  the  Ardennes  offensive  in  December  1944. 
These  examples  show  that  measuring  the  effectiveness  of  airborne  warfare  and  the 
requisite  forces  is  a  difficult  proposition,  with  views  varying  widely  even  amongst  those 
closely  involved  in  the  matter.  That  said,  some  attempt  to  achieve  this  difficult  goal  must 
be  made,  in  order  to  put  the  subject  of  this  thesis  into  context.  There  is  also  the  matter  of 
how  to  judge  the  value  of  such  operations.  There  is  insufficient  space  here  for  a  detailed 
analysis  of  all  the  airborne  operations  carried  out  in  the  West  during  the  Second  World 
War,  so  an  examination  of  a  representative  sample  of  airborne  operations  will  have  to 
suffice.  The  analysis  will  concentrate  mainly  on  four  operations  from  each  end  of  the 
airborne  scale,  two  parachute  raids  and  two  divisional  sized  operations,  of  which  one  of 
each  category  have  been  classified  rightly  or  wrongly  as  a  failure.  British  airborne  forces 
carried  out  all  the  operations  selected,  a  choice  made  in  part  because  the  British  example  is 
the  focus  of  this  thesis,  but  mainly  because  they  provide  the  clearest  illustrations  of  the 
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Let  us  begin  by  considering  the  British  parachute  raid  on  the  Tragino,  Aqueduct  in 
Southern  Italy  in  February  1941,  an  operation  covered  in  detail  in  Chapter  Five  above. 
Strictly  speaking,  the  operation  was  a  failure,  insofar  as  the  results  did  not  meet  the 
planner's  expectations.  Although  an  aqueduct  was  destroyed,  this  did  not  lead  to  the 
expected  disr4ption  of  drinking  water  supplies  to  ports  of  BarL  Brindisi  and  Taranto, 
which  were  heavily  involved  in  supporting  Italian  operations  in  Albania,  and  the  entire 
raiding  force  was  captured  during  its  withdrawal.  Operation  Colossus  could  therefore  be 
cited  as  evidence  against  the  effectiveness  of  airborne  operations,  but  such  a  judgement 
would  be  an  oversimplification,  because  the  reasons  for  the  failure  can  be  attributed  not  to 
the  method,  but  to  factors  that  would  have  hamstrung  any  operation.  Faulty  intelligence 
and  unrealistic  assumptions  were  foremost  among  these.  The  target  proved  to  be 
constructed  of  reinforced  concrete  rather  than  the  brickwork.  This  meant  that  the 
demolition  charges  were  insufficient  for  the  job,  although  the  RE  officer  with  the  raiders 
nonetheless  succeeded  in  demolishing  a  supporting  pier,  thereby  cutting  the  waterway  and 
accomplishing  the  raid's  specific  objective. 
That  this  failed  to  achieve  the  expected  degree  of  disruption  was  not  the  fault  of  the 
concept  or  the  raiders,  but  of  the  planners.  The  optimistic  assumption  that  the  raiders 
would  be  able  to  cover  the  sixty  miles  to  the  coast  for  extraction  in  the  time  allowed 
proved  sumilarly  misplaced,  with  predictable  results.  In  fairness,  it  has  to  be  acknowledged 
that  the  planners  themselves  were  working  in  the  dark,  given  that  the  Tragino  Raid  was  the 
fIrst  of  its  kind  launched  by  British  forces.  In  addition,  the  raid  was  conceived  at  least  in 
part  to  demonstrate  the  efficacy  of  the  airborne  method,  which  may  have  encouraged  the 
planners  to  err  on  the  side  of  optimism.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  fact  remains  that  the  raiders 
succeeded  in  carrying  out  their  allotted  mission  in  the  face  of  unforeseen  problems,  and  in 
cold  military  terms  the  loss  of  a  comparatively  small  team  of  raiders  was  a  fair  price  for  the 
anticipated  results.  This  fact  was  made  abundantly  clear  to  the  raiders  when  they 
volunteered.  It  should  also  be  remembered  the  mission  could  only  have  been  carried  out 
ýusing  parachute  insertion,  given  that  the  RAF  considered  hitting  it  with  aerial  bombs  to  be 
impossible.  The  fact  that  the  local  Population  detected  the  raiders  as  they  exfiltrated 
strongly  suggests  that  a  sea-insertion  would  have  led  to  a  similar  outcome  before  the  target 
was  reached,  especially  given  that  the  raiders  would  have  been  weighed  down  with  their 
demolition  equipment  going  in. 
Unrealistic  expectation  and  poor  intelligence  are  recurring  themes  in  the  history  of 
airborne  operations.  The  German  coup-de-main  attack  against  the  Corinth  Canal  Bridge  in 
Greece  on  26  April  1941  provides  a  close  parallel  to  the  Tragino  episode,  for  example. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  279 
Student's  Fallschirmjdger  captured  the  bridge  as  planned,  but  higher  authority  launched 
the  operation  too  late  to  achieve  its  intended  aim  of  cutting  the  sole  escape  route  for  the 
retreating  Allied  forces.  The  Corinth  operation  also  highlights  the  importance  of  a  further 
vital  but  less  tangible  factor,  that  of  luck.  Although  captured  intact,  the  bridge  was 
subsequently  destroyed  when  a  stray  shot  detonated  the  Allied  demolition  charges,  which 
had  been  disconnected  but  not  removed.  36  Thus,  while  the  operation  can  be  classified  as  a 
failure,  it  is  again  clear  that  responsibility  again  lies  largely  other  than  with  the  airborne 
method  or  troops  involved. 
The  British  raid  on  the  German  radar  station  at  Bruneval,  twelve  miles  north  of  Le  Havre 
in  France,  in  February  1942  provides  a  clear  illustration  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  airborne 
method  in  a  small-scale  raiding  context.  37  Operation  Biting  also  shows  how  well  the 
British  had  taken  on  board  the  lessons  of  Tragino.  By  the  end  of  1941,  Bomber  Command 
losses  were  running  at  around  four  per  cent  of  the  aircraft  committed,  an  unsustainable  rate 
largely  due  to  the  efficiency  of  German  radar,  and  of  the  Warzburg  type  used  to  vector 
Gerrnan  night-fighters  onto  specific  targets  in  particular.  38  Consequently,  when  air 
reconnaissance  identified  the  installation  near  Bruneval  as  a  Wamburg,  a  high  level 
decision  was  taken  to  launch  a  raid  to  capture  the  apparatus  for  closer  examination. 
Strong  German  defences  along  the  coast  and  the  distance  form  the  coast  to  the  objective 
ruled  out  a  seaborne  attack,  so  an  airborne  attack  followed  by  sea  evacuation  was  decided 
upon.  Gale  selected  the  2nd  Parachute  Battalion's  C  Company  for  the  job,  nicknamed 
"Jock  Company"  because  all  its  members  were  volunteers  from  Scots  regiments.  Jock 
Company's  conimander  was  Captain  John  Frost,  who  as  CO  of  the  2nd  Battalion,  The 
parachute  Regiment,  was  to  hold  the  road  bridge  at  Arnhem  two  and  a  half  years  later. 
The  final  plan  saw  Jock  Company  divided  into  four  parties,  and  included  a  RAF  NCO 
radar  specialist  to  examine  and  photograph  the  Wfirzburg,  and  a  section  of  airborne  Royal 
Engineers  (REs)  to  dismantle  and  carry  off  key  parts  for  further  examination.  All  told,  the 
force  consisted  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  men.  The  raiders  were  to  be  dropped  in  three 
waves  onto  a  drop  zone  half  a  mile  or so  east  of  the  target.  The  first  wave  was  to  seize  the 
beach  for  the  evacuation,  and  was  dropped  first  because  it  had  the  most  ground  to  cover. 
The  second  wave  was  divided  into  four  groups.  One  was  to  act  as  a  blocking  force 
between  the  objective  and  a  company-sized  German  garrison  located  a  few  hundred  metres 
to  the  north.  The  second,  led  by  Frost,  was  to  clear  a  nearby  villa  reportedly  used  as  by  the 
Germans  as  billets  for  the  radar  station  personnel,  while  the  third  group  seized  the  radar 
station  itself  The  fourth  group  consisted  of  the  RAF  radar  expert  and  the  RE  section.  The William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  280 
third  wave  was  to  provide  a  landward  blocking  force  and  reserve,  and  then  as  a  rearguard 
for  the  withdrawal  to  the  beach  pick-up  site.  To  complicate  matters  fin-ther,  the  operation 
had  to  be  launched  when  sufficient  moonlight  for  the  bombers  coincided  with  a  rising  tide 
for  the  evacuation  force.  This  narrowed  it  down  to  a  window  of  four  days,  24  to  27 
February  1942.  Adverse  weather  conditions  led  to  four  successive  cancellations,  but  the 
operation  was  finally  launched  a  day  late.  The  first  Whitley  took  off  for  Bruneval  at  10:  30 
on  the  night  of  27  February. 
In  the  event,  things  did  not  proceed  exactly  to  plan.  The  first  wave  was  dropped  over  a 
mile  short  of  the  correct  drop-zone,  the  villa  proved  to  be  unoccupied,  and  the  No.  38 
wireless  sets  Frost  was  relying  on  to  maintain  contact  with  his  outlying  units  failed  to 
function  . 
39  Ironically,  two  signallers  who  missed  the  pick-up  were  able  to  contact  Frost 
with  a  No.  18  set  in  mid-Channel,  to  report  their  intention  of  evading  and  escaping. 
Unfortunately  both  were  subsequently  captured.  40  In  addition,  the  alarm  was  raised 
almost  immediately  as  the  paratrooper's  descent  was  seen  by  a  variety  of  German 
observers,  and  by  coincidence  elements  of  the  local  German  garrison  were  on  exercise  in 
the  area  at  the  time.  41 
However,  Frost's  blocking  forces  succeeded  in  discouraging  the  German  garrison  until 
'the  RE  party  had  dismantled  the  apparatus  pointed  out  by  the  RAF  expert,.  and  then  moved 
it  under  fire  by  two  a  wheeled  trolley  to  the  beach,  along  with  three  German  prisoners 
captured  at  the  radar  station.  As  the  main  body  prepared  to  assault  the  unsubdued  German 
beach  defences,  the  misdropped  first  wave  took  them  in  the  rear  and  routed  them,  having 
navigated  across  country  to  reach  their  allotted  station.  The  extraction  force  of  assault 
landing  craft  located  Frost's  green  signal  flares  more  promptly  than  during  training 
exercises,  and  lifted  off  all  the  raiders  who  reached  the  beach,  the  German  apparatus  and 
the  prisoners  by  3:  30  on  the  morning  of  28  February  1942.  The  entire  operation  had 
therefore  been  successfully  carried  out  in  a  mere  five  hours,  for  a  cost  of  two  dead  and  six 
captured. 
, 
In  the  immediate  sense,  the  overwhelming  success  of  the  Bruneval  raid  was  due  largely  to 
simply  avoiding  the  errors  of  the  prior  effort  at  Tragino.  Detailed  and  up  to  date 
intelligence  on  the  target,  the  surrounding  area  and  the  German  defences  was  provided  by 
the  French  resistance,  and  the  presence  of  the  RAF  radar  expert  on  the  spot  greatly  aided 
the  choice  and  removal  of  relevant  parts  of  the  German  apparatus.  More  importantly, 
detailed  rehearsals  based  on  the  intelligence  and  technical  information  showed  that  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  281 
objective  was  attainable,  including  the  withdrawal  phase  that  was  neglected  at  Tragino, 
before  the  operation  was  launched. 
The  value  of  the  raid  proved  to  be  considerable.  The  mere  fact  that  a  parachute  force 
could  enter  and  leave  German  occupied  territory  virtually  at  will  was  a  useful  morale 
booster  in  itself,  particularly  as  it  came  after  a  series  of  British  defeats  including  the  loss  of 
Singapore  to  the  Japanese.  More  importantly,  however,  the  capture  of  the  Wz7rzburg 
components  allowed  the  formulation  of  counter-measures  to  aid  Bomber  Command  in  its 
night  bombing  offensive  against  Germany.  Specifically,  it  led  to  the  introduction  of 
,,  Window",  small  metal  foil  strips  that  showed  up  on  a  Wfimburg  screen  as  an  individual 
aircraft.  Jettisoning  bundles  of  Window  thus  totally  blinded  the  German  night-fighter, 
control  system,  a  technique  first  used  with  great  effect  on  a  raid  against  Hamburg  on  the 
night  of  24-25  July  1943.42  In  the  long  term  therefore,  the  actions  of  Frost's  Jock 
company  and  companions  at  Bruneval  proved  indirectly  to  be  of  strategic  importance,  and 
probably  saved  a  great  many  lives  in  RAF  Bomber  Command  into  the  bargain. 
Like  the  German  glider  assault  on  the  Eben  Emael  fortress  in  May  1940,  the  Bruneval 
raid  therefore  provides  a  clear  example  of  the  value  and  effectiveness  of  airborne 
operations  in  a  small-scale  context.  Both  operations  were  only  possible  from  the  air,  and 
both  achieved  results  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  forces  employed.  However,  small-scale 
airborne  operations  only  make  up  half  the  airborne  story,  and  the  less  spectacular  end  at 
that.  Consequently  we  must  now  examine  the  other  end  of  the  airborne  scale,  in  order  to 
ascertain  the  value  and  effectiveness  of  the  much  larger  divisional  and  multi-divisional 
airborne  operations  carried  out  during  the  Second  World  War.  Again  a  perceived  failure 
and  a  success  will  be  examined,  and  again  both  examples  will  be  British  operations. 
Operation  Market  Garden,  launched  in  September  1944,  provides  the  most  striking  and 
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oft  quoted  piece  of  evidence  against  the  value  and  efficacy  of  airborne  warfare.  Market, 
the  airborne  side  of  the  operation,  was  launched  on  Sunday  17  September  1944,  and 
remains  the  largest  and  most  ambitious  airborne  operation  ever  launched.  It  was  intended 
to  capitalise  on  the  German  defeat  in  Normandy  by  rapidly  advancing  on  a  narrow  front 
'into, 
Gerrnan  occupied  Holland,  before  swinging  east  into  northern  Germany,  thereby 
oppning  up  the  possibility  of  bringing  the  war  to  a  conclusion  by  the  end  of  1944.  The 
g  round  advance  by  the  British  XXX  Corps  was  to  be  preceded  by  a  sixty-mile  airborne 
spearhead  between  Belgian-Dutph  border  and  the  town  of  Arnhem,  the  purpose  of  which 
was  to  seize  and  hold  a  series  of  vital  water  crossings,  Particularly  those  at  Eindhoven., 
ýjjmegen  and  Arnhem  itself  Three  airborne  divisions  were  assigned  to  the  operation William  F  Buddrigham,  2000  Chapter  9  -28ýEý 
The  US  10  l"and  82"d  Airborne  Divisions  were  responsible  for  the  southern  and  central 
sections  of  the  corridor  respectively,  and  the  British  1  s'  Airborne  Division  was  given  the 
most  northerly  objective,  the  rail  and  road  bridges  at  Arnhem. 
The  US  divisions  succeeded  in  fulfilling  their  part  in  the  operation,  albeit  in  the  face  of 
stiff  German  resistance,  and  were  relieved  by  advancing  ground  forces,  although  the  latter 
had  to  assist  the  82nd  Airborne  in  seizing  the  main  bridge  at  Nijmegen.  Events  did  not 
unfurl  as  smoothly  at  Arnhem,  however.  The  Arnhem  rail  bridge  was  demolished  as 
elements  of  British  I"  Airborne  approached,  and  only  a  small  force  gathered  around  the 
bulk  of  John  Frost's  2"  Battalion,  The  Parachute  Regiment,  succeeded  in  reaching  the  road 
bridge,  where  they  were  eventually  overwhelmed  afler  three  days  of  heavy  fighting.  The 
bulk  of  I"  Airborne  sustained  heavy  losses  attempting  to  reach  Frost,  before  being  forced 
back  into  a  defensive  perimeter  at  Oosterbeek,  a  couple  of  miles  west  of  Arnhem  proper. 
There  the  remnants  of  the  division  attempted  to  maintain  a  presence  on  the  north  bank  of 
the  Neder  Rijn,  but  were  forced  to  evacuate  on  the  night  of  25-26  September  1944.44 
John  Terraine's  view  of  the  operation,  as  stated  in  his  history  RAF  operations  in  Europe, 
neatly  sums  up  subsequent  criticism  of  airborne  forces  and  of  airborne  warfare  with 
relation  to  Arnhem  and  in  a  more  general  sense: 
"We  return  here  [meaning  Arnhem]  to  the  bitter  lesson  of  D-Day  -  the  sheer 
wastefulness  of  the  airborne  style  of  warfare  ...  [and] 
...  the  waste  of  ifite 
troops.  "45 
if  the  losses  incurred  by  I"  Airborne  and  its  attached  units  are  used  as  the  yardstick,  this 
line  of  argument  appears  justified.  Of  the  11,920  men  delivered  to  Arnhem  by  parachute 
or  glider  1,485  were  killed,  6,525  were  taken  prisoner  or  evaded  capture  (including 
approximately  2,000  wounded),  and  3,910  were  successfully  evacuated.  Toputthisinto 
perspective,  I"  Airborne  casualties  were  double  the  combined  casualty  totals  for  both  the 
US  airborne  divisions  involved  in  Market  Garden,  who  themselves  participated  in  some 
extremely  heavy  fighting.  There  is  also  the  matter  of  casualties  suffered  by  the  RAF, 
which  lost  sixty-eight  aircrafl,  the  great  majority  on  resupply  missions,  along  with  368 
RAF  aircrew  and  79  Army  despatchers.  46 
However,  closer  analysis  of  events  at  Arnhem  shows  that  while  a  variety  of  factors  were 
responsible  the  debacle,  inherent  flaws  in  the  airborne  method  was  not  among  them. 
Again,  unrealistic  expectations  made  an  unwelcome  appearance.  The  back-to-front  British 
practice  of  giving  the  RAF  carle  blanche  in  the  selection  of  drop  and  landing  zones, William  F  Buddrigham,  2000  Chapter  9  283 
irrespective  of  the  views  or  needs  of  the  troops  they  were  delivering,  resulted  in  l' 
Airborne  being  dropped  a  minimum  of  seven  miles  west  of  their  objectives.  The  RAF 
justified  this  on  the  grounds  of  concern  over  possible  aircmft  losses  to  German  anti-aircraft 
fire,  which  also  ruled  out  coup-de-main  assaults  on  I"  Airborne's  objectives.  That  it  was 
able  to  take  this  responsibility  upon  itself  was  a  direct  result  of  the  political  horse  trading 
between  the  Air  Ministry  and  War  Office  in  the  period  1940-41  during  the  establishment 
and  initial  development  of  the  British  airborne  force. 
The  RAF  landing  zone  edict  removed  at  a  stroke  the  greatest  attribute  of  airborne  warfare, 
surprise,  although  in  fairness  it  has  to  be  said  that  aircraft  losses  in  the  first  lift  were 
ininimal.  Nonetheless,  as  the  primary  objective  of  Market  Garden  was  to  thrust  deep  into 
enemy  territory,  the  RAF's  behaviour  was  very  much  a  case  of  putting  the  cart  before  the 
horse,  and  arguably  amounted  to  little  more  than  sacrificing  airborne  lives  and 
achievement  of  the  mission  for  the  preservation  of  RAF  resources.  Incidentally,  neither 
was  unrealistic  expectation  confined  to  the  airborne  end  of  Market  Garden.  Efforsthere 
were  compounded  considerably  by  the  official  expectation  that  Is'Airborne  would  be 
relieved  by  advancing  ground  forces  within  forty-eight  hours,  a  somewhat  optimistic  view 
given  the  conditions  faced  by  the  ground  elements  to  say  the  least.  47 
All  this  was  beyond  the  control  of  I'  Airborne,  and  matters  were  compounded  further 
still  by  the  failure  of  the  division's  parent  formation,  I"Allied  Airborne  Army  0"  AAA), 
to  allocate  its  considerable  but  nonetheless  limited  resources  to  maximum  effect.  For 
reasons  that  have  yet  to  be  explained  General  Browning,  commander  of  P'  AAA  chose  to 
use  thirty-eight  gliders  to  fly  his  headquarters  into  the  US  82  nd  Airborne's  zone  in  the  first 
lift.  There  it  languished  without  contributing  anything  to  the  battle  it  could  not  have  done 
from  Britain.  Assigning  thirty-four  of  these  aircraft  to  I'  Airlanding  Brigade  would  have 
permitted  that  formation  to  arrive  at  Arnhem  in  its  entirety  on  the  first  day  of  the  operation, 
rather  than  over  two  lifIS.  4"  The  fact  that  I"  Airborne's  efforts  to  reach  its  objectives  were 
hamstrung  by  the  need  to  divide  its  strength  in  order  to  hold  its  far-flung  landing  zones 
illustrates  the  negative  impact  of  General  Browning's  decision. 
Add  to  this  the  fact  that  I"  Airborne's  new  commander  lacked  any  airborne  experience 
whatever,  that  the  bulk  of  the  division  exhibited  a  marked  lack  of  urgency  after  landing, 
and  that  intelligence  on  German  strength  in  the  Arnhem  area  was  withheld  from  the 
division  (again  for  reasons  that  have  yet  to  be  satisfactorily  explained),  it  is  hardly 
surprising  that  I"  Airborne  failed  to  achieve  its  objective.  The  wonder  is  that  it  achieved 
as  much  as  it  did,  given  that  it  managed  to  hold  out  against  elements  of  two  SS  Panzer William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  284 
divisions  for  nine  days,  rather  than  the  projected  forty-eight  hours  against  poorly  equipped 
Gemian  rear-echelon  troops  as  briefed. 
This  analysis  therefore  totally  refutes  the  criticisms  of  airborne  warfare  encapsulated  in 
the  quote  from  Terraine  cited  above.  It  is  doubtful  that  the  "airborne  style  of  warfare"  was 
any  more  costly  in  terms  of  men  and  material  than  high  tempo  mechanised  operations,  as 
typified  by  the  British  activity  in  Normandy  between  June  and  August  1944  for  example. 
Further,  any  "wastage  of  Ole  troops"  was  directly  attributable  to  high  level  British 
incompetence  rather  than  imaginary,  inherent  flaws  in  the  airborne  method.  With  specific 
regard  to  the  Arnhem  case,  the  present  author  firmly  believes  that,  contrary  to  much 
popular  opinion,  Market  Garden  could  have  achieved  its  immediate  objectives.  This  could 
only  have  been  possible,  however,  with  a  complete  reconfiguring  of  the  British  part  of  the 
scheme,  and  most  crucially  forcing  the  RAF  to  conform  to  the  needs  of  I'  Airborne  rather 
than  vice-versa.  A  force  of  approximately  company  strength  held  onto  the  north  end  of  the 
Arnhem  road  bridge  for  almost  three  days,  virtually  unsupported  and  in  the  face  of  elite 
Waffen  SS  troops  equippedwith  armour  and  heavy  fire  support.  The  ever-shrinking 
remnants  of  I"  Airborne  did  the  same  for  nine  days  at  Oosterbeek.  Imagine,  therefore, 
what  those  same  men  could  have  achieved  had  they  been  delivered  into  the  immediate  area 
of  the  Arnhem  bridges  in  brigade  strength  or  greater. 
This  is  of  course  conjecture,  but  conjecture  supported  by  the  final  piece  of  evidence  in 
support  of  the  view  that  the  airborne  method  was  both  valuable  and  effective.  Arnhem  was 
a  large-scale  operation  that  failed,  for  whatever  reason,  and  it  therefore  necessary  to 
examine  an  operation  on  a  similar  scale  that  succeeded.  For  this  it  is  necessary  to  look  no 
further  than  the  activities  of  the  I"  Airborne  Division's  sister  unit,  the  6h  Airborne 
Division,  on  the  night  of  5-6  June  1944. 
The  6h  Airborne  Division  was  entrusted  with  arguably  the  most  critical  mission 
connected  to  the  invasion  of  Europe  by  Allied  forces  on  6  June  1944,  that  of  securing  the 
eastern  flank  of  the  invasion  beachhead.  Before  examining  how  the  division  planned  and 
achieved  this,  it  is  necessary  to  provide  a  little  geographical  detail  about  the  area  in  which 
the  division  was  to  operate.  The  Caen  Canal  and  River  Orne  followed  a  parallel  course 
north  from  the  port  of  Caen,  which  lay  nine  miles  from  the  Channel  coast,  to  exit  at  the 
resort  town  of  Ouistreham.  Ouistreharn  also  marked  the  left  boundary  of  the  most  easterly 
invasion  beach,  codenamed  Sword.  Another  river,  the  Dives,  flowed  north  a  further  seven 
miles  east  of  the  Ome,  and  exited  into  the  English  Channel  through  the  town  of  Cabourg. 
The  area  between  the  Ome  and  Dives  contains  a  roughly  central  ridge  of  high  ground, William  F  Buddngham,  2000  Chapter  9  285 
again  running  on  a  north-south  axis,  and  a  large  wooded  area  called  the  Bois  de  Bavent.  In 
addition,  a  large  swathe  of  land  either  side  of  the  Dives  was  flooded. 
The  task  of  securing  the  eastern  flank  of  the  invasion  beachhead  was  far  more  complex 
than  merely  occupying  the  area  between  the  Rivers  Orne  and  the  Dives,  and  thus  included 
a  number  of  sub-missions.  First,  the  crossings  over  the  Orne  and  the  Caen  Canal  at 
B6nouville  had  to  be  seized  intact  and  held  so  60'Airbome  could  be  reinforced  by  the 
seaborne  forces,  and  for  future  use  as  a  breakout  route  from  the  invasion  beachhead.  A 
company  of  the  2""  Battalion,  The  Oxfordshire  and  Buckingham  Light  Infantry  (2  Ox  & 
Bucks)  under  Major  John  Howard  were  responsible  for  seizing  the  bridges  by  coup-de- 
main.  Howard's  men  were  to  be  delivered  by  six  gliders  as  close  as  possible  to  the 
bridges,  three  to  each.  They  were  to  be  reinforced  by  the  7h  Battalion,  The  Parachute 
Regiment,  which  was  to  parachute  in  thirty  minutes  after  the  glider  coup-de-main  . 
4"  Both 
units  were  to  come  under  command  of  5h  Parachute  Brigade,  commanded  by  Brigadier 
Nigel  Poett;  the  remainder  of  the  brigade  (I  2h  and  13'h  Battalions,  The  Parachute 
Regiment)  was  to  take  up  screening  positions  to  the  east.  Poett's  final  orders  from  Major- 
General  Richard  Gale,  6h  Airborne's  commander,  reflect  the  vital  importance  of  this  part 
of  the  division's  mission:  "The  whole  of  your  area  must  be  held.  Infantry  positions  will  be 
fought  to  the  last  round  and  anti-tank  guns  to  the  muzzle.  "50 
it  should  be  noted  that  Gale  was  a  highly  professional  officer  with  a  distinguished  record 
stretching  back  to  the  First  World  War,  and  was  not  given  to  histrionics.  His  order  to  Poett 
merely  reflected  the  fact  that  Howard's  coup-de-main  party  and  the  7"'  Battalion  was  the 
last  line  of  defence  between  a  German  counter-attack  and  the  invasion  beachhead.  The 
reference  to  anti-tank  guns  is  especially  significant.  The  nearest  German  armoured  unit  to 
the  invasion  beaches,  21'  Panzer  Division,  was  concentrated  south  of  Caen,  with  outlying 
units  located  on  the  western  and  south-eastern  edges  of  6h  Airborne's  area  of 
responsibility.  In  addition,  a  further  four  German  armoured  divisions  (2ndPanzer,  12th  SS 
Panzer,  Panzer  Lehr  and  II  60'Panzer)  were  located  east  and  south-east  of  Caen;  their 
most  direct  route  to  the  invasion  beaches  was  therefore  across  the  Ome  and  Caen  Cahal. 
The  location  of  these  German  mechanised  forces  explains  6h  Airborne's  second  major 
priority,  the  destruction  of  the  flve  bridges  over  the  Dives.  Responsibility  for  this  was 
given  to  the  units  whose  drop  zones  they  were  closest  to.  The  0  Canadian  Parachute 
battalion  was  responsible  for  the  two  most  northerly  bridges,  and  the  8dBattalion,  The 
Parachute  Regiment  for  the  three  southern  ones  at  Bures  and  Troarn.  The  latter  unit  was  to William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  286 
jump  with  the  3n'  Parachute  Brigade,  and  move  rapidly  east  from  that  formations  firm  base 
to  achieve  its  mission. 
6'h  Airborne  was  also  given  a  further  special  task,  the  elimination  of  a  fortified  German 
gun  battery  that  menaced  Sword  beach.  Located  at  Merville  in  the  north  of  the  divisional 
area,  the  battery  was  to  be  destroyed  by  the  9h  Battalion,  The  Parachute  Regiment, 
reinforced  with  sapper  and  anti-tank  elements.  The  attackwas  to  be  preceded  by  an  aerial 
bombardment  by  RAF  heavy  bombers,  and  three  Horsa  gliders  scheduled  to  land  atop  the 
battery  as  the  9t"  Battalion  made  its  assault.  As  a  fail-safe,  the  Royal  Navy  cruiser  HMS 
Arethusa  was  to  bombard  the  battery  afler  da%vn  unless  a  success  signal  was  received. 
Thus  6h  Airborne's  mission  was  both  complex  and  absolutely  crucial  to  the  success  of  the 
invasion.  The  Orne  and  Caen  Canal  bridges  at  Bdnouville  were  the  first  target,  and 
ljoward's  coul)-de-main  party  from  the  Ox  &  Bucks  were  the  first  invading  Allied  troops 
to  set  foot  in  Europe,  with  five  of  the  six  Horsa  gliders  landing  precisely  on  time  and  target 
at  00:  20,6  June  1944.  Both  bridges  were  seized  intact  from  their  German  defenders  within 
fifteen  minutes  of  landing.  The  71h  Battalion  reinforced  Howard's  men  by  03:  00  hours,  in 
spite  of  a  scattered  drop.  German  attacks,  some  including  tanks  and  armoured  cars,  began 
at  around  05:  00  and  continued  throughout  the  day.  Commando  troops  from  the  British  I' 
Special  Service  Brigade  reached  Bdnouville  just  after  midday,  but  were  funnelled  straight 
over  the  bridges  to  bolster  50'  Parachute  Brigade's  other  battalions,  which  were  hard 
pressed  by  German  counter-attacks.  At  one  point  a  large  German  aerial  bomb  struck  the 
Caen  Canal  bridge,  but  failed  to  detonate,  and  two  unsuspecting  German  coastal  craft 
moving  inland  down  the  Canal  were  engaged  with  small  arms  and  a  PIAT.  5'  One  was 
driven  aground  and  the  other  beat  a  hasty  retreat  the  way  it  had  come.  Leading  elements  of 
the  unit  scheduled  to  relieve  the  defenders  at  B6nouville,  the  British  P  Infantry  Division, 
linked  up  with  them  at  19:  00  hours  on  6  June,  and  a  full  relief  was  complete  by  01:  00 
hours  on  7  June. 
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The  various  battalions  charged  with  destroying  the  Dives  bridges  succeeded  in  carrying 
out  their  missions,  despite  scattered  drops  that  spread  some  of  their  elements  widely  across 
the  divisional  area  and  sometimes  beyond.  The  I"  Canadian  Parachute  Battalion 
encountered  less  dif'riculty  than  the  8h  Battalion  did  at  Bures  and  Troarn  to  the  south.  The 
RE  demolition  teams  attached  to  the  8"'  battalion  were  unable  to  reach  the  battalion 
rendezvous,  and  thus  proceeded  to  their  objectives  independently.  The  team  assigned  to 
the  road  and  rail  bridges  at  Bures  reached  their  target  at  the  same  time  as  the  lead  elements 
of  the  8h  Battalion,  and  successfully  carried  out  their  task-.  However,  German  defences  in William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  287 
the  outskirts  of  Troam  held  up  the  regular  paratroops,  so  the  RE  detachment  risked  a  high- 
speed  dash  with  its  single  Jeep  and  trailer  through  the  town.  This  reached  the  bridge, 
which  was  then  demolished  by  the  simple  expedient  of  unhitching  the  trailer  full  of 
demolition  charges  on  the  bridge,  under  fire,  and  abandoning  it  with  a  short  fuse.  The 
heavily  laden  Jeep  then  retraced  its  route  through  Troam,  picking  up  one  of  its  passengers 
who  had  fallen  from  the  vehicle  on  the  way  in  en  route,  and  linked  back  up  with  the  8' 
Battalion.  53 
However,  it  was  at  the  Mervi  I  le  Battery  that  things  went  most  awry.  The  9  th  Battalion 
dropped  at  00:  50  hours  on  6  June,  but  was  widely  scattered.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Terence 
otway  was  only  able  to  gather  one  hundred  and  fifty  of  his  men  from  an  expected  total  of 
around  seven  hundred,  and  the  missing  included  virtually  all  the  specialist  troops  and 
equipment  around  which  the  assault  had  been  meticulously  planned  and  rehearsed.  In 
addition,  the  RAF  heavy  bomber  raid  on  the  battery  had  failed  to  hit  the  target,  but  did 
rnanage  to  hit  the  90'  Battalion's  drop  zone  instead,  nearly  wiping  out  the  pathfinders  from 
22'  independent  Parachute  Company  as  they  were  marking  it  out  for  the  drop.  Otway 
pressed  ahead  with  the  mission  in  spite  of  this,  and  succeeded  in  overrunnin  the  battery  at  9 
a  cost  of  sixty-five  killed,  woundcd  and  missing  from  his  already  severely  depleted  force. 
The  four  guns  in  the  battery  were  put  out  of  action,  and  the  survivors  withdrew  with  twenty 
German  prisoners  before  liMS  Arethusa  was  scheduled  to  begin  its  bombardment.  54 
Thus  6"'  Airborne  achieved  all  of  its  disparate  initial  objectives,  thanks  to  a  combination 
of  airborne  esprit,  determination  and  sound  training,  along  with  some  old  fashioned  good 
luck.  The  task  of  Howard's  coup-de-main  party  was  eased  by  the  fact  that  the  Germans 
bad  for  some  reason  removed  their  demolition  charges  from  the  Caen  Canal  bridge  for 
storage  in  a  nearby  shed,  for  example.  That  said,  the  importance  of  luck  was  minimised  by 
an  abundance  of  the  three  former  attributes.  Otway's  assault  on  the  Merville  Battery 
arguably  provides  the  clearest  example,  but  the  performance  of  the  division  as  a  whole 
reflects  these  same  qualities.  The  7h  Battalion,  for  example,  was  badly  scattered  and  was 
only  able  to  muster  sixty  per  cent  of  its  strength,  but  still  managed  to  reinforce  the  Ox  and 
Bucks  coup-de-main  party  at  Bdnouville  as  scheduled,  and  the  Y"  Canadian  and  80' 
Battalions  also  succeeded  in  the  face  of  similar  handicaps.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that 
these  same  attributes  were  present  at  the  personal  level.  Individual  soldiers  were  rejoining 
their  units  throughout  6  June  and  afler,  having  navigated  their  own  way  through  the 
intervening  territory  and  fought  their  own  independent  actions  against  German  forces  in 
the  process.  This  not  only  says  a  great  deal  about  the  calibre  of  men  involved,  it  also 
justifies  the  frequently  criticised  concentration  of  such  manpower  in  airborne  formations, William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  288 
which  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  next  section.  Suffice  to  say  here  that  the  examples 
cited  above  show  that  large-scale  airborne  operations  are  invariably  high  value,  high  risk 
ventures,  and  to  entrust  such  operations  to  anything  less  than  the  best  personnel  available 
would  be  foolhardy  in  the  extreme. 
These  four  examples  tell  us  a  great  deal  about  the  value  and  effectiveness  of  airborne 
warfare  and  airborne  forces.  With  regard  to  the  former,  it  is  clear  that  the  additional 
capability  conferred  by  properly  configured  and  equipped  airborne  forces  is  extremely 
valuable  indeed.  None  of  the  operational  examples  cited  could  have  been  carried  out  by 
any  other  medium,  and  it  can  be  argued  in  the  case  of  the  Normandy  operation  that  the 
invasion  of  Europe  simply  could  not  have  gone  ahead  without  an  airborne  force  to  secure 
theflank  of  the  invasion  beachhead.  In  addition,  an  airborne  force  can  be  a  force 
multiplier,  in  the  sense  that  its  mere  existence  obliges  the  enemy  to  divert  resources  into 
guarding  against  the  possibility  of  airborne  attack.  In  the  aftermath  of  the  Tragino  raid,  for 
example,  the  Italians  assigned  more  troops  to  guarding  strategic  targetS,  55  and  the  British 
themselves  put  a  great  deal  of  effort  into  planning  and  preparing  for  a  German  airborne 
invasion  that  never  materialised  from  the  middle  of  June  1940  onward. 
,  of  course,  this  can  cut  both  ways.  One  reason  for  the  swift  German  reaction  against  the 
British  1'  Airborne  Division's  landings  at  Arnhem  was  the  fact  that  both  the  9h  and  10' 
SS  panzer  Divisions  had  been  originally  raised  for  operations  in  the  west,  and  had  trained 
extensively  in  anti-airbome  operations  before  the  Normandy  invasion.  56  None  the  less,  the 
threat  implicit  in  the  mere  existence  of  an  airborne  force  can  be  a  force  multiplier,  a  land 
warfare  equivalent  to  the  concept  of  a  fleet  in  being.  The  beneficial  effects  of  this  can  also 
extend  into  the  initial  stages  of  large  airborne  operations,  when  the  enemy  can  be  confused 
as  to  the  objective  of  the  operation  by  its  scale.  Probably  the  best  example  of  this  was  the 
reaction  of  the  21"Panzer  Division  to  the  60'Airbome  Division's  arrival  between  the 
Rivers  Orne  and  Dives  on  6  June  1944.  Part  of  21't  Panzer  was  located  west  of  the  Ome, 
and  thus  ideally  placed  for  a  counter-attack  against  Sword  beach.  However,  the  activities 
of  6h  Airborne  resulted  -in  the  bulk  of  21  st  Panzer  being  deployed  to  the  east  of  the  Ome 
and  thus  away  from  the  vulnerable  invasion  beach.  57  Ironically,  airborne  forces  being 
accidentally  scattered  during  delivery  heighten  this  diversionary  effect.  As  we  have  seen, 
elen-lents  of  6"'  Airborne  were  scattered  widely  across  the  division's  operational  area  and 
beyond,  which  encouraged  2  I't  Panzer's  incorrect  appreciation  of  the  situation  in  the  early 
hours  of  6  June.  The  effect  was  even  more  marked  at  the  western  end  of  the  invasion  area, 
where  the  US  82nd  and  10  I't  Airborne  Divisions  were  even  more  widely  scattered,  with 
sorne  troops  being  delivered  as  much  as  fifty  miles  from  their  intended  destination. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  289 
, With  regard  to  the  effectiveness,  the  analysis  of  the  so-called  airborne  failures  cited  above 
reveals  a  catalogue  of  ignorance  and  errors  that  would  have  hamstrung  any  military 
operation,  and  it  therefore  curious  that  such  episodes  are  routinely  trotted  out  as  evidence 
of  alleged  fatal  flaws  inherent  in  the  airborne  method.  To  draw  an  analogy  from  these 
examples,  it  is  frequently  overlooked  that  the  most  fundamental  reason  for  the  failure  of 
the  British  I'  Airborne  Division  at  Arnhem  was  the  failure  of  the  relieving  mechanised 
forces  to  arrive  within  their  scheduled  time  frame.  This  was  in  turn  largely  due  to  the  fact 
that  those  forces  were 
' 
operating  in  conditions  inimical  to  their  capabilities.  Specifically, 
tanks  were  being  asked  to  operate  along  elevated  roads  running  through  dead  flat  country 
that  offered  virtually  no  concealment,  and  in  which  they  were  likely  to  bog  down  if  they 
left  the  roads.  The  present  author  is  unaware  of  any  calls  for  mechanised  warfare  to  be 
abandoned  as  wasteful  and  impracticable  because  tanks  invariably  fail  to  succeed  when 
ob'liged  to  operate  in  totally  unsuitable  conditions.  Indeed,  according  to  the  same  logic 
frequently  used  to  criticise  airborne  warfare,  development  of  tank  should  have  been 
curtailed  after  the  tank  failed  to  live  up  to  expectations  twice  in  succession,  at  Bullecourt  in 
April  1917,  and  during  the  Third  Battle  of  Ypres  in  August  the  same  year. 
58 
r-31Y 
- 
The  point  is  that  airborne  operations  and  troops  are  no  different  to  their  ground-based 
equi  valents,  insofar  as  they  can  only  be  as  effective  as  the  people  controlling  them.  The 
airborne  option  is  not  a  magic  bullet,  and  the  troops  trained  for  such  operations  are  not 
supermen,  however  they  may  view  themselves.  That  said,  airborne  warfare  is  an  extremely 
effective,  not  to  say  potentially  vital,  adjunct  to  the  range  of  tactical  and  operational 
options  available  to  military  commanders,  again  providing  it  is  properly  used.  It  is  relevant 
in  this  regard  to  point  out  again  that  the  examples  cited  above  were  only  feasible  because 
of  the  option  of  deployment  from  the  air,  irrespective  of  how  vital  they  might  have  been  to 
the  success  of  concurrent  or  later  operations.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  fact  that  in  spite  of 
the  critics,  the  world's  major  armies  have  retained  a  significant  parachute  element  since 
1945.  The  French,  who  made  extensive  use  of  parachute  troops  in  their  colonial  wars  in 
the  1950s,  maintains  an  operational  airborne  division.  The  British  Army  currently  fields 
an  air  assault  brigade  configured  for  parachute  or  helicopter  delivery,  the  US  82  nd  Airborne 
Division  remains  the  US  Army's  rapid  reaction  force  and,  as  cited  at  the  beginning  of  this 
section,  the  Russian  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  also  maintains  a  substantial 
airborne  force. 
The  reason  for  all  this  is  simple.  No  one  has  Yet  come  up  with  a  better  method  of  getting 
battle-ready  troops  on  the  ground  at  short  notice  and  over  long  distances  than  the 
parachute.  In  addition,  airborne  units  have  a  relatively  small  logistical  tail,  and  are  thus Wifflarn  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  290 
trained,  equipped  and  configured  for  rapid  deployment  at  short  notice.  This  explains  the 
high  profile  of  airborne  units  in  military,  but  none-airbome,  operations  since  1945.  The 
1  73rd  Airborne  Brigade  and  10  1'  Airborne  Division  were  among  the  first  US  Army  units 
deployed  to  Vietnam  in  the  mid-  1  960s,  for  example,  and  the  Soviet  moves  into 
Czechoslovakia  and  Afghanistan  in  1967  and  1980  respectively  were  spearheaded  by 
airborne  troops.  Similarly,  two  battalions  of  The  Parachute  Regiment  were  among  the  first 
units  despatched  to  the  Falkland  Islands  in  1982,  the  82  nd  Airborne  Division  literally  was 
Operation  Desert  Shield  for  a  period  in  1990,  and  the  Parachute  Regiment  was  again  in  the 
forefront  of  recent  operations  in  Kosovo  and  Sierra  Leone.  Consequently,  despite 
recurring  claims  that  their  capabilities  and  indeed  existence  are  anachronistic,  airborne 
forces  look  set  to  retain  their  relevance  in  the  confused  military  climate  of  the  early  21  s' 
centurY. 
IV.  The  British  Airbome  Effott.,  Justified  Diversion  or  Merely  a  Waste  of 
Resources? 
. 
The  preceding  section  justifies  airborne  warfare  in  the  broad  sense,  and  the  maintenance 
of  the  specialist  forces  to  prosecute  it.  However,  whilst  many  of  the  arguments  contained 
therein  are  equally  applicable  to  the  British  case,  some  areas  require  more  specific 
exan-lination. 
Foremost  among  these  is  the  frequently  repeated  charge  that  airborne  forces  siphoned  off 
high  quality  Army  manpower  that  would  have  been  better  spread  around  more 
conventional  units.  Terraine  again  provides  a  convenient  pr6cis  of  this  argument: 
"Worst  of  all  the  'offenders'  [the  previous  paragraph  similarly  criticised  the 
Commando  force],  it  must  be  said,  were  the  Airborne  Forces,  with  their 
exacting  physical  and  psychological  requirements.  There  is  an  awful  irony  in 
the  spectacle  of  the  line  infantry  divisions  in  Normandy  struggling  to  perform 
their  ordinary  duties,  while  beside  them  the  6"'  Airborne 
...  consisting  entirely 
of  the  type  of  men  that  the  line  infantry  so  p1pably  lacked,  fought  as  line 
infanity  [original  emphasis]  for  82  days.  0 
Terraine's  line  of  argument  here  contains  a  number  of  glaring  flaws.  First,  he  puts  the  cart 
before  the  horse.  The  above  analysis  of  6h  Airborne's  initial  actions  in  Normandy  strongly 
suggests  that  personnel  of  a  lower  calibre  would  have  been  incapable  of  achieving  their 
individual  objectives,  with  the  likely  result  that  the  line  infantry  divisions  would  not  have 
been  in  Normandy  to  perform  their  "ordinary"  duties.  Put  simply,  the  reality  is  that  the 
rigour,  s  and  realities  airborne  training  and  operations  demand  above  average  human William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  291 
material.  Incidentally,  the  view  that  British  line  infantry  were  inferior  is  by  no  means 
universal,  not  least  amongst  men  who  served  in  that  capacity.  60 
Second,  the  fact  that  60'Airbome  remained  in  the  line  for  so  long  was  a  gross  misuse  of 
highly  trained  and  specialised  manpower,  rather  than  an  admission  that  any  infantry  unit 
was  capable  of  performing  airborne  operations  as  Terraine  implies.  The  US  82  nd  and  101s' 
Airborne  Divisions,  for  example,  were  withdrawn  from  Normandy  by  mid-July  1944.61  In 
this  instance,  the  British  profligacy  with  its  airborne  manpower  may  have  had  even  more 
serious  repercussions  later.  Both  US  divisions  were  able  to  participate  in  Market-Garden, 
where  their  recent  combat  experience  proved  invaluable,  whereas  the  British  had  no  option 
but  to  deploy  the  comparatively  inexperienced  I'  Airborne  Division. 
More  seriously,  however,  Terraine  is  blaming  the  British  airborne  force  for  much  deeper 
problems  in  the  British  system  of  selecting  and  training  its  military  manpower.  Recent 
research  by  David  French  shows  that  in  general,  the  British  Army  continued  to  value 
obedience  over  initiative  at  virtually  all  levels,  and  focused  its  training  and  selection 
procedures  accordingly.  62  Within  the  Home  Army  before  D-Day,  for  example,  there  was  a 
in,  arked  preference  toward  regular  officers,  not  because  they  were  necessarily  competent, 
but  because  their  superiors  lacked  any  more  realistic  method  of  assessing  their  competence 
and  thus  stuck  with  what  they  kneW.  63  Selection  of  the  Army's  rank  and  file  was  similarly 
handicapped.  The  War  Office  did  not  set  up  a  Directorate  of  Personnel  Selection  until  late 
1941;  and  centrally  administered  intelligence  and  aptitude  tests  did  not  come  into 
widespread  use  at  the  recruit  training  level  until  after  July  1942.64  Add  to  this  the  fact  that 
the  British  forces  per  se  were  becoming  overstretched  by  mid-  1943,  and  that  the  infantry 
enjoyed  the  lowest  priority  for  quality  manpower  of  all  arms  and  branches  of  the  service.  65 
It  is  therefore  clear  that  to  ascribe  the  British  infantry  arms  allegedly  less  than  stellar 
performance  after  D-Day  to  the  fact  that  the  best  potential  personnel  had  been  siphoned  off 
to  Inan  two  miniature  infantry  divisions  is  an  oversimplification  to  say  the  least.  Rather,  it 
provides  a  convenient  cover  for  the  far  deeper  and  fundamental  problems  that  were  really 
responsible. 
.  in  addition,  Terraine's  thesis  is  further  undermined  by  the  fact  that  the  practice  of 
'C  verting  existing  infantry  units  to  the  parachute  or  airlanding  role  en  masse  with 
'on 
exernptions 
for  only  the  physically  unfit,  became  increasingly  common  as  the  war  went  on. 
-r1he  re  is  also  the  fact  that  6"'  Airborne's  long  sojourn  in  the  line  in  Normandy  was  by  no 
nicans  uncommon  for  British  airborne  troops.  I"  Parachute  Brigade  held  the  line  in 
,  runisia  in  the  winter  of  1942-43,  and  its  parent  formation,  I  st  Airborne  Division,  operated William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  292 
in  the  infantry  role  in  the  invasion  of  southern  Italy  in  late  1943.  This  shows  that  the 
British  Army  got  plenty  of  non-airbome  use  out  of  its  airborne  force. 
However,  in  the  British  case,  the  real  red  herring  lies  not  in  the  claim  that  the  airborne 
force  misdirected  high  quality  Army  manpower,  but  that  it  diverted  resources  from  the 
RAF.  This  claim  supports  the  consistent  high-level  RAF  line  identified  in  this  thesis,  but 
unfortunately  it  simply  does  not  stand  up  to  critical  examination,  principally  because  it  is 
difficult  to  identify  any  such  diversion.  Admittedly,  the  RAF  did  form  a  dedicated 
transport  organisation  in  the  UK.  By  early  1944  this  consisted  of  No.  38  Group  and  No.  46 
Group  from  RAF  Transport  Command,  which  fielded  a  total  of  fifteen  squadrons,  each 
with  between  twenty-two  and  thirty  aircraft.  However,  this  was  not  the  substantial 
equipment  outlay  it  appears.  No.  46  Group's  five  squadrons  were  equipped  entirely  with 
US  produced  Douglas  C47  aircraft,  and  did  not  therefore  impinge  at  all  on  RAF  aircraft 
production.  The  same  is  largely  true  of  No.  38  Group.  Only  two  of  its  ten  squadrons  were 
equipped  with  first  line  aircraft  RAF  aircraft,  the  Handley  Page  Halifax.  The  remainder 
was  equipped  with  obsolete  Short  Stirling  heavy  and  Armstrong  %itworth  Albemarle 
friedium  bombers.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  this  force  was  not  set  aside  exclusively  for 
airborne  use.  No.  38  Group  was  also  responsible  for  dropping  agents  and  equipment  into 
occupied  Europe,  a  not  inconsiderable  effort  in  the  run  up  to  the  Normandy  invasion. 
,  The  Stirling's  poor  operational  performance  made  it  a  veritable  death-trap  for  night 
bc)lnbing  alongside  more  modem  types,  66  whilst  the  RAF  rejected  the  Albemarle  as 
67 
unsuitable  after  over  a  hundred  had  been  produced  . 
Consequently,  it  can  be  argued  that 
the  creation  of  this  transport  capability  provided  the  RAF  with  a  convenient  way  of 
rernoving  relatively  large  numbers  of  obsolete  aircraft  from  Bomber  Command's  order  of 
battle  to  make  way  for  more  modem  types  like  the  Avro  Lancaster.  It  may  also  be 
Significant  that  the  provision  of  aircrew  for  No.  38  and  No.  46  Groups  potentially  provided 
j3ornber  Command  with  a  useful  reserve  pool  of  trained  personnel.  This  casts  a  rather 
different  light  on  Terraine's  assertion  that  airborne  operations  diverted  scarce  RAF 
transport  resources  from  more  worthy  tasks  6"  not  least  because  it  can  be  argued  that  the 
RAF  only  possessed  a  European  transport  capability  because  of  the  British  airborne  force. 
,  rile  pitiful  dimensions  of  the  RAF  transport  force  in  the  UK  in  1940  are  amply  illustrated 
above,  and  there  is  no  obvious  evidence  that  the  Air  Ministry  intended  to  take  pay  the 
niatter  undue  attention. 
If  is  also  pertinent  to  point  out  that  despite  claims  to  the  contrary,  the  Air  Ministry 
successfully  maintained  its  original  policy  of  keeping  its  provision  for  the  airborne  force  to William  IF  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  293 
the  barest  possible  minimum.  Thus,  when  Churchill  attended  another  airborne 
demonstration  by  1"  Airborne  Division  at  Netheravon  on  16  April  1942,  Ringway  was  able 
to  muster  a  total  of  twelve  Whitleys  for  parachuting,  augmented  by  nine  Hawker  Hector 
biplane  glider  tugs.  69  This  not  only  prompted  Churchill  to  pressurise  the  Air  Staff  for  more 
aircraft, 
but  also  to  establish  a  dedicated  Airborne  Forces  Committee.  This  was  set  up  on  I 
N4ay  1942,  with  a  brief  to  "co-ordinate  arrangements  for  the  development,  production, 
supply,  transport  and  storage  of  all  equipment  for  airborne  forces,  and  to  secure  rapid 
decisions", 
70  with  direct  access  to  the  Prime  Minister  if  required. 
The  following  month  the  Parliamentary  Committee  on  National  Expenditure  held  its  own 
investigation  into  the  provision  of  aircraft  for  the  airborne  force,  and  recommended  that 
sixty  surplus  Armstrong  Whitworth  Albemarle  bombers  be  allocated  for  airborne  use 
inlinediately.  On  19  June  the  Air  Ministry  also  agreed  to  a  phased  transfer  of  eighty-six 
add  itional  Whitleys  to  No.  38  Wing.  In  effect,  the  latter  undertaking  meant  that  the  Air 
1,  Airlistry  had  finally  come  up  with  the  aircraft  it  had  promised  to  provide  two  years 
previously, 
in  June  1940.  Even  then,  this  development  proved  to  be  of  limited  utility,  for  it 
was  discovered  in  August  1942  that  the  Whitley'was  incapable  of  towing  a  fully-laden 
iFjorsa  glider  . 
71 
Admittedly,  the  matter  was  complicated  to  an  extent  by  Bomber  Command's  need  for 
obsolete  bombers  for  use  by  its  Operational  Training  Units.  Consequently,  "Bomber- 
][4arris  renewed  his  opposition  to  the  allocation  of  RAF  resources  to  the  airborne  force  in  a 
paper  on  12  September  1942.  In  this  he  reiterated  his  scepticism  regarding  the  utility  of 
airborne  troops,  and  claimed  that  provision  on  the  scale  advocated  by  the  War  Office 
would  cripple  Bomber  Command.  Churchill  was  thus  caught  between  the  conflicting 
n  eeds  of  two  of  his  pet  projects,  and  was  obliged  to  come  down  on  the  side  of  Bomber 
cornmand  on  18  November  1942.  The  matter  was  to  be  reviewed  in  June  1943,  and 
Cliurchill  held  out  the  prospect  of  obtaining  additional  transport  aircraft  from  the  US;  this 
][lope  did  come  to  fruition  with  the  formation  of  the  Douglas  C47  equipped  No.  46  Group 
in  early  1944.  In  the  meantime,  the  Air  Staff  attempted  to  restrict  the  size  of  the  airborne 
force  to  two  parachute  brigades  and  a  small  glider  force.  However,  Alan  Brooke  refused 
point-blank  to  break  up  I"  Airborne  Division,  and  Army  planning  for  finiher  airborne 
expansion  continued  as  cited  above. 
in  the  event,  it  was  the  arrival  of  large  numbers  of  US-produced  transport  aircraft,  both 
belonging  to  the  US  Army  and  provided  direct  to  the  RAF,  which  began  to  alleviate  the 
transport  shortfall  from  mid-1943.  Of  the  one  hundred  and  forty  four  aircraft  deployed  for William  F  E3uckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  294 
Is'  Airlanding  Brigade's  operation  near  Syracuse  in  July  1943,  for  example,  one  hundred 
72 
and  nine  belonged  to  the  USAAF.  In  May  1942  Churchill  had  obtained  a  promise  from 
Roosevelt  that  four  USAAF  transport  groups  would  be  despatched  to  the  UK  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  US  aircraft  continued  to  make  up  an  increasing  proportion  of  Allied  airborne 
transportation  through  to  the  end  of  the  war.  The  USAAF  IX  Troop  Carrier  Command,  for 
example,  not  only  carried  both  the  82  nd  and  101't  Airborne  Divisions  into  Holland  for 
operation  Market-Garden,  but  also  provided  the  lift  for  all  the  British  and  Polish  parachute 
elements  deployed  at  Arnhem.  73  The  USAAF  therefore  unwittingly  assisted  the  Air 
Ministry  in  minimising  its  commitment  to  the  airborne  force. 
s 
It  thus  remains  to  deliver  a  verdict  on  whether  that  effort  involved  in  establishing  an 
airborne  force  was  justified  from  a  British  perspective.  The  answer  to  that  question  has  to 
be  yes,  not  least  based  on  the  evidence  presented  above  to  justify  the  value  and 
effectiveness  of  airborne  forcesper  se.  All  these  factors  apply  at  least  equally  to  the 
][3ritish  example,  but  there  are  two  additional  factors  to  consider  in  the  specific  British 
context.  First,  the  creation  of  an  airborne  force  provided  the  Army  with  a  rapid 
deployment  capability  it  lacked  hitherto.  The  value  of  this  is  illustrated  by  the  activities  of 
tlle_  2"  Independent  Parachute  Brigade  Group  in  Greece  in  October  1944.  Originally  part 
of  I'  Airborne  Division,  2"d  Independent  had  remained  in  Italy  when  the  division  moved  to 
tlýe  UK  in  November  1943,  to  maintain  a  parachute  capability  in  the  Mediterranean.  Thus 
the  brigade  fought  as  conventional  infantry  in  Italy,  conducted  a  small-scale  parachute 
operation  in  May  1944,  and  participated  in  the  invasion  of  Southern  FI  rance.  74 
13y  October  1944  Axis  forces  were  withdrawing  from  Greece,  raising  the  serious 
possibility  of  a  take-over  of  the  country  by  Communist  partisans.  In  order  to  forestall  this, 
it  wýs  decided  to  use  2d  Independent  to  occupy  Athens.  A  company-size  spearhead 
jumped  in  dangerously  windy  conditions  on  12  October,  and  the  brigade  was  in  position  in 
Athens  by  15  October,  where  it  not  only  imposed  order  on  a  chaotic  situation,  but  also 
averted  a  humanitarian  disaster  by  guaranteeing  food  supplies  to  a  large  section  of  the 
population.  2d  Independent's  parachute  capability  proved  vital  here,  for  it  permitted  the 
entire  brigade  to  be  deployed  direct  from  the  heel  of  Italy  in  the  space  of  three  days.  In 
fact,  the  actual  drop  only  required  two  days,  but  had  to  be  spread  over  three  days  because 
of  bad  weather  on  13  October.  The  point  is  further  underlined  by  the  fact  that  sea-borne 
ilifantry  reinforcements  did  not  arrive  until  the  end  of  November.  75 
-  The  second  factor  to  consider  is  the  Army's  original  justification  for  establishing  an 
airborne  force  back  in  mid-1940.  This,  it  should  be  remembered,  was  to  provide  a VVilliam  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  295 
I spearhead  for  an  invasion  of  continental  Europe.  As  we  have  seen,  the  6  th  Airborne 
Division  performed  that  role  in  an  exemplary  manner  on  the  night  of  5-6  June  1944,  to  the 
extent  that  its  activities  provide  the  definitive  paradigm  for  the  prosecution  of  large-scale 
airborne  operations.  With  that  one  operation,  therefore,  the  British  airborne  balance  was 
paid  inTull. 
V.  Reflections 
One  of  the  most  striking  themes  to  emerge  from  this  examination  of  the  establishment  of 
a  British  airborne  force  is  the  role  played  by  luck.  The  case  of  Louis  Strange  provides  an 
excellent  example.  It  was  only  by  the  vagaries  of  the  RAF  postings  system  that  Strange 
became  involved  in  the  airborne  effort,  and  it  was  only  coincidence  that  placed  him  at 
Combined  Operations  HQ  at  precisely  the  right  moment  to  inherit  control  of  the  new 
airborne  venture.  It  would  also  appear  that  Strange  brought  his  own  luck  with  him.  This is 
well  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  he  was  able  not  only  to  locate  pre-war  stunt  parachutists 
like  Bruce  Williams,  Harry  Ward,  Bill  Hire  and  their  erstwhile  pilot  Earl  Fielden,  but  also 
to  recruit  them  to  Ringway. 
Strange's  somewhat  whimsical  arrival  onto  the  British  airborne  scene  highlights  a  finiher 
facet  of  airborne  luck,  that  of  having  the  right  man  in  the  right  place  at  the  right  time.  His 
direct  methods  undoubtedly  saved  a  great  deal  of  time  that  a  more  conventionally  minded 
O:  Crlcer  would  have  wasted  in  observing  bureaucratic  niceties.  This  applies  equally  to  a 
host  of  other  officers  from  both  services,  and  from  within  and  without  the  airborne 
Cornmunity. 
Those  from  the  RAF  included  Harvey,  Norman,  Buxton,  Hervey,  Newnharn 
a,  nd  Cole-Hamilton.  Their  contribution  may  have  been  more  circumspect  than  that  of 
Strange,  but  it  can  be  argued  that  working  within  the  system  ultimately  achieved  more  than 
trying  to  buck  it,  once  the  initial  establishment  had  been  made.  Their  contributions  should 
also  be  measured  against  the  fact  that  the  attitude  of  the  higher  RAF  echelons  to  the 
airborne 
idea  was  ambivalent  at  best. 
Luck  was  not  merely  confined  to  the  acquisition  of  personnel  for  service  at  Ringway. 
There  is  the  coincidental  establishment  of  the  Polish  parachute  force  in  Scotland,  and  the 
willin  , gness  of  the  Poles  to  share  their  research,  which  in  turn  enabled  the  British  to  cut 
many  corners  in  expanding  their  own  airborne  effort.  There  is  also  the  provision  of  US 
,  nen  and  machines  for  airborne  use,  and  not  merely  that  the  US  aircraft  manufacturing 
industry  had  sufficient  capacity  to  supply  its  own  needs  and  that  of  its  Ally.  There  was 
alsO*  the  appearance  of  the  US-built  Willy's  Jeep,  for  example.  Providing  the  airborne VVIIIiarn  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  296 
force  with  motorised  transport  had  been  a  priority  virtually  from  the  outset,  but  existing 
British-manufactured  light  vehicles  were  not  sufficiently  robust  and  proved  to  be  poorly 
configured  for  transport  by  glider  when  the  first  full-scale  mock  up  of  the  Horsa  appeared 
in  November  1941  . 
76  One  of  the  officers  invited  to  examine  the  mock-up  at  Ringway  was 
IjS  military  attach6  Lieutenant-Colonel  Tom  Wells,  who  arrived  in  one  of  the  first  Jeeps  to 
appear  in  the  UK.  An  impromptu  test,  using  the  assembled  high-ranking  officers  for 
labour,  showed  that  the  Jeep  fitted  perfectly  into  the  Horsa,  thereby  solving  the  airborne 
transport  probleM. 
77  The  airborne  establishment  was  complaining  about  the  non-arrival  of 
their  Jeeps  in  April  1942  '78 
but  by  early  1944  they  were  being  widely  employed  in  a 
variety  of  roles  by  lt  and  6h  Airborne  Divisions.  79  It  was  later  discovered  that  Jeeps  could 
ax,  and  four  were  delivered  by  parachute  to  SAS 
also  fit  into  the  bomb-bay  of  a  Halif 
troops  operating  behind  German  lines  in  France  after  D-Day.  80 
The  generally  favourable  Army  reaction  to  the  airborne  idea  eased  the  task  of  the  Army 
players  in  the  drama,  although  this  does  not  minimise  their  contribution  or  the  importance 
of  again  having  the  right  men  in  place.  Rock  was  instrumental  in  selling  his  vision  of  the 
airborne  idea  to  his  superiors  at  the  War  Office,  and  Browning  succeeded  him  in  this 
promotional  work.  Gale's  and  Down's  role  in  transforming  No.  2  Commando  into  I  st 
parachute  Brigade  has  not  received  the  recognition  it  merits,  and  all  these  players  were 
fortunate  to  enjoy  the  backing  of  Dill  and  his  successor  Alan  Brooke  at  the  top  of  the  War 
office  chain  of  command.  It  should  also  be  remembered  that  luck  could  and  did  run  in  the 
opposite 
direction,  and  not  just  in  connection  with  equipment  failures  such  as  that  which 
Icilled  Driver  Evans  and  a  succession  of  similarly  unfortunate  trainees.  John  Rock  died  in 
hospital  on  8  October  1942  from  multiple  injuries  sustained  in  a  Hotspur  crash  on  27 
September 
81  and  Nigel  Norman  was  killed  in  a  plane  crash  during  I't  Airborne  Division's 
n1o,  ve  to  North  Africa  in  mid-I  943.  Working  in  the  upper  echelons  of  the  airborne 
i.  nfrastructure  could  therefore  be  just  as  hazardous  as  participating  operationally. 
, rlle  ultimate  right  man  in  the  right  place  in  the  early  stages  of  British  airborne 
clevelopment  was  undoubtedly  Winston  Churchill.  Although  the  War  Office  began  to 
are  following  the  German  attacks  in  the  Low 
,  Xarnine  the  possibilities  of  airborne  warf, 
e 
countries  in  May  19409  it  was  Churchill's  order  that  elevated  the  creation  of  a  British 
airborne 
force  onto  the  official  Whitehall  agenda.  The  fact  that  Churchill  was  a  keen 
,  nilitary 
innovator,  and  had  theorised  on  airborne  matters  long  before  1940  guaranteed  his 
e 
or  the  project.  Incidentally,  the  establishment  of  an  airborne  force 
, atllusiastic  support  f 
shows  that  Churchill's  penchant  for  promoting  unconventional  projects  could  have  a 
positively 
beneficial  outcome  for  the  war  effort.  Churchill  possessed  incredible  stamina William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  297 
for  a  man  of  his  years,  which  was  channelled  into  a  high  degree  of  single-mindedness  and 
an  impressive  grasp  of  detail.  Unfortunately,  he  also  had  a  tendency  toward  micro- 
management,  was  frequently  distracted  by  trivia,  and  was  an  inveterate  meddler  in  military 
affairs. 
These  less  desirable  traits  were  simultaneously  beneficial  and  deleterious  to  the 
establishment  of  the  British  airborne  force.  They  meant  that  Churchill  monitored  the 
progress  of  his  pet  scheme,  and  was  quick  to  intervene  when  progress  failed  to  meet  his 
expectations.  This  is  precisely  what  happened  following  his  visits  to  Ringway  in  April 
1941  and  April  1942.  On  the  other  hand,  Churchill's  general  tendency  toward 
micromanagement  meant  that  his  attention  had  to  be  spread  wide  and  thin.  In  the  specific 
airborne  instance,  this  meant  that  he  did  not  monitor  progress  as  closely  as  was  necessary. 
This  in  tum  allowed  a  great  deal  of  scope  for  obstructionism  or  just  plain  misunderstanding 
in  the  periods  between  the  lack  of  airborne  progress  coming  to  his  attention. 
Luck  is  not  the  only  theme  to  emerge  from  this  study,  however.  It  is  also  interesting  to 
note  the  speed  and  degree  to  which  the  new  arm  was  incorporated  and  regularised  by  the 
two  services  involved,  despite  claims  by  participants  to  the  contrary.  With  regard  to  the 
RAF,  this  process  occurred  within  and  without  the  airborne  infrastructure  centred  on  RAF 
Ringway.  Regularisation  from  within  commenced  with  the  arrival  of  Harvey  in  September 
1940,  and  encompassed  the  subsequent  removal  of  Strange  and  his  more  recalcitrant 
acolytes  and  their  replacement  with  those  loyal  to  the  new  regime,  such  as  Newnham  and 
Kilkenny  as  detailed  in  Chapter  Seven  above.  The  course  of  events  shows  this  was  not 
necessarily  detrimental  to  the  airborne  project,  but  it  does  beg  the  question  of  how  much 
this  was  driven  by  a  desire  for  efficiency,  as  opposed  to  empire  building.  The  process  of 
absorbing  the  CLE  into  the  RAF  proper  can  be  seen  in  the  increasing  involvement  of 
outside  Commands  and  agencies  in  the  activity  at  Ringway,  and  the  parallel  reduction  of 
the  latter's  autonomy.  The  interest  shown  by  No.  70  Group  in  the  doings  of  its  new  charge 
after  inheriting  responsibility  from  No.  22  Group  in  January  1941  is  a  prime  example  of 
this  tendency. 
The  regularisation  of  the  Army  side  of  the  matter  went  much  further,  although  much  of  it, 
and  especially  the  more  deleterious  effects,  occurred  outside  the  time  frame  of  this  thesis. 
The  sidelining  of  Gale  in  favour  of  Browning  for  command  of  the  airborne  arm  clearly 
shows  that  political  acumen  and  connections  were  considered  more  desirable  than  mere 
operational  competence.  In  practical  terms,  Army  regularisation  began  with  the  decision  to 
expand  11  SAS  Battalion  into  a  parachute  brigade,  and  the  arrival  of  Gale  and  Down  to William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  298 
oversee  the  process.  The  freebooting  nature  of  the  original  parachute  raiders  may  well 
have  been  incompatible  with  more  conventionally  oriented  parachute  operations. 
However,  it  can  also  be  argued  that  the  insistence  that  parachuting  or  gliding  was  merely  a 
novel  way  of  getting  soldiers  to  the  battlefield  was  carried  too  far  in  appointing  British 
airborne  commanders. 
Browning's  decision  to  place  Major-General  Robert  "Roy"  Urquhart  in  command  of  I 
Airborne  in  January  1944  is  a  good  example  of  this  tendency.  The  appointment  was 
justified  on  the  grounds  that  Urquhart  was  "hot  from  the  battle',  having  commanded  a 
conventional  infantry  brigade  in  SiCily.  82  However,  unlike  Down  whom  he  replaced  or  his 
subordinate  brigadiers,  Urquhart  had  no  experience  in  commanding  airborne  troops  or  in 
airborne  operations.  The  appointment  was  therefore  curious,  given  that  there  was  no 
shortage  of  officers  with  both  qualifications  already  serving  within  I"  Airborne.  This  is 
not  to  suggest  that  airborne  command  is  a  black  art,  but  airborne  operations  do  require  a 
different  approach  from  more  conventional  ones,  not  least  because  of  their  high  intensity 
and  the  limited  support  available  to  airborne  formations.  British  command  appointments 
differed  significantly  from  US  practice,  where  even  general  officers  were  expected  to 
participate  in  the  same  rigorous  training  as  their  men.  The  fact  that  this  threw  up  talented 
airborne  commanders  such  as  "Jumping  Jim7'  Gavin  and  Matthew  Ridgeway  suggests  that 
there  was  little  wrong  with  the  US  system,  and  their  performance  also  suggests  that  they 
benefited  as  commanders  from  the  insight  this  provided.  This  contrast  further  highlights 
the  degree  to  which  the  British  airborne  force  remained  firmly  in  the  thrall  of  the  Army 
establishment. 
That  said,  attaining  parachute  or  glider  wings  did  not  automatically  guarantee  competence 
in  a  commander.  Major-General  George  "Hoppy"  Hopkinson  commanded  I'  Airborne 
Division  until  he  gained  the  dubious  distinction  of  being  the  only  British  airborne  general 
to  be  killed  during  the  war,  after  being  wounded  in  a  skirmish  with  retreating  Italian  troops 
near  Taranto  in  September  1943.  Hopkinson  is  eulogised  in  Dover's  "The  Sky  Generals", 
as  being  a  "...  man  who  lived  at  a  pace  faster  than  time  could  hold".  83  That  may  have  been, 
but  a  historian  of  the  Italian  campaign  provides  a  rather  different  opinion.  Speaking  of 
Hopkinson's  successful  lobbying  for  1"  Airlanding  Brigade's  night  operation  in  Sicily, 
Eric  Morris  claims  that: 
"in  truth,  Hopkinson  had  let  his  enthusiasm  override  his  common  sense.  He 
was  a  classic  example  of  a  commanding  officer  who  posed  a  greater  threat  to 
his  men  than  did  the  enemy;  there  is  no  place  in  the  modem  battlefield  for  the William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  299 
overgrown  boy  scout,  but  the  Second  World  War  is  littered  with  men  of  his 
inei.  84  ' 
The  fact  that  1  't  Airlanding  Brigade's  operation  to  seize  the  Ponte  Grande  bridge  near 
Syracuse  was  a  fiasco  '85  and  the  manner  in  which  Hopkinson  was  killed  suggest  that 
Morris  may  not  be  so  very  wide  of  the  mark. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  however,  the  most  salient  theme  in  the  establishment  of  a  British 
airborne  force  was  neither  lucký  nor  the  way  in  which  the  airborne  arm  and  infrastructure 
became  absorbed  into  the  respective  services,  but  the  often  skilfully  disguised 
intransigence  of  the  RAF.  It  would  be  convenient  to  regard  this  as  a  monolithic  example 
of  inter-service  rivalry,  but  unfortunately  the  evidence  does  not  support  such  a  contention. 
Indeed,  had  that  been  the  case  then  it  is  unlikely  that  the  airborne  project  would  have  got 
off  the  ground  literally  or  metaphorically,  for  RAF  personnel  played  a  crucial  role  in  that 
process.  In  fact,  the  RAF  attitude  toward  the  airborne  project  was  multi-faceted,  and 
ranged  from  deliberate  obstructionism,  through  institutional  hostility  carried  over  from  the 
RAF's  earliest  days  as  an  independent  service,  to  plain  bureaucratic  indifference  and 
incompetence. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  some  deliberate  obstructionism  occurred.  The  Air 
Ministry,  s  internal  reaction  to  Churchill's  original  parachute  directive  clearly  ran  deep,  and  im 
the  unremitting  hostility  of  Arthur  Harris  to  the  airborne  project  makes  it  highly  likely  that 
the  bombing  lobby  within  the  Air  Ministry  was  the  seat  of  it.  This  would  explain  why  it 
was  invariably  the  effect  upon  bomber  operations  and  bomber  production  that  were  cited 
as  evidence  for  curtailing  the  airborne  project,  rather  than  any  other  aspect  of  the  RAF's 
activities.  In  fairness,  it  has  to  be  acknowledged  that  this  was  not  motivated  by  hostility  to 
the  airborne  ideaper  se,  but  by  opposition  to  the  transfer  of  resources  away  from  the 
bombing  effort.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  these  fears  were  subsequently  justified  to 
some  extent,  although  ironically  not  because  of  the  airborne  effort.  Bomber  Command 
was  increasingly  directed  away  from  strategic  bombing  in  the  run  up  to  the  D-Day 
landings,  and  this  tendency  ultimately  resulted  in  heavy  bombers  being  co-opted  for  close- 
support  work  in  Normandy.  86 
More  widespread  was  the  intransigence  bred  by  inter-service  rivalry,  not  least  as  a  result 
of  the  difficult  circumstances  of  the  inter-war  period.  Old  habits  die  hard  even  in  wartime, 
and  the  RAF,  s  attitude  was  doubtless  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  it  carried  the  brunt  of  the 
war  between  Dunkirk  and  D-Day,  at  least  on  the  Home  Front.  Ironically,  the  third  source 
of  RAF  intransigence  was  equally  damaging  to  the  RAF  and  the  airborne  effort. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  300 
Bureaucratic  incompetence  and  indifference  were  probably  responsible  for  many  instances 
of  what  appear  to  be  deliberate  RAF  obstructionism.  The  discovery  of  the  serviceable 
Whitley  rotting  in  the  weather  whilst  the  CLE  struggled  to  keep  their  handful  of  worn-out 
aircraft  serviceable  is  a  case  in  point. 
Of  course,  these  traits  were  by  no  means  the  sole  preserve  of  the  RAF.  Some  within  the 
Army's  infantry  arm  doubtless  viewed  the  formation  of  the  airborne  force  as  a  needless 
diversion  of  effort  as  did  Bomber  Command:  inter-service  rivalry  was  a  two-way  process, 
and  the  Army's  bureaucracy  was  probably  no  more  efficient  than  that  of  the  RAF. 
Nonetheless,  the  most  crucial  problem  encountered  in  the  establishment  of  the  British 
airborne  force  lay  with  the  RAF.  This  was  the  RAF's  independent  status,  and  more 
specifically,  the  lack  of  proper  control  systems  to  limit  that  status.  The  fact  is  that  whilst 
Churchill  and  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  could  order  and  recommend,  there  was  no  machinery  to 
force  the  RAF  to  comply  at  any  level  and  pace  other  than  that  chosen  by  the  Air  Ministry. 
Churchill  himself  unwittingly  reinforced  this,  with  his  attempts  to  control  matters 
personally  despite  his  other  commitments,  and  by  his  seemingly  naYve  belief  that  issuing 
directives  automatically  guaranteed  compliance.  Appointing  someone  of  Amery's  calibre 
to  oversee  the  airborne  project  might  have  ameliorated  the  matter,  but  he  would  probably 
have  been  similarly  hamstrung  by  the  lack  of  enforcement  machinery. 
Achieving  Air  Ministry  compliance  was  thus  more  of  an  exercise  in  politics  than  military 
command,  and  it  had  two  major  side  effects.  First,  the  process  of  establishing  a  British 
airborne  force  took  far  longer  than  it  need  or  should  have.  To  claim  that  the  first  year  of 
the  airborne  effort  was  wasted  may  be  overstating  the  case,  but  the  fact  remains  that 
progress  in  that  period  was  shaped  by  efforts  to  circumvent  shortages  in  basic  equipment, 
rather  than  genuine  research  and  development  problems.  This  is  highlighted  by  the  fact 
that  over  a  full  brigade  of  parachutists  were  trained  in  less  time  than  it  had  previously  taken 
to  train  an  understrength  battalion,  once  a  modest  increase  in  resources  was  secured  after 
April  1941.  The  second  side  effect  was  that  the  horse-trading  to  gain  Air  Ministry 
compliance  left  the  RAF  with  too  much  power  over  the  operational  deployment  of  the 
airborne  force,  the  deleterious  results  of  which  we  have  seen  in  the  above  analysis  of 
events  at  Arnhem.  Consequently,  in  the  long  term  a  measure  intended  to  harmonise  inter- 
service  co-operation  actually  had  the  opposite  effect,  and  contributed  in  no  small  manner  to 
the  destruction  of  an  entire  division  and  the  failure  of  a  major  strategic  operation. William  F  Buckingham,  2000  Chapter  9  301 
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